

The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 1. The Communist Challenge

- [1] FMFPac *Historical Diary*, 1–31 Aug 50.
- [2] For a more detailed account of the organization of the NKPA and ROK forces, see v. I of this series, *The Pusan Perimeter*, ch. II.
- [3] US Dept of State, *Guide to the U. N. in Korea* (Washington, 1951).
- [4] Quoted from report of Chief of Staff, FECOM: LtGen Edward M. Almond (USA), *United Nations Military Operations in Korea, 29 June 1950–31 December 1951* (Carlisle Barracks, 1952), 10–11. (Hereafter, Almond, *UN Mil Ops*.)
- [5] Gen C. B. Cates ltr to authors, 7 Apr 54.
- [6] For the full story of the 1st ProvMarBrig, see *The Pusan Perimeter*, *op. cit.*
- [7] Col Edward S. Forney *Transcript of Special Report*, n. d., Part II.
- [8] In the autumn of 1946 a TTU team of 35 Marine officers and 40 enlisted men had been sent to Yokosuka, Japan, at MacArthur's request, to train Army troops in amphibious techniques.
- [9] Joint Landing Force Board, Project No. 13–52, Annex Able, 28–30; see also FMFPac, *Historical Outline of the Development of FMFPac 1941–1950* (Preliminary), 15–16 (hereafter, *FMFPac History*); and Maj Gen W. S. Fellers memo to authors, 16 Feb 55.
- [10] Capt E. P. Stamford interv with HistDiv HQMC, 16 Mar 51.
- [11] *Ibid.* The amphibious functions of the Marine Corps, as outlined by National Security Act of 1947 and the Key West Conference of 1948, are discussed in the following chapter.
- [12] ComPhibGru–1 (CTF 90), “Rpt of Ops for 25 Jun 50 to 1 Jan 51,” in CinCPacFlt, *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, v. XV, Annex Able Able. (Hereafter, *PacFlt Interim Rpt No. 1*, XV:Able Able. For detailed description and location of major reports, see the bibliography.)
- [13] LtGen Edward M. Almond (USA, Ret.) ltr to authors, 10 Feb 55; Col Edward S. Forney interv, 7 Dec 54. (Unless otherwise noted, all interviews were conducted by the authors of this work.)
- [14] Forney interv, 7 Dec 54.
- [15] *Ibid.*
- [16] USMA, Dept of Mil Art and Engr, *Operations in Korea* (West Point, 1953).
- [17] CG FMFPac *Report of Liaison Visit to the Far East*, 10–11 Jul 50.
- [18] Several of these encounters are realistically described from firsthand interviews in a study sponsored by the Chief of Military History, USA: Capt R. A. Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington, 1954), 3–19.
- [19] USMA, *op. cit.*, 7–8.
- [20] *Ibid.*
- [21] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50.
- [22] USMC MarCorps Board, *An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War* (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), v. I, 1–B–1. (Hereafter, *MarCorps Board Study*.)
- [23] For statistics on Reserve mobilization, see Ernest H. Giusti, *The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict*. (HistBr, G–3 HQMC, 1952). (Hereafter, *Giusti*.)
- [24] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50.
- [25] For a detailed discussion of this subject, see US Dept of State, Office of the Solicitor, *Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces*, 3d rev. ed. with sup. app. to 1933 (Washington, 1934). (State Dept Pub. No. 538.)
- [26] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50.

[27] *Ibid.*


[28] PacFlt *Interim Rpt No. 1*, XV:Able Able.

[29] *Ibid.*

The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 2. The Minute Men of 1950

- [1] PacFlt *Interim Rpt No. 1*, XV:Zebra. Estimates of Brigade numbers will be found to vary according to different stages of the build-up.
- [2] *Ibid.*; see also XV:Charlie Charlie.
- [3] CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 12 Jul 50.
- [4] CG FMFPac disp to CG 1st MarDiv, 14 July 50.
- [5] CG FMFPac disp to CMC, 15 Jul 50; CG FMFPac ltr to CMC, 16 Jul 50.
- [6] PacFlt *Interim Rpt No. 1*, XV:Zebra, 3–5.
- [7] *Ibid.*
- [8] Giusti, I–2.
- [9] *Ibid.*, 1–5, 6.
- [10] *Ibid.*, II–2.
- [11] CG FMFPac memo to CinCPacFlt, 20 Jul 50.
- [12] MajGen Oliver P. Smith, *Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division during the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951* (MS), 3–4. (Hereafter, O. P. Smith, *Notes*.) Among the most valuable sources of the present book are the *Chronicle of the Operations of the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951* (MS), (hereafter, O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*), and *Notes* prepared in typescript by the commanding general of the division. The *Chronicle* is a day-by-day account of planning, command decisions, and resulting events, while the *Notes* are an analytical review of the relative facts, statistics, and directives. Combining accuracy with a keen sense of historical values, the Marine general by his knowledge of shorthand was able to keep a fairly complete record in the field which he later checked with official reports.
- [13] Giusti, II–2.
- [14] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 5–6.
- [15] Giusti, III–2, 7.
- [16] Andrew Geer, *The New Breed* (New York, 1952), 103–105.
- [17] Giusti, III–2.
- [18] Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky* (New York, 1954), 51–53.
- [19] O.P. Smith, *Notes*, 18, 41.
- [20] *Ibid.*, 16–17.
- [21] PacFlt *Interim Rpt No. 1*, XV:Zebra, 8–9.
- [22] *Ibid.*; Col A. L. Bowser ltr to CMC, 11 Feb 55.
- [23] PacFlt *Interim Rpt No. 1*, XV:Zebra, 18–22.
- [24] 1st MarDiv *Embarkation Plan 1–50*, 6 Aug 50, Annex Charlie.
- [25] PacFlt *Interim Rpt No. 1*, XV:Zebra, 12.
- [26] 1st Marine Division *Special Action Report for the Inchon-Seoul Operation*, 20 Apr 51, sec. 1. (Hereafter, 1st MarDiv SAR.)
- [27] FMFPac *Operation Order (Opn O) 3–50*, 11 Aug 50.
- [28] See Appendix B for the build-up of the 1st Marine Division and Appendix C for the Task Organization.
- [29] This account of the build-up of the 7th Marines is based on the summary in PacFlt *Interim Rpt No. 1*, XV:Zebra, pt. V.
- [30] O. P. Smith, *Notes*. 36–37.
- [31] CinCFE disp to CinCPacFlt, 7 Aug 50, info CNO, CMC, CG 1st MarDiv, CG FMFPac, and ComNavFE.

[32] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 37–38.



The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 3. Operation Plan CHROMITE

- [1] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 22 Aug 50.
- [2] This section is based upon: O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 45–51, *Chronicle*, 22 Aug 50, and interv, 13 Jan 55.
- [3] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 23 Aug 50.
- [4] JANIS No. 75, ch. IV, *Theater Study, Korean Coast and Beaches*.
- [5] A spring tide is a higher than normal tide caused by the sun and moon being in conjunction or opposition, as at new moon and full moon. Conversely, when the moon is at first or third quarter the tide (neap tide) is smaller than usual.
- [6] JANIS No. 75, ch. V.
- [7] OCMH, Dept of Army (Maj J. F. Schnabel), *The Korean Conflict* (MS), v. I, ch. I.
- [8] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 23 Aug 50, *Notes*, 51–52. A *myon* is comparable to our county, being a Korean political subdivision containing several towns or villages.
- [9] MacArthur Hearings, 1295, quoted by Major Schnabel in *The Korean Conflict* (MS), v. I, ch. I.
- [10] The description of the conference has been derived from: LCdr Frank A. Manson (USN) interv, 22 Apr 52; Capt Walter Karig (USNR), *et al.*, *Battle Report: The War in Korea* (New York, 1952), 165–168 (hereafter, Karig, *Korea*); VAdm Arthur D. Struble ltr to authors, 25 Apr 55.
- [11] Karig, *Korea*, 165–168.
- [12] CTF 90 *Opn O 13–50*, in *PacFlt Interim Rpt No. 1*, XV:Able, 6.
- [13] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 24 Aug 50.
- [14] BrigGen Eli K. Cole, “Joint Overseas Operation,” *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 55, No. 11 (Nov 29):927.
- [15] J. A. Isely and P. A. Crowl, *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War* (Princeton, 1951), 21–24, 33–34.
- [16] FMFPac, *History*, 6–9.
- [17] MajGen J. F. C. Fuller, *The Second World War* (London, 1948), 207.
- [18] 61 *U.S. Stat. at L.* (1947), 495.
- [19] OAFIE, OSD, *The United States Marine Corps* (Washington, 1950). (Armed Forces Talk No. 317.)

The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 4. The Planning Phase


- [1] The battalion commander, Colonel Reynolds H. Hayden, had a deputy because of the administrative set-up within the Sixth Fleet and did not accompany the unit to the Far East.
- [2] This description is based upon: Col F. R. Dowsett interv, 2 Nov 54.
- [3] Giusti, II-5.
- [4] PacFlt *Interim Rpt No. I*, XV:Zebra, 15.
- [5] *Ibid.*, XV:Charlie Charlie, 4.
- [6] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 54-55.
- [7] 1st MarDiv SAR, basic rpt.
- [8] Struble ltr. 25 Apr 55.
- [9] MarCorps Board *Study*, v. II-B, 13-17.
- [10] MarCorps Board *Study*, v. II, app. 67.
- [11] *Ibid.*, v. I, III-B-8, and v. II, app. 16; O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 48-49.
- [12] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 50.
- [13] This account of G-2 planning for Inchon is based upon 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Baker.
- [14] See Appendix I for the Order of Battle of the units which opposed the 1st Marine Division throughout the Inchon-Seoul operation, listing them in chronological order as to area of employment, strength, and effectiveness.
- [15] This account is based upon: Capt James B. Soper interv, 16 Aug 54; and Karig, *Korea*, 176-191.
- [16] See Appendix G for a chronological list of all 1st Marine Division operation orders during the Inchon-Seoul operation.
- [17] This summary of Landing Force planning is based upon: 1st MarDiv SAR, basic rpt; MarCorps Board *Study*, v. I, II-B, 13-16; O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 58-62; PacFlt *Interim Rpt No. I*, XV: Able Able, 6-7.
- [18] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 74-80, *Chronicle*, 31 Aug-3 Sep 50; Forney *Special Rpt*, II, 4.
- [19] See Appendix E for Naval Task Organization giving components, ships, and commanders of JTF-7.
- [20] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 72-74.
- [21] This summary of naval gunfire planning is derived from: ComPhibGru One *OpnO 14-50*, Annex George, app. II, III.
- [22] 1st MAW SAR, basic rpt and Annex Able; PacFlt *Interim Rpt No. I*, XV:Charlie Charlie, 4-5.


| | With the 1st Prov Mar Brig in Korea | Aboard USS <i>Mount McKinley</i> in Tokyo | En route by sea to Japan | Total |
|------------------------------|--|---|--------------------------------|------------|
| Div Cdr Section | | 2 | | 2 |
| Asst Div Cdr Section | 2 | | | 2 |
| Chief of Staff Section | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| General Staff Section: | | | | |
| G-1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| G-2 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 11 |
| G-3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| G-4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| Special Staff Section: | | | | |
| Adjutant | 4 | | 7 | 11 |
| Air & Air Observers | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 |
| Amph Trac | ^a 1 | ^a 1 | | 2 |
| Anti-Tank | ^b 1 | | 1 | 1 |
| Armored Amtracs | | | ^a 1 | 1 |
| Artillery | ^a 1 | ^a 1 | ^a 1 | 3 |
| Chaplains | ^b 1 | | 1 | 1 |
| Chem War & Radiol Def | | | 1 | 1 |
| Dental | ^b 1 | | 1 | 1 |
| Embarkation | ^b 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Engineer | | ^a 1 | | 1 |
| Food Director | | | 1 | 1 |
| Hq Comdt | ^a 1 | | ^a 2 | 3 |
| Inspector | | | 2 | 2 |
| Legal | ^b 1 | | 1 | 1 |
| Liaison | 3 | | | 3 |
| Medical | 2 | | 1 | 3 |
| Mtr Trans | 1 | 1 | | 2 |
| Nav Gunfire | | 1 | | 1 |
| Ordnance | ^b 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| Post Ex | | | ^a 1 | 1 |
| Pub Info | ^b 1 | | 1 | 1 |
| Prov Marshal | | | ^a 1 | 1 |
| Shore Party | | ^a 1 | | 1 |
| Signal | 6 | 2 | | 8 |
| Spec Serv | ^b 1 | | 3 | 3 |
| Sup & Disb | ^b 2 | | 9 | 9 |
| Tank | ^b 1 | | ^a 1 | 1 |
| Total | 33 | 23 | 51 | 107 |

^a Carried in other Brigade, Division, or Force units.

^b Additional duty basis; not counted in total.⁶

⁶ O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 54-55.







The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 5. Embarkation and Assault


- [1] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Charlie.
- [2] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 82. See v. I of this series for a detailed account of the Brigade in the second battle of the Naktong and the embarkation from Pusan.
- [3] 1st MarDiv, “1st KMC Regiment and its relationship to the 1st Marine Division,” (Type “C” Rpt) 1–2.
- [4] As a time-saving measure, it was decided to combat-load only the assault elements, allowing the other elements to go as organization loads. This was considered an acceptable risk in view of the enemy’s lack of effective air and submarine forces.
- [5] 1st MarDiv SAR, sec. 1, and Annexes Dog and Jig; O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 101, 104, 107, 110–112.
- [6] See Appendix D for a list of supplies and equipment to be embarked in assigned shipping, as prescribed by 1st MarDiv Embarkation Order 1–50 of 31 Aug 50.
- [7] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Baker.
- [8] Col E. H. Forney, *Special Report*, 5–7.
- [9] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 92–95.
- [10] *Ibid.* Colonel Ely actually did embark with his Special Operations Company and make the approach, but the landing was called off because of his last-minute decision that too great a distance had to be covered in rubber boats.
- [11] *Ibid.* It later developed that the 32d Infantry, first regiment of the 7th Infantry Division ashore, did not land until D-plus 3.
- [12] See Appendix D.
- [13] 1st MarDiv SAR, sec. 1, and Annex Jig; O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 102, 117–119.
- [14] ComPhibGru-1; *OpOrder 14–50*, Annex Dog.
- [15] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 127–129.
- [16] Karig, *Korea*, 197.
- [17] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 127–129.
- [18] *Ibid.*
- [19] Lynn Montross. “Fleet Marine Force Korea,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 37, no. 9 (Aug 53): 836–838.
- [20] ComAirSupGrp and ComCarDiv 15 *Report of Operations 6–21 Sep 50*; 1st MAW SAR, Annex Item:Baker, 4.
- [21] 1st MarDiv *OpOrder 2–50*; Karig, *Korea*, 213.
- [22] 1st MarDiv SAR, sec. I; 1st MarDiv *C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50*; O. P. Smith, *Notes*.
- [23] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen; and O. P. Smith, *Notes*.
- [24] The following narrative is derived from 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Queen Queen and Oboe Oboe; 1st MAW SAR; 1st MarDiv *C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50*; Taplett interv, 25 Aug 54; Maj R. A. McMullen interv, 27 Jul 54; Capt J. D. Counselman memo to authors, 10 Mar 55; and MSgt E. L. Knox memo to authors, 10 Jan 55.
- [25] LtGen E. A. Craig memo to authors, 12 Jan 55.

Movement to the Objective Area

Command relationships during the assault and embarkation phase were as follows:







The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 6. Hitting the Beaches

- [1] LtGen O. P. Smith memo to authors, 28 Feb 55.
- [2] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [3] *Ibid.*, Annex Peter Peter.
- [4] *Ibid.*; and Col T. L. Ridge ltr to authors, 11 May 55.
- [5] 1st MarDiv *OpnO 2-50*; and 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter.
- [6] Taplett interv, 25 Aug 54.
- [7] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 152.
- [8] *Ibid.*; ComPhibGru-1 *OpnO 14-50*; and LCdr R. W. Berry ltr to authors, 17 Mar 55.
- [9] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter.
- [10] ComPhibGru-1 *OpnO 14-50*, Annex Item; I.
- [11] *Ibid.*, VII; Cdr C. E. Allmon, USN, ltr to authors, 9 Mar 55; LCdr T. B. Clark, USN, ltr to authors, 11 Mar 55; and LCdr R. H. Schneeloch, USN, ltr to authors, 20 Mar 55.
- [12] ComPhibGru-1 *OpnO 14-50*, Annex Item:VI.
- [13] *Ibid.*, Annex George: II; and Schneeloch ltr, 20 Mar 55.
- [14] 1st MAW SAR, basic rpt; and LtGen (Ret) T. J. Cushman interv, 26 Jul 54.
- [15] The RED Beach narrative, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: 1st Mar Div SAR, Annex Queen Queen; LtCol M. R. Olson interv, 29 Dec 54; Lt Col H. S. Roise intrev, 21 Dec 54; Maj J. R. Stevens interv, 1 Aug 54; Capt E. A. Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55; Capt G. C. McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; and 1stLt F. W. Muetzel interv, 6 Jan 54.
- [16] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Item:Baker; and 1stLt (Ret) F. W. Muetzel ltr to CMC, 11 Apr 54.
- [17] Capt F. F. Eubanks, Jr., ltr to CMC, 2 Jun 55.
- [18] Maj J. R. Stevens ltr to authors, 29 Mar 55.
- [19] Schneeloch ltr, 20 Mar 55.
- [20] Col G. R. Newton ltr to CMC, 8 Apr 55.
- [21] Capt P. F. Pedersen memo to CMC, 1 May 55.
- [22] Under the over-all command of LCdr James C. Wilson, who flew his broad pennant in LST 859, the eight ships were: 859 (Lt L. Tinsley); 883 (Lt C. M. Miller); 914 (Lt R. L. Holzhaus); 973 (Lt R. I. Trapp); 898 (Lt R. M. Beckley); 975 (Lt A. W. Harer); 857 (Lt D. Weidemeyer); and 799 (Lt T. E. Houston).
- [23] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; LtGen (Ret) E. A. Craig ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 55; LCdr R. I. Trapp, USN, ltr to CMC, 18 Mar 55; and Lt (Ret) R. L. Holzhaus, USN, ltr to CMC, 14 Mar 55.
- [24] LtCol H. S. Roise ltr to authors, 23 Mar 55.
- [25] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; and Maj F. I. Fenton, Jr., ltr to authors, 21 Mar 55.
- [26] *Ibid.*; Newton ltr, 8 Apr 55; and Capt B. L. Magness ltr to CMC, 29 Mar 55.
- [27] *Ibid.*
- [28] The following narrative is derived from: 1st Mar Div SAR, Annex Queen Queen; Roise interv, 21 Dec 54; Roise ltr, 23 Mar 55; McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; and Magness ltr, 29 Mar 55.
- [29] The preliminary to the landing account is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; Col R. W. Rickert memo to authors, 15 Apr 55; ltr, 11 May 55; Col A. Sutter and Maj G. S. Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; Col A. Sutter memo to authors, 5 May 55; and Maj E. H. Simmons ltr to CMC, 28 Mar 55.
- [30] Clark ltr, 11 Mar 55.
- [31] Unless otherwise cited, the remainder of this section is derived from: ComPhibGru-1 *Opno 14-50*, Item, V-

VI; 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; 2/1 SAR and *OpPlan 1-50*; Sutter—Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and Capt B. F. Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.

[32] Simmons ltr, 28 Mar 55.

[33] Unless otherwise cited, this section is derived from: ComPhibGru-1 *OpnO 14-50*, Item, V-VI; 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Peter Peter and Tare Tare; LtCol R. R. Myers interv, 1 Feb 55; LtCol J. D. Trompeter interv, 31 Jan 55; Maj D. W. Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; Maj W. L. Bates interv with MarCorps HistDiv, 27 Aug 51; Capt J. G. Costigan interv, 17 Nov 54; Capts R. W. Crowley and N. L. Adams II interv, 9 Feb 55.

[34] Maj G. C. Westover memo to CMC, 21 Apr 55.

[35] Rickert memo, 15 Apr 55. "Study of aerial photos of BLUE Beach prior to departing Kobe, Japan, convinced CO, 1st Marines, that aluminum scaling ladders might not suffice for the sea wall. Consequently, the assault companies were provided with debarkation nets, 3' steel picket pins, and sledges with which to anchor the nets on the reverse slope of the sea wall. The nets proved very valuable, not only with regard to getting personnel ashore but particularly in landing crew-served weapons, ammo, and equipment."

[36] Westover memo, 21 Apr 55.

[37] MajGen L. B. Puller ltr to authors, 11 May 55.

[38] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Tare Tare, 4.


[39] Clark ltr, 11 Mar 55.


[40] Capt J. L. Carter ltr to CMC, 12 Apr 55.

[41] The following account of 1/1 is derived from: Rickert, memo 15 Apr 55; LtCol J. Hawkins ltr, 8 Mar 55; Bates interv, 27 Aug. 51; Bridges interv, 18 Oct. 54, and memo to CMC, 31 Mar 55; Maj R. H. Barrow memo to CMC, 25 Apr 55; and Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 23 Apr 55.

[42] Ridge ltr, 11 May 55.

[43] Sutter memo, May 55.





The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 7. Securing the Beachhead

- [1] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Dog.
- [2] LCdr R. Schneelock, Jr., USN, memo to authors, 20 Apr 55.
- [3] Karig, *Korea*, 236–241.
- [4] MSgt B. W. Gifford interv, 17 Nov 54; Col G. R. Newton memo to authors, 16 Apr 55; LCdr D. Weidemeyer memo to authors, 12 Apr 55.
- [5] LCdr T. E. Houston ltr to authors, 8 Mar 55.
- [6] SSgt H. M. Grenell interv, 15 Nov 54.
- [7] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Mike Mike; Costigan interv, 17 Nov 54; K. W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea” in *Marine Corps Gazette*, 37, no. 1:48–55 (Jan 53).
- [8] Capt E. R. Hering, (MC) USN, memo to authors, 4 Apr 55; 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex How How; Lynn Montross, “They Make Men Whole Again,” in *Marine Corps Gazette*, 36, no. 12:42–49 (Dec 52).
- [9] The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, was attached to RCT–7 and had not yet landed at Inchon.
- [10] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Sugar Sugar.
- [11] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Oboe Oboe.
- [12] Muetzel interv, 6 Jan 55.
- [13] 1st MarDiv *OpOrders 2–50* and *3–50*; O. P. Smith *Notes*, 346.
- [14] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Jig, VMF–214 rpt, 4.
- [15] *Ibid.*; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
- [16] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Jig, VMF–214 rpt, 4.
- [17] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen.
- [18] *Ibid.*
- [19] *Ibid.*; 2/1 SAR, 4; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54; LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 55; and Capt J. L. Carter ltr to CMC, 19 Apr 55.
- [20] 3/1 SAR; Crowley-Adams interv, 9 Feb 55; Col T. L. Ridge ltr to CMC, 12 May 55; LtCol J. Hawkins ltr to CMC, 27 Apr 55; and LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr to CMC, 15 Apr 55.
- [21] The first bomb line corresponded to the FBHL, and Corps Phase Line AA was the equivalent of the O–2 Line.
- [22] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [23] 1st MarDiv SAR, sec. 1; 2/1 SAR; 3/1 SAR; Ridge ltr, 12 May 55; and Hawkins ltr, 27 Apr 55.
- [24] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2dLt J. Sleger, Jr., to Dr A. D. Coox, ORO, Dept of Army, n. d. (Sleger rpt).
- [25] *Ibid.*
- [26] *Ibid.*; CG 1st MarDiv disp to CTF 90, 16 Sep 50.
- [27] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; LtCol H. S. Roise interv, 24 Nov 54.
- [28] Roise interv, 24 Nov 54.
- [29] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Oboe Oboe.
- [30] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [31] *Ibid.*
- [32] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; 2/1 SAR, 4; and Carter ltr, 19 Apr 55.
- [33] *Ibid.*
- [34] 2/1 SAR, 4; and Carter ltr, 19 Apr 55.

[35] 3/1 SAR, 6; Ridge ltr, 12 May 55; Simmons ltr 15 Apr 55.


[36] *Ibid.*; Maj G. C. Westover ltr to authors, 1 Apr 55; and Capt J. R. Fisher ltr to authors, 18 Apr 55.

[37] Recon Co, HqBn, 1st MarDiv *Unit Rpts*, 9 Sep–11 Nov 50; and Ridge ltr, 12 May 55.

[38] BGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to authors, 5 Apr 55.


[39] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Nan Nan.


[40] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 188–189.




The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 8. On to Kimpo

- [1] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 197–199.
- [2] Material for this section has been derived from Karig, *Korea*, 112, 243–255.
- [3] Quoted in Karig, *Korea*, 202.
- [4] VAdm A. D. Struble ltr to authors, 18 May 55.
- [5] PacFlt *Interim Rpt No I*, XV:Annex Able Able, 8.
- [6] Dowsett interv, 2 Nov 54.
- [7] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Capt J. E. Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55.
- [8] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; and Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55.
- [9] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Oboe Oboe, Peter Peter, and Queen Queen; and 2/1 SAR ,5.
- [10] The following narrative, unless otherwise noted, is taken from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Baker, Oboe Oboe, Peter Peter, Queen Queen; 2/1 SAR; Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55; Roise interv, 21 Dec 54; and McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; and Statement of Capt W. D. Pomeroy enclosed in Maj G. M. English ltr to CMC, 19 Apr 55.
- [11] *Ibid.*
- [12] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 17 Sep 50.
- [13] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55.
- [14] MarCorps Board *Study*, II-B, 29; O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 18 Sep 50.
- [15] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Charlie, 7.
- [16] *Ibid.*, Annex Queen Queen.
- [17] *Ibid.* The word “Ascom” was formed from “Army Service Command.”
- [18] *Ibid.*; Capt T. A. Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
- [19] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; and Maj R. A. McMullen interv, 27 Jul 54.
- [20] *Ibid.*
- [21] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
- [22] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Queen Queen.
- [23] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; and Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55.
- [24] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
- [25] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; Roise interv, 21 Dec 54; and Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55.
- [26] Maj S. Jaskilka memo to authors, 13 May 55; Roise interv, 21 Dec 54. In the gathering darkness, Roise underestimated the size of the airfield and thought he controlled more than actually was the case. Thus he reported the objective “secured” at 2020, as 2/5 commenced digging in for the night.
- [27] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; and Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55.
- [28] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [29] Capt G. H. Stewart interv, 17 Nov 54.
- [30] Maj J. D. Jordan interv, 27 Sep 54.
- [31] The intelligence summary is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Baker and Queen Queen.
- [32] The account of the Kimpo counterattacks is taken from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55; and Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55.
- [33] Jaskilka memo, 13 May 55.
- [34] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [35] *Ibid.*







The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 9. Marine Air Support

- [1] 1st MAW, Annex Able.
- [2] Maj V. A. Armstrong interv, 16 Mar 55.
- [3] 1st MarDiv SAR. Annex Oboe.
- [4] *Ibid.*, Annexes Baker Baker, Charlie Charlie, and Dog Dog.
- [5] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex George George.
- [6] *Ibid.*, basic rpt, and Annex Queen Queen.
- [7] CG 1st MAW speedltr, 20 Sep 50.
- [8] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Item.
- [9] MarCorps Board *Study*, IV-B, 16, 17; 1st MAW SAR, basic rpt, and Annex Jig.
- [10] 1st MAW SAR, basic rpt.
- [11] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Item, VMF(N)–542 rpt.
- [12] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Item VMF–212 rpt.
- [13] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 212–213.
- [14] Almond, *UN Mil Ops*, 13.
- [15] *Ibid.*
- [16] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Item, VMF(N) –513 rpt.
- [17] GHQ UNC *OpnO No. 1*, 30 Aug 50.
- [18] 2/1 SAR, 5; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
- [19] *Ibid.*
- [20] Capt J. L. Carter ltr to authors, 9 May 55.
- [21] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2/1 SAR; 3/1 SAR; and Capt B. J. Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54. Col T. L. Ridge, memo to authors, 13 May 55.
- [22] 2/1 SAR; 3/1 SAR; and Cummings interv, 24 Aug 54.
- [23] Cummings interv, 24 Aug 54.
- [24] *Ibid.*; and 1st MAW SAR, Annex Jig, VMF–214 rpt, 5.
- [25] *Ibid.*; 3/1 SAR; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
- [26] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2/1 SAR; and 3/1 SAR. In its account of NKPA losses for 17 September, 2/1 lists four other enemy tanks destroyed. These vehicles were among the six knocked out jointly by the 1st and 5th Marines and Able Company Tanks at the dawn ambush near Ascom City. 1st MarDiv G–2 reports of 14 NKPA tanks destroyed this date cannot be supported by the records of subordinate units. In addition to the six T–34s destroyed in the morning and the single vehicle knocked out by our tanks near Mahang-ri, one other kill was recorded by Marine air.
- [27] McGee-Carlton interv, 9 Feb 55.
- [28] HqBn, 1st MarDiv *Unit Rpts*, 9 Sep–11 Nov 50; and Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54. See also this series, I:225.
- [29] Ridge memo, 13 May 55.
- [30] 2/1 SAR, 6; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54; Carter ltr, 9 May 55.
- [31] *Ibid.*; and 3/1 SAR, 7.
- [32] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [33] *Ibid.*; and 1st MarDiv *Chief of Staff (C/S) Journal*, 15–20 Sep 50.
- [34] The following narrative, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: 1st MarDiv *C/S Journal*, 15–20 Sep 50; 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; and 1st Marines *PIR No. 3*.

[35] Myers interv, 1 Feb 55; Ridge memo, 13 May 55


[36] Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.


[37] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 218–219.


[38] LtCol J. H. Partridge interv, 23 Nov 54.

[39] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Tare Tare.

[40] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Mike Mike.







The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 10. Crossing the Han

- [1] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen, 19 Sep 50; Capt R. B. Crossman ltr to authors, 23 Nov 54.
- [2] Maj K. J. Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54.
- [3] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 227.
- [4] 1stLt E. L. DeFazio ltr to authors, 11 Dec 54.
- [5] *Ibid.*; Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54.
- [6] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
- [7] Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
- [8] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54, DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
- [9] Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
- [10] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
- [11] Ensign Seigle found it hard to part with his tape recorder containing an account of the venture. He hid it near the water, but the record had been erased by subsequent sounds when he retrieved it the next day.
- [12] 1stLt J. P. Harney interv, 17 Nov 54.
- [13] DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
- [14] MSgt E. L. Knox, ltr to authors, 13 May 55.
- [15] LtGen (Ret) E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 25 Aug 54.
- [16] MarCorps Board *Study*, II–B, 27, 28.
- [17] This section is based upon: McMullen interv, 27 Jul 54; Maj J. N. Irick interv, 16 Nov 54; 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Peter Peter and Queen Queen.
- [18] Roise memo to authors, 13 May 55.
- [19] Col V. H. Krulak interv, 27 Jun 55.
- [20] CinCFE radio to JCS, 8 Sep 50, quoted in OCMH (Schnabel), *Korean Conflict (MS)*, v. I, ch. I.
- [21] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Nan Nan; Partridge interv, 23 Nov 54.
- [22] Partridge interv, 23 Nov 54.
- [23] *Ibid.*
- [24] MajGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to authors, 29 Apr 55.
- [25] 1st Mar Div SAR, Annex Mike Mike.
- [26] MarCorps Board *Study*, II–B, 32.
- [27] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg memo to authors, 11 May 55.
- [28] Capt E. E. Collins ltr to authors, 6 May 55.
- [29] Capt J. R. Wayerski, interv, of 28 Sep 54.
- [30] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 253–255.
- [31] 1st MarDiv, SAR, Annex Queen Queen; O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 255–256.

The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 11. The Fight for Yongdungpo

- [1] 1st MarDiv *C/S Journal*, 15–20 Sep 50.
- [2] Unless otherwise noted, the story of 1/5's fight is derived from 1st MarDiv *SAR*, Annex Queen Queen.
- [3] *Ibid.*; and Capt. P. F. Pedersen memo to authors, 30 May 55.
- [4] Maj F. I. Fenton, Jr., memo to authors, 1 Jun 55.
- [5] 1st MarDiv *SAR*, Annex Peter Peter.
- [6] *Ibid.*; and 1st MarDiv *C/S Journal*, 15–20 Sep 50.
- [7] *Ibid.*; and Myers interv, 1 Feb 55.
- [8] 1st MarDiv *SAR*, Annex Oboe Oboe.
- [9] 2/1 *SAR*; 1st MAW *SAR*, Annex Jig; Easy; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
- [10] Owing to the crude design, the top of the wooden box mine must protrude above the road for best effect. Although the Communists sometimes concealed the projections with debris, Marines usually had no difficulty in spotting them.
- [11] Capt G. A. Babe—1stLt P. Paolino interv, 15 Nov 54.
- [12] *Ibid.*; 1st MarDiv *SAR*, Annex Peter Peter.
- [13] 2/1 *SAR*, and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55
- [14] *Ibid.*; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
- [15] Rice bags filled with dirt commonly were used by the NKPA for barriers in place of sandbags.
- [16] 1st MarDiv *SAR*, Annex Oboe Oboe.
- [17] *Ibid.*; and 2/1 *SAR*.
- [18] 2/1 *SAR*; Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
- [19] Issued at 2000, 19 September.
- [20] 7th InfDiv (USA) *Opn Rpt*, in Inclusions to 7th InfDiv War Diary for Sep 50.
- [21] 1st MarDiv *SAR*, Annex Peter Peter; Maj R. H. Barrow interv, 17 Aug 54; and LtCol J. Hawkins ltr to CMC, 21 May 55.
- [22] *Ibid.*; and Fenton ltr, 1 Jun 55.
- [23] *Ibid.*; and Bates interv, 27 Aug 51.
- [24] The account of this counterattack is taken from: 1st MarDiv *SAR*, Annex Peter Peter; 2/1 *SAR*; Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54; and CMH Citation for PFC W. C. Monegan, Jr.
- [25] Marine losses were surprisingly small, although the exact number cannot be determined. In the whole course of 20 September, 2/1 sustained four KIA and 32 WIA, but these figures included losses during the Marine advance after the NKPA counterattack.
- [26] 1st MarDiv *SAR*, Annex Sugar Sugar.
- [27] *Ibid.*; and Capt D. A. Rapp interv, 18 Nov 54, with comments by Capt E. A. Bushe.
- [28] 1st MarDiv *SAR*, Annex Peter Peter; and 7th InfDiv *OpnO* 2.
- [29] Though not provided for in Fleet Marine Force T/O, the “supporting arms center,” a provisional facility for coordination modeled after the regimental SAC, was a favorite with many battalion commanders in the field.
- [30] The following narrative is taken from: Bates interv, 27 Aug 51; Barrow interv, 17 Aug 54; and Captains F. B. Carlon and J. M. McGee interv, 9 Feb 55; Hawkins ltr 21 May 55; and Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 30 May 55.
- [31] Barrow interv, 17 Aug 54; and SSgt C. O. Edwards interv, 12 May 54.
- [32] 2/1 *SAR*.

[33] *Ibid.*; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55.

[34] 32d InfRegt *War Diary*, 18–30 Sep 50.

[35] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; and Bates interv, 27 Aug 51.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] 2/1 SAR; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55.


[39] *Ibid.*; and E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air Over Inchon-Seoul,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, 36, no. 6 (Jun 52).


[40] 2/1 SAR; 3/1 SAR; LtCol T. L. Ridge ltr to CMC, 20 May 55; and LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr to CMC, 19 May 55.


[41] 32d InfRegt *War Diary*, 18–30 Sep 50.


[42] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; Bates interv, 27 Aug 51; Maj R. H. Barrow interv, 8 Oct 51 and 17 Aug 54; and Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54.

[43] *Ibid.*











The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 12. Main Line of Resistance

- [1] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Baker, and Queen Queen:Baker, app. 1.
- [2] Geer, *The New Breed*, 163.
- [3] Capt G. H. Stewart interv, 17 Nov 54.
- [4] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [5] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
- [6] Capt J. A. Schimmenti interv, 4 Jan 55.
- [7] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:Nan.
- [8] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Jig: Appendix Fox; Annex Item: Roger, Sugar.
- [9] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Roger Roger.
- [10] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 251–252.
- [11] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [12] LtCol H. S. Roise interv, 9 Nov 54.
- [13] *Ibid.*
- [14] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
- [15] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55.
- [16] *Ibid.*
- [17] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
- [18] *Ibid.*
- [19] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
- [20] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 19 Apr 55.
- [21] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:Nan; 1st MAW SAR, Annex Jig:Easy.
- [22] This section has been derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, sec. 1; O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 252–253, 262–265, and *Chronicle*, 23–24 Sep 50.
- [23] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
- [24] 1st MarDiv OpnO 10–50, 24 Sep 50.
- [25] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
- [26] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54; 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:Oboe.
- [27] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [28] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55.
- [29] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen :Oboe.
- [30] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55.
- [31] *Ibid.*
- [32] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Oboe.
- [33] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
- [34] *Ibid.*
- [35] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:Oboe; Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55.
- [46] Cushman interv, 26 Jul 54.
- [37] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Item:Roger.
- [38] Roise interv, 9 Nov 54; and O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 286.
- [39] 2/1 SAR; and O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 268.
- [40] Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54.

[41] 3/1 SAR.





The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 13. Seoul as a Battlefield

- [1] Almond, *UN MilOps*, 13.
- [2] *Ibid.*
- [3] MarCorps Board *Study*, II–B, 37.
- [4] MarCorps Board *Study*, II–B, 37; Irick interv, 16 Nov 54.
- [5] MajGen D. G. Barr (USA) ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 5 Oct 50.
- [6] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 133–135.
- [7] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [8] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Jig:Easy; Karig, *Korea*, 259.
- [9] *Ibid.*, Annex Item:Sugar; Col M. I. Volcansek, Jr. interv, 15 Mar 55.
- [10] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Oboe.
- [11] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
- [12] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 11 May 55; and LtCol H. S. Roise interv, 11 May 55.
- [13] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; Taplett interv, 11 May 55; and Maj R. A. McMullen interv, 25 Aug 54.
- [14] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 286–287.
- [15] The description of this fight is based upon the following sources: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54; and Babe-Paolino interv, 15 Nov 54.
- [16] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 284–285.
- [17] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 288–289.
- [18] *Ibid.*
- [19] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter, Queen Queen; MarCorps Board *Study*, II–B, 38–39.
- [20] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter.
- [21] 3/1 SAR.
- [22] *Ibid.*
- [23] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter.
- [24] *Ibid.*
- [25] 32d Inf *War Diary*, 18–30 Sep 50.
- [26] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 294–295.
- [27] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Roger Roger; and Maj J. D. Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54.
- [28] *Ibid.*; and Capt H. H. Harris—Capt R. R. Van Cleve interv, 10 Aug 54.
- [29] As is frequently the case after heavy fighting, 3/5's SAR contains inaccuracies in its account covering 24–27 September, leaving the reader with the impression that the entire spur leading into the city was secured on the 26th. In retracing the progress of the attack during interviews with the authors, both Lieutenant Colonel Taplett and Captain (now Major) McMullen agree that the foregoing account is correct.
- [30] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Peter Peter; 2/1 SAR; Sutter—Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and Cummings interv, 12 Oct. 54.
- [31] Capt N. R. Stanford, "Road Junction", *Marine Corps Gazette*, 35 no. 9 (Sep 51):16–21.
- [32] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Capt F. B. Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55.
- [33] 32d Inf *War Diary*, 18–30 Sep 50.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] MarCorps Board *Study*, II-B, 42.

[36] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Roger Roger; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54; Harris—Van Cleve interv, 10 Aug 54; and Maj W. R. Earney, *Notes on Operations of 3d Bn, 7th Mar, in South Korea* (Earney Notes), MS.

[37] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.

[38] Contact on 26 September was between rearward elements of the 1st and 5th Marines, not between assault units.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] 2/1 SAR; and Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54.

[41] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.

[42] *Ibid.*


[43] 2/1 SAR.

[44] Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55.

[45] 32d Inf *War Diary*, 18–30 Sep 50.

[46] 2/1 SAR; and Capt T. Culpepper interv, 9 Feb 55.

[47] *Ibid.*; Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55.




SEOUL ASSAULT PLAN

26 SEP 50

SHOWING DIVISION & REGTL BOUNDARIES





THE BATTLE OF SEOUL

SHOWING ATTACKS BY 5th MARINES, 1st MARINES, & 32d INF


25 SEP 26 SEP 27 SEP

NK COUNTERATTACKS OF 25 & 26 SEP

APPROXIMATE X CORPS FRONT, 2400 27 SEP


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YARDS



The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 14. The Drive to Uijongbu

- [1] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex How How.
- [2] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 312–313.
- [3] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [4] *Ibid.*, Annex Roger Roger.
- [5] *Ibid.*, Annex Peter Peter.
- [6] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 308, 338–339.
- [7] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 27 Sep 50, *Notes*, 313–315.
- [8] CinCFE msg to CG X Corps, 28 Sep 50.
- [9] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter.
- [10] Col E. H. Forney memo to authors, Dec 54.
- [11] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 29 Sep 50.
- [12] U.S. MilAcad, *Operations in Korea*, 18–19.
- [13] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 318.
- [14] *Ibid.*, 318–319, 336–337. Both “Kimpo” and “Kumpo” are used in reports to designate the same area—the peninsula formed by the mouth of the Han. The first name was derived from the airfield, of course, and the second from the principal town of the peninsula.
- [15] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Peter.
- [16] *Ibid.*, Annex Roger Roger.
- [17] This section is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Roger Roger; 1st MAW SAR, Annex Item:Queen; Col H. L. Litzenberg interv with HistDiv, 22 Apr 51; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54; and Capt R. T. Bey interv, 17 Nov 54.
- [18] Lieutenant Colonel Hinkle, the former 2/7 commander, had been wounded and evacuated on 28 September.
- [19] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 2–3 Oct 50.
- [20] Capt J. E. Dolan memo to authors, 24 Nov 54.
- [21] *Ibid.*
- [22] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 342; 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex George, 7.
- [23] Wonsan fell without a fight on 10 October, before the Marines embarked, to ROK units advancing up the coastal route.
- [24] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 365–366.
- [25] Summaries and statistics for Marine air have been derived from: 1st MAW SAR, Annexes Able, Item, Jig, Queen, and Sugar; also E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air over Inchon-Seoul,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, 36, no. 6 (Jun 52): 19–27. Note that the total of 2,774 combat sorties includes 38 flown by two aircraft of VMF–312, which began operating from Kimpo nine days before the rest of the squadron arrived.
- [26] VAdm A.D. Struble ltr to authors, 3 May 55.
- [27] 1st MarDiv SAR., Annex William William.
- [28] MarCorps Board *Study*, II–B, 45–46. Here again it may be noted that later reports, not available when this study was made, indicate that duplicate claims were entered for four of these 44 tanks, with two others unaccounted for in records. The actual total, therefore, is 38.



**PURSUIT OF THE NKPA
&
CAPTURE OF UIJONGBU
28 SEP -- 3 OCT 1950**



The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 1. Problems of Victory

- [1] The story of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and Marine Aircraft Group 33 in the Pusan Perimeter has been told in Volume I of this series, and Volume II deals with the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in the Inchon-Seoul operation.
- [2] Col C. W. Harrison, interview (interv) 22 Nov 55. Unless otherwise noted, all interviews have been by the authors.
- [3] US Dept of State, *Guide to the UN in Korea* (Washington, 1951). Yugoslavia abstained from the vote, and the USSR, then boycotting the Council, was absent.
- [4] *Ibid.*
- [5] Maj J. F. Schnabel, USA, Comments on preliminary manuscript (Comments).
- [6] JCS memo to Secretary of Defense (SecDef), 7 Sep 50. Unless otherwise stated, copies of all messages cited are on file in Historical Branch, HQMC.
- [7] JCS message (msg) WAR 91680, 15 Sep 50; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2 vols (Garden City, 1955–1956), II, 359.
- [8] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 360; MajGen Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History* (New York, 1956), 397. Commenting on the JCS authorization Gen MacArthur stated, “My directive from the JCS on 27 September establishing my military objective as ‘. . . the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces’ and in the accomplishment thereof authorizing me to ‘. . . conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea. . .’ made it mandatory rather than discretionary . . . that the UN Forces operate north of that line against enemy remnants situated in the north. Moreover, all plans governing operations north of that Parallel were designed to implement the resolution passed by the UN General assembly on 7 October 1950, and were specifically approved by the JCS. Indeed, the military objectives assigned by the JCS, and the military-political objectives established by said resolution of the UN could have been accomplished in no other way.” Gen D. MacArthur letter (ltr) to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 24 Feb 56.
- [9] JCS msg 92985, 29 Sep 50. For a differing interpretation see Whitney, *MacArthur*, 398.
- [10] JCS msg 92762, 27 Sep 50.
- [11] CinCUNC msg to CinC North Korean Forces, 1 Oct 59, in *EUSAK War Diary (WD)*, 1 Oct 50, Sec II; JCS msg 92762, 27 Sep 50.
- [12] US Ambassador, England msg to Secretary of State, 3 Oct 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 361–362. The information was forwarded to Tokyo but MacArthur later claimed that *had* never been informed of it. *Military Situation in the Far East. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Eighty-second Congress, First Session, To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area* (Washington, 1951, 5 vols.), (hereafter *MacArthur Hearings*), 109.
- [13] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 360; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 397. Italics supplied.
- [14] Resolution of 7 Oct 50 in *Guide to the UN in Korea*, 20.
- [15] JCS msg 93709, 9 Oct 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 362; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 404.
- [16] C/S FECOM memo to JSPOG, 26 Sep 50. Copy at Office of The Chief of Military History (OCMH).
- [17] Maj J. F. Schnabel, *The Korean Conflict: Policy, Planning, Direction*. MS at OCMH. See also: Capt M. Blumenson, “MacArthur’s Divided Command,” *Army*, vii, no. 4 (Nov 56), 38–44, 65.
- [18] Schnabel, *The Korean Conflict*.

[19] *Ibid.*, and CinCFE *OpnPlan* 9–50. Copy at OCMH.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] CinCFE msg C 64805, 28 Sep 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 361; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 397–398.

[22] JCS disp 92975, 29 Sep 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 361; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 398. All dates in the narrative and in footnotes are given as of the place of origin of the action. Thus, 29 September in Washington was actually the 30th in Tokyo.

[23] UNC *Operation Order (OpnO)* 2, 2 Oct 50.

[24] LtGen E. A. Almond, USA, (Ret.) ltr to Col J. Meade, USA, 14 Jun 55.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*; Schnabel, *The Korean Conflict*; Blumenson, “MacArthur’s Divided Command.” Gen MacArthur stated: “If such a dissension existed it was never brought to my attention. To the contrary, the decision to retain as a function of GHQ command and coordination between Eight Army and X Corps until such time as a juncture between the two forces had been effected was, so far as I know, based upon the unanimous thinking of the senior members of my staff . . .” MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 56. Gen Wright has stated: “Neither General Hickey, General Eberle, nor I objected to the plan, but we did feel that X Corps should have been made part of the Eighth Army immediately after the close of the Inchon-Seoul operation.” MajGen E. K. Wright, USA, ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 16 Feb 56.

[27] JSPOG memo to C/S, FECOM: “Plans for future operations,” 27 Sep 50. Copy at OCMH.

[28] 1stMarDiv *Special Action Report for the Wonsan-Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir Operation, 8 Oct–15 Dec 50* (hereafter 1stMarDiv SAR), 10.

[29] 1stMarDiv SAR, 10 and MajGen Oliver P. Smith, *Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division during the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–51* (MS), (hereafter Smith, Notes), 370–371.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] ComNavFE *OpnPlan* 113-50. Copy at OCMH.

[32] *Ibid.*, B, 11.

[33] X Corps *OpnO* 3, 2 Oct 50.

[34] MajGen Oliver P. Smith: *Chronicle of the Operations of the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950-1951* (MS), (hereafter, Smith, *Chronicle*), 54

[35] Gen Wright stated, “There was definitely *not* a complete lack of planning data. I doubt if any operation ever had more planning data available. It may not have been in General Smith’s hands on 3 October, but it was available.” Wright ltr, 16 Feb 56.

[36] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units: “Planning Information,” 3 Oct 50.

[37] Special Report 1stMarDiv, in CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Rpt #1*, annex DD, 11; 1stMarDiv *Historical Diary (HD)*, Oct 50; X Corps *OpnO* 4, 4 Oct 50.

[38] Smith, *Chronicle*, 54.

[39] *Ibid.*, 55.


[40] ComSeventhFlt *OpnO* 16–50, 5 Oct 50.


[41] *Ibid.*


[42] The description of Wonsan is based upon: GHQ, FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Theater Intelligence Division, Geographic Branch, *Terrain Study No. 6, Northern Korea*, sec v, 13–16; 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 15–50, annex B, sec 2, 1, 3, 10 Oct 50; and 1stMarDiv SAR, annex B (hereafter G-2 SAR), sec 2, 1.

[43] 1stMarDiv SAR, 10. The classes of supply are as follows: I, rations; II, supplies and equipment, such as normal clothing, weapons, vehicles, radios, etc, for which specific allowances have been established; III, petroleum products, gasoline, oil and lubricants (POL); IV, special supplies and equipment, such as fortification and construction materials, cold weather clothing, etc, for which specific allowances have not been established; V,

ammunition, pyrotechnics, explosives, etc.







The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 2. The Wonsan Landing

- [1] 1stMarDiv Embarkation Order (*EmbO*) 2-50, 6 Oct 50; Smith, *Notes*, 394.
- [2] G-2 SAR, 2. JANIS is the abbreviation for Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.
- [3] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 16-50*, 10 Oct 50.
- [4] EUSAK *War Diary Summary (WD Sum)*, Oct 50, 14-16.
- [5] CinCFE *OpnPlan 9-50 (Alternate)*, 8 Oct 50.
- [6] C/S Notes in X Corps *WD 10-25 Oct 50*; ComPhibGruOne, "Report of . . . Operations . . . 25 Jun 50 to 1 Jan 51," 11; Smith, *Chronicle*, 57-59; and Capt Walter Karig, *et al*, *Battle Report: The War In Korea* (New York, 1952), 301-302. According to Gen Wright, MacArthur's G-3, "Admiral Joy may have 'discussed' this often with the Commander-in-Chief, but no one ever 'argued' with him." Wright ltr 16 Feb 56.
- [7] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.
- [8] Smith, *Chronicle*, 59.
- [9] ComPhibGruOne "Operations Report," 10. SCAJAP is the abbreviation for Shipping Control Authority, Japan. Under this designation were American ships lent to Japan after World War II, of which many were recalled during the Korean War to serve as cargo vessels.
- [10] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex D (hereafter G-4 SAR), 2.
- [11] *Ibid.*, 3.
- [12] These totals were authorized: C-Rations for five days; individual assault rations for one day; POL for five days; Class II and IV supplies for 15 days; and five units of fire (U/F). *Ibid.*; 1stMarDiv *Administration Order (AdmO)* 13-50, 8 Oct 50. A unit of fire is a convenient yardstick in describing large quantities of ammunition. It is based on a specific number of rounds per weapon.
- [13] G-4 SAR, 1.
- [14] *Ibid.*, 3.
- [15] ComNavFE msg to ComPhibGruOne, CG 1stMarDiv and others, 0200 8 Oct 50.
- [16] 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035 11 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex QQ, appendix A (hereafter 1/5 SAR), 4, appendix B (hereafter 2/5 SAR), 6, and appendix C (hereafter 3/5 SAR), 4.
- [17] CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 0752 11 Oct 50; Smith, *Notes*, 373.
- [18] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex RR (hereafter 7thMar SAR), 9; Smith, *Notes*, 399, 409; 1stMar *HD Oct 50*, 3.
- [19] 1stMarDiv *Embarkation Summary*, 16 Oct 50; and "Special Report 1stMarDiv," 12.
- [20] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 17-50*, 10 Oct 50.
- [21] ". . . Division [1stMarDiv] Advance Parties were flown to Wonsan in accordance with a definite plan which materialized just before we set sail from Inchon. As a matter of fact the personnel for these parties and even some of the jeeps were already loaded out and had to be removed from the shipping prior to our sailing." Col A. L. Bowser, Comments, n. d.
- [22] CG's Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 10-25 Oct 50; Smith, *Chronicle*, 59.
- [23] X Corps *Operation Instruction (OI) 11*, 14 Oct 50; Smith, *Notes*, 385.
- [24] According to General Smith, "The reason for issuing 1stMarDiv *OpnO 17-50* was to provide for an administrative landing in sheltered waters just north of Wonsan where there would be easy access to the existing road net. The ship-to-shore movement provided for in 1stMarDiv *OpnO 16-50* was retained intact. This plan [*OpnO 17-50*] had to be dropped when it was found that Wonsan Harbor was completely blocked by mines, and that it would be much quicker to clear the approaches to the Kalma Peninsula where we eventually landed . . . 1stMarDiv dispatch [1450 24 Oct] cancelled both 1stMarDiv *OpnOs 16* and *17* and provided for an administrative

landing on the Kalma Peninsula as directed by CTF 90.” Gen O. P. Smith ltr to authors, 3 Feb 56. Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, letters may be assumed to be to the authors.

[25] CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, VI, 1090.

[26] *Ibid.*, VI, 1088–1089; Smith, *Notes*, 404; Karig, *Korea*, 301. See also ADVATIS Rpt 1225 in EUSAK *WD*, 24 Oct 50.

[27] CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, VI, 1004; Dept Army, Joint Daily Situation Report (D/A Daily SitRpt) 105; Karig, *Korea*, 311–314.

[28] Minesweep Rpt #1 in X Corps *WD* 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE Intelligence Summary (IntSum) 76; ComNavFE Operations Summary (OpSum) 201; D/A Daily SitRpt 105; Karig, *Korea*, 315.

[29] ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” in CinCPacFlt, *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, 13–15; ComSeventhFlt, “Chronological Narrative,” in *Ibid.*, 7.

[30] CTG 95.6 msg to CTF95, CTF77 11 Oct 50 in G–3 Journal, X Corps *WD* 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE OpSum 215; ComNavFE IntSum 82; Karig, *Korea*, 315.

[31] VAdm A. D. Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.

[32] ComPatRon 47, “Special Historical Report,” in CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, H4; ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” 5, 15; Karig, *Korea*, 318–322.

[33] ComNavFE OpSum 219; ComNavFE IntSum 82.

[34] ComFltAirWing 6, “Evaluation information,” in CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, D8.

[35] Smith, *Notes*, 404–407; Karig, *Korea*, 324–326.

[36] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith, *Notes*, 404–405; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 11–12; LtCol H. W. Edwards, “A Naval Lesson of the Korean Conflict,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, lxxx, no. 12 (Dec 54), 1337–1340; Karig, *Korea*, 324–326; 1stMarDiv G–1 Journal 20 Oct 50.

[37] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Smith, *Notes*, 404; Struble Comments, 16 Mar 56.

[38] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Struble Comments, 16 Mar 56.

[39] *Ibid.*, 11; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex VV, (hereafter 7thMTBn SAR), 2; ComPhibGruOne msg to BuMed, 0034 27 Oct 50.

[40] CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 1119 24 Oct 50 in G–3 Journal, X Corps *WD* 10–25 Oct 50.

[41] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12–13; Smith, *Notes*, 407; CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50; Smith ltr, 3 Feb 56.

[42] Unless otherwise stated this section is based on: 1stMAW *HD*, Oct 50; 1stMAW SAR, annex K (hereafter MAG–12 SAR), 1, appendix G (hereafter VMF–312 SAR), 3, 5–6; and Smith, *Notes*, 433–441.

[43] E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii, no. 7 (Jul 52), 19–20; 1stMAW SAR, annex K, appendix H (hereafter VMF(N)–513 SAR), sec 6, 2.

[44] 1stMAW SAR, annex J, appendix Q (hereafter VMF–214 SAR), 2.

[45] Giusti and Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,” 20; 1stMAW *HD*, Oct 50; TAC X Corps *OpnO* 2–50, 15 Oct 50, in *Ibid.*

[46] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex WW (hereafter VMO–6 SAR), 2.

[47] EUSAK *WD Sum*, Oct 50, 13–23.

[48] *Ibid.*, 25–30.

[49] Schnabel, *The Korean Conflict*.

[50] EUSAK *WD Sum*, Oct 50, 11–20.

[51] *Ibid.*, 20–32.

[52] The following summary of the Wake Island meeting is primarily based on: Gen O. N. Bradley, Comp., *Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on October 15, 1950* (Washington, 1951); and Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 364–367. These accounts are strongly objected to in MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 56. For a differing

account of the meeting see: C. A. Willoughby and J. Chamberlain, *MacArthur 1941–1951* (New York, 1954), 382–383; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 384–395, 416; and Gen D. MacArthur, “Gen. MacArthur Makes His Reply,” *Life*, xl, no. 7 (13 Feb 56), 107–108. Participants in the conference besides Truman and MacArthur were: Secretary of the Army Frank Pace; Ambassador Philip Jessup; Ambassador to Korea John Muccio; General Bradley; Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CinCPacFlt; Averell Harriman; and BrigGen Courtney Whitney of FECOM Headquarters.

[53] By way of comparison, MacArthur paid tribute to the Marine Corps’ highly technical system of tactical air employment: “Ground support is a very difficult thing to do. Our marines do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own Air and Ground Forces are not as good as the marines but they are effective.”

[54] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 10–25 Oct 50; Schnabel, *Korean Conflict*.

[55] CinCUNC msg CX 67291, 24 Oct 50; X Corps *WD Sum*, Nov 50, 5.

[56] JCS msg 94933, 24 Oct 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 372.

[57] CinCFE msg 67397, 25 Oct 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 372.

[58] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 10–25 Oct 50.

[59] EUSAK *WD*, 23 Oct 50.

[60] X Corps *WD*, 10–25 Oct 50.

[61] “Summary of Activities, 21 Oct,” in *Ibid.*; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 13; Smith, *Notes*, 404–407; Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.

[62] 1stMarDiv *OpnPlan 4–50*, 22 Oct 50. “G–3 (Col Bowser) and G–4 (Col McAlister) landed by boat at Wonsan through a very narrow swept channel on the 23rd or 24th of October. Advance Parties of the Division were contacted at this time and a reconnaissance of the entire Wonsan area was made to select and mark administrative assembly areas for units of the Division. Included in this reconnaissance was the St. Benedict Abbey, which was selected as the assembly area for the 7th Marines in view of its projected employment to the north shortly after landing.” Bowser Comments.

[63] X Corps *WD*, 10–25 Oct 50; X Corps G-3 Journal, in *ibid.*; Smith, *Notes*, 285.

[64] 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex PP (hereafter 1stMar *SAR*), 4; and Smith, *Notes*, 407–409. The orders covering the actual debarkation of troops were contained in CTF 90 msgs to CTG 90.2, 0240 and 0910 23 Oct 50; CTG 90.2 msg to CTE 90.22, 1328 25 Oct 50; and CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50. The order to land was given in CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 0707 25 Oct 50.

[65] “At the time of the administrative landing we thought that we might as well use the planned ship-to-shore movement for scheduled waves in order to avoid making a new ship-to-shore plan. In this way we were able to execute by referring to our original plan [OpnO 16–50] for the assault landing without issuing an entire new order.” Bowser Comments.

[66] 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex OO (hereafter 1stTkBn *SAR*), 2–8.

[67] 1stAmphTracBn *HD Oct 50*, 2–3.

[68] 1stMar *SAR*, 4; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1355 26 Oct 50.

[69] 7thMar *SAR*, 12; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1628 26 Oct 50. For a detailed account of the tragedy of St. Benedict’s, see Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USNR, *The History of the Chaplains Corps, U.S. Navy*, (MS) V.

[70] 1stMarDiv, *SAR*, annex QQ, (hereafter 5thMar *SAR*), 8.


[71] 11thMar *UnitReport (URpt)*, 21–28 Oct 50.

[72] The concluding narrative of this chapter is derived from 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annexes MM (hereafter 1stSPBn *SAR*), 5–8, and UU (hereafter 1st CSG *SAR*) 6 and 1stSPBn, *HD for Advance Party*, 1–2.

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 3. First Blood at Kojo

- [1] *Newsweek*, xxxiv, no. 18 (30 Oct 50), 30.
- [2] Smith, *Notes*, 403; Col A. L. Bowser, Comments, n. d. See also FMFPac Staff Study: "The Establishment of a Balanced Fleet Marine Force Air-Ground Force in the Western Pacific," 19 Oct 50.
- [3] Smith, *Notes*, 403.
- [4] CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2001 27 Oct 50. Firewood being scarce in Korea, it was sometimes booby trapped.
- [5] Smith, *Notes*, 385; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex C (hereafter G-3 SAR), 5. The assignment went to 1/1. See Col J. Hawkins ltr to CMC, n. d., and LtCol R. E. Lorigan ltr to CMC, 8 Feb 56 for a discussion of the lack of planning and intelligence resulting from this order being received while underway.
- [6] Smith, *Notes*, 393-394; G-3 SAR, 5-6.
- [7] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 18-50*, 28 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 2146 28 Oct 50.
- [8] Smith, *Chronicle*, 66; MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, 22 Mar 56; LtGen E. A. Craig, "Notes concerning Wonsan Administrative Landing and events immediately following, October 26, 1950 to November 5, 1950," 4 Sep 56.
- [9] This section is derived from: 1/1 msg to 1stMarDiv, 1750 27 Oct 50; 1stMar SAR, 4; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 7; 1stMar *HD*, Oct 50, 4; X Corps *Periodic Operations Report (POR)* 30; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; Capt G. S. Belli Comments, n. d.
- [10] Hawkins ltr, n. d. It should be remembered that Hawkins made his dispositions before learning that the ROKs had taken the supply dump with them.
- [11] Maj W. C. Noren, Report of 27-28 Oct 50, revised and annotated in ltr to authors, 22 Nov 55; (hereafter Noren rpt); Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv, 27 Oct 55; Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 24 Jan 56.
- [12] Hawkins ltr, n. d.
- [13] 1stMar *HD*, Oct 50, encl 2, 1; Noren rpt; Bridges interv 4 Nov 55.
- [14] 1/1 telephone call (tel) to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct 50; G-2 X Corps Rpt in G-3 Journal, X Corps *WD*, 29 Oct 50; X Corps *Periodic Intelligence Report (PIR)* 33.
- [15] 1stMarDiv SAR, 26; X Corps *PIR* 41, annex 3; 1stMarDiv *PIR* 20, encl 2.
- [16] 1stMar SAR, 4; Noren rpt; Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55.
- [17] 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 2130 31 Oct 50; Wray ltr, 24 Jan 56.
- [18] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon the 1stMar SAR 4-5, appendix II, 2; Noren rpt; Bridges interv 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv 27 Oct 55; 1stMar, *HD Oct 50*, encl. 2; 1; Wray ltr, 24 Jan 56; Hawkins ltr, n. d.; Statement of Lt James M. McGhee, 15 Feb 51.
- [19] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex SS, appendix 2 (hereafter 2/11 SAR), 14.
- [20] Capt R. M. Taylor tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1545 28 Oct 50.
- [21] VMF(N)-513 SAR, sec 6, 6; VMF(N)-513 *WD Oct 50*; 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0050 29 Oct 50; Maj W. B. Noren Comments n. d.
- [22] Capt R. B. Robinson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 6 Feb 51; Hawkins ltr, n. d.
- [23] S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0700 28 Oct 50; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1825 29 Oct 50.
- [24] 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50.
- [25] 1/1 msg to 1stMar, 1000 28 Oct 55. As Col Hawkins points out, the request for instructions refers to his only orders being to defend the ROK supply dump which no longer existed. Hawkins ltr, n. d.
- [26] CG's Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 28 Oct 50; Craig "Notes . . . Oct 26-Nov 5, 1950"; G-3 1stMarDiv tel

- to G-3 X Corps, 1215 28 Oct 50; 1stMar *HD, Oct 50*, 4; LtCol R. E. Lorigan ltr to CMC 7 Dec 55.
- [27] 1/1 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct 50; Hawkins ltr, n. d.
- [28] 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50.
- [29] Craig, "Notes . . . 29 Oct–Nov 5, 1950" ; Col A. Sutter Comments n. d.
- [30] Barrow interv, 28 Oct 55.
- [31] CTF-90 msg to USS *Wantuck*, 0839 28 Oct 50; VMO-6 *SAR*, 23.
- [32] 1stTkBn *SAR*, 9, 11; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1650 29 Oct 50.
- [33] 1stSPBn *SAR*, 5–6; 1stMar *SAR*, 6; 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex TT (hereafter 1stAmph TracBn *SAR*) 4–5, appendix 2, 3–4.
- [34] Craig ltr, 4 Sep 55; Smith, *Notes*, 450.
- [35] 2/1 *SAR*, 3; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1816 29 Oct 50; 1stMar Fwd *ISUM*, 1900 29 Oct 50.
- [36] VMO-6 *HD Oct 50*; VMO-6 *SAR*, 3.
- [37] Smith, *Notes*, 451; Noren Comments.
- [38] Smith, *Notes*, 451; CG's Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 29 Oct 40.
- [39] Smith, *Notes*, 451–452; 1stMar *SAR*, appendix 5, 2; Noren Comments.
- [40] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to ExecO 1stMar, 1450 30 Oct 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMar Div, 1521 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMarFwd, 2355 31 Oct 50; 1stMarAdv msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1900 1 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 453–454; 1stMar *SAR*, 6–7; Hawkins ltr, n. d.; Sutter Comments.
- [41] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 18-50*, 28 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne, "Operations Report", 13–14; 1stMarDiv *SAR*, 12; X Corps *WDs*, 29 Oct–8 Nov 50.
- [42] 1stMarDiv *POR* 98; CG X Corps msg X11890; X Corps *OI 14*, 29 Oct 50; X Corps *OI 16*, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CO 1stMar, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to 1stMar, 1803 2 Nov 50.
- [43] 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8; CO 1stMar msg to 2/1, 1825 2 Nov 50; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 3 Nov 50; 2/1 msg to 1stMar, 1820 3 Nov 50; 2/11 *SAR*, 14–15; Sutter Comments.



The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 4. Majon-ni and Ambush Alley

- [1] CO 3/1 msg to CO 1stMar, 1900 28 Oct 50; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 7, 2.
- [2] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1730 27 Oct 50. See also CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1515 27 Oct 50; 1stMar *OpnO 9-50*, 27 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv *AdmO 14-50*, 27 Oct 50.
- [3] Col T. L. Ridge, *Notes on Operations in North Korea*, 9 Sep 55 (hereafter Ridge, *Notes*) and comments on preliminary draft, 28 Feb 56; Andrew Geer, *The New Breed* (New York, 1952), 203.
- [4] Smith, *Notes*, 393-394; G-3 *SAR*, 5-6.
- [5] Except where otherwise indicated, this section is based on: Ridge, *Notes*; and Comments, 28 Feb 50; LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr, 14 Jan 56; 1stLt Charles R. Stiles, "The Dead End of Ambush Alley," *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvi, no. 11 (Nov 51), 38-45.
- [6] 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 14; Capt A. J. Strohmenger, ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 16 Sep 55; 3/1 msg to 1stMar, n. t. 2 Nov 50.
- [7] This section is based upon LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 4 Nov 55 and ltr, 14 Jan 56.
- [8] 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 4.
- [9] *Ibid.*, 5; Ridge Comments, 28 Feb 56.
- [10] LtCol T. L. Ridge, interv with HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Aug 51.
- [11] 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 8; 1stMarDiv *PIRs 21* and *22*.
- [12] The account of the How Company ambush is derived from: 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 5; VMF-312 *SAR*, 8-9; 3/1 memo: "Summary of Friendly Situation as of 1600," 2 Nov 50; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8, 3; 2/11 *SAR*, 16; Simmons interv, 4 Nov 55; and ltr, 14 Jan 56; Capt R. A. Doyle Comments, n. d.; Maj C. E. Corley Comments, n. d.
- [13] As a result of this experience a radio which could contact planes was later requested. 3/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, n. t. 2 Nov 50.
- [14] LtCol V. J. Gottschalk interv, 21 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle Comments; Cdr R. J. Fleischaker Comments, n. d.
- [15] Col T. L. Ridge, ltr, 28 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle Comments.
- [16] C-3 composition is a powerful, putty-like explosive used chiefly by military engineers for demolitions work.
- [17] S-2 1stMar to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1200 2 Nov 50; 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1115 2 Nov 50; VMF-312 *SAR*, 8-9; 1stTkBn *SAR*, 11; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8, 2-3; 1stLt J. L. Crutchfield ltr to CMC, 23 Jan 56.
- [18] 1stAirDelPlat, *HD, Nov 50*; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8, 3.
- [19] The rest of this section is based upon these sources: Maj R. H. Barrow interv, 7 Oct 55; ExecO 1stMar tel to G-3, 1stMarDiv 3 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2010 5 Nov 50; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8, 3-4.
- [20] 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 5; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 9; Ridge ltr, 28 Nov 55; Narrative of Capt H. L. Coffman, n. d.
- [21] S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0945 7 Nov 50. 1stMar *SAR*, 10, 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 5-6; 2/11 *SAR*, 17; Capt C. R. Stiles ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, 25 Jan 56; Corley Comments.
- [22] The account of the Easy Company ambush is derived from: 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 9; 2/1 *SAR*, 6-7; Col A. Sutter Comments 2 Feb 56; TSgt H. T. Jones ltr, n. d.
- [23] 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 6. 1stMar ISUM, 1200 9 Nov 50; 2/11 *SAR*, 17; Capt R. A. Mason Comments, 25 Jan 56. See also Corley Comments.
- [24] 2/1 *SAR*, 7. Ridge, *Notes*.
- [25] Geer, *The New Breed*, 215.
- [26] VMO-6 *SAR*, 8; X Corps, *Guerrilla Activities X Corps Zone, Nov 50*, 1; 1stMarDiv *PIR 18*; 2/11 *SAR*, 17.

[27] Col T. L. Ridge interv, 22 Nov 55.

[28] 3/1 SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50, 6. 1stMarDiv *URpt (S-3)* 9. 1stMar SAR, 11; 2/11 SAR, 17. The “Bouncing Betty” type of antipersonnel mine was equipped with a spring which sent it several feet into the air to explode with maximum destructive effect.

[29] Air Off 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1445 12 Nov 50; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1845 12 Nov 50; LnO 1stMar tel to 1stMarDiv, 1530 14 Nov 50; G-3 1stMar Div tel to S-3 1stMar, 1600 14 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv *POR 146*; 3/1 SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50, 3-4, 6-7; 2/1 SAR, 9; 1stMar SAR, 11-12; Capt Max W. Dolcater, USA, *3d Infantry Division in Korea* (Tokyo, 1953), 73; Ridge Comments, 28 Feb 56.

[30] 3/1 SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50. General Ruffner, Chief of Staff of X Corps, later commented: “Personally, I always had a feeling that the Marines did a masterful job at Majon-ni. To begin with, it was a very tough assignment and in the second place I always felt that it broke up what remained of organized units in the North Korean Army that would otherwise have given us a tremendous amount of trouble in our backyard at Wonsan. A lot of determined enemy action on our perimeter at Wonsan would have been most disconcerting, troublesome, and unquestionably slowed down our subsequent movement to the north.” MajGen C. L. Ruffner ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 13 Jan 56.

[31] 3/1 SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50, 7.

[32] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 13-14; X Corps *WD*, 29 Oct 50; X Corps *POR 35*.

[33] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 145; X Corps *WD*, 5 Nov 50; X Corps *POR 40*.

[34] Division of Publication, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, *United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949* (hereafter *U.S. Relations with China*), (Washington, 1949), 318, 331.

[35] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 14-15; ComNavFE msg to NavFE, 0204 30 Oct 50; X Corps *POR 150*; LtGen E. A. Craig ltr, 20 Feb 56.

[36] X Corps *OpnO 6*, 12 Nov 50.


[37] 1stMar *OpnO 19-50*, 5 Nov 50; X Corps msg X 14010 9 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 459-460. 1/5 had been initially assigned as the standby BLT but was replaced by 1/1 on its return from Kojo.


[38] 1stMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv 1030 and 1910, 9 Nov 50; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 9; 1stTkBn SAR, 14. Ruffner ltr 13 Jan 56.

[39] X Corps *OpnO 6*, 12 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 492-493; Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 73; CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2305 11 Nov 50.

[40] 1stMarDiv *POR 145*; Smith, *Notes*, 494; 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1845 15 Nov 50; Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 73.

[41] 2/1 SAR, 9-10; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2245 15 Nov 50; 3/1 SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50; 1stMar SAR, 12; 1stMarDiv *POR 154*; Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 73; Sutter Comments, 2 Feb 56.





The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 5. Red China to the Rescue

- [1] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 18-50*, 28 Oct 50; Smith, *Notes*, 463-464.
- [2] 7thMar SAR, 12; CO 7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., 28 Oct 50; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0850 1 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv *OpnO 18-50*, 28 Oct 50. See the detailed account of the move in Col R. G. Davis Comments, 7 May 56. RCT-7 did not receive all of its cold weather clothing until after it reached Koto-ri. MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 18 Jul 56; LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 17 May 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56.
- [3] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2118 31 Oct 50; CO 5thMar msg to CO 1/5, 1013 1 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 463-464; 5thMar SAR, 8-9; 5thMar *URpt 2*; 1/5 SAR, 5; 3/5 SAR, 5; Col A. L. Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.
- [4] 1stMarDiv msg to 1stTkBn, 1750 31 Oct 50; 1stTkBn SAR, 11. The move was made 1 Nov. 11thMar *URpt 2-28 Oct 50*.
- [5] CG's Diary in X Corps *WD*, 2 Nov 50. Smith, *Notes*, 463-464. The Special Operations Company was a commando-type U.S. Army organization, generally employed in such operations as raids and reconnaissance. The strength, weapons, and organization depended on the mission.
- [6] 11thMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1300 2 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv *PIR 9*.
- [7] EUSAK *WDs* 29 Oct-1 Nov 50.
- [8] Maj J. B. Wilson and Capt W. G. Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
- [9] Smith, *Notes*, 534; 1stMarDiv *PIR 4*; 1stMarDiv SAR, 30. These prisoners were later interrogated by Gen Almond himself and formed the basis of the first official report of Chinese intervention. Almond Comments, 21 Jun 56; FECOM msg C 67881, 31 Oct 50.
- [10] Maj R. B. Crossman, Capt C. R. Puckett, and Capt D. W. Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; HqBn, 1stMarDiv (hereafter HqBn) *URpt 8 (Supplementary)*, 2. Maj Webb D. Sawyer, CO 2/7 and Maj James F. Lawrence also made helicopter reconnaissances of the same ground looking for possible flanking routes to Koto-ri. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56.
- [11] Smith, *Notes*, 523-524. See also: Smith, *Chronicle*, 70.
- [12] Richard L. Walker, *China under Communism* (New Haven, 1954), 111-112; Order of Battle Branch, Office of the AC/S G-2, HQ Eighth United States Army (Fwd), *CCF Army Histories* (hereafter *CCF Army Histories*), 1.
- [13] *U.S. Relations with China*, 43-44, 207, 323.
- [14] Quoted in George Moorad, *Lost Peace in China* (New York, 1949), 33.
- [15] *U.S. Relations with China*, 352-363.
- [16] *U.S. Relations with China*, 358.
- [17] *Ibid.*, xiv-xv.
- [18] Marines remained in Tsingtao until early 1949.
- [19] The first blows between the Marines and the Chinese Communists took place not in Korea, but along the Peiping-Tientsin highway as early as October, 1945.
- [20] *U.S. Relations with China*, xiv-xv.
- [21] Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the following sources: GHQ, FECOM, *Order of Battle Information, Chinese Third Field Army* (1 Mar 51) and *Chinese Fourth Field Army* (7 Nov 50); 164-MISDI, ADVATIS, and ADVATIS FWD rpts in EUSAK *WDs*, *passim*; X Corps *PIRs*; 1stMarDiv *PIRs*; 1stMarDiv SAR, 30; G-2 SAR, 16-18; Far East Command, Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS), *Enemy Documents, Korean Operations*, *passim*; Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac), *Chinese Communist Forces Tactics in Korea*, 5-11; Maj R. C. W. Thomas, "The Chinese Communist Forces in Korea," *The Army Quarterly*, Oct 52 (digested

in *Military Review*, xxxii, no. 11 (Feb 53), 87); LtCol Robert F. Rigg, *Red China's Fighting Hordes* (Harrisburg, 1951); Walker: *China Under Communism*.

[22] Walker, *China under Communism*, 51-76.

[23] FMFPac, *CCF Tactics*, 9.

[24] ADVATIS FWD Rpt 0213 in EUSAK WD, 14 Nov 50; G-3 SAR, 21-22.

[25] There is some evidence of an attempt to supply troops from division stocks. See ADVATIS 1245 in EUSAK WD, 4 Dec 50, and 164-MISDI-1176 in *Ibid.*, 1 Nov 50. Normal CCF doctrine, however, held that a division should be committed to combat for about six days and then withdrawn to replenish its supplies and replace casualties. This procedure, naturally, definitely limited the extent of an attack by the CCF and prevented the maintenance of the momentum for an extended offensive. MajGen D. G. Barr testimony in *MacArthur Hearing*, 2650; Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.

[26] X Corps msg X 11792; G-2 SAR, 21-22; SSgt Robert W. Tallent, "New Enemy," *Leatherneck Magazine*, xxxiv, No. 2 (Feb 51), 12-15; 3/1 SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 11.

[27] Mao Tse-tung: *Strategic Problems of Chinese Revolutionary Wars*, Ed by LtCol F. B. Nihart (Quantico, 1951), 17-18. Adapted from an English translation published in the *China Digest*, of Hong Kong.

[28] *Ibid.*, 4.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] LtGen E. M. Almond Comments, 22 Jun 56.

[31] Excerpt from a series of three articles, "Look, This is the American Way of Life," used as a primer in the "Hate America" campaign. Quoted in Walker, *China Under Communism*, 13.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Mao, *Strategic Problems*, 31.

[34] *Ibid.*


[35] Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.

[36] The above description was derived from S. L. A. Marshall, "CCF in the Attack" (EUSAK Staff Memorandum ORO-S-26), 5 Jan 51.

[37] 3/1 SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 9. The remainder of the section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: *Ibid.*; G-2 SAR, 13-45; 1stMar SAR, 28-29; 5thMar SAR, 38-44; EUSAK *Combat Information Bulletin No. 4*; FMFPac, *CCF Tactics*, 1-5.

[38] These weaknesses, however, were confined to the early months of CCF participation in the Korean conflict. Following the peace talks in the summer of 1951—an interlude with the enemy exploited for military purposes—the Chinese gradually built up to an equality with UN forces in mortars and artillery.

[39] 164-MISDI-1232, 1260, 1266, 1274, and 1275 in EUSAK WD, 19, 26, and 28 Nov and 1 Dec 50; ADVATIS FWD #1. Rpt 0271 in EUSAK WD 4 Dec 50; X Corps *PIR 81*, Annex 2; G-2 SAR, 17-18.



The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 6. The Battle of Sudong

- [1] Descriptions of the briefing session and reconnaissance flight are based on LtCol H. J. Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56.
- [2] Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56; Maj M. E. Roach Comments, 17 May 56. The quotation is from Litzenberg.
- [3] 7thMar SAR, 5, 7.
- [4] *Ibid.*, 3. Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.
- [5] 1stMarDiv PIR 6. Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
- [6] X Corps WD Sum, Nov 50, 24.
- [7] 1stMarDiv PIR 6.
- [8] *Ibid.*
- [9] 1stMarDiv PIRS 7 & 8; Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
- [10] The account of 2 Nov, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: 1stMarDiv SAR, annex SS, appendix 3 (hereafter 3/11 SAR), 3; G-3 SAR, 16; 7thMar SAR, 12; VMF-312 SAR, 8–9; VMF(N)-513 SAR, sec 6, 10; Col H. L. Litzenberg interv by HistDiv HQMC, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; LtCol F. F. Parry interv by HistDiv HQMC, 4 Apr 51; Caps D. C. Holland, J. G. Theros, and H. G. Connell interv by HistBr G-3 HQMC, n. d.; W. J. Davis interv, 18 Oct 55; 1stLt W. F. Goggin interv by HistDiv HQMC, n. d.; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1157 2 Nov 50; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Col A. L. Bowser Comments, n. d.; LtCol M. A. Hull Comments, n. d.; Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56; Capt W. J. Davis Comments, 15 Apr 56; Bey Comments, 24 Apr 51.
- [11] This section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: G-3 SAR, 18–19; 7thMar SAR, 13, n. p.; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; 3/11 SAR, 3; 1stMarDiv PIRs 9 & 10; Litzenberg interv 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Parry interv, 4 Apr 51; Holland-Theros-Connell interv, n. d.; Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; Geer, *The New Breed*, 228–235; Capt William J. Davis, “Nightmare Alley,” *Leatherneck Magazine*, MS.; Narrative of SSgt R. E. McDurmin, 23 Jul 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.; W. J. Davis Comments, 15 Apr 56; Maj W. E. Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, n. d.
- [12] Due to 2/7’s difficulties on Hill 698 Charlie Company was unable to move position until dusk. As Col Davis has pointed out, this was fortuitous because it allowed Charlie to move into position unseen by the Chinese and was a major factor in trapping the Chinese in the valley the next morning. R. G. Davis Comments, 3.
- [13] LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 7 May 56.
- [14] 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50. Since neither D nor F Companies was involved at this time, the information must have come from E. Capt Bey, however, doubts if either of the probing attacks received by E Company was made by more than 20 men. Capt R. T. Bey Comments, 24 Apr 56.
- [15] X Corps PIR 44, annex 2; 1stMarDiv PIR 10; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1530 3 Nov 50; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 51.
- [16] *Ibid.*
- [17] The demolition had little more than dramatic effect, however, since the Songchon river bed was negotiable to vehicles of all types.
- [18] Sawyer Comments.
- [19] *Ibid.*; X Corps PIR 44, annex 2; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50; 7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1315 3 Nov 50; and Geer, *The New Breed*, 235–236.
- [20] 3/11 SAR, 3; Maj W. R. Earney Comments, n. d.

- [21] VMF-312 SAR, 12.
- [22] VMF(N)-513 SAR, 11. The others on this flight were Capt Edwin Pendry, 1stLt Warren J. Beyes, and 1stLt William E. Jennings.
- [23] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 27; 7thMar SAR, 13; R. G. Davis Comments, 7–9; Vorhies Comments.
- [24] 7thMar SAR, 13; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51.
- [25] Goggin interv; Hull Comments.
- [26] Bey Comments, 24 Apr 56.
- [27] 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; and Capt E. R. Delong interv, 18 Oct 50.
- [28] 1stMarDiv SAR, EE (hereafter HqBn SAR), 10; HqBn URpt 8, 2–3; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55.
- [29] *Ibid.*, Goggin interv; Delong interv, 18 Oct 50; and 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; Hull Comments.
- [30] 7thMar SAR, appendix 4, 4; ADC 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1320 3 Nov 50; and Delong interv, 18 Oct 50. Casualty figures could only be estimated in after action reports, since all 7th Marines' records were destroyed before the withdrawal from Yudam-ni in early December 1950. Throughout the remainder of this volume, only those casualty figures for the Division as a whole can be reported with consistent accuracy.
- [31] 7thMar SAR, 14; 3/11 SAR, 3; Goggin interv; HqBn URpt 8, 2–3; 7th Mar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 0804 and 1508 4 Nov 50.
- [32] X Corps PIR 44, annex 2; 1stMarDiv PIRs 11 and 12, encl 1; 7thMar SAR, n. p.
- [33] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex NN (hereafter 1stEngrBn SAR), 8; and 7thMar SAR, n. p.
- [34] G-2 SAR, 34; and 7thMar SAR, n. p.
- [35] 1stMarDiv PIR 10.
- [36] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1508 4 Nov 50.
- [37] The advance to Chinhung-ni and the engagement with enemy tanks is derived from: 7thMar SAR, 13; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; Geer, *The New Breed*, 236–237; and P. G. Martin ltr to HistBr G-3 HQMC, 21 Oct 55; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0045, 5 Nov 50; R. G. Davis Comments, 13–15; Maj R. B. Crossman Comments, n. d.; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56.
- [38] Available records do not indicate whether tank number three should be credited to VMF-312 or to VMF(N)-513, both of which had close-support flights in the area.
- [39] 7thMar SAR, 13; and 1stMarDiv POR 116.
- [40] 7thMar SAR, n. p.; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; Dowsett Comments, 29 May 56.
- [41] HqBn URpt 8, 3; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55.
- [42] *Ibid.*
- [43] 7thMar SAR, 13; 3/11 SAR, 3.
- [44] VMF(N)-513 SAR, 12.
- [45] HqBn SAR, 12; HqBn URpt 9, 2; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; and Geer, *The New Breed*, 237–238; Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56. This was the last employment of Recon by the 7th Marines. On 7 November it was detached and ordered back to Majon-dong to patrol the road to Huksu-ri and the division's left flank.
- [46] The fight for Hills 891 and 987 is derived from 7thMar SAR, 13–14; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; 3/11 SAR, 3; VMF-312 SAR, 9; VMF(N)-513 SAR, 13; 1stMarDiv *OpnO 19–50*, 5 Nov 50; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; W. J. Davis interv, 18 Oct 55; 1stMarDiv PIRs 12 & 13; Aide-de-Camp, CG 1stMarDiv tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1130 5 Nov 50; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035, 1200, 1330, 1900, 2130, and 2215 5 Nov 50, and 1145, 1245, 1410, 1425, 2055, and 2245 6 Nov 50; 7thMar ISUM 14; 1stMarDiv POR 122; and Geer, *The New Breed*, 237–

240; Capt H. H. Harris Comments, n. d.; Earney Comments, 2-8; Capt M. P. Newton, "The Attack on 'How' Hill," (MS); Roach Comments, 7 May 56.

[47] Smith, *Chronicle*, 73.

[48] One Chinese took all the pounding from supporting arms that he could, then climbed out of his bunker and walked into G Company's lines to surrender. On interrogation he pinpointed his regiment: one battalion on Hill 987, one on Hill 891, and the reserve battalion in the saddle between 987 and 1304. Roach Comments, 7 May 56.

[49] 7thMar SAR, 14.

[50] *Marine Corps Board Study* (hereafter *MCB Study*), II-C-16. *CCF Army Histories*, 31, states that the 124th was in action in west central Korea by the middle of November.

[51] 7thMar SAR, 14; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; Roach Comments, 7 May 56.

[52] Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; CG's Diary in X Corps *WD*, 8 Nov 50; Roach Comments, 7 May 56.

[53] 7thMar SAR, 13-14; Geer, *The New Breed*, 243-247; Goggin interv.

[54] Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55.

[55] Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 45.

[56] Marshall, *CCF in the Attack*. See also FECOM, *Terrain Study No. 6*, XIX-8; R. G. Davis Comments; Dowsett Comments, 29 May 56; Cdr J. C. Craven, USN, Comments, n. d.

[57] 7th Mar SAR, 15-16; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1400 10 Nov 50; Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56.

[58] 2/5 SAR, 10; CG 1stMarDiv msgs to CO 5thMar, 1605 and 2202 3 Nov 50; CG X Corps msg X 11939, 3 Nov 50; CO 5thMar msg to 2/5, 1/11, A/Engr, ATCo, 4.2'' MCo, 2100 3 Nov 50; 2/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 2.

[59] 2/5 SAR, 10.

[60] CO 1/5 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1820 8 Nov 50; "Special Reconnaissance of the 1st Bn 5thMar, 7-9 Nov 50," 10 Nov 50.


[61] 2/5 SAR, 10, 32.


[62] 1/5 msg to 5thMar, 1956 10 Nov 50; 1/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 5; 5thMar *URpt 4*.


[63] 5thMar *URpt 4*; 1/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 6.

[64] 5thMar SAR, 12; 5thMar *URpt 4*.

[65] 1stMAW SAR, annex K, appendix I (hereafter VMF(N)-542 SAR), 1-8.







ACTION OF 4-5 NOVEMBER AND FUNCHILIN PASS

- Advances made 4 November
- - -→ Advances made 5 November
- ★ CCF Strongpoints



MAP-10

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 7. Advance to the Chosin Reservoir

- [1] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr, 20 Feb 56.
- [2] HqBn SAR, 10–11; Smith, *Notes*, 513–514; CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 2200 3 Nov 50; MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, 4 May 56.
- [3] HqBn SAR, 10–11; Smith, *Notes*, 513–514. Some explosive, too unstable to be moved, was left in the caves. Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56.
- [4] Smith, *Notes*, 472–473; G–3 SAR, 21. The previous day an A/Tks patrol had killed an estimated 150 NKs in a short fire-fight west of Munchon. 1stTkBn, SAR, 12.
- [5] CG X Corps msg X12075, 5 Nov 50; Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 69; Smith, *Notes*, 473.
- [6] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.
- [7] The account of the guerrilla attack at Kowon is derived from: 1stAmphTracBn SAR, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn *HD*, Nov 50, 3; Statement of Pvt Richard J. Foster, n. d.
- [8] G–3 SAR, 24; 1stTkBn SAR, 13.
- [9] The description of this fight at Yonghung is based upon: 1stAmphTracBn SAR, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn *HD*, Nov 50, 3; Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 69; G–3 SAR, 24; X Corps *POR* 42; and *1stMarURpt (S–3)* 9; D/Tks tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 0955 8 Nov 50.
- [10] CO I Co [sic] 1stAmphTracBn tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 2215 7 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 475–478.
- [11] Smith, *Notes*, 475–478; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD* 7 Nov 50.
- [12] Smith, *Notes*, 475–478; CG X Corps msg X12270, 9 Nov 50.
- [13] 1st CSG SAR, 8.
- [14] GHQ/UNC msgs 2977 and 2979, 3 and 5 Nov 50, as cited in Schnable, *Korean Conflict*.
- [15] Ninth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea, for the Period 1 to 15 November 1950 in Dept State, *United Nations Action in Korea* (Washington, 1951), 9.
- [16] C/S USA msg 95790, 3 Nov 50; Truman *Memoirs* II, 373.
- [17] Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 373; CinCFE msg C68285, 4 Nov 50.
- [18] CinCFE msg C68396, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95878, 5 Nov 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 375–376; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 405–411.
- [19] CinCFE msgs C68456 and CX68436, 7 Nov 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 377.
- [20] Smith, *Notes*, 552–553.
- [21] X Corps *OpnO* 6, 11 Nov 50.
- [22] X Corps *Special Report on Chosin Reservoir*, 27 Nov to 10 Dec 50, 9; X Corps *WDSum*, Nov 50, 5.
- [23] X Corps *WD Sum*, Nov 50, 4–5.
- [24] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to Gen C. B. Cates, 15 Nov 50. Gen Almond comments: “I am very mindful of the skepticism of General Smith in all of the supply plans that X Corps conceived and I sympathize with his viewpoint very thoroughly. However, in my mind there was always the assistance to be gained by air supply either drop or landing them and the counterpart of that, the evacuation to be expected by plane from the air field that we were to build.” Almond ltr, 22 Jun 56.
- [25] Smith, *Chronicle*, 31.
- [26] This section is based on: X Corps *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 9; and X Corps *WDSum*, Nov 50, 5–6, 51–52.
- [27] 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 21–50, 13 Nov 50. The orders for the seizure of Hagaru and the 5th Mar’s movement of a battalion to Koto-ri had been issued in CG 1stMarDiv FragO, 2130 12 Nov 50. Hagaru was occupied without a

fight at 1300 on the 14th. CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1437 14 Nov 50.

[28] Smith, *Notes*, 592–594.

[29] Bowser Comments.

[30] 1stMar SAR, 13.

[31] Smith, *Notes*, 614; LtGen F. Harris ltr, 24 Aug 56.

[32] LtCol J. H. Partridge interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 25 Jun 51, 31–32.

[33] 1stTkBn SAR, 18. 1stEngrBn had been ordered to prepare the MSR for tank use on 6 Nov. CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stEngrBn, 1530 6 Nov 50.

[34] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1229 18 Nov 50; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 39–40.

[35] Kenneth W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 53–54.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 2345 20 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex HH (hereafter 1stMedBn SAR), 4–7.

[38] 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 22–50, 17 Nov 50.

[39] 1stMar SAR, 12; G–3 X Corps tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 1220 18 Nov 50; 26thROK msg to 3dInfDiv, 1030 19 Nov 50.

[40] Smith, *Notes*, 638–639; X Corps *OI* 17, 22 Nov 50. See also G–3 X Corps tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 1850 20 Nov 50, in G–3 Journal, X Corps *WD*, 20 Nov 50.

[41] Smith, *Notes*, 638–639; 1stMarDiv *POR* 164.

[42] 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 23–50, 23 Nov 50.

[43] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex II (hereafter 1st MTBn SAR), 4, 7; 7th MTBn SAR, 2–3.

[44] CG X Corps msg X12811, 20 Nov 50. Italics added.

[45] See Memo Chairman JCS to SecDef: “Chinese Communists Intervention in Korea,” 9 Nov 50; and Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 372.

[46] JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; CinCFE msg CX 68411, 7 Nov 50; Schnable, *Korean Conflict*. See also Karig, *Korea*, 376–378.

[47] Schnable, *Korean Conflict*. Bombing of the bridges ceased 6 December with the freezing of the Yalu. OCMH, *Report from the Secretary of Defense . . . on Operations in Korea*, (Draft No. 1), Pt. V, 3–4.

[48] X Corps ltr to Subordinate Commands, 16 Nov 50.

[49] This was the only American unit ever to push as far north as the border. On the Eighth Army front a regiment of the 6th ROK Division reached the Yalu on 26 October, only to be cut off and badly mauled a few days later in the first CCF attacks. EUSAK, *WDSum*, Oct 50, 38, 44.

[50] CinCUNC Communique 12, 24 Nov 50.

[51] EUSAK *WD*, 24 Nov 50.

[52] X Corps *OpnO* 7, 25 Nov. 50.

[53] CG X Corps msg X 13069, 24 Nov 50; CG’s Diary in X Corps *WD*, 25 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 727.

[54] Smith, *Notes*, 727–729.

[55] *Ibid.*, 728; EUSAK *WD*, 26 Nov 50.

[56] It is interesting to note that this is an increase of 95,741 over EUSAK’S estimate of the day before. EUSAK *PIR* 136, encl. 2, 3, in EUSAK *WD*, 25 Nov 50.

[57] EUSAK *PIR* 137, 4, and encl 4, 3, in EUSAK *WD*, 26 Nov 50.

[58] 1stMar SAR, 13, and appendix 6, 4; 1stMar *HD*, Nov 50, 2; 1stMarDiv msg to COs 11th & 1stMars, 1350, 22 Nov 50.

[59] 5thMar SAR 15–18. Smith, *Notes*, 626.

[60] 7thMar SAR, 19–20; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.

[61] 5thMar SAR, 18; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2101, 25 Nov 50.


[62] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 24-50*, 26 Nov 50.

[63] Smith, *Chronicle*, 89.

[64] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935, 26 Nov 50.

[65] X Corps, *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 32; 1stMarDiv *PIR* 33.

[66] Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56. See also Smith, *Chronicle*, 79, 82, 87.



The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 8. Crisis at Yudam-ni

[1] 2/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 8–9.

[2] 5thMar *OpnO* 39–50, 26 Nov 50.

[3] The transport priority given the move of the 5th Marines prevented H&S and Weapons (—) Companies from moving to Yudam-ni. Fox Company moved to Toktong Pass on the 27th while How Battery of 3/11 remained at Hagaru to support Fox Company. The two rifle companies of 2/7 at Yudam-ni were assigned to 1/7 for operational control. MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sept 56.

[4] Col Roise states that he was attached to the 7th Marines in the absence of the Commanding Officer, 5th Marines. The record does not indicate a formal attachment. Col Litzenberg appears to have acted in his capacity as senior officer present. See Col R. L. Murray Comments, n. d.; Col H. S. Roise Comments, n. d.; LtCol H. J. Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56.

[5] 7thMar *SAR*, 20; 2/5 *SAR*, 14; 2/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 8–9; Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56. Roise Comments.

[6] 2/5 *SAR*, 14.

[7] 7thMar *FragO*, 1850 26 Nov 50; 7thMar *SAR*, 20–21.

[8] Cooke had taken over the company on 12 November, and Lieutenant H. H. Harris reverted to ExecO.

[9] Unless otherwise stated this section is derived from: 7thMar *SAR*, 20–21; RCT 7 *URpt* 5; 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.; 2/5 *SAR*, 15–18; 2/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 9; 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex SS, appendix A (hereafter 1/11 *SAR*), 8–9; VMF-312 *SAR*, 15; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1945 27 Nov 50; LtCol M.A. Hull Comments, n. d.

[10] Feehan, on 15 Nov 50, had relieved LtCol Ransom M. Wood who had commanded 1/11 since its arrival in Korea with the 1st ProvMarBrig on 2 Aug 50.

[11] While returning to the rear to bring up reinforcements, George Company's commander, Capt Cooney, was mortally wounded. LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 24 Jul 56.

[12] This section is derived from: 5thMar *SAR*, 19–20; 7thMar *SAR*, 21; 1/5 *SAR*, 11–12; 2/5 *SAR*, 15–18; 3/5 *SAR*, 13.

[13] Yudam-ni itself is 3500 feet above sea level.

[14] Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A. Z. Freeman, 7 Mar 51.

[15] LtCol Lockwood had relieved Maj Sawyer as CO 2/7 on 5 Nov.

[16] Four M-4 tanks of the Provisional Tank Platoon had attempted to come through from Hagaru but gave up the attempt when all slid off the road. Later on the 27th one M-26 succeeded in completing the trip, but the Chinese cut the road before the others could follow. 1stTkBn, *SAR*, 21.

[17] 7thMar *SAR*, 42–43; 5thMar *SAR*, 45–50; 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex FF (1stServBn); 1stMTBn *SAR*, 9; Roach Comments, 24 Jul 56.

[18] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from 7thMar *SAR*, 21, n. p.; RCT 7 *URpt* 5; 2/5 *SAR*, 17–18; 2/5 *HD* Nov 50, 9; CO 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 2253 27 Nov 50, 1000 and 1250 28 Nov 50; Capt Samuel Jaskilka, "Easy Alley," *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxv, no. 5 (May 51), 15–18; Maj S. Jaskilka Comments, n. d.

[19] 1stMarDiv *SAR*, 31–32; G-2 *SAR*, 15, 30–31; *CCF Army Histories*, 13, 21.

[20] Unless otherwise stated the sources for this section are: 7thMar *SAR*; RCT 7 *URpt* 6; 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.; 2/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 9–10; 2/5 *SAR*, 18–19; CO 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 0810 and 1000 28 Nov 50; Jaskilka, "Easy Alley," 18–19; Capt M.P. Newton Comments, n. d.


[21] LtCol Harris, son of MajGen Field Harris, had relieved Maj Roach on 11 Nov.


[22] ATIS, *Enemy Documents: Korean Operations*, Issue 84, 38. Except where otherwise noted, this section is based on: *Ibid.*, 26–43; LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 3 May 56; 1stLt R. T. Bey ltr to Maj A. C. Geer, 26 Jun 52; RCT 7 *URpt* 5; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMar Div, 1000 28 Nov 50; 7thMar SAR, 21; CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0730 28 Nov 50; 3/5 SAR, 13–14; Hull Comments; Capt J. H. Cahill ltr, 3 Jul 56. The ATIS translation contains a number of detailed and apparently accurate critiques of small unit actions. An earlier translation is to be found in ATIS, *Enemy Documents: Korean Operations*, Issue 66, 87-134.


[23] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 20 Jul 56.


[24] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from: 1/5 SAR, 12–13; 1/5 *HD*, Nov 50; 7thMar SAR, 21; 7thMar *URpt* 5; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Murray Comments; Hull Comments; Cdr J. H. Craven Comments, 24 Aug 56; Maj W. E. Kerrigan ltr, 7 Sep 56; Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56; 1stLt R. E. Snyder Comments, 15 Sep 56.

[25] Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52.













THE BATTLE OF NORTHWEST RIDGE





ACTION AT 3/5'S CP

CCF Attacks



MAP-15

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 9. Fox Hill

- [1] 3/11 SAR, 6; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex SS, appendix 4, (hereafter 4/11 SAR), 5.
- [2] 1/11 SAR, 8; 4/11 SAR, 5; LtCol W. McReynolds interv, 26 Nov 56.
- [3] Col R. G. Davis Comments, 30 Nov 56
- [4] The following section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from; Geer, *The New Breed*, 288–290; Lynn Montross, “Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii, no. 5 (May 53), 16–23; 7th Mar ISUM 67; and 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50.
- [5] The following section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from Capt R. C. McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii, no.3 (Mar 53), 16–23; Montross, “Ridge runners of Toktong Pass,” 16–23; 7thMar SAR, 20–21; 7thMar URpt 5; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A. Z. Freeman, 3 Jul 51; 1stLt C. C. Dana and Ssgt R. R. Danford interv by Capt Freeman, 4 July 51.
- [6] These figures would indicate the complete destruction of a CCF Battalion.
- [7] The description of 3/5’s counterattack is derived from: 5thMar SAR, 21–22; 3/5 SAR, 14; Taplett interv, 3 May 56; Capt D. B. Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56 and statement, n. d.
- [8] Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56, estimates the opposition came from 25–30 Chinese.
- [9] The account of Company C’s counterattack is derived from 5thMar SAR, 21; 1/5 SAR, 12–13; 7thMar SAR, 21; 7th Mar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; 1/5 HD, Nov 50, 8; Maj L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52; ATIS *Enemy Documents: Korean Operations* Issue 66, 130–134, and Issue 84, 38–43; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 27 Jun 56; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56; SSGt R. C. Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55.
- [10] L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Geer, *The New Breed*, 285.
- [11] 5thMar SAR, 12–13; Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56.
- [12] The account of the action of Hill 1240 is derived from: 5thMar SAR, 12; 1/5 SAR, 12–13; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Geer, *The New Breed*, 288; Capt H. L. Dawe, Jr., Comments, n. d.
- [13] 3/5 SAR, 14, and 2/5 SAR, 18; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0840 28 Nov 50.
- [14] *Ibid.*; Jaskilka, “Easy Alley.”
- [15] 2/5 HD, Nov 50, 9–10.
- [16] 5thMar SAR, 21; 2/5 SAR, 19; Col J. L. Stewart interv 13 Jun 56.
- [17] *Ibid.*; Col R. L. Murray Comments, n. d.
- [18] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 1650 28 Nov 50.
- [19] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 7thMar, 1627 28 Nov 50.
- [20] *Ibid.*; 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1050 28 Nov 50.
- [21] 2/5 SAR, 19.
- [22] The account of C/5’s rescue, is derived from: 7thMar SAR, 21; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv 1150, 1200, 1450, 1550, 1915, 2040 28 Nov 50, and 0144 29 Nov 50; 7thMar msg to 2/7 0515 28 Nov 50; Geer, *The New Breed*, 290–291.
- [23] This account of Company F’s activities on 28 Nov is derived from: 7thMar SAR, 18–24; McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” 16–23; Thornton interv, 3 Jul 51; Dana-Danford interv 4 Jul 51; Geer, *The New Breed*, 300–302; Statement of Cpl C. R. North, n. d.
- [24] 5thMar SAR, 48; Stewart interv, 13 Jun 56; 4/11 SAR, 5; McReynolds interv, 26 Nov 56.
- [25] Keyes Beech: *Tokyo and Points East* (New York, 1954), 196.
- [26] This account of the Composite Battalion is derived from the following sources: Narrative of Maj W. R. Earney, n. d., 5–8; 3/7 SAR, n. p.

[27] Beech, *Tokyo and Points East*, 197.

[28] This description of the third night on Fox Hill is derived from McCarthy, "Fox Hill," 21.

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 10. Hagaru's Night of Fire

- [1] This section is derived from: 1stMar *HD*, Nov 50, 2; 3/1 *SAR*, 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 2–3; Col T. L. Ridge ltr, 22 Sep 55, and Comments, 7 Jun 56; LtCol E. H. Simmons Comments, n. d.
- [2] Ridge, *Notes*; LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 1 Dec 55.
- [3] Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 17 May 56.
- [4] Smith, *Notes*, 689–690.
- [5] D/Engr *SAR*.
- [6] 1stEngrBn *SAR*, 11; and Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51.
- [7] 3/1 *SAR*, 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 4; 1stTkBn *SAR*, 21; 3/1 msg to CO 1stMar, 1845 28 Nov 50.
- [8] *Ibid.*; Narrative of Maj C. E. Corley, n. d.
- [9] 3/1 *SAR* 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 4; and 1stLt R. C. Needbon [sic] interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 28 May 51.
- [10] VMO–6 tel to G–2 1stMarDiv, 1015 28 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1100 28 Nov 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1103 28 Nov 50.
- [11] This section is based on Ridge, *Notes*, and Comments, 7 Jun 56; Narrative of Capt R. E. Carey, 3 Feb 56. The need for NCOs in rifle platoons was so pressing that the former intelligence chief, TSgt James E. Sweeney, had been transferred from the S–2 Section just before the move to Hagaru.
- [12] The possibility of an attack from the East Hill area was considered, since Chinese forces were known to be east of the hill. Col Ridge states “I assume[d] that the build up of such forces would not allow their capability of a strong attack.” Ridge Comments, 7 Jun 56.
- [13] This section, unless otherwise noted, is based upon the following sources: 3/1 *SAR* 26 Nov–15 Dec 50; Ridge, *Notes*; Maj A. J. Strohmenger ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 17 Aug 55; Corley narrative; Narrative of Maj J. R. Fisher, n. d.; Simmons Comments.
- [14] Smith, *Notes*, 695–696; CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 1015 28 Nov 50.
- [15] CG Diary, in X Corps *WD*, 28 Nov 50; X Corps *WDSum*, Nov 50, 16.
- [16] Narrative of Major C. L. Sitter, n. d.
- [17] This was made official by CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 1625 28 Nov 50.
- [18] Ridge, *Notes*, 27–28.
- [19] “CO 2/7 and his headquarters were not given a specific mission because it was assumed that his uncanceled order from CO 7th Marines would require his further efforts in the relief of Fox Company.” Ridge Comments, 7 June 56.
- [20] This section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: 3/1 tel to CO 1stMar, 2100 29 Nov 50; Ridge, *Notes*; Simmons interv, 1 Dec 55 and Comments; Fisher narrative; Corley narrative; Narrative of Capt R. L. Barrett, Jr., 9 Aug 55; Capt J. H. Miller ltr to authors, 10 Oct 55; and Sgt K. E. Davis ltr to authors, 20 Oct 55.
- [21] K. E. Davis ltr, 20 Oct 55.
- [22] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 45. Ridge Comments, 7 Jun 56, questions whether the floodlights were on during the whole attack.
- [23] Smith, *Chronicle*, 93.
- [24] Corley narrative.
- [25] References to Co D, 10th Engr Bn, USA, are based on Lt Norman R. Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” in Capt John G. Westover, Ed., *Combat Support in Korea* (Washington, 1955), 206–208.
- [26] 1stMar tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 0230 29 Nov 50.
- [27] Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” 209.

- [28] *Ibid.*, 209–210; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1445 29 Nov 50.
- [29] Narrative of Capt N. A. Canzona, 28 Mar 56.
- [30] Capt Benjamin S. Read (as told to Hugh Morrow): “Our Guns Never Got Cold,” *Saturday Evening Post*, ccxxiii (7 Apr 51), 145.
- [31] Strohmenger ltr, 17 Aug 55.
- [32] Corley and Barrett narratives.
- [33] POW reports stated that the Chinese assault force in this sector had been one regiment. CIC tel to G–2 1stMarDiv, 1715 29 Nov 50.
- [34] Capt R. E. Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Myers Comments.
- [35] VMF–312 SAR, 15–16.
- [36] Myers Comments state: “High ground was taken. But [we] could not control movement of the enemy on the reverse side. As a result [we] could not stay on top.”
- [37] Myers Comments.
- [38] Canzona narrative, 28 Mar 56. Col Brower points out that the Chinese positions were defiladed from artillery fire. Col J. H. Brower Comments, n. d.
- [39] 3/1 SAR 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 9–10; Ridge, *Notes*; Carey narrative.

HAGARU DEFENSIVE PERIMETER

28-29 November 1950


————— Perimeter
 - - - - - Perimeter abandoned during night

—+—+—+—+—+—+—+ Railroad

▨ Marsh

500 0 500
YARDS

MAP-17



ITEM COMPANY

HOW COMPANY

| | | | | | |
|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|----------|
| | Lt Fisher | | | | |
| Lt Degerne | Lt Hall | Lt Needham | Lt Barrett | Capt Corley | Lt Mason |
| 1st | 3d | 2d | 1st | Lt Endsley | 2d |
| | | | | 3d | |

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 11. Task Force Drysdale

- [1] This section is based upon the following sources: 1stMar SAR, 13–14; 1stMar *Urpt (S–3) 13*, 1–2; VMF-312 SAR, 16; LtCol D. M. Schmuck interv, 2 Apr 56; Maj W. L. Bates, Jr., interv by HistDiv HQMC, 16 Mar 53; Col D. M. Schmuck Comments, n. d.
- [2] Schmuck Comments.
- [3] 1stMar SAR, 14, and appendix 10, 6; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1815 and 1930 27 Nov 50.
- [4] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1058 28 Nov 50.
- [5] The remainder of this section is based upon: 2/1 SAR, 12–13; HqBn *URpt 12*. LtCol J. C. McClelland, Jr., ltr, 21 Feb 56; Col A. Sutter Comments, n. d.
- [6] LtCol R. E. Lorigan Comments, 16 May 56.
- [7] Unless otherwise specified, this section is based on: CO 41st Commando ltr to CG 1stMarDiv, 30 Nov 50; 1stTkBn SAR, 23–27; Smith, *Notes*, 859–868; Maj C. L. Sitter ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 4 Oct 55; TSgt G. D. Pendas ltr to HistBr G–3, 18 Dec 55; Narrative of Capt M. J. Capraro, 2 Feb 56; Narrative of Capt J. D. Buck, 27 Jan 56; LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM, “41 Commando,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii no. 8 (Aug 51), 28–32; 1stMar tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 1705 29 Nov 50; and Lt Alfred J. Catania, “Truck Platoon in Korea,” in Westover, *Combat Support in Korea*, 53–57; LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM, Comments, n. d.
- [8] Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this section are the same as the preceding, plus: Statement of Capt M. C. Capraro, 12 Feb 51; MSgt E. F. Grayson, Sgt E. J. Keeton, and Cpl E. McCardell interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 17 Feb 51; Capt M. C. Capraro interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51; CWO D. R. Yancey interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51; Sgt C. W. Dickerson, Cpl C. W. Williams, Sgt M. L. Estess, SSgt J. B. Nash, and TSgt C. L. Harrison interv by HistDiv HQMC, 25–31 Jul 51; Col H. S. Walseth interv by Capt Shutts, 26 Jan 51; LtCol J. N. McLaughlin Comments, 5 Nov 56. Nash, Harrison, Dickerson, Estess, and Williams were among the men captured with McLaughlin. They escaped from Chinese imprisonment several months later.
- [9] Maj McLaughlin was one of the TTU instructors who had transferred to the X Corps Staff. He was an Assistant G–3 and Corps liaison officer with 1stMarDiv.
- [10] Distances are approximate, since it is understandable that estimates made by participants in the darkness varied a great deal.
- [11] LtCol Chidester and Maj Eagan were still missing at the end of the conflict, when the exchanges of prisoners took place. From the information that LtCol McLaughlin has been able to secure, it appears that both officers died of wounds prior to reaching a prison camp. McLaughlin Comments, 5 Nov 56.
- [12] *Ibid*. A postscript to the Hell Fire Valley fight was written the following spring in front-page headlines announcing the escape from a CCF prison camp of 17 enlisted Marines and a soldier. Among them were five NCOs who contributed firsthand accounts for these pages. Of the 44 Marines listed as MIA, a total of 25 either escaped or survived their prison camp experiences and were liberated in Operation Big Switch.
- [13] This section, except where otherwise specified, has been derived from the following sources: 3/1 SAR 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 4–5, 8–9; 1stTkBn SAR, 24–25; Ridge, *Notes*; Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Canzona narrative, 27 Mar 56; Carey narrative, 3 Feb 56.
- [14] This account of Marine supporting fires on the night of 29–30 November is based on: Carey narrative, 3 Feb 56; LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; 3/1 SAR 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 4–5.
- [15] X Corps *OI 19*, 29 Nov 50.
- [16] Smith, *Chronicle*, 95; X Corps *WD Sum*, Nov 50, 16–17; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 30 Nov 50.
- [17] Col E. H. Forney, *Transcript of Special Report, Deputy Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 August, 21 December*

1950, 3.

[18] Smith, *Chronicle*, 95. These decisions were confirmed by CG X Corps msg X 13522, 1 Dec 50.

[19] X Corps *OpnO* 8, 30 Nov 50. See also X Corps *WD Sum, Nov 50*, 16–17; and CG's Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD* 30 Nov 50.

[20] MAG–12 *HD Nov 50*, 8; 1stMAW *HD Dec 50*; CO MAG–12 msg to Movement Report Office (MRO) Tokyo, 0805 2 Dec 50 in *ibid.* VMF–312 *HD, Dec 50*.

[21] ComPhibGruOne, *Action Report for Hungnam Redeployment, December 1950*. 1.

[22] Miller ltr, 10 Oct 55.

[23] 3/1 *SAR* 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 5; Ridge, *Notes*.

[24] Sources for the balance of this section are as follows: Smith, *Chronicle*, 97–100; 3/1 *SAR* 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 5–6; Ridge, *Notes*; Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Canzona narrative, 8 Mar 56; Pendas ltr, 18 Dec 55; Carey ltr, 14 Feb 56; Capt E. L. Meeker interv, 10 Apr 56.

[25] Ridge, *Notes*; Smith, *Notes*, 854.

[26] The sources for the operations of Task Force Faith, unless otherwise noted, are: Statement of Capt Edward P. Stamford, n. d., 2–15; Statement of Dr. Lee Tong Kak, n. d.; Capt Martin Blumenson, USA, “Chosin Reservoir,” in Capt Russell A. Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea*, 63–86; X Corps *WD Sum, Nov 50*, 33–34. Chinese accounts of these actions may be found in *ATIS Enemy Documents: Korean Campaign*, Issue 84, 7–15 and 20–25. LtCol Faith had distinguished himself in World War II as aide to MajGen Matthew B. Ridgway, then commanding the 82d Airborne Div.

[27] VMF(N)–542 *SAR*, sec C, 1–2; VMF(N)–542 *HD*, Dec 50, 1–2; 1stMAW *SAR*, annex J, (hereafter MAG–33 *SAR*), sec B, 5, 8–9. See also descriptions of air support in 1stLt H. S. Wilson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 29 Jan 51; 1stLt K. E. Kiester interv by Capt Kiernan, 25 Jan 51; Capt C. P. Blankenship interv by Capt Kiernan, 26 Jan 51; and 1stLt W. R. Lipscomb interv by Capt Kiernan, 18 Feb 51.

[28] The courageous Army officer was awarded posthumously a Congressional Medal of Honor.

[29] The account of the rescue of survivors from Task Force Faith is based upon: 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex Q (hereafter DivSurgeon *SAR*), n. p. and appendix II, 10; Statement of LtCol O. L. Beall, n. d.; 1stMarDiv *POR* 197; Smith, *Notes*, 902–906; and Smith, *Chronicle*, 98, 100.

[30] 1stMarDiv G–3 Journal 1–2 Dec 50, entry 18; G–3 1stMarDiv tel to S-3 11–2 Mar, 1150 2 Dec 50.

[31] *Ibid.* Estimates of the number of soldiers evacuated by air from Hagaru as casualties run as high as 1500, but no accurate records were kept. Any such total, moreover, would have to include men from the Army units stationed at Hagaru as well as survivors of the Task Force Faith disaster.

[32] DivSurgeon *SAR*, n. p.; Smith, *Notes*, 990–994, and *Chronicle*, 1 Dec 50; Capt E. R. Hering, “Address Before U.S. Association of Military Surgeons,” 9 Oct 51; and “Address Before American Medical Association Convention,” 14 Jun 51.

[33] VMO–6 *SAR*, 14–15; Smith, *Notes*, 844.


[34] *Ibid.* See also Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky* (New York, 1954), 134–136.

[35] DivSurgeon *SAR*, n. p.; Smith, *Notes*, 990–991, and *Chronicle*, 98–99.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Smith, *Notes*, 1001–1004. Col J. H. Brower Comments, n. d.

[38] Smith, *Notes*, 1001–1004.



KOTO-RI PERIMETER

28 November - 7 December


RAILROAD

TANKS


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

500 YARDS

MAP-19



D/TKs & AT/5 — G/1 — 41 Cndo — B/31 — HqBn — B/TKs
17 tks 22 veh 31 veh 22 veh 66 veh 12 tks





EAST HILL ATTACKS

30 November

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 12. Breakout From Yudam-ni

- [1] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1750 29 Nov 50.
- [2] XCorps *OI 19*, 29 Nov 50.
- [3] Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 57. Maj McReynolds had already placed his battalion under Col Litzenberg as senior officer present. LtCol W. McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
- [4] LtCol H. A. Feehan Comments, 1 Aug 56. McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
- [5] Smith, *Notes*, 918-919.
- [6] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: RCT 5 and RCT 7 *Joint OpnO 1-50*, 30 Nov 50; X Corps *OpnO 8*, 30 Nov 50; 7thMar *SAR*, 22-23; 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.; 2/5 *SAR*, 20-21; Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55; Gen O. P. Smith Comments, 13 Nov 56; Col J. L. Winecoff Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. D. Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
- [7] A copy had been sent out earlier with the pilot of an evacuation helicopter but it did not reach the Division CP until 1 December. Winecoff Comments.
- [8] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1920 30 Nov 50. See also Smith, *Notes*, 923-924.
- [9] This account of the organization of the "Damnation" Battalion is based upon: Narrative of Maj W. R. Earney, n. d., 9-10; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg ltr, 7 Aug 56; LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56. "I trust," commented Gen Litzenberg dryly, "that the green neckerchiefs were all made of *torn* parachutes!"
- [10] Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55.
- [11] *Ibid.*, McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
- [12] This section is derived from: RCT-5 and RCT-7 *Joint OpnO 2-50*, 1 Dec 50; 5thMar *SAR*, 26-27; 3/5 *SAR*, 15; 7thMar *SAR*, 23; Smith, *Notes*, 923-927; Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 58-59; Col J. L. Stewart Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. V. Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; Narrative of LtCol R. G. Davis, 11 Jan 53; Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56; Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56; McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
- [13] After the cease-fire of July 1953, the remains were returned to the United States, in accordance with the terms of the Korean Armistice.
- [14] The description of the withdrawal of 1/5 and 3/5 is based on: 5thMar *SAR*, 26; 1/5 *SAR*, 15-16; 3/5 *SAR*, 15; LtCol R. D. Taplett and Maj R. E. Whipple, "Darkhorse Sets the Pace," *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii, no. 6 (Jun 53), 22-23; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55; Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 25 Jul 56.
- [15] 5thMar *SAR*, 26-27; 7thMar *SAR*, 23; 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.; 1/5 *SAR*, 15-16; 2/5 *SAR*, 21-22; 3/5 *SAR*, 15. CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935 1 Dec 50.
- [16] Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
- [17] 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.
- [18] 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.; R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935 1 Dec 50; LtCol R. G. Davis interv by Capt K. W. Shutts and A. Z. Freeman, 6 Apr 51; Maj E. M. Hovatter Comments, 19 Jul 56.
- [19] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based on Davis narrative; Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; R. G. Davis interv, 6 Apr 51; and Capt W. J. Davis interv, 4 Jun 56.
- [20] Descriptions of 3/5 operations in this section are based on the 3/5 *SAR*, 15; Taplett and Whipple, "Darkhorse Sets the Pace," II, 46-50; Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
- [21] 11thMar *SAR*, 7; *MCB Study*, II-C-72.
- [22] "Item Company upon relief was temporarily non-effective. In fact it ceased to exist except on paper. Some of the survivors were assigned to G/5 and the wounded who were able to walk were assigned to a provisional rifle

unit organized from H&S Co and under the command of Lt George Bowman.” Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.

[23] This section is based on R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53; Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; R. G. Davis interv, 6 Apr 51; and W. G. Davis interv, 4 June 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 20 Aug 56; Hovatter Comments, 19 Jul 5.

[24] 2/5 SAR, 22; Stewart Comments; McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.

[25] 1/5 SAR, 16; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55.

[26] The description of the fight on Hill 1542 is derived from: ATIS *Enemy Documents: Korean Campaign*, Issue 66, 88-93; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; Litzenberg ltr, 7 Aug 56; Maj W. R. Earney ltr to Gen Litzenberg, 16 Jul 56.

[27] General Litzenberg points out that “it was necessary for 3/7 to maintain protection for the main column until it passed by Hill 1542. They [3/7] held high enough to keep Chinese small arms fire at a sufficient distance from the Road.” Litzenberg Comments, 7 Aug 56.

[28] Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 61. Other sources for this section are as follows: LtCol Taplett interv, 8 Jun 56 and Comments, 9 and 14 Aug 56; TSgt E. L. Knox interv, 30 May 56; *MCB Study*, II-C-78-80; Taplett and Whipple, “Darkhorse Leads the Way,” II, 49-50; Smith, *Notes*, 932-946; R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53; 5thMar SAR, 29; Geer, *The New Breed*, 338-341.

[29] Stewart Comments.

[30] Sources for this section, unless otherwise noted, are the same as those for the last and: 3/1 tels to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0430 and 1715 4 Dec 50; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to 11thMar, 0730 4 Dec 50; 7thMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0830 and 0925 4 Dec 50; G-31stMarDiv tels to 3/1, 0950 and 1330 4 Dec 50; Stevens Comments, 25 Jul 56.


[31] MAG-33 SAR sec B 6-7; VMF-214 SAR, 5; 1stMAW *HD*, Dec 50.


[32] Since the four rifle companies had been left on key points, controlling the last two and a half miles into Hagaru, the column consisted mostly of H&S and Weapons Company personnel. Davis Comments, 20 Aug 56.


[33] Lieutenant Meeker, dispatched from Hagaru with fuel, was unable to get through to the stalled artillery because of Chinese fire. Some of his men, however, did pass the Chinese block and served as part of CWO Carlson’s improvised gun crew. Capt E. L. Meeker interv, 19 Jul 56.

[34] Taplett interr, 8 Jun 56.

[35] Smith, *Notes*, 948.







| Unit | 1 Dec. | 2 Dec. | 3 Dec. | 4 Dec. |
|----------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| George Company | 114 | 96 | 84 | 80 |
| How Company | 180 | 167 | 131 | 73 |
| Item Company | 143 | 41 | 41 | 41 |
| Total | 437 | 304 | 256 | 194 |

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 13. Regroupment at Hagaru

- [1] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex T (Post Exchange), n. p. Smith, *Notes*, 1017–1018.
- [2] Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, U.S. Navy, Public Information Release, 21 Apr 51; LCdr J. H. Craven, (ChC) USN, interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Oct 52; Hering, “Address Before U.S. Association of Military Surgeons, 9 Oct 52.”
- [3] *Ibid.* Study of the frostbite casualties of the Chosin Reservoir campaign led to the adoption of the thermal boot as an effective preventive measure during the operations of the following two winters of the Korean conflict.
- [4] 2/1 SAR, 16; LtCol W. S. Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56; X Corps, *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 93; Smith, *Notes*, 844; VMO-6 SAR, 13–18.
- [5] Smith, *Notes*, 998–999.
- [6] X Corps *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 93.
- [7] Maj Paul A. Noel, Jr. interv, 4 Dec 56.
- [8] *Ibid.*, Smith, *Notes*, 998–999.
- [9] X Corps *OI 22*, 2 Dec 50.
- [10] This section, except where otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: G-1 SAR, 6–7 and G-4 SAR 6–7, appendix 3–5; X Corps *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*; Smith, *Notes*, 1011–1015, and *Chronicle*, 103–105; Forney, *Special Report*, 3–5; Maj M. J. Sexton interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 6 May 51.
- [11] Smith, *Notes*, 977–978; *Chronicle*, 103–106.
- [12] 1stMarDiv *G–3 Journal*, 5–6 Dec 50, entry 7; Maj H. E. Hood, memo: Close Air Support, 11 Feb 51; Wilson interv, 29 Jan 51.
- [13] HqBn *URpt 13*; G-4 SAR, appendix II, 2–3; LtCol F. Simpson Comments, 24 Sep 56.
- [14] G-4 SAR, appendix II, 3–5.
- [15] Smith, *Notes*, 1010.
- [16] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 25–50*, 5 Dec 50. Other sources for the remainder of this section are: 1stMarDiv *AdmO 20–50*, 4 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv Destruction Plan, Hagaru Area, 4 Dec 50; Smith, *Chronicle*, 104–106.
- [17] Smith, *Notes*, 1025, 1051; CG’s Diary in X Corps *Command Report Annex (CR)*, 4 Dec 50.
- [18] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, Hagaru, 2000 4 Dec 50; 5thMar SAR, 30–31.
- [19] 1stMAW *OpnO 2-50*, 5 Dec 50; 1stMAW, “Summary of Air Support for 6 Dec,” 5 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex CC (Air Officer), 6–7; CinCPacFlt, *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, III, 225–226; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 5 Oct 56; Maj H. D. Kuokka interv, 13 Dec 56. 1stMAW *HD, Dec 50*. The VMF-214 pilots casually made their transition from shore to carrier base between sorties.
- [20] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex SS (hereafter 11Mar SAR), 8. As a consequence of the loss of nine 155mm howitzers during the last night of the Yudam-ni-Hagaru breakout, 4/11 was reorganized into two firing batteries of four howitzers each.
- [21] *Ibid.*, 1stMarDiv *POR 209*, 6 Dec 50; LtCol W. McReynolds Comments, 16 Aug 56.
- [22] Smith, *Notes*, 1058–1060; HqBn, *HD, Dec 50*, 5.
- [23] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon the following sources: 5thMar SAR, 31–32; 1/5 SAR, 17–18; 2/5 SAR, 27–29; Smith, *Notes*, 1031–1033; Geer, *The New Breed*, 353–357; Capt S. Smith, 1stLt J. R. Hines (sic) and 1stLt J. H. Honeycutt, interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 4 Feb 51; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55. Col R. L. Murray, Comments, n. d.
- [24] 2/5 SAR, 28–29.
- [25] Capt G. E. Shepherd, “Attack to the South,” (MS), 10–13.

[26] Since the ground to the left of the MSR was too cut up to permit advance through the high ground, the Provisional Battalion was to operate from the valley and clear enemy from noses found to be occupied. Litzenberg Comments, 5 Oct 56.

[27] Sources for this section, except where otherwise noted, are: 7thMar SAR, 24; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; Smith, *Notes*, 1029-1031, 1033-1047; RCT-7 *URpt 6*; 1stLt J. B. Chandler, "Thank God I'm a Marine," *Leatherneck Magazine*, xxiv, no. 6 (Jun 51), 25-26; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg, *Recollections of the Action from Hagaru to Koto-ri*, 6-7 December 1950, 2 Oct 56, and Comments, 5 Oct 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 28 Sep 56; Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56; LtCol H. T. Milne Comments, 24 Sep 56; LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56.

[28] Litzenberg *Recollections*, 2 Oct 56.

[29] 1stLt J. G. Theros, interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 16 Feb 51; Litzenberg *Recollections*, 2 Oct 56.

[30] 1stMAW SAR, Annex I (VMR-152), 11-12, and annex K, appendix J, (hereafter MTACS- 2SAR), 25; Air Officer's Rpt, in X Corps CR, 6 Dec 50; LtCol J. N. Swartley ltr to authors, 15 Oct 56.

[31] 1stMarDiv msg to 7thMar, 1030 7 Dec 50; CO RCT 7 FragO, 0930 7 Dec 50.

[32] Unless otherwise noted the description of the movement of the division trains is based on: HqBn, *HD, Dec 50*, 6-9; HqBn, *URpt 13*; Maj F. Simpson interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 11 Apr 51.

[33] This description of the headquarters convoy fight is based on: *Ibid.*; Cpl G. L. Coon, "Versatility," *Leatherneck Magazine*, xxiv, no. 3 (Mar 51), 18-19; Simpson Comments, 24 Sept 56; MTACS-2 SAR, 19; Maj C. C. Lee interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 7 Feb 51, Comments, 14 Aug 56, and ltr 1 Nov 56.

[34] Col J. L. Stewart Comments, n. d.


[35] The description of the operations of the 5th Marines and 3/1 are based on: 3/5 SAR, 17; 3/1, SAR, 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 7; 5thMar SAR, 32-34; 1/5 SAR, 18-19; 2/5 SAR, 29-30, 37.


[36] Descriptions of the operations of the engineers at Hagaru are based on these sources: 1st Engr Bn SAR, 13; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 50; Narrative of Capt N. A. Canzona, 13 Jul 56.


[37] Sexton interv, 16 May 51.

| | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Total Battle | Non- Battle ¹ |
|---------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| 30 Nov..... | 27 | 6 | 6 | 183 | 222 | 102 |
| 1 Dec..... | 27 | 14 | 6 | 111 | 158 | 134 |
| 2 Dec..... | 55 | 2 | 33 | 231 | 321 | 180 |
| 3 Dec..... | 16 | 1 | 6 | 194 | 217 | 196 |
| 4 Dec..... | 10 | 6 | 4 | 202 | 222 | 582 |
| Totals | 135 | 29 | 55 | 921 | 1140 | 1194 |

¹ 1stMarDiv SAR, annex E (Division Adjutant), appendix II, 3.







| Dates | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Totals |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------|
| 6 Dec..... | 32 | 4 | 7 | 218 | 261 |
| 7 Dec..... | 51 | 16 | 0 | 288 | 355 |
| Totals | 83 | 20 | 7 | 506 | 616 ¹ |

¹ Div Adjutant SAR, Appendix II, 3.

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 14. Onward from Koto-ri

- [1] Smith, *Notes*, 1056.
- [2] Col A. Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56; Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56.
- [3] Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56. This section is also based on 1stMar SAR, 18–24, and the 2/1 SAR, 15–18.
- [4] Not so fortunate was 2/31, which lost 5 KIA and 10 WIA expanding the perimeter to the south on 3 Dec. CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1850 3 Dec 50.
- [5] Smith, *notes*, 1069–1071.
- [6] “Carrier Deck,” *Leatherneck Magazine*, xxxiv, no. 3 (Mar 51), 19–20; 1stMar SAR, 23; 2/1 SAR, 17–18; 1stEngrBn SAR, 13; 1stMedBn SAR, 12; and VMO-6 SAR, 17–18; 1stMAW SAR, 7; BrigGen E. C. Dyer Comments, n. d.
- [7] 1stMedBn SAR, 3–7.
- [8] *Ibid.* See also Smith, *Notes*, 995–998, 1110–1112.
- [9] Smith, *Notes*, 1063–1064.
- [10] X Corps *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 17–18; Forney, *Special Report*, 3.
- [11] Smith, *Notes*, 1063–1064; X Corps *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 20–24; X Corps *OI 26*, 5 Dec 50; and Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 90; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 2115 6 Dec 50; CG X Corps msg X 13811, 7 Dec 50; Col D. M. Schmuck Comments, n. d.
- [12] Except when otherwise specified, this section is based on the following sources: Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 48–63; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 15 Jul 51, 72–73; Smith, *Notes*, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1109; 1stEngBn SAR, 3–14; Geer, *The New Breed*, 361–362, 369; LtCol J. H. Partridge Comments, n. d.
- [13] Smith, *Notes*, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1097; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 48–53; 1stEngBn SAR, 13–14.
- [14] Partridge interv 25 Jun 51, 48–53; Capt C. W. Hospelhorn, “Aerial Supply in Korea,” *Combat Forces Journal*, I, no. 10 (May 51), 29–30.
- [15] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 26–50*, 7 Dec 50. The task organization remained as it was during the move from Hagaru to Koto-ri. For the regimental orders, see 1stMar *OpnO 16–50*, 7 Dec 50; 5thMar *OpnO 44–50*, 7 Dec 50; and 7thMar *Frag O*, 7 Dec 50. Other sources for this section are: 11thMar SAR, 9; and Smith, *Notes*, 1062.
- [16] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 1st, 5th, 7th Mars, 1stTkBn, 1100 8 Dec 50.
- [17] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: *Ibid.*; 1stMar SAR, 19–20, 24–26; 1stMar *URpt (S-3) 13*; Bates interv, 16 Mar 53, 108–112; Geer, *The New Breed*, 364–368; Col D. M. Schmuck, LtCol D. W. Bridges, LtCol W. L. Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; special mention should also be made of the two-part article, “Last Barrier,” by S. L. A. Marshall in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 20–23, and no. 2 (Feb 53), 40–46; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 14 Dec 56.
- [18] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 68–69.
- [19] FSCC tel to G-3, X Corps, 1245 8 Dec 50 in G-3 Journal; X Corps *C*, 8 Dec 50; RCT-7 *URpt 6*; 7th Mar SAR, 25; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 17 Nov 56; LtCol W. Morris Comments, 15 Oct 56.
- [20] 7thMar SAR, 25; RCT-7 *URpt 6*; CO 1/7 msg to CO 7thMar, 1341 8 Dec 50; Geer, *The New Breed*, 362–363. LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 26 Oct 56.
- [21] 1/5 SAR, 19; S-3 5thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 8 Dec 50; Maj Stewart tel to CO 5thMar, 1940 8 Dec 50; 5thMar SAR, 34; Smith, *Notes*, 1072.
- [22] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to CO 1stEngBn, 1325 8 Dec 50; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 X Corps, 1450 8 Dec 50, in

G-3 Journal, X Corps *CR*, 8 Dec 50; D/Engrs *SAR*, 10.

[23] 2/1 *SAR*, 18–19.

[24] Smith, *Notes*, 1112–1113; Smith, *Chronicle*, 110. According to the terms of the Armistice of 27 July 1953, the remains were delivered to the Americans after the cease-fire.

[25] 1stMar *SAR*, 24–26; Bates interv, 16 Mar 53, 108–112; Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Marshall, “Last Barrier, II,” 40–46; Schmuck Comments.

[26] 7thMar *SAR*, 26; RCT-7 *URpt 6*; 3/7 *SAR*, n. p., 1stMar *SAR*, 25; 3/1 *SAR*, 8; 5thMar *SAR*, 35; 1/5 *SAR*, 19; Smith, *Notes*, 1077, Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct 56.

[27] Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct 56.

[28] *Ibid.*, Schmuck Comments.

[29] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 56–65.

[30] Smith, *Notes*, 1114; *Chronicle*, 111–112.

[31] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 66.

[32] Smith, *Notes*, 1077; Narrative of Col E. W. Snedeker [Apr 51].

[33] HqBn *HD Dec 50*, 9; 1stMTBn *SAR*, 13; Simpson interv, 11 Apr 51; LtCol F. Simpson Comments, 22 Oct 56.

[34] 7thMar *SAR*, 26; 3/11 *SAR*, 9.

[35] 1stMarDiv *PIR 47*. Bates interv, 16 Mar 53; Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Schmuck Comments.

[36] 7thMar *SAR*, 26; 11thMar *SAR*, 9–10; Smith, *Chronicle*, 112; 1stMTBn *SAR*, 14; Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.

[37] 5thMar *SAR*, 34–36; 1/5 *SAR*, 20; 2/5 *SAR*, 31; 3/5 *SAR*, 17–18; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 19 Oct 56.

[38] 1stMar *SAR*, 26; 2/1 *SAR*, 19; 1stMar (S-3) *URpt 13*, 16–17. The Marine Provisional Tank Platoon had reached Koto-ri with only two M4A3 tanks, one of which had to be cannibalized. Then the platoon was disbanded and integrated with its remaining M4A3 into B and D companies. All the other tanks in the column were M-26s

[39] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1700 10 Dec 50; Col C. A. Youngdale Comments, 19 Nov 56.

[40] MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, n. d., and MajGen A. D. Mead, USA, ltr to Gen Snedeker, 6 Dec 56.

[41] This is probably the same action referred to in 3dInfDiv *CR, Dec 50*, as occurring at 0130 11 Dec. The account of the Sudong ambush is based on: 1stMar *SAR*, 26; 1stMar *URpt (S-3) 13*, 18; Narrative of Col W. C. Winston, USA, 14 Jan 55; Cpl M. L. Wasson ltr to Col Winston, 16 May 51; Cpl D. E. Klepsig interv by H. L. Page, Jr., 6 Mar 52; Capt N. A. Canzona and J. C. Hubbell, “The 12 Incredible Days of Col John Page,” *Readers Digest*, lxxix, no. 4 (Apr 56), 84–86. The Page and Winston material is in the possession of Capt Canzona.

[42] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to COs 1st, 5th, and 7thMars, 1530 9 Dec 50.

[43] 1stMar *OpnO 16–50*, 7 Dec 50. This order issued before the decision to send the tanks down the MSR in one group makes no mention of protecting the armor.

[44] 1stMar *URpt (S-3) 13*, 18; Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.

[45] Neither Capt Bruce F. Williams, commanding Baker Company, nor his platoon leaders realized that Hargett’s men were screening the rear of the tank column. Maj B. F. Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56.

[46] This description of the ambush at the rear of the tank column is based upon: Capt E. C. Hargett, interv by HistBr, G-3, 14 Dec 53; Maj W. Gall, 1stLt R. B. Grossman [sic], 1stLt F. R. Kraince, 1stLt E. C. Hargett, 2dLt C. E. Patrick, and 2dLt D. W. Sharon, interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 11 Feb 51; *MCB Study*, II-C-111–113; Smith, *Notes*, 1087; HqBn *URpt 14*; Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56; Maj E. C. Hargett Comments, 17 Oct 56.

[47] Developed by the scientists of the Naval Field Medical Research Laboratory at Camp Lejeune, the ordinary utility jackets contained thin plates of fiberglass which would stop most shell or grenade fragments. Five hundred jackets had been air-shipped to the 1st Marine Division for field tests, but other supplies had a higher priority

during the Chosin Reservoir campaign and only the 50 garments sent to Recon Company were worn in combat. Lynn Montross, "Development of Our Body Armor," *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxix, no. 6 (Jun 55), 10–16. The full story of the development of body armor, one of the most important tactical innovations of the Korean conflict, will be told in the next two volumes of this series.


[48] CO 1stTBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., 11 Dec 50, gives tank personnel losses as 4 MIA.

[49] 1stTkBn SAR, 36; Snedeker narrative, Apr 51; Statement of N. A. Canzona, n. d.; Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56.

[50] Schmuck Comments.

[51] LtCol Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.

[52] Smith, *Notes*, 1091.



| Date | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Totals ¹ |
|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------------------|
| 8 Dec..... | 29 | 8 | 4 | 127 | 168 |
| 9 Dec..... | 6 | 7 | 1 | 46 | 60 |
| 10 Dec..... | 7 | 5 | 8 | 45 | 65 |
| 11 Dec..... | 9 | 4 | 3 | 38 | 54 |
| Totals | 51 | 24 | 16 | 256 | 347 |

¹ DivAdjutant SAR, appendix II, 3.

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 15. The Hungnam Redeployment

[1] *Time, the Weekly Newsmagazine*, lvi, no. 25 (18 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 18-19.

[2] *Time*, lvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 9.

[3] *Newsweek*, xxxvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50) 11. "Such quotations," comments General MacArthur, referring to the excerpts from *Time* and *Newsweek*, "certainly do not reflect the mood of the American public at the time, but rather the emotional reaction of irresponsible writers. . . . Neither [of the two news magazines] had the slightest access to the basic information and factors which involved the decisions and operations of our government and its higher military commanders. . . . The unreliability of these nonprofessional estimates of the situation is indeed eloquently demonstrated by comparing them with the actual military reports by the commands involved." Gen D. MacArthur ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 17 Oct 56.

[4] The Division Embarkation Section began revision of its standby embarkation order on 10 December and the following day was able to issue Embarkation Order 3-50. EmbO memo to HistO, subj: Historical Diary, 19 Dec 50.

[5] Smith, *Notes*, 1065-1066, 1119; 1stMarDiv memo: "Plan for receiving 1stMarDiv Units, Hamhung-Hungnam area," 0800 8 Dec 50.

[6] Except when otherwise noted, the remainder of this section is based on the following sources:

ComPhibGruOne, *Action Report, Hungnam*, 1-2, 4-6; Forney *Special Report*, 5-7; X Corps, *OpnO 9*, 5 Dec 50; X Corps, *Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation*, 2-3; X Corps *OI 27*, 9 Dec 50; Gen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 25 Oct 56.

[7] ComNavFE endorsement on CG FMFPac ser 8432, 6 Dec 50. "Although it was not necessary for me to exercise my command functions," commented General Shepherd, "I had been orally directed to do so by both Admirals Radford and Joy if I considered it expedient. As I recall, I was directed to take charge of the naval phase of the evacuation of Hungnam as Representative of the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. In compliance with these instructions I exercised close overall supervision of this phase of the operation and made suggestions to both Admiral Doyle and General Almond relative to the embarkation and evacuation of the Marine Forces from Hungnam." Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56.

[8] The sources of this section, unless otherwise states, are as follows: Forney, *Special Report*, 8-18; *MCB Study*, II-C-114-115; ComPhibGruOne *Action Report, Hungnam*, 5-10, 25; 1stMAW *HD, Dec 50*, 1-2; Smith, *Notes*, 120-1123; Maj R. W. Shutts, *Report on Amphibious Withdrawal of the U.S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea*, 1-9; *MGCIS-1 HD, Dec 50*; X Corps *OpnO 10*, 11 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv *EmbO 3-50*, 11 Dec 50; Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56; LtGen W. H. Tunner, USAF, ltr to MajGen Snedeker, 8 Dec 56.

[9] LtGen T. J. Cushman Comments, n. d.; *MAG-12 WD, Dec 50*.

[10] Unless otherwise stated, the sources for this section are the same as for the last.

[11] VAdm J. H. Doyle ltr, 5 Oct 56.

[12] 1stAmphTracBn *HD, Dec 50*, 5.

[13] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50, with attached report from Gen Almond and a Navy announcement in *New York Times*, 27 Dec 50.

[14] Smith, *Notes*, 1126. A detailed account of the arrival of the 1st Marine Division at Pusan and Masan will be found in the first chapter of Volume IV of this series.

[15] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50.

[16] General MacArthur's comments are as follows: "This, again, is a non-professional estimate belied by the facts and the viewpoints of all senior commanders present It was the purpose of Red China to overwhelm

and annihilate, through a 'sneak' attack, the Eighth Army and X Corps by the heavy assault of overwhelming forces of a new power, not heretofore committed to war, against which it knew or rightly surmised there would be no retaliation. This plan was foiled by our anticipatory advance which uncovered the enemy's plot before he had assembled all of his forces, and by our prompt strategic withdrawal before he could inflict a crippling blow of a 'Pearl Harbor' nature. . . . This was undoubtedly one of the most successful strategic retreats in history, comparable with and markedly similar to Wellington's great Peninsula withdrawal. Had the initiative action not been taken and an inert position of adequate defense assumed, I have no slightest doubt that the Eighth Army and the X Corps both would have been annihilated. As it was, both were preserved with practically undiminished potential for further action. I have always regarded this action, considering the apparently unsurmountable difficulties and overwhelming odds, as the most successful and satisfying I have ever commanded." MacArthur ltr, 17 Oct 56.

[17] Air Officer SAR, 4.

[18] The material in this section is derived from: MAG-12 SAR, annex C, 10; VMF-214 SAR, annex F, 23; 1stMAW SAR, annex J, appendix S (VMF-323), 4, 9, 11; 1stMAW SAR, 5-7; Maj H. D. Kuokka Comments, n. d.

[19] MGCIS-1 *HD Dec 50*, 2; MTACS-2 *HD Dec 50*, 7.

[20] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is based upon: Smith, *Notes*, 1149-1161, 1222.

[21] 1stMAW *HDs, Oct-Dec 50*.

[22] VMF-312 *HD, Dec 50*, 2.

[23] ComNavFE msg to CinCPacFlt, 0858 1 Oct 50; CinCPacFlt msg to ComNavFE, 2245 2 Oct 50; CG 1stMAW msg to CO VMR-152, 0620 12 Oct 50; VMF-152 SAR, 6; Col R. R. Yeaman Comments, 19 Sep 56 and 6 Nov 56. By 25 December when VMR-152 returned to Navy control it had flown 729,790 miles in Korean lifts and carried 8,068,800 pounds of cargo, 234,000 pounds of mail and 11,314 passengers, including 4276 casualties.

[24] 1stMAW SAR, annex K, appendix F (VMF-311), 2; VMF-311 *HD, Dec 50*.

[25] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to MajGen F. Harris, 20 Dec 50.

[26] VMO-6 SAR, 20; LtCol V. J. Gottschalk, *Transcript of Informal Remarks at HQMC*, 17 May 51.

[27] Smith, *Notes*, 1146-1149. See Appendix E for a day-by-day accounting of Marine casualties.

[28] Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.

[29] A CCF army consisted of three or four divisions and therefore might be considered generally the equivalent of a U.S. corps. This account of CCF units and movements is derived from the *MCB Study*, II-C-116-125, which in turn is based on an analysis of CCF prisoner interrogations and captured enemy documents. The Board, consisting of senior officers, was given the mission in 1951 of preparing "an evaluation of the influence of Marine Corps forces on the course of the Korean War, 4 Aug 50-15 Dec 50."

[30] Translations of CCF documents referred to in this section are found in HQ 500th Military Intelligence Group, Document 204141, "Compilation of Battle Experiences Reported by Various in their Operation Against U.S. Forces in Korea." Among the units covered are the 20th, 26th, and 27th Armies.

[31] 1stMarDiv *PIR* 47, encl. 1. The four armies referred to by the POW were the 20th, 26th, 27th, and 30th. Actually the 30th Army did not exist, as one of its divisions had been attached to each of the other three armies.

[32] *MCB Study*, II-C-125.

[33] Quotations in this section, except when otherwise noted, are from the *MCB Study*, 11-C-125-127.


[34] Xenophon, *The Anabasis of Cyrus*, Henry C. Dakyns, trans., in F. R. B. Godolphin, *The Greek Historians*, (2 vols., New York, 1942), II, 297-298.

[35] *Time*, lvii, no. 9 (26 Feb 51).

[36] Gen Douglas MacArthur, CinCUNC, *11th Report of the Operations in Korea of United Nations Forces*, 31 Jan 51. See Appendix H for transcript of Presidential Unit Citation awarded to the 1stMarDiv and the Distinguished Unit Citation awarded to the 1stMAW.


[37] RAdm J. H. Doyle ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 2 Mar 51.


[38] 1stMarDiv memo 238-50, 19 Dec 50.




The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 1. Interlude at Masan

- [1] This section is based on 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv) Historical Diary (*HD*), Dec 50, 1–12; MajGen O. P. Smith, *Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War* (hereafter Smith, *Notes*), 1239–1242; and BrigGen E. A. Craig, Comments, 4 Jun 57.
- [2] CG 1stMarDiv FragO, 1515, 18 Dec 50.
- [3] CG XCorps msg X 15292, 18 Dec 50; Eusak msg GX–35290-KG00, 19 Dec 50.
- [4] Smith, *Notes*, 1244–1245.
- [5] The remainder of this section is based upon Smith, *Notes*, 1264–1274.
- [6] Gen M. B. Ridgway as told to H. M. Martin, *Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York, 1956), 196–211, hereafter Ridgway, *Memoirs*.
- [7] *Ibid.*, 204–205.
- [8] LtGen E. A. Craig, USMC (Retd), ltr of 4 Jun 57. All letters, typed interviews, and other documentary sources cited in footnotes are on file in the archives of the Historical Branch, G–3, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- [9] Gen Douglas MacArthur, ltr of 6 Jun 57 to MajGen E. W. Snedeker.
- [10] EUSAK Command Report (*Cmd Rpt*), Dec 50.
- [11] Memorandum from commanding general to all troops of Eighth Army, 21 Jan 51.
- [12] The source for the remainder of this section is Ridgway, *Memoirs*, 205–207.
- [13] Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are Smith, *Notes*, 1280–1292, 1294, 1295, 1303; 1stMarDiv Periodic Logistics Reports (*PLR*) 2, 11.
- [14] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr of 4 Jun 57.
- [15] ComPhibGruOne Action Rpt, Hungnam, 5–10, 25.
- [16] For a detailed account of the “amphibious operation in reverse,” see the last chapter of Volume III of this series.
- [17] CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Report (PacFlt Interim Rpt)* No. 2, II, 621–758.
- [18] TacRon-1 War Diary (*WD*), Dec 50.
- [19] HDs and WDs of VMF–323, VMF–214, and VMF–212; *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 1939–1960.
- [20] The material in this section is derived from the following sources: *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 463–620; Chief, Army Field Forces Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground Operations; and CMC, ltr to Dist List re “Analysis of CAS Systems,” 19 Aug 52.
- [21] 1stMarDiv *HD* Dec 50, 12–13; Smith, *Notes*, 1258–1259.
- [22] EUSAK msg GX–20179–K600, 27 Dec 50.
- [23] CG X Corps msg X 16070, 28 Dec 50.
- [24] This account of the Kyongju conference is derived from Smith, *Notes*, 1269–1271.






| <i>Items of equipment</i> | <i>T/E allowance</i> | <i>Shortages 23 Dec 50</i> | <i>Shortages 31 Dec 50</i> |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Bags, sleeping | 23,000 | 3,585 | 0 |
| Machine gun, Browning, Cal. 30, M1919A4 | 1,398 | 338 | 0 |
| BAR, 30 cal. | 904 | 441 | 0 |
| Carbine, 30 cal., M2..... | 11,084 | 2,075 | 0 |
| Launcher, rocket, 3.5", M20..... | 396 | 105 | 0 |
| Howitzer, 105mm | 54 | 8 | 0 |
| Howitzer, 155mm | 18 | 9 | 0 |
| Glasses, field, 7x50..... | 1,740 | 1,305 | 1,006 |
| Tank, Med., M4A3, dozer, 105 mm. | 12 | 7 | 7 |
| Tank, med., M-26, 90mm..... | 85 | 16 | 12 |
| Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ T., 4x4..... | 641 | 105 | 58 |
| Truck, $1\frac{1}{2}$ T., 6x6, cargo..... | 54 | 3 | 0 |
| Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ T., 6x6, cargo..... | 737 | 124 | 33 |
| Radio set, SCR 536..... | 474 | 211 | 211 |
| Radio set, SCR 619..... | 137 | 74 | 49 |
| Telephone, EE8 | 1,162 | 58 | 58 |




The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 2. The CCF January Offensive

- [1] EUSAK msgs GX 20332–KG00 and GX 20335 KG00 31 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 51, 4.
- [2] Smith, *Notes*, 1315.
- [3] Sources for this section are EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Jan 51, 4–5, 7, 9, 27, 62–65.
- [4] Gen M. B. Ridgway, ltr of 5 Jun 57.
- [5] Ridgway, *Memoirs*, 215.
- [6] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Jan 51, 9, 62, 64, 82, 92.
- [7] USAF Hist Study No. 72, *U.S. Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict*, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, (hereafter cited as AHS–72) pp. 188–196. The term “net” denotes a network of radio stations, all on a single frequency for a specific purpose.
- [8] The term “scramble” in military aviation parlance refers to an expeditious takeoff in response to an emergency call or an alert. With highly trained personnel, it is a pattern rather than a panic.
- [9] AHS–72, 47, 48; PhibGru–3 *WD*, Jan 51.
- [10] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 51, 4; EUSAK msg G–1–628–KGG, 8 Jan 51.
- [11] EUSAK msg GX–1–661–KG00, 9 Jan 51.
- [12] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 1–51*, 9 Jan 51.
- [13] Smith, *Notes*, 1279.
- [14] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 2–51*, 10 Jan 51.
- [15] Smith, *Notes*, 1285–1286, 1307–1308.
- [16] Material relative to Marine replacements has been derived from FMFPac *HD*, Dec 50 and Jan 51.
- [17] The balance of this section is derived from the Dec 50 and Jan 51 historical diaries of VMF–352, VMR–152, 1st MAW, and FMFPac.
- [18] This section is based on the 1st MAW and MAG–33 *HDs* of Jan 51; Fifth Air Force History (hereafter to be designated FAF), Dec 50 and Jan 51; AHS–72, 35–37; EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Jan 51, Sec II, 12, 63, 64–65; *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 969, 1062; Mobile Construction Battalion Two (hereafter MCB–2) Report of Activities for Jan 51; Col T. J. Noon, interv of 5 Jun 58.
- [19] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 51.
- [20] U.S. Military Academy, *Operations in Korea*, 28–29.
- [21] Richard L. Walker, *China Under Communism* (New Haven, 1955), 119, 307.
- [22] *Ibid.*, 13.
- [23] The day had not yet dawned when the hydrogen bomb would have a much greater potentiality for frightfulness.
- [24] Gen M. B. Ridgway, *Memoirs* (New York, 1956); Gen J. M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York, 1958); Gen M. D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York, 1959).



The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 3. The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt

- [1] MajGen F. M. McAlister ltr, 17 Jun 57.
- [2] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Jan 51.
- [3] 1stMarDiv Periodic Intelligence Report (*PIR*) 87-94, 17-22 Jan 51.
- [4] Units of these armies, it may be recalled, were not identified again in the CCF order of battle before the middle of March 1951. Until that time, the possibility of these enemy troops being used for a surprise stroke had to be taken into consideration.
- [5] Smith, *Notes*, 1339.
- [6] This section, unless otherwise stated, is based on the January historical diaries of the following organizations: 1st MAW; MAG-33; MAG-12; VMF-312; VMF-214; VMF-323; VMF(N)-513; VMF(N)-542; MWSS-1; FMFPac. Another source is *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 969.
- [7] VMF-212 *HD*, Jan 51; USS *Bataan* (CVL-29) Action Rpt, "Operations off the West Coast of Korea, 15 Jan-7 Apr 51 ;" USS *Bataan* *WD*, Jan 51; Col R. W. Wyczawski, interv of 2 Jun 58.
- [8] 5thMar *WD*, Jan-Feb 51.
- [9] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 51.
- [10] The remainder of this section, except when otherwise noted, is based on 1stMAW *HD*, Jan 51 and VMF(N)-513 *HD*, Jan 51. See Glossary in Appendix A for explanations of aircraft designations.
- [11] VMF(N)-542 *HD*, Jan 51.
- [12] VMF-312 *HD*, Jan 51.
- [13] 1stMarDiv *PIR* 116, Encl 1.
- [14] *HDs* of 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, VMF(N)-513, and VMF-323 for Jan 51.
- [15] Organized from units of RCT-1 on 25 January when Colonel Puller was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. On that date Colonel McAlister assumed command of RCT-1.
- [16] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 50, 11.
- [17] Maj J. R. Jones ltr, 24 Jun 57.
- [18] 1stMarDiv *PIR* 105, 5 Feb 51; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 51, 13.
- [19] *Ibid.*
- [20] 1stMar *WD*, Feb 51.
- [21] References to the 1st KMC Regt in this chapter are based on Smith, *Notes*, 1450-1458, and Col C. W. Harrison, *Narrative*, n.d., 1-15. Previous periods of KMC attachment to the 1stMarDiv are described in Vols I, II, and III of this series.
- [22] What would normally have been the 4th KMC Battalion was designated the 5th because the Korean word for 4th is the same as the word for death and is considered unlucky.
- [23] Col C. W. Harrison, *Narrative*, 8-9; VMF(N)-513 *HD*, Feb 51.
- [24] VMF-323 *HD*, Feb 51.
- [25] Smith, *Notes*, 1378.
- [26] VMO-6 *HD*, Feb 51.
- [27] Smith, *Notes*, 1369.
- [28] 1stMarDiv Periodic Operations Report (*POR*) 18 Jan-15 Feb 51, 71-159.
- [29] Smith, *Notes*, 1441-1445.
- [30] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51.



The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 4. Operation Killer


- [1] Ridgway, *Memoirs*, 216.
- [2] IX Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Feb 51; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51; Smith, *Notes*, 1462–1465.
- [3] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Feb 51, Sec 1, 52. Comments by Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret), 13 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser, 14 Feb 58.
- [4] LtCol H. T. Milne, ltr of 3 Dec 57; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51.
- [5] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Feb 51; Comments by Gen M. B. Ridgway, USA (Ret), 4 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser, 14 Feb 58.
- [6] The balance of this section, unless otherwise specified, is derived from the *HDs* for Feb 51 of the 1st MAW, MAG–33, VMF–214, VMF–312, VMF–323, VMF(N)–513, and VMF–311.
- [7] *Naval Aviation News*, Apr 51, 8.
- [8] VMF–323 *HD*, 15 Feb 51.
- [9] *Naval Aviation News*, Apr 51, 8.
- [10] 1st MAW and MAG–12 *HDs*, Feb 51.
- [11] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg, ltr of 14 Jun 57.
- [12] MIG Alley was the name the American airmen gave the area along the Yalu River where Communist jets were active.
- [13] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51, 1–2, 20.
- [14] *Ibid.*
- [15] *Ibid.*, 2, 22, and 1stMarDiv OpnO 6–51.
- [16] *Ibid.*, 22–24.
- [17] IX Corps msg in 1stMarDiv *In&Out* #9.
- [18] CG 1stMarDiv, msg of 12 Feb 51 to CG EUSAK.
- [19] LtGen O. P. Smith, ltr of 28 Jul 53.
- [20] Ridgway, *Memoirs*, 218–219.
- [21] Maj W. E. Kerrigan, ltr of 25 May 57.
- [22] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51, 4.
- [23] Comment by Col J. L. Stewart, 25 Oct 57.
- [24] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51, 4-5.
- [25] Statistics are from EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Feb 51, G–3 Air Rpt.
- [26] 2/1 *HD*, 16 Dec 51, 15–16.
- [27] LtCol F. B. Mayer, ltr of 8 May 57.
- [28] This account of the tank-infantry patrol is based on Maj R. P. Wray’s ltr of 6 May 57.
- [29] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51, 2, 5–6.
- [30] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sec III, Bk 4, Pt 5, 23 and 24 Feb; 1st MAW *HD*, 22–24 Feb 51.
- [31] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Feb 51, Sec 2, 23.
- [32] MajGen Oliver P. Smith, *Chronicle of the Operations of the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951* (MS), (hereafter, Smith, *Chronicle*), 24–25 Feb 51.
- [33] 5th and 7th Marines *HDs*, Feb 51.
- [34] FEAF *Operations History*, Vol II, 300–306; Comment by Col J. H. Partridge, 10 Dec 57.
- [35] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, Sec 1, 53.
- [36] Except when otherwise noted, this section is derived from the 1stMatDiv *HD*, Mar 51, 2–5; 7thMar *HD*, Mar

51, 2–6; IX Corps *Cmd Rpt* No. 4, Mar 51, 31–32; EUSAK *Cmd. Rpt*, Sec 1, Mar 51, 53–59; LtCol Edwin H. Simmons narrative, n.d.; Comment by Col Wilbur F. Meyerhoff.

[37] FM 70–10, *Mountain Operations*, 41–46.


[38] Shepherd Papers, 27 Apr 51, Encl. 4. This is a file of documents in the Marine archives relating to problems of JOC control in the spring of 1951.


[39] Shepherd Papers, Encl 2, a ltr from Gen Shepherd to CMC, dtd 9 Mar 51. DEVASTATE BAKER was the call sign of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron–2 (MTACS–2), which coordinated the assignment of aircraft to tactical air control parties (TACPS).



The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 5. Operation Ripper

- [1] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51.
- [2] IX Corps *PIR* # 169; IX Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, 21.
- [3] This section, except when otherwise stated, is derived from the IX Corps *Cmd Rpt* and the 1stMarDiv *WD* for Mar 51.
- [4] A CCF Army, composed of three or four infantry divisions supported by artillery, is comparable to a U.S. corps.
- [5] Compilation from 1st MAW Sqdns' *HDs*, 7 and 8 Mar 51.
- [6] 7thMar *HD*, Mar 51; VMF-323 *HD*, Mar 51; Capt Clayton O. Bush, ltr of 11 Aug 57.
- [7] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Mar 51, 8.
- [8] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, 68–70.
- [9] IX Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, 35–37.
- [10] *Ibid.*
- [11] FMF Status Sheet, 31 Mar 51.
- [12] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, Plate 17. Figures do not include personnel in hospitals or clearing stations. UK and Australian statistics are not separated in available records.
- [13] *Ibid.*
- [14] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, 95.
- [15] IX Corps msg IXACT-1053 (122100) in 1stMarDiv *HD*, Mar 51.
- [16] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv; CO 1stMar, 1300 15 Mar 51.
- [17] LtCol W. D. Sawyer, interv of 30 Aug 57; Field Manual 9-1980, AF 136–137. This was not the first nor the last time that M-83 fragmentation (butterfly) bombs became a deadly nuisance to friendly forces.
- [18] Unless otherwise specified, references to changes in 1st MAW units are derived from the historical diaries of the units concerned for February, March, and April 1951.
- [19] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, 11, 1038, 1039. A “bogey” is an unidentified plane.
- [20] LtCol H. E. Allen, interv of 26 Feb 59.
- [21] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2130 15 Mar 51.
- [22] 2/1 *HD* 16 Dec 50 to 30 Apr 51, 21–22; VMF-214 *HD* Mar 51, 25–26.
- [23] Smith, *Chronicle*, 17 Mar 51.
- [24] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Mar 51, 10; VMF-214 and VMF-323 *HD*, Mar 51.
- [25] Col C. W. Harrison, *Narrative*, Mar-Apr 51, 2–3.
- [26] 1stKMCRegt *POR*, 24 Mar 51.
- [27] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, 18–19.
- [28] Smith, *Chronicle*. 1 Apr 51.
- [29] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58.
- [30] Col J. L. Stewart, ltr of 25 Oct 57.
- [31] The following description is from: 7th Mar *HD*, 8 Apr 51, 5; IX Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Apr 51, Bk III, Vol 2, PORs #574 and 575 of 8 Apr; Shepherd Memo, 27 Apr 51, encl (7) “Excerpt from Maj Hewitt rept;” 1stMAW *HD*, Apr 51, App VII, “Staff Journal G-3 Section,” 9 Apr.
- [32] 1st MAW G-3 Staff Journal, 9 Apr, *op. cit.*






The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 6. The CCF Spring Offensive

- [1] This section is based upon the following documents: IX Corps *CmdRpt* 5, Apr 51, Sec 3, Intelligence; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51; *PIR* 171, 179, 180.
- [2] EUSAK, IX Corps and 1stMarDiv G-2 *PIRs*, 1-20 Apr 51.
- [3] 1stMarDiv *HD* Apr 51, 47-48; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1830 21 Apr 51.
- [4] Capt D. E. Fowler, "Operations at the Hwachon Dam, Korea," *The Military Engineer*, Jan-Feb 1952, 7-8.
- [5] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51.
- [6] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58; Col J. H. Partridge, ltr of 17 Mar 58.
- [7] CO KMC Regt msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2335 22 Apr 51, in *KMC In&Out* #1; Col C. W. Harrison, *Narrative*, Mar-Apr 51.
- [8] Compilation of data from 1stMAW sqdn *HDs*, Apr 51; *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 1051, 1071.
- [9] *Ibid*.
- [10] 1st MAW *HD*, 20 Apr 51; VMF-312 *HD*, 20 Apr 51.
- [11] Sgt Paul G. Martin, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 2 Jul 56.
- [12] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th, 7th, 11th Mar, 1st KMC, Tk, and EngBns, 2224 22 Apr 51 in Div *In&Out* #21.
- [13] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar 2130 and 2232 22 Apr 51 in Div *In&Out* #12; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51, 6 and 50.
- [14] 2dLt J. M. Reisler, ltr to family of 1 May 51.
- [15] Sources for this 1/5 action are 5thMar *HD*, Apr 51; LtCol John L. Hopkins interv of 24 Jan 58; Maj J. T. Cronin, ltr of 30 Jan 58; Capt P. T. McGahn, interv of 27 Jul 56.
- [16] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO KMC Regt, 0910 23 Apr 51.
- [17] This account of the 7th Marines' fight is based on the following sources: 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51; BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58; Col R. G. Davis, Comments, n.d.; Col H. Nickerson, comments of 25 Feb 58; Col W. F. Meyerhoff, ltr of 25 Feb 58; Col J. T. Rooney, ltr of 26 Feb 58.
- [18] *HDs* of VMF-323, VMF-214, and VMO-6 for Apr 51.
- [19] Gen M. B. Ridgway, ltr of 29 Jan 58.
- [20] Compilation of data from 1st MAW squadrons for 23 Apr 51.
- [21] VMF-212, MAG-33, and MAG-12 *HDs* for Apr 51.
- [22] Gen J. S. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mar 58.
- [23] *HDs* of 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, and 7thMar for Apr 51; MajGen O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 23-24 Apr 51; MajGen E. W. Snedeker, ltr of 12 Feb 58; Col J. T. Rooney, ltr of 26 Feb 58; Col H. Nickerson, ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col W. F. Meyerhoff, ltr of 25 Feb 58; Maj R. P. Wray, ltr of 27 Apr 58; LtCol J. F. Coffey and Maj N. B. Mills, interv of 4 Apr 58.
- [24] Sources for operations of the two Army artillery battalions are: Gen W. M. Hoge, USA (Ret.), ltr of 3 Feb 58; LtCol Leon F. Lavoie, USA, ltr of 5 Feb 58; LtCol Roy A. Tucker, USA, ltr of 30 Nov 57; LtCol John F. Coffey, USMC, ltr of 9 Feb 58; Capt Russell A. Gugeler, USA, *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington, 1954), 162-173.
- [25] 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, and 7thMar *HDs*, Apr 51; LtCol E. A. Simmons, interv of 12 Jun 57.
- [26] 2dLt J. M. Reisler, ltr to family of 1 May 51.
- [27] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51; 1stMar *HD*, Apr 51.
- [28] Col H. Nickerson Jr., ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col R. E. West, comments, n.d.

- [29] VMO-6 *HD* for Apr 51.
- [30] LtCol R. P. Wray and Maj N. W. Hicks, interv of 16 Dec 59.
- [31] Capt R. A. Gugeler, USA, *Combat Actions in Korea*, 170-172
- [32] Summary of data from 1st MAW *HDs* for 24 Apr 51.
- [33] *EUSAK Cmd Rpt.*, Apr51, Sec I, 98, 100, 101; Brig C. N. Barclay, *The First Commonwealth Division* (Aldershot, 1954), 69-70.
- [34] 7thMar *HD*, Apr 51.
- [35] 1stMar *HD*, Apr 51.
- [36] Gen O. P. Smith USMC (Ret.), ltr of 11 Feb 58.
- [37] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2040 27 Apr 51.
- [38] CO IX Corps *IXACT 1370*; 1stMar *HD*, Apr 51; 5thMar *HD*, Apr 51; 7thMar *HD*, Apr 51. A “ripple” normally consists of 144 rounds fired simultaneously by six launchers.
- [39] CG IX Corps msg to CG 1stMarDiv with plans for withdrawal, 28 Apr 51.
- [40] 1st MAW *HD*, Apr51, Pt #1, Chronology 22-30 Apr and App VI, PORs #46 (23 Apr) and 54 (1 May).
- [41] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51; 5thMar *HD*, Apr 51; 7thMar *HD*, Apr 51.
- [42] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58.
- [43] *EUSAK Cmd Rpt*, Apr 51, 115-118.
- [44] *Ibid.*
- [45] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 766.
- [46] Col Merritt Adelman, ltr of 10 Feb 58.
- [47] 11thMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 4 May 51; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 9 May 51; X Corps msg X9613, 10 May 51.
- [48] Gen J. A. Van Fleet USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mar 58.
- [49] Unless otherwise specified, accounts of the CCF offensive of 16 May 51 are based on the following sources: *EUSAK Cmd Rpt*, May 51, 12-18; 1stMarDiv *HD*, May 51; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2015 17 May 51.
- [50] This account of 3/7’s action is derived from 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, 1stTkBn, and 3/7 *HDs*, May 51; Col B. T. Kelly, interv of 28 Dec 57.
- [51] VMO-6 *HD*, May 51.
- [52] 5thMar *HD*, May 51.


MAP 10

CCF Offensive Starting 22 April And Subsequent Marine Withdrawals



MAP II

Action of 1/1 at Horseshoe Ridge, 3/1 on 902, and Subsequent Withdrawals, 23-25 April



The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 7. Advance to the Punchbowl

- [1] Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret), "The Truth About Korea," *Life*, 11 May 53.
- [2] CG X Corps msg of 1500, 3 Jun 51; 1stMarDiv *HD*, May 51.
- [3] 2/1 *HD*, May 51.
- [4] 1stMarDiv *HD*, May 51
- [5] CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2359 24 May 51.
- [6] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2050 26 May 51; Col W. F. Meyerhoff, ltr of 8 Aug 58.
- [7] CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 24 May 51, in 5thMar *In & Out* #13.
- [8] James T. Stewart, *Airpower, The Decisive Force in Korea* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957) 13-15, 84-86; 1st MAW *HD*, May 51, Pts 4 and 5, Fifth Air Force Frag orders (hereafter listed as FAF FragOs), 20-31 May; 1st MAW *HD* May 51, Pt 1, G-3 PORs for 20-31 May; *Ibid.*, Pt 2, Staff Jrn G-3, 25 May, 26 May, 27 May, 31 May; EUSAK *Cmd Rept*, May 51, Sec II, Bk 4, Pts 5 and 6, Encls 20-31, PORs, sections entitled G-3 Air.
- [9] *Ibid.*, VMF(N)-513 *HD*, 27 May 51.
- [10] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, May 51, 24; Gen G. C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.), interv of 6 Jun 58; LtGen E. M. Almond, USA (Ret.), ltr of 22 May 58.
- [11] Col R. G. Davis, comments, n.d.; *HDs* for 1stMarDiv, 5thMar and 7thMar for May 51.
- [12] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 21 Aug 58.
- [13] LtCol D. W. McFarland, ltr of 21 Aug 58.
- [14] *Ibid.*
- [15] Col B. T. Kelly, interv of 9 Jun 58.
- [16] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 523-537.
- [17] Gen E. E. Partridge, USAF, ltr of 28 Jun 59.
- [18] *FMFPac Visit* 21-31 May 51, 5, 6.
- [19] MAG-12 *HD*, May 51, 24, 25 and 27 May; 1st MAW *HD*, May 51, Summary and Chronology for 19, 24, 27 and 28 May 51.
- [20] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CG X Corps, 31 May 51.
- [21] 1st MAW *HD*, May 51, Pt 2, Assessment Rpt for 31 May 51.
- [22] 1st MAW *HD*, May 51, Pt 1, App II, 2; Chronology, 31 May; MAG-12 *HD* Jun 51, Chronology and 12 Jun.
- [23] This section, unless otherwise specified, is based on the following sources: X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Jun 51; *HDs* of 1st MarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, and VMF-214 for Jun 51.
- [24] 5thMar *UnitReport (URpt)*, Jun 51, 35.
- [25] Descriptions of Operation STRANGLE are based on *Pac Flt Interim Rpt* No. 3, Chapter 10, 10-45 to 10-47; and on 1st MAW *HDs*, May to Jul 51, G-3 PORs, G-3 Journal entries, Assessment Rpts.
- [26] 1st MAW *HDs* May-Jul 51, Summaries; MAG-12 and MAG-33 *HDs* May-Jul 51, Summaries.
- [27] Summarization from DivAirO memo of 26 Jun 51 to CG 1stMarDiv.
- [28] 1st MAW *HD*, Jun 51, Pt 1, Chronology, 15 Jun.
- [29] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1915 2 Jun 51.
- [30] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1830 3 Jun 51; *HDs* of VMF-214 and VMF-323, Jun 51.
- [31] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 3, VI, 6-6, 6-7; 1stMarDiv *Special Action Report (SAR)*, Jun 51.
- [32] The account of the KMC attack is based upon these sources: 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jun 51; "KMC Operations in Korea, Jun 51," n.d., by Col C. W. Harrison, then KMC senior adviser.


[33] The KMC's drew fuel and ammunition from the 1st Marine Division and rations from the ROK Army. Other classes of supplies were obtained generally on a catch-as-catch-can basis with some aid from KMC Headquarters in Pusan.


[34] *HDs* of 1stMarDiv and 1stMar, Jun 51.

[35] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 8 Jun 58. Other sources for this section are the *HDs* of 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, and VMF-214.


[36] Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the *HDs* of the 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, 1/7, 2/7, and 3/7 for Jun 51.


[37] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr to Maj W. T. Hickman, 22 Apr 57.





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The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 8. The Truce Talks at Kaesong

- [1] This section is based on by Peter Kihss, "One Year in Korea," *United Nations World*, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 1951, 21–23.
- [2] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Jun 51.
- [3] *U.S. News and World Report*, 13 Feb 53, 40–41.
- [4] *UN World*, Vol. 5, No. 10, Oct 51, 10.
- [5] U.S. State Department Publications 3573, Far East Series 30, pp. 352-363.
- [6] Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN (Ret.), *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 176, hereafter Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*. One of Admiral Joy's last services to his country before his death in 1956 was the writing of this book. Other sources for this section are William H. Vatcher, Jr., "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea," *U.S. News and World Report*, 23 Jan 1953, 35-36; E. Weintal, "What Happened at Kaesong and What is in Prospect," *Newsweek*, 23 Jul 1951, 38; Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray.
- [7] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 4–5.
- [8] *Ibid.*
- [9] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jun 51, 55.
- [10] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0815 27 Jun 51.
- [11] Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 6 Feb 58. It is interesting to note that there was no mention of the patrol base concept in the then current *Field Service Regulations, Operations, FM 100–5*, published by the Department of the Army in August 1949.
- [12] Unless otherwise specified, the remainder of this section is based on 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jul 51, 7-11; Col C. W. Harrison's account, "KMC Attack on Taeu-san, 8-11 July 1951;" Col G. P. Groves, ltr of 9 Apr 58.
- [13] X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Jul 51, 13; 2dInfDiv *HD*, Jul 51, 13–19.
- [14] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 6–10, 129, 140; Carl Berger, *The Korean Knot* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 141-151; Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray.
- [15] Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.), "The Truth About Korea," *Life*, 11 May 53, 133.
- [16] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 166.
- [17] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jul 51, 18.
- [18] *Ibid.*
- [19] CG XCorps, CITE X 21568.
- [20] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Apr 51, 1080110.
- [21] *Ibid.*
- [22] VMO–6 Daily Flight Log, 23Apr51.
- [23] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: Elizabeth L. Tierney, Historical Branch, G–3, HQMC, statistics compiled from VMO–6 reports of Aug 50 to Jul 51; HMR–161 *HD*, Sep 51; 1stMarDiv type "C" rpt on assault helicopters, 4 Oct 51; Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky* (Harper, 1954), based on Marine records, 151–158.
- [24] CO USS *Consolation* rpt to ComNavFe, 26 Jan 52.
- [25] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: Rpt of Joint Army–Navy Mission at HQMC, 9 Nov 51, in G–4 Files; *Instructional Information, Vest, Armored*, M-1951, G–4 Files, HQMC; LCdr F. J. Lewis (MSC) USN, ltr of 21 Jun 54; Capt Louis Kirkpatrick (MC) USN, ltr of 22 Jun 54; Capt D. G. McGrew, ltr of 2 Jul 54; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, USMC, ltr of 30 Jun 54.

[26] Quotations are from *Instructional Information, Vest Armored, M-1951*. The italicized words were in the original.

[27] Quoted in James T. Stewart, *Air Power, The Decisive Force in Korea* (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957), 22–23.

[28] *Ibid.*


[29] MAG-12 *HD*, Jun 51, Summary and Chronology, 30 Jun; MAG-12 *HD*, Jul 51, Chronology, 13 Jul.


[30] “Rpt of Visit to Far East by CG, FMFPac, and his staff during the period 27 August to 12 September 1951,” 17 *ff.*

[31] Berger, *The Korean Knot*, *op. cit.* 144–145.

[32] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Aug 51, 3–5.

| NON-FATAL | | FATAL | |
|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| | <i>Percent</i> | | <i>Percent</i> |
| Head | 10 | Head | 20 |
| Chest | 10 | Chest | 50 |
| Abdomen | 10 | Abdomen | 20 |
| Upper Extremity | 30 | Upper Extremity | 5 |
| Lower Extremity | 40 | Lower Extremity | 5 |





The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 9. Renewal of the Attack

- [1] Sources are 1stMarDiv *HD*, Aug 51, 3–5; Col B. T. Kelly’s contemporary “Notes on my Service in Korea, 14 Apr–13 Sep 1951” (hereafter Kelly, *Notes*).
- [2] This section, except when otherwise specified, is based on 1stMarDiv *HD*, Aug and Sep 51; X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51; 2/7 and 3/7 *HD*, Aug and Sep 51; Kelly, *Notes*; Col G. P. Groves, ltr of 8 Apr 58.
- [3] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 4, 7.
- [4] X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 41–42; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 5–6.
- [5] This section, except when otherwise specified, is based on the following sources: EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 38–53; X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 9–12; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 8–14; 7th Mar *HD*, Sep 51; 1st, 2d, and 3d Bns of 7th Mar, *HDs* for Sep 51.
- [6] LtCol E. G. Kurdziel interv, 13 Jun 58.
- [7] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CinCPacFlt, 4 Oct 51, enclosure (1) “Observations on Close Air Support for the 1st Marine Division during 5–23 September 1951.”
- [8] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 3, VI, 6–6, 6–7; 1stMarDiv *SAR*, Jun 51.
- [9] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 3, Chap. 9, 9–18; Chap. 10, 10–12, Chap. 15, 15–20, 60–61; Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 21 Jan 59.
- [10] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 3, Chap. 9, 9–14.
- [11] Sources for this section are as follows: EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 35–53; X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 9–12; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 10–16; 1st Marines *HD*, Sep 51; 1/1, 2/1, and 3/1 *HD*, Sep 51; Class “C” Rpt, *Employment of Assault Helicopters*, 1–6; Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky* (New York, 1954), 159–162, (hereafter *Cavalry of the Sky*).
- [12] CMC ltr to CO MCAS, Quantico, 3 Dec 47.
- [13] *Cavalry of the Sky*, 157.
- [14] Auxiliary airstrips in Korea had an “X” designation and fields in the “K” category were major installations. Those in proximity to U.S. Army centers were designated “A.”
- [15] LtCol H. W. Edwards, interv of 20 Feb 61.
- [16] Sources for this section are the same as for the previous section except when otherwise noted.
- [17] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 19–20.
- [18] Jane Blakeney, ed., *Heroes, U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955* (Washington, 1957), Joseph Vittori Medal of Honor Citation, 45.
- [19] *Ibid.*, Pfc Edward Gomez citation, 38.
- [20] On 14 September, LtCol Horace E. Knapp, Jr., the previous commanding officer of 1/1, was severely wounded while reconnoitering forward positions. He was evacuated, and the executive officer, Major Edgar F. Carney, Jr., commanded until LtCol John E. Gorman assumed command at noon on the 16th.
- [21] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified are as follows: 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 19–23; 5thMar *HD*, Sep 51, 14–19; 1st, 2d, and 3dBn, 5th Mar, *HD.*, Sep 51; LtCol Houston Stiff, interv of 25 Jun 58; Maj G. P. Averill, “Final Objective,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 40, no. 8 (Aug 56), 10–16.
- [22] *Cavalry of the Sky*, 162.
- [23] 1st Marine Division losses of 33 killed and 235 wounded during the three-day attack were incurred for the most part by the 5th Marines in general and 2/5 in particular. Enemy casualties of this period were reported as 972 KIA (265 counted) and 113 prisoners.

The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 10. The New Warfare of Position

[1] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 47. Other sources for this chapter are comments and criticisms by the following officers, all but one of whom are U.S. Marines. Ranks in each instance are those held at the time of interview or correspondence.

General J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.); General G. C. Thomas, Lieutenant General J. T. Selden; Brigadier Generals V. H. Krulak, S. S. Wade, R. G. Weede; Colonels G. P. Groves, B. T. Hemphill, K. L. McCutcheon, J. H. Tinsley, F. B. Nihart, G. D. Gayle, W. P. Mitchell, J. F. Stamm, F. P. Hager, Jr.; Lieutenant Colonels H. W. Edwards, J. G. Kelly; Major R. L. Autry.

[2] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 53.

[3] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Oct 51, 5–6 and Plate 1; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 3.

[4] *Ibid.*, 29–30.

[5] *Ibid.*, 7–9 and Plate No. 4.

[6] *Ibid.*, 5–6, and Plate No. 1.

[7] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 3.

[8] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 47.

[9] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 3–4, 18–22.

[10] The balance of this section is based on the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 18–24, and on 1/1 and 3/1 *HD*, Sep 51.

[11] Sources for the action on Hill 854 are the 1/1 and 3/1 historical diaries for September 1951.

[12] 3/1 *HD*, Sep 51, 8.

[13] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified, are the following: DivReconCo *HD*, 1stShorePartyBn *HD*, HMR–161 *HD*, Sep 51; Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,” 7–13; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 162–165.

[14] Messages of congratulation are quoted from HMR–161 *HD*, Sep 51.

[15] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 4, 31–32.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] The remainder of this section is based upon the Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,” Part II, 1–9; HMR–161 and 1stShorePartyBn *HD*, Sep and Oct 51; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 165–167.

[18] Type “C” Spec Rpt, “The Employment of Assault Helicopters,” Part II, 4.

[19] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 1–3.

[20] Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,” Part II, 5–9. Other sources for Operation BUMBLEBEE are HMR–161 and 1st ShorePartyBn *HD*, Oct 51, and *Cavalry of the Sky*, 167–170.

[21] *Cavalry of the Sky*, 171.

[22] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise specified, is based on the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 3–12.

[23] This account of the raid is derived from the 1/7 *HD*, Oct 51, and the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 7.

[24] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 7–8.

[25] 1/1 *HD*, Oct 51, 16; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 7.

[26] CO 1stMarDiv msg to USS *Toledo*, 1232 30 Oct 51 in G-3 msgs, Oct 51.

[27] *Cavalry of the Sky*, 172–173.

[28] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 2.

[29] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Nov 51, 9.

[30] *Ibid.*, 32.

[31] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise specified, is derived from the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Nov 51, 1–20.

[32] The initials TOT stand for Time on Target—an artillery order calling for all guns to time their firing so that projectiles will hit the target simultaneously.

[33] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Nov 51, 42.

[34] HMR-161 *HD*, Nov 51; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 174.

[35] References to the Panmunjom decisions are based upon the following sources: William H. Vatcher, Jr., *Panmunjom, The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations* (New York: F. Praeger, 1958), 72–94, 232–237; Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 40–52.

[36] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Nov 51, 58.

[37] X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Nov 51, 15–16.

[38] The source for the remainder of this section, unless otherwise stated, is the 1stMar-Div *HD*, Dec 51, 1–17.

[39] LtCol Harry W. Edwards, memo to G-3 dtd 3 Feb 1959.


[40] Maj J. Angus MacDonald, “The Problems of Marine POWs,” MS available in Historical Archives, G-3, HQMC.


[41] Maj G. Fink, interview of 16 Dec 1960; Extract of Interim Historical Report, Korea War Crimes Division, cumulative to 30 Jun 1953, 18.

[42] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 104–105; Maj J. A. MacDonald, “The Problems of Marine POWs,” *op. cit.*

[43] HMR-161 *HD*, Dec 51; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 175–176. Two of the original 15 HRS-1 aircraft had been damaged in accidents, but one was later restored to action with parts cannibalized from the other.

[44] VMO-6 *HD*, Jun–Dec 51; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 146, 180–181.





1ST MARINE DIVISION
 ZONE OF ACTION
 SITUATION ON
 20 SEPT 51

□ 800 METERS

■ 1000 METERS

— LINE MINNESOTA


- - - LINE HAYS

SCALE



CONTOUR INTERVAL 200 METERS

MAP 20



The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 11. Winter Operations in East Korea

[1] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 52, 1–2.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1, 6, 7.

[3] 1/5 *HD*, Dec 51, 31; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 52, 3.

[4] Sources for this account of the raid, unless otherwise specified, are Maj J. B. Ord, Jr., interv of 3 Sep and 24 Oct 58; and Appendix VI, 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 52, a five-page special action report of the operation.

[5] Later in the chapter this innovation will be described.

[6] Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan, Feb, and Mar 52, and *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 4, IX.

[7] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 4, IX, 9–11.

[8] LtCol G. W. Hardwick, “Summary of Marine Corps Experience with IRB [Insulated Rubber Boot], Rpt of 8 May 1951.” Other sources for the development of the boot, also found in G–4 files, Headquarters Marine Corps, are as follows: G. E. Folk, Abstract of Bowdoin College Rpt, Jun 1951, “The Penetration of Water into the Human Foot;” G–4 Rpt, “Resume of Activity re Insulated Rubber Boot,” 7 Feb 1952; G–4 Rpt, “Boot, Rubber, Insulated, Cold Weather,” 28 Nov 51; G–4 Rpt, “Fact Data Sheet, Boot, Insulated, Rubber,” n.d.; MajGen J. T. Selden memo to CMC, 26 Apr 52.

[9] Sources for this section, except when otherwise specified, are the following: ACofS, G–4, Rpts of 2 Jan, 29 Feb, and 15 May 52 (in G–4 files, Headquarters Marine Corps); Rpt of Test (Project 671) by MCEB, Quantico, Va., 3 Jan 1952; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, ltr of 30 Jun 1954; LtCdr F. J. Lewis (MSC) USN, ltr of 21 Jun 1954.

[10] ACofS, G–4, “Instructional Information, Vest, Armored, M–1951,” 5–6.

[11] Capt D. W. McGrew, Jr. to LtCol G. W. Hardwick, ltr of 4 Feb 52.

[12] ACofS, G–4, “Report of Field Test of Armored Vest, M–1951,” 15 May 51.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Sources for the helicopter operations described in this section are the following: HMR–161, *HD*, Jan and Feb 51; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 176–175. Veterans of the Korean conflict will recall that “changie-changie” meant “swap” in the pidgin English serving as a conversational medium between Americans and Orientals. Hence it was applicable to a relief operation.

[15] This section, unless otherwise specified, is based upon the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 52, 1–12; and *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 4, 9–11 to 9–14.

[16] 11thMar *HD*, Feb 52, 13; Col B. T. Hemphill comments, 20 Jan 59.

[17] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 52, 3.

[18] 1stMarDiv *PIR* No. 486, Feb 52.


[19] The battleship *Wisconsin* had a main battery of 16-inch guns with a maximum range of about 23 miles. The heavy cruiser *St. Paul* had a main battery of 8-inch guns with a maximum range of 16 miles.

[20] U.S. Marine Corps Landing Force Bulletin No. 6, “Night Vision and Night Combat,” 5 Dec 53. See also Bulletin No. 18, “Battlefield Illumination,” 4 Jun 56.

[21] 1st MarDiv *HD*, Feb 51, App No. 5. Other sources for this chapter are comments and criticism by the following officers: (Ranks listed below are those held at time of interview or comment.) Gen. G. C. Thomas; LtGen J. T. Selden; BrigGen S. S. Wade; BrigGen C. R. Allen; Col J. H. Tinsley; Col F. B. Nihart; Col J. F. Stamm; Col B. T. Hemphill.

The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 12. The Move to West Korea

- [1] Wilford G. Burchett: *This Monstrous War* (Melbourne, 1953): J. Waters, 121–122. Burchett was a Communist free lance correspondent for left-wing newspapers. He wrote several books and articles lauding the Communist cause in the Korean War.
- [2] *Ibid.* General Van Fleet did not “hurl” his troops against anything. He began limited offensives for the purpose of improving Eighth Army morale and maintaining offensive spirit. See Gen James A. Van Fleet, ltr of 28 Feb 59.
- [3] C. Turner Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 28.
- [4] FECom G–2 Intelligence Summary, 18 Sep 51.
- [5] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 53.
- [6] *Ibid.*
- [7] Col J. C. Murray, Comments, Jan 59.
- [8] BGen V. H. Krulak, Comments, Jan 59.
- [9] Previous chapters discuss the background and development of these innovations.
- [10] Col B. T. Hemphill, Comments, 30 Jan 59.
- [11] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Mar 52, 1–2.
- [12] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 52, 13–14.
- [13] Sources for this section are 1stMarDiv *HD*, Mar 52, 9–10; 1st MT Bn *HD*, Mar 52; 7th MT Bn *HD*, Mar 52.
- [14] Col T. A. Culhane, Jr., Comments, 4 Mar 59, and others.
- [15] *Ibid.*
- [16] Col F. B. Nihart, Comments regarding author James Michener’s visit to 1stMarDiv, ltr of 23 Mar 59.
- [17] Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 28 Jan 59.
- [18] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 3, 15–25.
- [19] See Ridgway’s Declaration of Faith, Chapter 1.



Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 1. Operations in West Korea Begin

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1st Marine Division Staff Report, titled “Notes for Major General J. T. Selden, Commanding General, First Marine Division, Korea,” dtd 20 Aug 52, hereafter Selden, *Div. Staff Rpt*; the four previous volumes of the series *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, namely, Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, *The Pusan Perimeter*, v. I; *The Inchon-Seoul Operation*, v. II; *The Chosin Reservoir Campaign*, v. III; Lynn Montross, Maj Hubard D. Kuokka, and Maj Norman W. Hicks, *The East-Central Front*, v. IV (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1954–1962), hereafter Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea—Central Front*, v. IV; Department of Military Art and Engineering, U.S. Military Academy, *Operations in Korea* (West Point, N. Y.: 1956), hereafter USMA, *Korea*; David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), hereafter Rees, *Korea*, quoted with permission of the publisher. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is on file at, or obtainable through, the Archives of the Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

[2] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of MajGen John T. Selden, Mar 54.

[3] China did not attend. Instead, it received an advance copy of the proposed text. President Chiang Kai-shek signified Chinese approval on 26 July. A few hours later, the Potsdam Declaration was made public. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943* (Department of State publication 7187), pp. 448–449; *The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, v. II (Department of State publication 7163), pp. 1278, 1282–1283, 1474–1476.

[4] The 7th Marines was on its way to Korea at the time of the Inchon landing. The brigade, however, joined the 1st Division at sea en route to the objective to provide elements of the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT).

[5] For a discussion of the hardships facing the landing force, see Montross and Canzona, *USMC Ops Korea—Inchon*, v. II, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–42, 59–60, 62–64.

[6] In World War II, the Japanese developed a logistical base east of Inchon. When the Japanese surrendered, the Army Service Command temporarily took over the installation, naming it Ascom City. Maj Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War* (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1962), p. 43n.

[7] Montross and Canzona, *USMC Ops Korea—Chosin*, v. III, p. 161.

[8] On 9 January 1951, General MacArthur was “directed to defend himself in successive positions, inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea subject to the primary consideration of the safety of his troops and his basic mission of protecting Japan.” Carl Berger, *The Korea Knot—A Military-Political History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), pp. 131–132, hereafter Berger, *Korea Knot*, quoted with permission of the publisher.

[9] The 1st KMC Regiment was again attached to the Marine Division on 17 March 1951 and remained under its operational control for the remainder of the war. CinCPacFlt Interim Evaluation Rpt No. 4, Chap 9, p. 9–53, hereafter *PacFlt EvalRpt* with number and chapter.

[10] Command responsibility of 1st MAW changed on 29 May 51 when Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman succeeded General Harris.

[11] The Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Commission, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, has described how the Communists in Korea concocted incidents “calculated to provide advantage for their negotiating efforts or for their basic propaganda objectives, or for both.” Examples of such duplicity are given in Chapter IV of his book, *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1955), hereafter Joy, *Truce Negotiations*, quoted with permission of the publisher. The quote above appears on p. 30.

[12] Col Franklin B. Nihart comments on draft MS, Sep 66, hereafter *Nihart comments*.

[13] Marine commanders and staff officers involved in the planning and execution of the division move were alarmed at the amount of additional equipment that infantry units had acquired during the static battle situation. Many had become overburdened with “nice-to-have” items in excess of actual T/E (Table of Equipment) allowances. Col William P. Pala comments on draft MS, 5 Sep 66, hereafter *Pala comments*.

[14] Heavy equipment and tracked vehicles were loaded aboard LSDs and LSTs which sailed from Sokcho-ri to Inchon.

[15] Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 16 Sep 59, hereafter *Culhane ltr*.

[16] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52; CIA, *NIS 41B*, South Korea, Chap I, Brief, Section 21, Military Geographic Regions, Section 24, Topography (Washington: 1957–1962); Map, Korea, 1:50,000, AMS Series L 751, Sheets 6526 I and IV, 6527 I, II, III, and IV, 6528 II and III, 6627 III and IV, and 6628 III (prepared by the Engineer, HQ, AFFE, and AFFE/8A, 1952–1954).

[17] The two other reasons were the weakness of the Kimpo defenses and abandonment of plans for an amphibious strike along the east coast. Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea*, v. IV, p. 253. Planning for a Marine-led assault had been directed by the EUSAK commander, General Van Fleet, early in 1952. The Marine division CG, General Selden, had given the task to his intelligence and operations deputies, Colonel James H. Tinsley and Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle. On 12 March General Van Fleet came to the Marine Division CP for a briefing on the proposed amphibious assault. At the conclusion of the meeting the EUSAK commander revealed his concern for a possible enemy attack down the Korean west coast and told the Marine commander to prepare, in utmost secrecy, to move his division to the west coast. Lynn Montross, draft MS.

[18] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar ComdDs, Mar 52; 1st KMC RCT Daily Intelligence and Operations Rpts, hereafter KMC Regt UnitRpts, Mar 52; Kimpo ProvRegt ComdDs, hereafter KPR ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52.

[19] KPR ComdD, Mar 52, p. 13.

[20] The following month the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion would be added to the four regiments on line, making a total of five major units manning the 1stMarDiv front. It was inserted between the Kimpo and 1st KMC regiments.

[21] Commandant, Korean Marine Corps ltr to CMC, dtd 20 Sep 66, hereafter *CKMC ltr*.

[22] 1stMar ComdD, Mar 52, p. 2.

[23] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App IX, p. 1.

[24] LtCol Harry W. Edwards comments on preliminary draft MS, *ca.* Sep 59.

[25] Col Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 25 Aug 59, hereafter *Henderson ltr I*.

[26] Col Sidney S. Wade ltr to Deputy AsstCofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd 25 Aug 59.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] Rees, *Korea*, p. 295.

[29] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52, p. 7.

[30] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52; 1st MAW ComdDs, Mar–Apr 52.

[31] In Korea, fields near U.S. Army installations were known as “A”; major airfields carried a “K” designation; and auxiliary strips were the “X” category.

[32] MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon comments on draft MS, dtd 1 Sep 66.

[33] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of General Christian F. Schilt, USMC (Ret.), Jun 59 rev.

[34] Robert Sherrod, *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II* (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952), p. 26, hereafter Sherrod, *Marine Aviation*.

[35] 1st MAW ComdD, Mar 52, p. 2.

[36] Unit commanders also changed about this time. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Smith, Jr. assumed command of the Checkerboard squadron from Lieutenant Colonel Joe H. McGlothlin, on 9 April.

[37] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 10–75. The Haeju–Chinnampo region, noted in the surveillance mission, is a coastal area in southwestern North Korea between the 38th and 39th Parallels.

[38] VMFs–212 (LtCol Robert L. Bryson) and –323 (LtCol Richard L. Blume) left an east coast field for a flight mission over North Korea and landed at K–6 thereafter, also completing the move without closing down combat operations. The relocation in air-fields was designed to keep several squadrons of support aircraft close to the 1st Marine Division. Col E. T. Dorsey ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7 Sep 66.

[39] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52.

[40] The Korean Marine Corps placed the artillery count at 240 weapons ranging from 57 to 122mm. *CKMC ltr*.

[41] *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 4, p. 10–38.

[42] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar–Apr 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 31, dtd 2 Apr 52.

[43] *Henderson ltr 1*.

[44] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, KPR ComdDs, Apr 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 35, dtd 16 Apr 52.

[45] Chapter III discusses in detail the construction of bunkers.

[46] One of those wounded was Corporal Duane E. Dewey, a machine gunner. He was wounded twice, in fact, the second time from an exploding enemy grenade which he had rolled upon to shield two nearby comrades. Dewey somehow survived, and the following March, after release from the Marine Corps, he went to the White House where he received the Medal of Honor, the first to be presented by the new President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Duane E. Dewey Biog. File)

[47] *Culhane ltr*.

[48] LtGen Merrill B. Twining ltr to Deputy Asst CofS, G–3, HQMC, dtd 19 Aug 54.

[49] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpt* No. 4, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 46, dtd 17 Apr 52.

[50] Colonel Flournoy became regimental CO on 10 April, succeeding Colonel Wade.

[51] Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had been attached to the Kimpo Provisional Regiment since 31 March and Company B was supporting MAG–33 at Pohang.

[52] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpt* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; 1st MAW, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, Apr 52; Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky—The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), hereafter Montross, *SkyCav*, quoted with permission of the publishers.

[53] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, 10–73.

[54] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9–50.

[55] Rotary wing aircraft assigned were two types, HTL–4 and HO3S–1. The former is a two-place, plastic-dome Bell product; the latter, the first helicopter operated by the Marine Corps, is an observation-utility, three-passenger Sikorsky-made craft. HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, *Marine Corps Aircraft, 1913–1965*, Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet (Washington: 1967 ed.) pp. 34, 38.

[56] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, pp. 10-2, 10-108. This record was established despite the fact that the Marine squadron, with 10 jets, flying out of K-3 (Pohang) was more than 150 miles further from most targets than the other major photo unit, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, based at K–14 (Kimpo).

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 10–59.

[58] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of LtGen Clayton C. Jerome, Jul 58, rev.

[59] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, 1st CSG, 11thMar, 1st TkbN ComdDs, Mar–Apr 52; 1st CSG UnitRpts, Apr 52.

[60] The Support Company moved to Ascom City on 14 Jun 52.

[61] One artillery weapon, in particular, as well as the Marine tanks habitually drew the fury of Chinese counter-fire. The heavy destructive power of the U.S. Army 8-inch, self-propelled howitzers firing on tough Chinese defensive positions, generally brought down on their own emplacements a rain of enemy shells, so sensitive were enemy commanders to these hard-hitting weapons. *Pala comments.*

[62] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9–39.

[63] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to CMC, dtd 6 Sep 66, hereafter *Henderson ltr II.*


[64] *Ibid.*


[65] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 12, p. 12–18. The medical officer's report to CinCPac noted that a vast improvement "in the spaces allocated for the care of the sick and wounded" had been made.


[66] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 10–69, p. 10–73.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 10–68. Flights were not made in heavy fog. Test use by the Marine Corps Equipment Board of some of the equipment needed to navigate under conditions of reduced visibility was nearing the end of its development cycle.

[68] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC, dtd 23 Jul 53, Subj: Type "C" Rpt: "Civilian Affairs and the Korean Service Corps, Mar 52–May 53," hereafter CG, 1stMarDiv ltr, *Civ Afrs and KSC*; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar–Apr 52; HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar–Apr 52.









MAP 3

K White



MAP 4

E Wilson



Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 2. Defending the Line

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Cdr Malcolm W. Cagle, USN and Cdr Frank A. Manson, USN, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), hereafter Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; James A. Field, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations, Korea* (Washington: [Div. of Naval Hist], 1962), hereafter Field, *NavOps, Korea*; John Miller, Jr., Maj Owen J. Carroll, USA, and Margaret E. Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953* (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1958), hereafter Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*.

[2] General Van Fleet, CG, EUSAK since April 1951, had advocated a program in which South Korean troops would be rigorously trained to take over an increasingly greater part of the UNC defense efforts in Korea. See Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 185, hereafter Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, quoted with permission of the publishers.

[3] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9; No. 5, Chap. 8; West Coast Island Defense Element ComdDs, Feb–Oct 52, hereafter *WCIDE ComdD*, with date; East Coast Island Defense ComdDs, Jan–Oct 52, hereafter *ECIDE ComdD*, with date; Col William K. Davenport ltr to CMC, dtd 27 Jun 52, Subj: Type D Report of duty as Commander West Coast Island Defense Element (CTE 95.15); Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Field, *NavOps, Korea*.

[4] Evidence of Chinese concern about such rear area attacks is apparent in the countermeasures taken: “Order of Battle reports indicated that a total of three North Korean Corps and three Chinese Communist Armies were engaged in coastal defense operations on the east and west coasts of North Korea.” *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 5, p. 8–79.

[5] CinPac Weekly Intel Digest No. 23–52, dtd 6 Jun 52, included as App. 17 to *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9–110.

[6] First Lieutenant Joseph S. Bartos, Jr., a former All-American football great, also distinguished himself during the Yang-do action. His cool, resourceful, and valiant leadership during the two-day defense earned him the Silver Star Medal. BGen Frank M. Reinecke comments on draft MS, dtd 25 Aug 66.

[7] Field, *NavOps, Korea*, p. 426.

[8] CTE 95.15 ComdD, 1 Feb–31 May 52, p. 8.

[9] Colonel Davenport later pointed out that the enemy could easily employ high-powered rifles against Ho-do occupants, that resupply posed problems to his command, and that at times the enemy could even walk to Ho-do over the winter ice. Col William K. Davenport ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7 Sep 66.

[10] A T/E is a listing of equipment that a unit needs to accomplish its mission. Tables vary according to type of unit and its mission.

[11] Commenting on logistical matters, Colonel Kenneth A. King, who during 1952 commanded first the WCIDE and then 1st CSG, was of the opinion that the main difficulty lay “not in getting requisitions filled, but in getting delivery of what was approved” due to the fact Marines were not assigned to processing of requisitions and delivery of supplies. He had high praise for the concern and assistance of 1st MAW units as well as Captain G. L. G. Evans (RN) of HMS *Ocean* and various other United Kingdom ship captains. Colonel King further commented that “for the benefit of Marines who may have to serve in isolated areas, and I imagine this often prevails in Vietnam today, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the Marine Corps should be very reluctant to leave the support of any of its elements, no matter how small, to other services or nationalities.” Col Kenneth A. King ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24 Aug 66.

[12] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section has been derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 10; No. 5, Chap. 9; 1st MAW ComdDs, May–Aug 52; MAG–12 ComdDs, Jun, Aug 52; Robert F. Futrell. *The*

United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961), hereafter Futrell, *USAF, Korea*.

[13] 1st MAW ComdD, Feb 52, quoted in *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 10–45.

[14] Two months earlier, FAF had begun “a program for training pilots in close air support techniques. . . . Initially, all training missions for this division were flown by Air Force aircraft.” The flights, not in response to specific requests, were assigned by the G-3, I Corps. CG, 1stMarDiv ltr to CG, FMFPac dtd 23 May 52, Subj: CAS sum for pd 1 Jan–30 Apr 52, cited in *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 10–196. These flights ceased just before the ones from MAG–12 began. 1st MarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 4. A 1st MarDiv staff officer, who had observed the frequency of General Jerome’s visits to the division CP to discuss the new close air support training program, has credited the two Marine CGs for their “great amount of coordinated personal aggressiveness in bringing this about.” Col Robert A. McGill comments on draft MS, Sep 66, hereafter *McGill comments*.

[15] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8–54.

[16] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9–36.

[17] 1st MarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2.

[18] Col Russell E. Honsowetz ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14 Sep 66.

[19] As an Air Force spokesman noted, “. . . the AN/MPQ–2 radars introduced into Korea in January 1951 were Strategic Air Command bomb scoring radars and not tactical equipment. This would explain the large vans.” Robert C. Futrell, Historian, Hist Studies Br USAF Hist Div, comments on draft MS, dtd 12 Oct 66. Dr. Futrell authored the definitive unclassified history of Air Force operations in Korea, previously cited as *USAF, Korea*.

[20] These letters indicate first, the type of installation; next, the kind of electronic equipment; and finally, its purpose. In this case, M-mobile”ground installation, P-radar, and Q-intended for a combination of purposes. The figure indicates the model number in the developmental history of the equipment.

[21] HistDiv, Air Univ, USAF, *United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950–30 June 1952*, USAF Hist Study No. 72 (Washington, 1955), p. 159, hereafter USAF, *Ops in Korea*, with appropriate number. The Air Force operations were published in three books, numbered 72, 73, and 127.

[22] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 435–436.

[23] General Mark W. Clark had succeeded Ridgway as UN Commander on 12 May 1952. Ridgway was to take over as the new Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1 June, replacing General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was returning to the United States.

[24] Cited in Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 435.

[25] USAF, *Ops in Korea*, No. 72, p. 156.

[26] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 436–437.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 452–453 and Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*, pp. 443–445.

[28] MajGen John P. Condon ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 1 Oct 66.

[29] MAG-12 ComdD, Aug 52, p. D-4.

[30] The AU is the attack version of the Marines’ famed World War II fighter, the F4U Corsair.

[31] MAG-12, ComdD, Aug 52, p. D-2.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. D-3.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. D-4.

[34] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 616.

[35] TACC is the senior agency for controlling all tactical aircraft and air warning functions; the TADC performs similar functions in an area controlled by the TACC. JCS, *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage* (Short title: JD), JCS Pub. 1 (Washington, 1964), p. 141, hereafter *JCS, JD*.

[36] VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Jun 52, App II, p. 5. Mention of a flak analysis program first appeared in the March 1952 records of MAG-33. Aircraft losses on interdiction strikes (the program was not applicable to CAS

missions) dropped for the next several months. When Lieutenant Foley transferred to the night squadron, he took his system with him and had it put into operation there. LtCol Kenneth S. Foley interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24 Mar 66.

[37] FAF CbtOps Notam No. 6-10.1 cited in App. 9, *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-199.

[38] *Pala comments; Nihart comments*. Both of these officers, the former artillery, the latter infantry, recall flak suppression firing late in 1951 or early in 1952 when the division was on the eastern front. Colonel Nihart pointed out, in addition, that “such expedients and new tactics went on for some time before getting into the regimental commander’s reports.”

[39] 1stMar ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2.

[40] LtCol Gerald T. Armitage interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 15 Aug 61.

[41] MajGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 12 Oct 66.

[42] An SOP, standing operating procedure, is a set of instructions for conducting operations that lend themselves to established procedures. *JCS, JD*, p. 133.

[43] With respect to the effect of enemy fire on attack aircraft, the CO, MAG-33 later commented that “Antiaircraft artillery has a direct deterioration effect on pilot accuracy, particularly with regard to care in getting on target and doing a precise job.” CO, MAG-33 ltr to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 25 Jul 52, quoted in *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9-76.

[44] *Henderson ltr II*.

[45] CO, MAG-12 Spdltr to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 2 Jul 52, Subj: Comments on 11th Mar Flak Suppression SOP, cited in *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 5, Chap. 9, p. 9-78.

[46] *Henderson ltr II*.

[47] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Apr-Jun 52; 5thMar ComdDs, Apr-Jun 52; 7thMar ComdD, Jun 52; 11thMar ComdDs, Apr-May 52; 1/5 ComdD May 52; 1/7, 2/7 ComdDs, May 52.

[48] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 52, p. 1.

[49] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-51.

[50] LtCol Bruce F. Hillam comments on draft MS, dtd 31 Aug 66.

[51] A type of proximity fuze, the V.T. depends upon an external source, such as an electronic signal, rather than the force of ground impact, to detonate the shell at a predetermined height over the target.

[52] 1stMatDiv ComdD, May 52, p. 4.

[53] The 7th Marines advanced to the line to relieve the 5th Marines in the center sector on 11 May.

[54] The artillery regiment had earlier developed the “box-me-in” fires for outpost defense. If under heavy attack the outpost could call for these preplanned close-in fires that completely surrounded the position. In event of radio or wire communication failures, the outpost could call for “box-me-in” or “Fire VT on my position” by signal flare or other pyrotechnic device. *Henderson ltr II*.

[55] This support squad itself was later ambushed. The heavy casualties it received prevented its further participation in the raid. KMC Regt UnitRpt 53, dtd 4 May 52.

[56] This position, the site of the mid-April battle, along with several others had been abandoned when the division withdrew its OPLR late in April. Infantry regiments dispatched frequent patrols in an attempt to discourage the enemy’s incorporating the hill into his own OPLR.

[57] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 10.

[58] Lieutenant Colonel Nihart believed that the heavy enemy shelling, which had caused the early retirement of his battalion, had been possible either because Chinese mortar and artillery positions were so well camouflaged that intelligence had not located them or else so well protected that UNC counterbattery fire had failed to destroy them. *Nihart comments*.

[59] 5thMar ComdD, May 52, p. 9.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[61] This force and its mission at various times were known as “Task Force Jig” or “Operation Snatch.”

[62] Maj Kenneth A. Seal comments on draft MS, dtd Oct 66. At the time of this attack, Lieutenant Seal commanded the 2d Platoon, A/1/7.

[63] Two Marines killed in the action were later posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Corporal David B. Champagne, A/1/7, was responsible for saving the lives of the three other members of his fire team. When a grenade fell in their midst, Champagne grabbed it to hurl back to CCF positions. Just as it cleared his hand, the grenade exploded, showering lethal shrapnel into the body of the 19-year-old Rhode Islander. One of the C/1/7 reinforcement Marines, Private First Class John D. Kelly, had conducted a one-man assault against a dug-in Chinese machine gun crew. Though painfully wounded during this encounter, he disposed of the enemy, then reduced a second weapons bunker. While firing point-blank into a third position the brave Marine was fatally wounded. This 1/7 action was the first in the western Korea defense to result in multiple Medal of Honor awards.

[64] 1/7 ComdD, May 52, pp. 17–18.

[65] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52; 5th Mar ComdDs, Apr, Jun 52; 7thMar ComdDs, May–Jun 52; 1/7 ComdD, May 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 120, dtd 30 Jun 52.

[66] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9–33.

[67] BGen Austin R. Brunelli ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 13 Sep 66, hereafter *Brunelli ltr*. The division chief of staff during more than half of 1952, Colonel Brunelli later observed that the “school produced more effective patrolling and . . . contributed to reducing our casualties.”

[68] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 8.

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] Selden, *Div Staff Rpt*, p. 16.

[71] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8; and 1stMarDiv, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 52.

[72] Colonel Moore took over regimental command on 11 June. The former CO, Colonel Honsowetz, had been named Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3 of the 1st Marine Division.

[73] The leadership, bravery, and unselfish devotion to duty earned for Sergeant Shuck the Medal of Honor, an award made to 14 Marines during the fighting in West Korea. During the earlier part of the war, 28 Marines had received the Medal of Honor. Of these, 17 were awarded posthumously. Five Navy hospital corpsmen, all attached to the 1st Marine Division, also earned the MOH. These awards, with one exception, were for heroism under combat conditions during the 1952–1953 period of the Korean War.

[74] In the TOT technique, participating units time their initial volleys to ensure that their shells arrive on the target at the same time.

[75] Among division commanders in the I Corps area, General Selden was not alone in his grave misgivings of this method of gaining information about the Chinese. Major General A. J. H. Cassels, 1st Commonwealth Division, shared with the Marine commander the belief that such operations were too costly for the intended purpose. *McGill comments* and Brigadier C. N. Barclay, *The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950–1953* (Aldershot, England: Gale and Polden Ltd., 1954), p. 127, hereafter Barclay, *Commonwealth*.

[76] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 52.

[77] The material in this section is derived from the 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52.

[78] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9.

[79] *Brunelli ltr.*

[80] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9–27.

[81] 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 52, p. 4.

[82] FMFPac ComdD, Jul 52, App VIII, Encl (7), Anx (E).

[83] FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App I, Enci (35).


[84] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 10–198.

[85] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Selden, *Div Staff Rpt; PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv, 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Jun–Jul 52.

[86] The KSC was a ROK quasi-military organization for logistical support of the UNC. Personnel were drafted from those rejected for Army service. Each KSC unit had a cadre of ROK officers and enlisted. All types of labor except personal services were performed by these Koreans. During its period in western Korea, the 1st Marine Division was supported by the 103d KSC Regiment of 5,222 men. CG, 1stMarDiv, *Civ Afrs and KSC*, pp. 8–9.


[87] Col Harry D. Clarke ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 1 Sep 66.

[88] This included employment of the 60-inch searchlight for night illumination, maintenance of boats for debris removal, and operation of the M–4 ferry. Other preparations by the division, of a non-engineer nature, included positioning of 13,000 life-saving floatation devices for use by frontline troops should they become shut off from planned evacuation.



MAP 6

K. White





Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 3. The Battle of Bunker Hill

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Jul-Aug 52; 1stMar, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52; 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 52.
- [2] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52, p. 2.
- [3] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
- [4] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 18 Jun 52, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 5.
- [5] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 12.
- [6] HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 52, p. 27.
- [7] *Ibid.*
- [8] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 5.
- [9] “The Chinese attack by ‘shovel’ proved effective and difficult to combat. They burrowed forward almost continuously, even under direct observation. Every foot of advance provided added opportunity to attack Marine COPs with greater impunity. While this activity possibly provided Marines with target practice in both small arms and mortars, these CCF working parties in a narrow trench 7 to 10-foot deep probably took very few casualties.” Col William R. Watson, Jr. ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 18 July 67.
- [10] *A Volunteer Soldier’s Day: Recollections by Men of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 193, hereafter CPV, *Recollections*.
- [11] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8–90.
- [12] LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr., “Random Notes on Korea,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 11 (Nov 55), p. 29, hereafter Batterton, *Korea Notes*.
- [13] CO 5thMar msg to 5thMar units, dtd 20 Apr 52, in 5thMar ComdD, Apr 52, #2, App. II, p. 6.
- [14] Since bunkers were in everyone’s mind and frontline units were heavily involved in the bunker-construction program, it is felt likely “someone in G-2 arbitrarily assigned the name.” Col Gerald T. Armitage ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 6 July 67, hereafter *Armitage ltr*.
- [15] Two days earlier Colonel Layer had taken over the command from Colonel Flournoy.
- [16] Lieutenant Colonels Gerald F. Russell and Anthony Caputo, respectively, commanded 3/7 and 2/7 at this time.
- [17] 1stMarDiv PIR 657, dtd 13 Aug 52.
- [18] Frequently cartographers use elevations for names of hills. Heights on the Korean maps are in meters, and many of these hills derive their name (i.e., number) from their elevation. For changing meters to feet, the conversion factor 3.28 is used.
- [19] A saddle, the low point in the crest line of a ridge, is much in appearance like the side view of a riding saddle.
- [20] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 9–11 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.
- [21] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, App. VII, p. 1.
- [22] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is derived from: Encl (1) to CG, FMFPac ltr 0762/161 over A9 to CMC, dtd 25 Nov 52, Subj: “Summary of 1stMarDiv Sit from 20 July–20 Oct 52,” hereafter FMFPac, *1stMarDiv Sum, Jul–Oct 52*; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 2/1, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52.
- [23] Recalling the Marine seizure of Bunker, the G-3, 1stMarDiv at that time expressed the view that “taking these places was easy but holding them under heavy Chinese artillery and mortar fire was extremely costly. Our counterbattery fire was ineffective because we were limited to from one to eight rounds per tube per day,

depending on the weapon, by Army order, because of an ammunition shortage.” Col Russell E. Honsowetz MS comments, dtd 15 Jun 67, hereafter *Honsowetz ltr II*.

[24] Initially the diversionary attack against Siberia and subsequent assault against Bunker had been made by Marines of 2/1 since Siberia was in the 2/1 sector. On 12 August operational control was transferred to 3/1 as the fighting continued at Bunker, in the area of responsibility of the left battalion sector.

[25] From the division reserve, Captain Anthony J. Skotnicki’s company, I/3/7, was en route to take over the I/3/1 sector. As an interim measure, Captain Byron J. Melancon’s Company H extended its MLR positions to the right to cover the Company I area.

[26] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 12-13 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.

[27] A characteristic of 4.5-inch rocket launcher is the discharge of 24 rounds in quick succession, called a ripple. A battery of six launchers can fire 144 rounds on target in less than a minute.

[28] 1stMarDiv PIR 658, dtd 14 Aug 52.

[29] Selden, *Div Staff Rpt*, p. 19.

[30] During the fighting on the 13th, Hospitalman John E. Kilmer was mortally wounded while “administering aid to the wounded and expediting their evacuation.” Though wounded by enemy mortars, he continued his life-saving efforts until another barrage took his life. He had died shielding a wounded Marine undergoing emergency treatment. Hospitalman Kilmer, a distant cousin of poet Joyce Kilmer, became the first of four corpsmen serving with the 1st Marine Division to be awarded the Medal of Honor during the trench warfare in western Korea.

[31] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 3/1, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52.

[32] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4.

[33] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 4-16 Aug 52; 1st Mar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52; MAGs-12,-33 ComdDs, Aug 52.

[34] Two days later, Colonel Lambrecht, flying a F3D twin jet night fighter with his radar operator, Second Lieutenant James M. Brown, disappeared while on a night flight. The last known position of the plane was over the Yellow Sea, 50 air miles west of Pyongyang. At about that point the aircraft faded from the radar screen. Efforts to re-establish communications failed. It was reported that observers at sea sighted a crash and explosion at about this same time. Extensive search failed to uncover any trace of the Marines or their aircraft.

[35] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, pp. 3-4.

[36] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC and MS comments, dtd 20 Jun 67, hereafter *Henderson ltr III*.

[37] *Armitage ltr* and comments, p. 12.

[38] Many of these targets were CCF choke points, dumps, and weapons emplacements. Targets were identified and confirmed by a highly developed system that employed air spotting, aerial photographic interpretation, artillery evaluation, and POW interrogation.

[39] The use of fighting lights to illuminate targets for tank gunners had been undertaken in July, but the results were inconclusive, owing to failure of one of the bulbs of the two lights tested. 1st TkBn ComdD, Aug 52, App. VI, Encl. 2. Declared the G-3, 1stMarDiv: “The diversion on Siberia was 100 percent effective, due largely to the new tank battle lights which we were using for the first time.” *Honsowetz ltr II*.

[40] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: FMFPac, *1st-MarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52*; *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar ComdDs, Aug 52.

[41] CG, FMFPac, Lieutenant General Hart, requested the Commandant to delay decision until FMFPac could survey the combat replacement situation and aircraft availability. After a quick evaluation of both these factors,

General Hart on the 14th recommended approval. FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App. I, Encl. (6). The air lift of 500 replacements to Korea was an “all out effort for Marine Aviation Transport based on the West Coast. This general support of Korean based forces demonstrated the total capability of Marine Aviation in support of ground forces.” MajGen Samuel S. Jack to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 27 Jun 67, hereafter *Jack ltr*.

[42] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 12. p. 12-8.

[43] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4.

[44] Earlier, on 13 August, a flare drop requested by the 1st Marines went awry when the aircraft got off course and dropped the flares forward of the 5th Marines main line. 1stMarDiv G-3 Jn1, 13 Aug 52.

[45] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, p. 2.

[46] MajGen John T. Selden ltr to Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., dtd 14 Aug 52.


[47] *Armitage ltr* and draft MS comments, p. 7. For further details of the Bunker Hill action, see *Armitage ltr* in v. V, Korean comment file.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[49] *Ibid.*


[50] *Ibid.*, p. 9.


[51] As the military situation changed in Korea to become increasingly one of a battle of position and attrition, the Marine Corps Basic School, Quantico, Va. curriculum was revised to give greater emphasis to tactics of positional warfare. Close attention was paid to terrain evaluation, employment of infantry units, offensive and defensive use of automatic and supporting weapons, night counterattacks, field problems of reverse slope defense, and even tasks of “research into WW I—and the American Civil and Revolutionary Wars for the tactic of Reverse Slope defense.” *Armitage ltr*.



MAP 9

K. White





Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 4. Outpost Fighting Expanded

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 661-675, dtd 18-31 Aug 52; 1stMar, 5thMar, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.
- [2] Command responsibility for this sector changed on 20 August, when Lieutenant Colonel William S. McLaughlin took over the battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Cross.
- [3] To escape the murderous hostile fire, the Marines sought shelter in a trench nearby. During the ensuing clash, a Chinese grenade landed in the midst of the Marines. Private First Class Robert E. Simanek, E/2/5, unhesitatingly threw himself upon the deadly missile an instant before it exploded. Although gravely wounded, his courageous action prevented injury or death to fellow patrol members. The following year, President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented the Medal of Honor to the Detroit, Michigan Marine for his “daring initiative and great personal valor.”
- [4] 1stMarDiv PIR 669, dtd 25 Aug 52.
- [5] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, Jan 56, rev.
- [6] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 2/1, 3/1, 2/5, 3/5 ComdDs, Sep 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 188-189, dtd 6-7 Sep 52.
- [7] Normally a component of the 2d Battalion, Company E had been attached to the 3d Battalion on 1 September when the company took over the Bunker Hill outpost. The relieved Company H was then attached to 2/1, the reserve battalion, from 1-3 September.
- [8] On 20 August Lieutenant Colonel Altman became the commander of 3/1 in relief of Lieutenant Colonel Armitage.
- [9] Colonel Smoak had relieved Colonel Culhane on 15 August.
- [10] Although 1/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Gentleman) was the regimental reserve at this time, the regiment had assigned one company to 2/5, manning the right sector.
- [11] Still another award of the Medal of Honor was to come out of the action that ended on 5 September. Hospitalman Third Class Edward C. Benfold had ministered aid to several wounded Marines and was searching for others who needed medical attention when he saw two wounded Marines in a shell crater. Just as he neared its edge two grenades fell into it and two Chinese prepared to assault the Marines. “Picking up a grenade in each hand, Benfold leaped out of the crater and hurled himself against the onrushing hostile soldiers, pushing the grenades against their chests and killing both. . . . He gallantly gave his life for his country.” Medal of Honor citation, case of Hospital Corpsman Third Class Edward C. Benfold, USN, 4168234.
- [12] Contemporary records of the 1st KMC Regiment for 1952-1953 identify this as Outpost 37. Current reviewer comments refer to this hill as OP 67. LtCol Kim Yong Kyu, ROKMC, ltr to CMC, HQMC, dtd 5 Jul 67.
- [13] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 195-202, dtd 13-20 Sep 52.
- [14] 1st MarDiv ComdD, Sep 52, App. I, # 8.
- [15] *Ibid.*
- [16] When the 7th Marines took over this sector from the 5th in early September, the names changed to Carson, Vegas, Detroit, and Seattle respectively. COP Bruce was also redesignated as Reno. Since the old names of the outposts were well known to the enemy, for purposes of security it was decided to identify them differently. U.S. cities were selected.
- [17] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 7thMar, 2/1 ComdDs, Sep 52.
- [18] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: FMFPac, *1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52*;

1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1-7 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRS 706-713, dtd 1-8 Oct 52; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7 ComdDs, Oct 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 214-220, dtd 2-8 Oct. 52.

[19] The outpost at the extreme right flank was given the name "Verdun" because of its World War I connotation of "They shall not pass." Col. Leo J. Dulacki ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2 Jun 67, hereafter *Dulacki ltr*.

[20] During the latter stage of the fight for Warsaw, a Chinese soldier tossed a grenade into a bunker shared by five Marines. Private Jack W. Kelso, of I/3/7, quickly picked up the missile and ran outside with it. As he was throwing the grenade back to the Chinese, it went off in his hand. Disregarding his wounds, the Marine moved back inside the shelter, directed the other four to return to the MLR, and went outside to cover their exit. As he was firing at the advancing Chinese soldiers, Private Kelso was hit several times by enemy bullets. His "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life" was later recognized in the posthumous award of the Medal of Honor.

[21] This squad was from Company A (Captain Frederick C. McLaughlin), which came under the operational control of 3/7 at 1130 on 3 October, relieving Company C (Captain Paul B. Byrum). The latter company had reported to the 3d Battalion from regimental reserve at 2130 the previous day. Company D was sent immediately to reinforce the hard-pressed Company I.

[22] At the same time one company, I/3/7, became the regimental reserve, having been relieved on the MLR at 1500 the previous day by A/1/7.

[23] During the predawn attempt to retake Frisco on 7 October, Staff Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins, I/3/7, although already wounded, led his rifle platoon in the assault against Frisco. When an enemy machine gun impeded their progress, Staff Sergeant Watkins grabbed a wounded man's automatic rifle to help get the assault moving forward again. At that instant, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of the Marines. Staff Sergeant Watkins immediately seized it. Just as he was about to hurl it away it exploded in his hand. The grenade took the sergeant's life but he had saved his fellow Marines. For his bravery Staff Sergeant Watkins was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

[24] FMFPac, *1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52*.

[25] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 9; 1st MAW ComdDs, Jun-Oct 52; MAG-12 ComdDs, Jun, Sep 52; MAG-33 ComdD, Aug 52; MACG-2 ComdD, Sep 52; VMA-312 ComdDs, Sep-Oct 52; VMA-323 ComdDs, Jun-Jul, Sep 52; VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Jun-Jul 52; VMJ-1 ComdD, Jul 52; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Field, *NavOps, Korea*; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Rees, *Korea*.

[26] The 1st MAW chief of staff during this period, then Colonel Samuel S. Jack, offered the opinion that "the Fifth Air Force was most sympathetic to Division requirements for close air support from Wing sources. The Eighth Army in the Joint Operations Center proved to be the principal limiting factor in the assignment of air in accordance with these requests. Also, requirements that Division CAS requests filter through I Corps and JOC constituted a major factor in Wing response." *Jack ltr*.

[27] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 482.

[28] Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, pp. 208-209.

[29] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 482.

[30] Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, p. 209. "I told you so" leaflets were dropped after the raid to impress the inhabitants with the importance of believing the warning leaflets. USAF, *Ops in Korea*, No. 127, pp. 36, 37.

[31] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 489.

[32] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9-53.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 9-143.

[34] The first Marine night ace was Captain Robert Baird, who shot down six Japanese planes between 9 June and

14 July 1945. Sherrod, *Marine Aviation*, p. 404. Lieutenant Andre's first four planes were also downed during World War II. See Appendix F for Marine air kills during the Korean War.

[35] VMA-312 ComdD, Sep 52.

[36] The exchange program "appears to have originated with the participation—at Tactical Air Command's invitation—of two Marine Corps and two Navy pilots . . . in the fall of 1947." Within two years, the program designed to "indoctrinate selected Air Force and Navy pilots in the air operational and air training activities of each other's service, had received Department of Defense approval." On 1 October 1949 the program went into effect. Initially the exchange period was one year, but after the Korean fighting broke out, the period was reduced to approximately three months. Marine participation began late in 1951. Atch 1 to Hq, USAF (AFCHO) memo to Maj J. M. Yingling, HQMC, dtd 16 Jan 67 in v. V, Korean comment file.

[37] On 15 September, Major Gillis had shot down a solo MIG-15.

[38] *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-77.

[39] MAG-33 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 16.

[40] Although not definitely proven, there were "some indications of false radio beacons being used by the enemy in clandestine operations in the K-2 area." *Jack ltr*.

[41] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1st MAW ComdD, Oct 52; HMR-161 ComdDs Aug-Sep 52.


[42] *Henderson ltr III*.


[43] For example, on 25 September, rain soaked the cardboard cover of the rations, adding extra weight to each preloaded lift of these Class I supplies. On the other hand, a heavier load could have been used at times. As the helicopter used up its fuel, a commensurate increase in cargo could have been carried.

[44] Spare parts shortages are "inherent in the introduction of new equipment into the field and prior to the development of usage data." A major effort was made at this time by 1st MAW to improve its critical spare parts support by improved stock control procedures and complete inventory. *Jack ltr*.

[45] On 4 April Lieutenant Colonel Alton L. Hicks assumed command of the battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Jacob E. Glick relieved him on 3 August.


[46] Communication with General Kendall's I Corps consisted of radio-teletype, telephone, radio relay, courier plane, and motor messenger. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-68. The 11th Marines also had an additional 1,100 miles of communication wire. *Henderson ltr III*.





MAP 13

K.White



Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 5. The Hook

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv, *Info for CG, FMFPac*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 706–736, dtd 1–31 Oct 52; 7thMar ComdD, Oct 52; LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. memo to Dir, MarCor Hist, HQMC, dtd 28 Oct 52, Subj: Notes on 7th Marines' Action (Defense of "The Hook"), 26–27 Oct 52, hereafter Heinl, *memo*.

[2] Responsibility for this part of the 7th Marines line changed on 13 October, when Lieutenant Colonel Barrett took command of 3/7 from Lieutenant Colonel Russell. The latter then was assigned as division senior liaison officer to the KMC regiment.

[3] Heinl, *memo*. The originator of this memo, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., was an experienced Marine officer and military historian who had just been assigned to the division for duty. Temporarily attached to the 7th Marines as an observer, his brief visit there happened to coincide with the beginning of the Hook battle.

[4] Quoted in LtCol Herbert F. Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defense Policy of Canada* (Ottawa: The Army Historical Section, Canadian Forces Headquarters, 1966), p. 213.

[5] The Marine division artillery regiment reported that in late October nine battalions of Chinese artillery, ranging from 75 or 76mm guns or howitzers to 122mm howitzers, opposed the 7th Marines. It was estimated that one other 122mm battalion was also emplaced north of the right division sector. In addition to these CCF units, elements of a 152mm self-propelled howitzer unit were also believed to be in the area. Late in November two batteries of 152mm howitzers were tentatively located about 4,000 yards west northwest of the Hook. Disposition had been determined "as a result of crater analysis, shell reports, sound plots, and capabilities of the weapon." 11thMar ComdD, Nov 52, "Enemy Artillery Activity Rpts," Nos. 21, 23, dtd 1, 21 Nov. 52.

[6] *CPV, Recollections*, p. 360.

[7] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 24–26 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 729–732, dtd 4–27 Oct 52; 7th Mar, 1/7, VMA–323 ComdDs, Oct 52; Heinl, *memo*.

[8] 11thMar ComdD, Oct 52, App III, Sheet 3. Eighteen of the weapons (the 623d Field Artillery Battalion) had just moved into the Marine sector and begun operating on 14 October. The unit remained under I Corps operational control, with the mission of providing general support reinforcing fire.

[9] Later in 1951, during the UN Summer-Fall offensive, ammunition consumption had again risen sharply, creating concern among corps commanders and occasioning one of them to remark to a subordinate, "We have the distinct impression that two of your battalions are trying to compete for a world's record." Capt Edward C. Williamson, *et. al.*, "Bloody Ridge," ms OCMH, 1951, cited in James A. Huston, *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953—The Army Historical Series* (Washington: OCMH, 1966), v. II, p. 632.

[10] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App I, No. 19.

[11] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8–71.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] For example, during the latter part of the month each rifle company in the Hook battalion was limited to 150 hand grenades. The total 11-day allowance for Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's 81mm mortars was 475 rounds. 1/7 ComdD, Oct 52, App. III.

[14] Heinl, *memo*.

[15] 1stMarDiv PIR 729, dtd 24 Oct 52, p. 2. Ronson, the Hook, and Warsaw are within the 1,000-meter square, CT 1010.

[16] Heinl, *memo*.

[17] 1stMarDiv Intell. Est., dtd 19 Oct 52, p. 8, filed with the divisions PIRs for that month.

[18] *Dulacki ltr.*

[19] Heinl, *memo.*

[20] Due to the width of the Hook sector, it was necessary to keep all three rifle platoons in the line. A reinforced platoon from the battalion reserve outposted Warsaw. While Company A was on line, a Company C platoon manned the outpost; when Company C was relieved on 26 October, a Company A platoon was sent to Warsaw.

Maj Frederick C. McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Jan 70, hereafter *McLaughlin ltr.*

[21] On 24 October, Battery M of the battalion was temporarily relaid to provide additional support to Colonel Moore's regiment.

[22] The flight had been scheduled to attack active artillery positions 3 1/2 miles north of the Carson-Reno-Vegas area. When some of their ordnance was unexpended after putting these guns out of action, the planes were ordered to take on the trench target.

[23] Within the division there were no reports of sightings of unusually large groups of enemy soldiers in this area. In fact, there were fewer enemy seen on the 26th than any other day since 18 October. During the 23d and 24th, about 100 enemy had been observed almost a half mile closer to the Hook than the hideout area used on the 26th. 11thMar ComdD, Oct. 52, p. 12; 1stMarDiv PIR 729, dtd 24 Oct 52, p. 2.

[24] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 26 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 723, 734, dtd 27, 29 Oct 52; 7thMar, 11th Mar, 1/7, 4/11, 1st TkBn, VMF (N) -513 ComdDs, Oct 52; Heinl, *memo.*

[25] The 1/7 commander, who was uninjured by the blast, might have become a believer that day in the military cliché, "Rank hath its privileges," for Brigadier A. H. G. Ricketts (29th British Infantry Brigade, 1st Commonwealth Division), who was standing near Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki, was untouched. The British division was scheduled to take over responsibility for the Hook sector in early November.

[26] Prior to the enemy's steady shelling of the Hook, the trenches were six feet deep. The preparatory fires of the past several days had been so intense that in nearly all areas the trenchline had been leveled by the time of the Chinese attack. "I am convinced that the Chinese didn't realize that they had penetrated our MLR or they would have exploited the penetration." Col Russell E. Honsowetz ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 26 Jan 70.

[27] The material in this section has been derived from 7thMar, "Summary of Action, 26 Oct-1 Nov 52, Hook, Reno, Ronson"; 2/7 ComdD, Oct 52.

[28] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27-28 Oct 52; 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/7, 4/11, 1st TkBn, VMAs-121, -212, -323 ComdDs, Oct. 52.

[29] At 0545 on the 25th, Company I (Captain John Thomas), then the regimental reserve, and Captain Belant's Company H, responsible for the right sector of 3/7, had exchanged roles.

[30] Another Medal of Honor resulting from the Hook action was awarded posthumously to Second Lieutenant Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr. for "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity." Lieutenant Skinner, whose twin brother was also a Marine officer, had been assigned as an artillery forward observer with F/2/11. When the Chinese attack hit the MLR, Lieutenant Skinner organized the surviving Marines in defense of their observation post. Fighting off the enemy and calling down defensive artillery fire on the assaulting Chinese, he delayed capture of the position. Twice he left the bunker to direct fire on the enemy and get more ammunition.

When the Communists finally overran the bunker, Lieutenant Skinner instructed his fellow Marines to pretend they were dead; during the next three hours several different enemy groups frisked the inert Marines without discovering their ruse. Later, when a skeptical enemy soldier hurled a grenade into the bunker, Lieutenant Skinner unhesitatingly rolled on top of the missile, shielding the two surviving Marines. By thus absorbing the full force of the explosion, he sacrificed his life for theirs. (2dLt Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr. Biog. File)

[31] The new squadron commander had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Fletcher two days earlier. This

flight was the first of two CAS attacks in behalf of the Hook forces that the new commanding officer participated in that day.

[32] During this action, the company suffered 15 killed, 71 seriously wounded, and 6 slightly wounded. 3/1 ComdD, Oct. 52, p. 3.

[33] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Oct 52.

[34] As a part of the reorganization, H/3/1 remained in the right sector, and Company C, of the Hook battalion, filled in the middle. Company A was in position on the friendly side of that part of the ridge held by Captain Byrum's Company C. During the afternoon of the 28th, I/3/1 and H/3/7 also left Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's area to rejoin their parent organizations.

[35] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 734-735, 741, dtd 29-30 Oct 52, 5 Nov. 52.

[36] The CCF casualty figures were derived from a comparison of reports of participating Marine battalions, the 7th Marines, and division. In addition to these losses caused by Marine infantry units were enemy casualties listed by the artillery and tank battalion command diaries and records of participating air squadrons; these supporting arms figures amount to 468 casualties, more than one-third the total number.

[37] During the Task Force Drysdale operation, in November 1950, more than 40 Marines had been seized by the enemy. Maj James Angus MacDonald, Jr., "The Problems of U.S. Marine Corps Prisoners of War in Korea" (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Maryland, 1961), App. G, pp. 261-262, hereafter MacDonald, *POW*.


[38] Comments by Dr. Robert F. Futrell, USAF Historian, in ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 2 Feb 70: "The Air Force position about the accumulation of munitions at frontline units was that by exercising supply discipline and refraining from combat, the enemy could hoard and build supply over a period of time."


[39] 1stMarDiv PIR 738, dtd 2 Nov 52, p. 3. The Chinese also used hand grenades in searching the bunkers. All of these explosives had been widely employed during World War II.


[40] 1stMarDiv PIR 741, dtd 5 Nov 52, Encl. 2, p. 2.

[41] 1/7 ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI.

[42] CG, FMFPac ComdD, Nov 52, App IV, Encl (8), Anx G, p. 4. During the Hook fighting, General Hart also witnessed the helicopter deployment of the 4.5-inch rockets. He was impressed with the progress that had been made in this helicopter-ground team performance, particularly the speed and efficiency with which these weapons could be set up to fire and then displaced to a new position.









MAP 17

K. White



OUTPOST RENO ATTACKS

27 October 1952



Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 6. Positional Warfare

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Oct–Nov 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 737–738, dtd 31 Oct–1 Nov 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 238–244, dtd 24–30 Oct 52.
- [2] KMC Regt UnitRpt 216, dtd 4 Oct 52, p. 2.
- [3] KMC Regt UnitRpt 243, dtd 31 Oct 52, pp. 5–6.
- [4] The attack on the 31st took place after the KMC 5th Battalion had taken over the right regimental sector, at 1700, from the 3d Battalion. The Chinese often deliberately timed their outpost attacks to coincide with a relief of lines. Company personnel of both the 5th and 3d Battalions were on line during the fighting. KMC Regt UnitRpts dtd 1 Nov 52, p. 4; 245, dtd 2 Nov 52, p. 4.
- [5] KMC Regt UnitRpt 244, dtd 1 Nov 52, pp. 1,4. A different account as to size of attacking units is given in Maj Kang Shin Ho, ROKMC ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 30 Apr 70, which states two reinforced enemy companies assaulted COP 33 and an estimated enemy battalion struck COP 31.
- [6] *Ibid.*
- [7] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Barclay, *Commonwealth*; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Field, *NavOps, Korea*; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front—United States Army in the Korean War* (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1966), hereafter Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*.
- [8] For details of this action see Canadian Department of National Defence ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 8 Jan 70 in v. V, Korean comment file.
- [9] Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 392.
- [10] Quoted in Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*, p. 461.
- [11] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Dec 52; Berger, *Korea Knot*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Robert Leckie, *Conflict—The History of the Korean War, 1950–1953* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962), hereafter Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.
- [12] Eisenhower had resigned his commission, following his return to the States in April to seek election.
- [13] Joy, *Truce Negotiations*, p. 156. The proposal was a “complete armistice agreement” not merely another offer to solve the prisoner question.
- [14] Quoted in Berger, *Korea Knot*, p. 153.
- [15] Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, p. 240.
- [16] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Nov 52–Jan 53; 1stMar ComdDs, Nov 52–Feb 53; 5thMar ComdD, Dec 52; 7thMar ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53; 11th Mar ComdDs, Jan–Feb 53; 2/1 ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdD, Jan 53; MAG–12 ComdD, Jan 53; MAG–33 ComdD, Oct 52; MACG–2 ComdD, Feb 53.
- [17] At this time a new limiting point between the division and British division was also established. This slightly reduced Marine division frontage to 33 miles and allowed the two MLR regiments to shorten their lines and maintain somewhat larger reserve units. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8–23.
- [18] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to GOC, 1stComWelDiv, dtd 29 Oct 52, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App. II, p. 6.
- [19] GOC, 1stComWelDiv msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 19 Nov 52, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52, App. I, p. 3.
- [20] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of LtGen Vernon E. Megee, 1959.
- [21] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 5, Chap. 9 and No. 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdDs, Oct 52, Jan–Feb 53; MAG–12 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53, Mar 53; MAG–33 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan–Mar 53; VMA–121 ComdDs, Nov–Dec 52; VMF–115

ComdDs, Nov–Dec 52; VMF(N)–513 ComdDs, Oct 52–Jan 53; HMR–161 ComdDs, Jul 52, Nov–Dec 52, Jan 53; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Montross, *SkyCav*.

[22] A total of 1,362 CAS sorties were flown, with 443 for the 1st Marine Division. Interdiction missions numbered 1,842, plus additional miscellaneous and air reconnaissance flights. 1st MAW ComdD, Oct. 52.

[23] Montross, *SkyCav*, p. 189.

[24] A relatively small number of night med evac flights was also being flown by HMR–161. During March 1953, for example, in transferring 283 casualties to the hospital ships, squadron helicopters made only 15 flights at night.

[25] Col Glenn R. Long ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 11 Jun 67.

[26] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 10–76.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 10–80.

[29] *PactFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9–81.

[30] *PctFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 10–80.

[31] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 582.

[32] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Jan–Feb 53; 1/1 ComdD, Feb 53; HMR–161 ComdD, Feb 53; Montross, *SkyCav*.

[33] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No.6, p. 10–133.

[34] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3.

[35] The following month, HMR–161 engaged in a four-day ammunition resupply operation for the division. Except for one day, the 22d, all available helicopters were assigned to that mission, beginning 20 March. HMR–161 also had a new CO by that time, Colonel Owen A. Chambers who had taken over from Lieutenant Colonel Carey on 15 March.

[36] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: KPR ComdDs, Jun, Aug, Oct–Dec 52, Jan–Mar 53; 1st AmTracBn ComdDs, Mar–Dec 52, Jan–Mar 53.

[37] On the west, the Yom River similarly separates the Kimpo Peninsula from Kanghwado Island, second in size of all Korean islands and a base for friendly intelligence operations.

[38] Identified as elements of the 195th CCF Division of the 65th CCF Army and an unidentified CCF division, in a revised EOOB issued in December. Previously, units of the 193d CCF Division were at the front in this far western sector. KPR ComdDs, Oct–Dec 52.

[39] Colonel Tschirgi had taken command of the KPR on 1 December from Colonel Richard H. Crockett, who previously relieved Colonel Staab (the original KPR commander) on 31 August.

[40] Comprising a platoon from Company B and several headquarters elements, the provisional company was disbanded on 14 June when Company B that had been supporting MAG–33 at Pohang was reassigned to the battalion.

[41] Formerly the executive officer, Major Saussy took over unit command on 7 November, when Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler was transferred to the 5th Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., became the next commanding officer on 16 March 1953.

[42] The material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8.

[43] The 1st Commonwealth Division, to the Marine right, utilized a different defense system. Instead of relying on the COPs forward of the main line of defense as major deterrent positions, the British preferred to include all strategic terrain features within the MLR itself. They followed a policy of active patrolling to the front and, at night, occupied selected ground sites, preferring to fight the enemy from their main battle positions rather than from more isolated COP positions. *PactFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap, 9, pp. 9–92, 9–93.

[44] The military crest is that point along the slope of a hill from which maximum observation up and down the hill can be obtained. The topographical crest is the highest point on a hill or ridge.

[45] Commenting on the heavy destruction of Hook fortifications by CCF preparation, one 7th Marine company commander stated: "Enemy artillery and mortars did tend to destroy the protective wire. We noted especially that the Canadian 'Random Wire,' although it tended to move about under fire, did hold together and continue to offer good protection." *McLaughlin ltr.*

[46] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Feb–Mar 53; 1stMar ComdD, Mar 53; 5thMar ComdDs, Feb–Mar 53; 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/5, 2/5, 1/7 ComdDs, Feb 53.

[47] For a detailed account of the tank action in the CLAMBAKE raid see Col Clyde W. Hunter ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 6 Jun 70, in v. V, Korean comment file.

[48] 1/5 ComdD, Feb. 53, App. IVc, dtd 19 Feb 53, p. 5.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] In order to assure better close air support during the assault, an SOP for the airborne tactical controller was proposed and drafted by MAG–12 for 1st MAW approval. The plan utilized the marking of targets by rocket and subsequent corrections to be made by the FAC. This enabled MAG–12 aircraft "to scramble, fly a CAS mission at the Division front and be back at the field at K–6 in approximately 40 minutes." Col Wayne M. Cargill ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 8 Jan 70.

[51] 5th Mar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 20 Feb 53, p. 3.


[52] Lieutenant Colonel Peatross had succeeded Lieutenant Colonel McLaughlin as battalion CO on 11 Sep 52.


[53] Beginning morning nautical twilight is that period before sunrise or after sunset (BENT, or beginning evening nautical twilight) when visibility is limited to approximately 300 yards.

[54] 5thMar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 28 Feb 53, p. 5.

[55] In nearly three hours of firing, the 11th Marines and its reinforcing and attached units, including the 1st Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, expended 11,881 rounds. Indicative of the meticulous planning that preceded an operation such as CHARLIE is the 11th Marines report of this raid. 11thMar ComdD, Feb 53.


[56] Prior to the raid various combinations of flamethrower fuels and pressure were extensively used. The purpose was to determine the maximum effective range of the flamethrower teams in order to "neutralize the hand-grenade throwing potential of the enemy, this being one of the major problems confronting assault elements on other raids." Final tests resulted in flame being thrown more than 40 yards up hill. 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, App. IVf, p. 3.





MAP DIAGRAM 20

K. White



Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 7. Vegas

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar ComdD, Apr 53, Special Action Rpt Period 26–30 Mar 53, “Battle of the Cities,” hereafter 5thMar SAR “Cities”; Maj Norman W. Hicks, “U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1952–1953 with Special Emphasis on Outpost Warfare” (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Maryland, 1962), hereafter Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; 1stLt Peter Braestrup, “Outpost Warfare,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 37, no. 11 (Nov 53) and “Back to the Trenches,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 3 (Mar 55); MSgt Robert T. Fugate, “Vegas, Reno, and Carson,” *Leatherneck*, v. 36, no. 6 (Jun 53), hereafter Fugate, “Vegas.”
- [2] Since the first of the year division intelligence reports had given the CCF the capability of mounting limited objective attacks ranging from company to regimental size. *PacFlt EvalRpt*, p. 9–28, quoting 1stMarDiv PIR 860, dtd 4 Mar 53.
- [3] The 1st KMC Regiment had been redesignated the 1st KMC/RCT on 15 Dec 52. Continuing under opcon of the 1stMarDiv, the Korean RCT consisted of four infantry battalions, plus attached artillery, armor, engineer, and service units. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8–64.
- [4] To the Marine division right were the U.S. 2d Infantry, ROK 1st, and U.S. 7th Infantry Divisions.
- [5] No stranger to the 5th Marines, Colonel Walt had served with this regiment during World War II at Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. He had commanded, on separate occasions, 2/5 and 3/5 and had earned two Navy Crosses for combat leadership and bravery.
- [6] Normally Ava was a squad-size outpost. Prior to and during the late March attacks, all 5th Marine COPs were strengthened.
- [7] Company B from 1/1 had been assigned to operational control of 2/1 when the latter unit relieved 1/7 on line on 10 March. The increased personnel enabled the battalion to position a company-size detachment at the strategic high ground, COP 2, that overlooked Panmunjom and the critical truce talk site.
- [8] Regimental command changed 27 March when Colonel Glenn C. Funk, former commanding officer of the 1st Shore Party Battalion, was assigned to the 7th Marines, succeeding Colonel Haffner, who became G-2.
- [9] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv, 11thMar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 1st MAW, MAGs–12,–33 ComdDs, Mar 53.
- [10] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1/5, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities.”
- [11] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Reno Report, by Capt Henry A. Checklou, dtd 12 Mar 53, p. 4.
- [12] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Vegas Report, by Capt Henry A. Checklou, on 26 Mar, dtd 31 Mar 53, p. 4.
- [13] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnl, 26–27 Mar 53; 1st–MarDiv PIR 883, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIRs 86–53, dtd 27 Mar 53, 87–53, dtd 28 Mar 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR, 18–28 Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; Fugate, “Vegas.”
- [14] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, dtd 4 Apr 53, p. 2.
- [15] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, p. 10.
- [16] At both Reno and Vegas the Marines had moved into the caves for protection from VT fire. This was the plan in event of an overwhelming enemy attack. In contrast, the detachment at Carson fought from covered fighting holes and employed the cave there only to get their wounded out of direct fire. 5thMar SAR “Cities,” pp.

2-3.

[17] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 26-27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 883, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIR 86-53, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11 ComdDs, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR; 5thMar SAR "Cities"; VMO-6, HMR-161 ComDs, Mar 53; MacDonald, *POW*; USMC Biog.

[18] Statement by LtGen Lewis W. Walt, as cited in Eloise Engle, *Medic* (New York, N.Y.: John Day, May 1967), p. 211.

[19] In 1956, a newly-completed school in Alexandria, Virginia was named the Francis C. Hammond High School and dedicated in his memory.

[20] 1/5 and 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53. At this time 1/5 had suffered 5 killed, 30 wounded, 21 wounded not evacuated, 39 missing (personnel at Reno), or 95. Reports from 3/5 showed 1 killed, 8 wounded/evacuated, and 40 missing (at Vegas), or 49.

[21] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR Nos. 882-4, dtd 26-28 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIR 86-53, dtd 27 Mar 53, 87-53, dtd 28 Mar 53, 88-53, dtd 29 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR "Cities"; 11thMar "Artillery in the Defense of Outpost Vegas, 26-30 Mar 53," hereafter 11thMar SAR "Arty Defense"; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-212, -323; VMFs-115, -311, VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, "Vegas"; USMC Biog.

[22] Fugate, "Vegas," p. 20.

[23] Statement cited in personnel record of HMC(SS) William R. Charette, USN. He was the only corpsman during the Korean War who was awarded the Medal of Honor and lived to receive it.

[24] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 28 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 884, annex 340-MISP-53-12, POW Rpt and 1stMarDiv PIR 885, annex 340-MISP-53-13, POW Rpt; 1st MAW PIRs 88-53, dtd 29 Mar 53 and 89-53, dtd 30 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR "Cities"; 11thMar SAR "Arty Defense"; MAGs-12,-33, VMAs-212,-323, VMFs-115,-311 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, "Vegas"; USMC Biog.

[25] The Marine NCO was to be posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, presented a year after the action, on 29 March 1954.

[26] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 28 Mar 53.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] The material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMar Div PIRs 884-5, dtd 28-29 Mar 53; 1stMar ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR.

[29] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 28-29 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 884-6, dtd 29-31 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIR 89-53, dtd 29 Mar 53; 5th Mar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 3/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR "Cities"; 11thMar SAR "Arty Defense"; Fugate, "Vegas."

[30] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 29-31 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 885-887, dtd 29-31 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIRs 8-53, dtd 29 Mar 53 and 90-53, dtd 30 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR "Cites"; 11thMar SAR "Arty Defense"; MAGs-12,-33, VMAs-212,-323, VMFs-115,-311 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, "Vegas."

[31] Fugate, "Vegas," p. 74.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 887, dtd 31 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53;

11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; MacDonald *POW*; Jane Blakeney, *Heroes—U.S. Marine Corp, 1861–1955* (Washington, D.C.: Blakeney, 1957); Leckie, *Conflict*; Fugate, “Vegas”; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, “A Year in Korea,” *Leatherneck*, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov 53); *New York Times*, 29–31 Mar 53; *Washington Post*, 29–31 Mar 53.

[34] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to COs, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, KMC, KPR, dtd 31 Mar 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53, App. II, p. 9.

[35] 5thMar SAR “Cities,” p. 8.


[36] Heinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 50.


[37] CMC msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 30 Mar 53, cited in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53, App. I, p. 7.


[38] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 31 Mar 53, in MAG–12 ComdD, Mar 53, App. VII-3.


[39] CROKMC ltr to CMC, dtd 2 Feb 1971, hereafter *ROKMC Comments*.


[40] See Appendix G for complete text of citation. Previous awards were as follows: 1stProvMarBrig (for 2 Aug–6 Sep 50 period), 1st MAW (3 Aug 50–26 Feb 51), and 1stMarDiv (15–27 Sep 50).











Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 8. Marking Time (April-June 1953)

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr 53; Berger, *Korea Knot*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Leckie, *Conflict*; M/Sgt Robert T. Fugate, "Freedom Village," *Leatherneck*, v. 36, no. 7 (Jul 53), hereafter Fugate, Freedom Village."
- [2] Leckie, *Conflict*, p. 373.
- [3] CG, Eighth Army msg to CG, 1stMarDiv and others, dtd 4 Apr 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53, App. I, p. 1.
- [4] Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 415.
- [5] With resumption of truce negotiations, the 1st Marines, whose left battalion sector was immediately adjacent to the Panmunjom neutral zone between the two battle lines, took certain precautionary measures. The regiment set up radio communication with the UN base camp at Munsan and reactivated its rescue task force. This unit was on alert to evacuate the UN truce team from Panmunjom in the event of Communist hostile action or any threat to security. While the talks were in session, a forward covering group, composed of a reinforced rifle company and 1st Tank Battalion platoon, occupied the high ground east of Panmunjom at COP 2. Here the Marine rescue force maintained close surveillance of the enemy in the Panmunjom peace corridor as well as the safe arrival and departure of the UN truce team shuttled in by helicopter or motor convoy. 1stMar ComdD, Apr 53, pp. 5, 14 and App. II, pp. 1-4.
- [6] The battalion's new commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Francis "X" Witt, Jr., who a week earlier had succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Francis W. Augustine.
- [7] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap 9; Commander Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE), "Operation Little Switch-Apr 53"; ComNavFE Rpt of Intelligence Processing; ComNavFE Rpt, 24 Jul 53; FMFPac ComdD, Apr 53 (#1); FMFPac ComdD, May 53 (Pt. 2), rpt LtCol Fisher to CG, FMFPac, subj, "Debriefing of Returned POWs"; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; MacDonald, *POW*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Fugate, "Freedom Village"; *New York Times*, 19-21 Apr 53; *Washington Post*, 19-21 Apr 53.
- [8] The 684 UNC prisoners returned in LITTLE SWITCH represented 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 British, 15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, 1 Greek, 1 South African, 1 Filipino and 1 Netherlander.
- [9] *New York Times*, dtd 20 Apr 53, p. 1.
- [10] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- [11] In brief, these were: (1) that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) take custody of Chinese nonrepatriates but give Korean POWs the option of settling either in North or South Korea, as they wished; (2) that troops from just one country (India) be used to guard nonrepatriates, rather than the unwieldy five-nation force earlier proposed by the Communists; and (3), that specific procedures, which were clearly spelled out, be followed for granting political asylum to returning prisoners who refused repatriation.
- [12] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFLt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 896-900, dtd 8-12 Apr 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 2/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Apr 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311, VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr 53.
- [13] Official records are at variance on this point. The 2/5 command diary indicates that the battalion continued the exercise on 16-17 April, returning the latter date. The 5th Marines report categorically indicates that

MARLEX XX was cancelled on 15 April, because of the weather.

[14] Now under a new regimental commander, Colonel Tschirgi, who had joined the 5th Marines on 14 April, succeeding Colonel Walt, newly assigned division G-3.

[15] Throughout the three-day action, gun tanks from Companies A and B (the forward reserve unit) and the regimental antitank company fired a total of more than 1,469 90mm shells to neutralize enemy positions and weapons.

[16] This same date was significant because it marked the first time a searchlight-guided night close air support mission was flown by 1st MAW in the division sector.

[17] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Apr–May 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 22 Apr–13 May 53; 1stMar ComdDs, Apr–May 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar ComdDs, May 53; 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr–May 53; Hermes, *Truce Tent*.

[18] News story (AP), Robert D. Tuckman, Seoul, dtd 12 May 53, 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, p. 1.

[19] The two divisions had also seen combat together early in WW II, at Guadalcanal. Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Sep 70, hereafter *Heinl ltr*.

[20] Soon after assuming command of the Eighth Army, in mid-February, General Taylor had begun to stress the need for a complete eight-week training program for reserve divisions before reentering the line, detailed rehearsal of patrols, and more frequent rotation of artillery battalions to maintain their basic mobility. Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 391.

[21] The regiment was newly-commanded by Colonel Nelson, the former UN Personnel and Medical Processing Unit officer, who succeeded Colonel Adams as CO, 1st Marines on 1 May.

[22] On 23 April, 2/7 had relieved 1/7 in the left battalion sector and 1/7 became the regimental reserve. There was no change in 3/7's location in the right sector. These were the positions for transfer with the Turkish troops in early May.

[23] *ROKMC Comments*.

[24] Final relief was largely complete at this time. Exceptions were the 7th Marines reserve battalion, 1/7, relieved by TAFC forces at 0350 the following day and a few remaining Marine rear echelon elements that closed out the sector on 7 May.

[25] The 1st Tank Battalion was now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. McCoy, who had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Williamson on 16 April 1953.

[26] The tanks were not kept in exposed firing positions at all times. They were parked in protected, defilade revetments and were periodically driven into the firing slots to zero in on targets of opportunity. One tank might thus use any of several slots, and in cases of major attacks reserve tanks could reinforce. LtCol Robert J. Post ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May 70, hereafter *Post ltr*.

[27] Later, the Turkish forces were to place three battalions forward [adding the 2d], with a fourth in reserve.

[28] General Clarke had succeeded General Kendall on 10 April 1953.

[29] CG, I Corps msg to CGs, 1stMarDiv, 25th InfDiv, dtd 6 May 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. I, p. 2.

[30] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 5, Chap 6, No. 6, Chaps. 7, 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, May–June 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 22 Apr–30 Jun 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st EngrBn, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, May–June 53; Field, *NavOps, Korea*.

[31] Relief from the Eighth Army defense line provided the first opportunity for expansion of the 1st Marine Division amphibious training to regimental level. Amphibious training in battalion-sized MARLEXES had been under way since June 1952, upon transfer of the Marines to the western coastal sector. This had, in fact, “produced an extra dividend as [their] amphibious retraining program, conducted throughout the summer in the Tokchok Islands, was apprehensively observed by the enemy.” Field, *NavOps, Korea*, p. 430.

[32] CTE 90.85 constituted the MARLEX training element of TF-90, Amphibious Force Far East, redesignated

Amphibious Group Western Pacific earlier that month.

[33] 1stMarDiv msg to addressees in 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 22 May 53.

[34] MAR RCT LEX II, Opn Plan I, App. 1 to Annex B, dtd 9 May 53, p. 1, in 7thMar ComdD, May 53.

[35] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of Gen Randolph McC. Pate, Jan 56, rev.

[36] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 15 May, 28-30 May 53; 11thMar, 2/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1st MAW ComdD, May 53; 1st MAW PIR 136-53, dtd 14-15 May 53 and PIR 150-53, dtd 28-29 May 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, May 53; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951-1953*.

[37] Total ammunition expenditure by the 11th Marines and the 25th Division artillery batteries was 11,527 rounds, to the Chinese output of approximately 10,000 rounds. 11thMarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 13.

[38] 11thMar ComdD, May 53, dtd 27 May, p. 19.

[39] Some historians indicate that the 120th Division initially sent four battalions forward in the action, with two against the main objective, Vegas. Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 463.

[40] Discussing the Army employment of tanks in fixed MLR positions, Lieutenant Colonel Post recalled that although many Marine tankers were originally opposed to this procedure, "I am forced to confess that it worked well in that static defensive situation." A major advantage resulting from this change was that tanks effectively linked the MLR with rear area CPs through land line and radio. While initial preparatory fire often tore out the phone lines, the radios worked well and this was "generally the only reliable means of communications with the scene of action." *Post ltr*.

[41] Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 462.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 464.

[43] 1st TkBn ComdD, May 53, p. 3.

[44] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 7thInfDiv, CG, 25thInfDiv, CG, 1stMarDiv, GOC, 1stComWelDiv, CG I Corps Arty, dtd 9 Jun 53 in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 53, App. I, p. 1.

[45] The strong likelihood of such attacks at this time had been noted by Eighth Army in a warning issued the previous day that reminded all commanders to be "particularly alert" at this time. CG, 8th Army msg to CG, 1stMarDiv and addressees, G-3 Jnl, dtd 24 Jun 53.

[46] This change was due to the existing policy of not having a United States unit serving under operational control of a Korean commander. Had the 7th Marines or other U.S. unit been so committed, it is expected that a provisional task force would have been created for the assignment, under a non-Korean commander. *PctFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-20. Actually, the 7th Marines alert on the 25th was of such short duration that no mention of it appears in the regimental command diary, although the fact is so noted in division records. The 1st KMC/RCT was ordered to move out from the Indianhead area at 1630 on 26 June and came under operational control of 1st ROK Division at 1540, 27 June. By 0100 the following day, it had relieved 11th ROK Regiment. *ROKMC Comments*.

[47] 11thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 15.

[48] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 4, Chap 10, No. 5, Chap 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; 1/7 ComdD, Apr 53, App. IV, Rpt of Night Air Strikes; 1st MAW, MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311, VMF(N)-513, VMJ-1 ComdDs, Apr-Jun 53; VMA-312 ComdDs, Apr-May 53; VMA-251 ComdD, June 53; VMO-6 ComdD, Apr 53; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*.

[49] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CMC, dtd 18 Apr 53; in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53, App. II, p. 2.

[50] Confirmed damage assessment in this period: 75 enemy KIA, 5 WIA; 25 bunkers, 12 personnel shelters, 20 mortar positions, 32 automatic weapons positions, 1 ammunition bunker, and 1 37mm AA position destroyed; 1

supply area, 3 weapons damaged; 1,545 yards trenchline destroyed; and 190 secondary explosions or fires. Due to operating conditions, these figures represented only 80 percent of the total flights made on which TAOs confirmed results. VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr-May 53.

[51] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-106, quoting 1stMarDiv Training Bulletin No. 5-53, dtd 10 Jun 53.

[52] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-70.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 10-99.

[54] Also characterized by squadron members as the "tired old Tigercats" in reference to the war-weary, 1945-vintage aircraft. VMF(N)-513 ComdD, May 53, p. 6.

[55] CO, 19th Bomber Group (Col Harvey C. Dorney, USAF) msg to CO, VMF(N)-513 (LtCol Robert F. Conley), n.d., reading: "19th Bomber Group Airborne Commander and crews participating in attack on Sinanju Bridge Complex, 11 April, have high praise for night fighter protection. All feel that without their protection severe damage or loss of B-29's would have resulted." VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 6.

[56] Prior to early May, VMA-312 had been based aboard the USS *Bataan* (CVL-29). The carrier itself was scheduled for relief from the Korean Theater shortly before the new afloat MAG-12 squadron reported in, and a transfer was made by 312 to the new, larger escort carrier on 8 May.

[57] Comments *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-33: "Severe tactical operations weakness developed throughout the war in Korea which can be traced directly to the individual pilot rotation system. These weaknesses are inherent in any system which precludes pre-combat unit training of pilots in the tactical squadron with which they later go into combat. The situation is aggravated further when pilots, many of them inadequately pre-combat trained, are rotated through combat engaged units so rapidly that squadron esprit cannot develop to a degree which will insure a high standard of tactical efficiency."

[58] MAG-12, since 1 April, had been under Colonel Edward B. Carney, who assumed command upon reassignment of Colonel Bowman to the States.

[59] See Chapter VI.

[60] The magnitude of the VMJ-1 work load can be gauged by one day's peak effort of 5,000 exposures, which, if laid end to end, would cover a strip of ground one and one half miles long." *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-67.

[61] MAG-35 ComdD, May 53, p. H-2.

[62] VMA-312 ComdD, May 53, p. G-2.

[63] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-65.

[64] Between 15-18 April the west coast carrier squadron was under a FEAF order restricting normal interdiction missions. This was to protect UNC sick and wounded POWs in transit from China to Kaesong for final exchange at Panmunjom. VMA-312 air operations were held to CAS along the bomblines. "Marine fliers of the 'Checkerboard' squadron proved adept at this unusual role [CAS support missions along the front lines], and received a 'well done' from JOC Korea as the Corsairs flew more than 100 close air support sorties from 16-18 April." *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-110.

[65] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.

[66] Their respective locations were: 7th Division, at the extreme right of I Corps sector; and further east, the 3d Division occupied the corresponding right flank of IX Corps sector. VMF-311 concentrated on the 7th Division targets while VMF-115 efforts were devoted primarily to the 3d Division.

[67] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.

[68] This figure does not include sorties by VMA-312 (carrier-based), VMO-6, or HMR-161, the latter two under operational control of the 1st Marine Division.

[69] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 631.

[70] *Ibid.*

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] CG, FAF msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 17 Jun 53, in 1st MAW ComdD Jun 53 (Vol I), p. 3 and App. IV (Vol III).

[73] Presentation of this second Korean PUC to the 1st MAW was made by South Korean President Rhee in impressive ceremonies 12 June at MAG-33 headquarters, K-3. Among the many ranking military officials attending the ceremony was Admiral Radford, former CinCPacFlt, and newly-appointed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[74] MAG-12 ComdD, Jun 53, p. C-1.

[75] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 5, Chaps. 2, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 2, 9; WCIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; ECIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Field, *NavOps, Korea*.

[76] Locations given on WCIDE map, Chapter II.

[77] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-128. See also Chapter II.

[78] An average day's enemy harassment consisted of 4, 7, 10, or at the most approximately 28 rounds of fire. WCIDE ComdDs, *passim*.

[79] See Chapter II and ECIDE map.

[80] ECIDE ComdD, Oct 2, p. 1.

[81] Field, *NavOps, Korea*, p. 434.

[82] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 2, p. 2-5.

[83] *Ibid.*

[84] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Feb 53, p. 1. Seventh Fleet intelligence estimated that there were no less than "21 active batteries emplaced on Wonsan Bay and within range of our islands." *Heinl ltr.*

[85] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3.


[86] Another record at this time was the spate of senior visiting officers. Seven times during the month no less than 15 flag and general officers had taken their turn inspecting the ECIDU command headquarters at Yo-do. Services represented were the Marine Corps, U.S. Army, Korean Marine Corps, ROK Navy, and ROK Army. "One local statistician computed the total number of stars for the month (one side of the collar only) as 38," the monthly report brightly noted. This was believed possibly an all-time high for any headquarters in the Korean theater, short of the Eighth Army. ECIDE(U) ComdD, Mar 53, p. 1.

[87] The previous T/O for the ECIDU was 5 officers and 30 enlisted USMC, 15 USN attached primarily to the Navy maintenance unit, and 55 officers and 1,217 enlisted KMCs.

[88] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.

[89] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar ComdDs, Jun 53.

[90] 5thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.



MAP 28

K. White

Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 9. Heavy Fighting Before the Armistice

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *Pac Flt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC 3/cpc, A16-13, n.d., Subj: Berlin and East Berlin Action, Rpt of, in 1stMarDiv Summary of Activities, Jul 53 (G-3) file (Records Group 127, 61A-2265, Box 74, FRC, Alex., Va.), hereafter *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1-9 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53.
- [2] *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt.*, p. 1.
- [3] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- [4] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 53; 1stMar Div G-3 Jnls, 1-10 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 992, dtd 8-9 Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 2/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; 1st MAW, VMF-311, VMO-6, HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; MacDonald, *POW*.
- [5] Discussing this phase of operations, the 2/7 commander stated: "As it turned out we were in great shape with both Marines and Turks fighting side by side in some instances. We had a great rapport with the Turks in that they had previously relieved 2/7. In fact, they made us honorary members of their battalions, giving each 2/7 Marine one of the unit patches." Col Alexander D. Cereghino ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 19 Jun 70.
- [6] On 7 July, 2/11 had become the direct support battalion for the 7th Marines
- [7] The ridge on which COP Berlin was located was split by two valleys. Both of these and the ridge itself served as approaches to the Marine MLR. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-169.
- [8] *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*, p. 2.
- [9] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2.
- [10] Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*, p. 136.
- [11] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 9 Jul 53.
- [12] On 9 July Company C relieved Company B on the MLR in support of the 7th Marines. Both tank companies had been in action with the TAFC during the entire 60-day period the division was in I Corps reserve. Due to the rotation system, however, Baker Company had been on line longer and transferred to the rear ranks for a "much needed test and rehabilitation." 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 3.
- [13] Later it was determined that only two were actually captured and they were subsequently repatriated. MacDonald, *POW*, p. 211.
- [14] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 10-17 Jul 53; 1st MarDiv PIRs 923-930, dtd 10-17 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hermes, *Truce Tent*.
- [15] The 1st KMC/RCT turned over its sector of the 1st ROK Division front to the 1st ROK Regiment at 1800 on 8 July and relieved the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment on 12 July. *ROKMC Comments*.
- [16] Spoonbill Bridge was submerged under 11 feet of water and destroyed by the pressure against it on 7 July. Flood conditions existed again on 14-15 July when the Imjin crested at 26 feet at Libby Bridge. Roads in the vicinity were impassable for three days. Resupply of forward companies was made via Freedom Bridge. One command diary writer, discussing the elaborate series of six moves made by 1/1 during July, added a touch of unconscious humor when he observed, "During the month, it seemed as if the Battalion was constantly on the move . . . Rain hampered these moves considerably. The weather between moves was generally clear and dry." 1/1 ComdD, July 53, p. 1; 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, pp. 5, 11-12, 23; *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, pp. 9-68, 9-136.

[17] Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 470.

[18] *ROKMC Comments*.

[19] One, who died that morning, was squad leader Sergeant Stephen C. Walter, posthumously presented the Navy Cross. Also awarded the nation's second highest combat medal for extraordinary heroism in a patrol action on 16–17 July was Private First Class Roy L. Stewart, of the 5th Marines.

[20] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 10, No. 5, Chap. 9, No. 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 924, dtd 10–11 Jul 53; 1st MAW, MAGs–12, –33, VMAs–121, –212, –251, –323, VMF(N)–153, VMF-311 ComdDs, Jul 53; Field, *NavOps, Korea*; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*.

[21] Marine Attack Squadron 251 (Lieutenant Colonel Harold A. Harwood) administratively joined MAG–12 on 6 July for 323, which had rotated back to MCAS, El Toro three days earlier. Movement of –251 aircraft to Korea could not take place, however, until 12 July. When VMA–323 (Major Woten) departed, the famous “Death Rattlers” had the distinction of being the Marine tactical (VMA/VMF) air squadron in longest service during the Korean War. The unit's final combat mission on 2 July brought its total Korean operations to 20,827 sorties and 48,677.2 hours. On 6 August 1950, roaring up from the flight deck of the USS *Badoeng Strait*, the VMA–323 Corsairs (then VMF-323) had launched their opening blow against North Korean installations, led by Major Arnold A. Lund, CO. The initial Marine air offensive action of the Korean War had been flown three days earlier by VMF–214. This unit was reassigned to CONUS in November 1951, giving the Death Rattlers the longest continuous service flight record. Jul 53 ComdD, 1st MAW, p. 2; *USMC Ops Korea-Pusan*, v. I, pp. 89–90, 98; VMF–214 Squadron History, HRB.

[22] Individual reports by the two groups result in a slightly higher figure. MAG–12 recorded 2,001 combat sorties (including more than 400 flown by carrier-based VM–332, not in the 1st MAW sortie rate). MAG–33 listed 945 sorties, or a combined group total of 2,946 for the month. ComdDs Jul 53 MAG–12, p. C-1 and MAG–33, p. I.

[23] Colonel Stacy was group commander until 24 July, when he was detached for assignment to 1st MAW as Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2. He was succeeded at MAG–33 by Colonel John L. Smith.

[24] Wing casualties for July 1953 were listed as three killed, seven missing, and two wounded in action. Names of enlisted crew members on flights are not always given in air diaries, which accounts for the discrepancies.

[25] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 933–934, dtd 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMar ComdD, Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 1/11, 2/11 3/11, 4/11, 1stTkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar Preliminary Special Action Report, period 8–27 Jul 53 in ComdD, Jul 53, hereafter 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs–12, –33, VMAs–121, –212 ComdDs, Jul 53.

[26] The 19th of July, ironically, was the date that truce negotiators working at Panmunjom had reached final agreement on all remaining disputed points. Staff officers were scheduled to begin drawing up details of the armistice agreement and boundaries of the demilitarized zone. *USMA, Korea*, p. 51.

[27] Company E and a detachment of the 81mm mortar platoon from the 2d Battalion remained on line. They were attached to the 3d Battalion when the sector command changed.

[28] Three Marine, one TAFC, and two Army battalions.

[29] At a routine conference that same morning attended by CG Eighth Army (General Taylor), CG I Corps (General Clarke) and CG 1st Marine Division, the earlier decision about not regaining the outposts was affirmed. General Taylor maintained the positions “could never be held should the Chinese decide to exert sufficient pressure against them” and recommended instead that the sector be organized on a wide front defense concept. Actually, following the initial Berlins attack of 7–8 July, a discussion about possible readjustment of the Marine sector defense had been initiated by General Pate. A staff study recommending that just such a “strongpoint”

concept (rather than the customary linear defense) be adopted had been completed by Marine Division officials on 15 July. I Corps staff members had concurred with the study and it was awaiting consideration by CG, I Corps when the Berlins were attacked for the second time on 19 July. *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*, pp. 3–4.

[30] Commenting on this point, the I Corps commander noted: “The outposts in front of the MLR had gradually lost their value in my opinion because, between the MLR and the outposts, minefields, tactical wire, etc. had made their reinforcement and counterattacks very costly.” Resupply was thus restricted to narrow paths on which the CCF had zeroed in and “holding poor real estate for sentimental reasons is a poor excuse for undue casualties.” Gen Bruce C. Clarke, USA, ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 20 May 70.

[31] The new squadron commander had taken over 16 July from Major Braun.

[32] BGen Manly L. Curry ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May 70, hereafter *Curry ltr*.

[33] Tank and artillery ammunition allocations had been cut 50 percent the afternoon of the 19th, with a subsequent reduction of normal destruction missions and elimination of H&I fires. ComdDs Jul 53 1st TkBn, p. 3 and App. 2, p. 4 and 1/11, p. 5.

[34] 3/7 ComdD, 20 Jul 53, p. 5. With respect to the number of enemy casualties that night, battalion, regimental, artillery support, and division command diaries given differing accounts. Other figures cited are: 9 CCF killed, between 234–284 estimated killed, and 630 estimated wounded.

[35] Subsequently, it was learned that of 56 Marines unaccounted for at the time, 12 were actually captured. They were returned after hostilities ended. Several men from 1st Marines units under operational control of the 7th were also taken in this battle. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 212, 268–269.

[36] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, dtd 21–28 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 935–941, dtd 21–27 Jul 53 and 942, dtd 7 Aug 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7, 3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs–12, –33, VMAs–121, –212, –251, VMFs–115, –311 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*; Martin Russ, *The Last Parallel: A Marine’s War Journal* (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1957); USMA, *Korea*.

[37] One additional flight expending three 1,000-lb. bombs was made 22 July by a single AD from replacement squadron VMA–251. This was the unit’s first combat sortie in support of the 1st Marine Division after its indoctrination flights. VMA–251 also flew four MPQ flights for the 7th Marines in the early hours of 24 July, the day the outposts were attacked again. VMA–251 ComdD, Jul 53.

[38] A similar incident had occurred on 7 July when the 7th Marines was attacked while in the process of relieving a regiment of the 25th Infantry. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9–58.

[39] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” Aug 53, p. 4.

[40] One participant remarked: “I think the Boulder City action . . . is the classic example of where the Army system worked well. The tanks were generally given credit for saving the position, and I seriously doubt our ability to have done the job under the previous system, which would have required the tanks to move to the scene after the action had begun.” *Post ltr*.

[41] In retaliation, between 2200 and 0600, the four tanks at Hill 119 drew 2,200 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery.

[42] The British were not hampered by any ammunition restrictions at this time. The excellent liaison between the 11th Marines and Commonwealth Division Artillery resulted in a humorous incident. After the battle of 24–25 July, a young British artillery officer arrived at a Marine regimental CP. He identified himself as being from the unit that had provided artillery support to the Marines the previous night, for which he was profusely thanked. Before his astonished audience he then unrolled an impressive scroll. This proved to be a bill enumerating the various types and amounts of projectiles fired and specifying the cost in pounds sterling. When he felt the Marine staff was properly flabbergasted, he grinned and conceded waggishly: “But I am authorized to settle for two

bottles of your best whiskey!” *Curry ltr.*

[43] Seventh Marines units were Companies D and E, and elements of the 4.2-inch Mortar Company.

[44] Casualty breakdown: 181 killed, 86 missing, 862 wounded and evacuated, 474 wounded (not evacuated), and 10 non-battle deaths.

[45] During this period 186 Marines were killed and 1,798 listed as casualties.

[46] Col Gordon H. West ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 1 Jul 70, hereafter *West ltr.*

[47] Minor realignments of the military line of demarcation were made in the center sector to include a few miles of territory gained by the Communists in their massive July offensive there. Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, p. 292; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 640; Leckie, *Conflict*, p. 385.

[48] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 26-28 Jul 53; 1st MarDiv PIR 941, dtd 27 Jul 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7, 4/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; HRS Log Sheet, dtd 21 Aug 67 (n.t., about Korean War Casualties, prepared on request for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC); Leckie, *Conflict*; Capt C. A. Robinson and Sgt D. L. Cellers, “Land of the Morning Calm,” *Midwest Reporter* (Jul 68).

[49] Msg 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoting Cease Fire and Armistice Agreement, IUS-OP-9-53.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] See Map 33 for Eighth Army dispositions on the last day of the war.


[52] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” p. 5.


[53] The CO of the direct support artillery battalion in the defense of Boulder City, recalled that “on the evening of the 27th, with the Armistice only hours away, 2/11 received heavy Chinese artillery fire apparently directed at the batteries. Of the many rounds . . . 80% were duds and no damage was done. Numerous time fuzed shells detonated hundreds of meters above ground. We figured that they were using up old rounds to keep from hauling them back north.” *West ltr.*

[54] 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53 (Folder 3), CTF-91 msg to ComNavFE, dtd 27 Jul 53.

[55] 1stMarDiv, ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2. One Marine officer, Major General Louis Metzger, who at the time was Executive Officer, Kimpo Provisional Regiment, recalled how voices of the Chinese Communists’ singing and cheering drifted across the Han River that night. “It was an eerie thing . . . and very depressing.” MajGen Louis Metzger comments on draft MS, dtd 1 Jul 70, hereafter *Metzger comments.*

[56] 1stMarDiv ComdD, *op. cit.*, and Rees, *Korea*, p. 434.





Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 10. Return of the Prisoners of War

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Jul–Sep 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, Jul–Aug 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53; 11thMar, MAG–33 ComdDs, Jul 53; HRS Subject File VE23.2.S8 “CMC Statements on Korean POWs”; HRS Subject File #1 “Prisoners of War—Korea—General”; HRS Subject Files “Prisoners of War—Korea—News Clippings, folders #1, #2, #3”; Korea War casualty cards from Statistical Unit, Casualty Section, Personal Affairs Br, Code DNA, HQMC; MacDonald, *POW*; Berger, *Korea Knot*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War—A Study in Unpreparedness* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963), hereafter Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, quoted with permission of the publisher; Field, *NavOps, Korea*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*; USMA, *Korea*; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, “Big Switch,” *Leatherneck*, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov 53), hereafter Heinecke, “Big Switch”; *Life Magazine*, Jul–Aug 53 issues; *New York Times*, 5 Aug–6 Sep 53; *Washington Post*, 5 Aug–6 Sep 53.

[2] Marine Corps prisoners, including their unit designations and date of release (or death), are listed in MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 249–273.

[3] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9–134.

[4] Clarke, *Danube to Yalu*, pp. 298–299.

[5] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 44.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] For at least two Marines their return home was news in itself. Captain Paul L. Martelli, VMF–323, had been reported KIA. First Lieutenant Robert J. O’Shea, of division headquarters, the son of Marine Brigadier General George J. O’Shea (Ret), had also been thought dead by his family. He had been reported missing in July 1951 and had not been carried on the official POW list released the following December.

[10] HRB Subject File: “#1, ‘Prisoners Of War—Korea—General,’ ” HQMC Div Info release, n.d., n.t.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 48.

[14] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 53, App. VI, p. 12.

[15] As the exchange got underway, General Mark Clark was on a trip to the U.S. Unable to greet the returning prisoners, as he had at LITTLE SWITCH, the UNC Commander had a welcoming letter waiting for each repatriate. A booklet especially prepared for returning POWs which contained a quick fill-in on world news and sports events they may have missed as prisoners was also given each returnee. *Washington Post*, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 3.

[16] HRS Subject File: #1. “PRISONERS OF WAR—Korea—General,” *Washington News* article, dtd 26 Aug 53 from Panmunjom, “Officers’ Fate Worries Army,” by Jim G. Lucas.

[17] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 225.

[18] Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, p. 651.

[19] *Life Magazine*, v. 35, no. 11 (15 Sep 53), p. 42.

[20] Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, p. 651.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Life Magazine*, v. 35, no. 7 (17 Aug 53), p. 22.

[23] *Metzger comments*.

[24] Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, p. 299.

[25] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE 23.2.S8 “CMC Statements on Korean POWs”; HRS Subject File: “Korea—Korean War—General”; MacDonald, *POW*; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea—East-Central Front*, v. IV; Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter Ridgway, *Korean War*; Heinecke, “Big Switch.”

[26] HRS Subject File: “VE 23.2.S8—CMC Statements on Korean POWs,” CMC Statement dtd 14 Apr 54, p. 2.

[27] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 58.

[28] Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea*, v. IV, p. 201.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] In July 1951, fighting had quieted down all along the UNC front, as a result of truce talks initiated by the Communists. This conveniently provided the enemy, at that time hard-pressed, a much-needed breathing spell. The lull in ground fighting continued until late August when the truce negotiations were suspended.

[31] HRS Subject file “Korea—Korean War—General,” article *Washington Times-Herald*, dtd 20 Aug 53, by Walter Simmons, p. 27.

[32] For further details of this action, see MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 33–43; Montross and Canzona, *USMC Ops Korea—Chosin*, v. III, pp. 140–141, 225–235; and Reese, *Korea*, p. 162.

[33] Records indicate that 3 officers and 18 enlisted died while in captivity. Three officers and 3 enlisted POWs were also presumed to have died. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 257–259.

[34] The number of American servicemen returned was approximately 4,428 of 7,190 captured during the war. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1966 edition, “Prisoners of War—Korean War,” p. 519B. Earlier DOD “Tentative Final Report of U.S. Battle Casualties in the Korean War,” cited by MacDonald, *POW*, p. 230, indicated 7,140 Americans were captured, 4,418 recovered, and 2,701 died. Either way, the percentages remain the same.

[35] A similar mishap had dire consequences for Major General Dean of the Army. Cut off from his unit, he was attempting to return to the U.S. line. Lacking a compass he walked to the southwest—and thereby into NKPA hands—instead of the southeast where U.S. troops were then heavily engaged in the fierce battle of the Pusan Perimeter.

[36] A radio-jeep driver, Private First Class Barnett, was returning to his unit when he made a wrong turn and, instead, came upon a group of North Koreans. The enemy fired and halted the vehicle, quickly taking Barnett prisoner. Beaten, searched, and interrogated, the Marine was placed in a heavily-guarded cellar. For several days he was given only a few crackers to eat. On the third night, unaccountably, the Koreans took him along on an attack. As they neared the objective, Barnett noticed that all but one of his NKPA guards had gotten ahead of him. He deliberately fell, throwing a rock in the face of the nearby guard, and raced for safety. Successfully eluding his captors, Private First Class Barnett later rejoined his own forces. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 8–10.

[37] One Marine who had conducted volunteer AAA reconnaissance missions over North Korea was Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. May, CO of the 1st 90mm AAAGunBn. In December 1951 he was lost in such a mission—the same flight in which Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, of VMA–121, was captured. MajGen A. F. Binney ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14 Sep 66.

[38] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 139.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

[40] Recapitulation of facts from MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 260–269 and *passim*.

[41] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea—East-Central Front*, v. IV; Barclay, *Commonwealth*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

- [42] Although some American prisoners were taken in the summer of 1950, it was not until the late autumn that large numbers of men taken in several major engagements created a need for a permanent prison-camp system. Rees, *Korea*, p. 330.
- [43] Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, pp. 423–424.
- [44] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 63.
- [45] Rees, *Korea*, p. 330.
- [46] The Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War later adjudged Pak's to have been "the worst camp endured by American POWs in Korea." MacDonald, *POW*, p. 104.
- [47] Barclay, *Commonwealth*, p. 190.
- [48] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 127.
- [49] Negotiations broke down at this point. No other list was offered by Communist officials until the first exchange of wounded POWs, 17 months later, in the April 1953 LITTLE SWITCH operation. Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea*, v. IV, p. 223.
- [50] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 138.
- [51] *Ibid.*, p. 164.
- [52] *Ibid.*, pp. 165–166.
- [53] *Ibid.*, p. 190.
- [54] *Ibid.*, p. 195.
- [55] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Barclay, *Commonwealth*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.
- [56] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 61. One former Marine POW commented: "The 'lenient policy' applied to the 'liberated soldiers,' who had supposedly been 'liberated' from the American capitalists by the Chinese People's Volunteers. Unless a prisoner accepted this absurd concept, he was a 'war criminal' and subject to being treated as such. The North Vietnamese use this same characterization ('war criminal') in reference to U.S. POWs when queried by U.S. representatives at the Paris talks." MajGen John N. McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 17 Jul 70.
- [57] Rees, *Korea*, p. 337.
- [58] There were, for example, instances when POW columns were being marched north and the NKPA treatment was so rough that "Chinese guards intervened to protect the prisoners from the North Koreans." MacDonald, *POW*, p. 43.
- [59] *Ibid.*, p. 60.
- [60] Rees, *Korea*, p. 334.
- [61] *Ibid.*, p. 335.
- [62] Davies was the only one of the four captured UNC chaplains who survived the war. During his imprisonment, he visited hospitalized POWs at the makeshift hospital near Camp 2 and held weekly community services. Another well-remembered chaplain was Captain Emil J. Kapaun, Chaplains Corps, USA. The Catholic priest stole food and sneaked into the enlisted compounds at Camp 5 to distribute it. His heroic behavior and selfless interest in his fellow-men were an inspiration to fellow POWs. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 77, 136.
- [63] Rees, *Korea*, p. 336.
- [64] *Ibid.*, p. 337.
- [65] Some analysts have pointed out that the Lenient Policy with its "emphasis on confession and repentance, and its propaganda exploitation" closely resembled POW indoctrination tactics developed by the Russians with their German prisoners in World War II. Rees, *Korea*, p. 338.
- [66] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

[67] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 175.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

[70] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10; MacDonald, *POW*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*.

[71] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 121.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

[73] A hollowed-out compartment of the leg was used to hide written records on deaths, atrocities, and other administrative data. Ultimately, the records were brought back to the U.S. The Air Force officer was a cousin, interestingly enough, of the chief Allied truce negotiator, General Harrison. MacDonald, *POW*, p. 227, and *Washington Post* dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 1.

[74] The crucifix was brought back to freedom by Camp 2 POWs and later placed in the Father Kapaun High School, in Wichita, Kansas. MacDonald, *POW*, p. 172.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

[76] Parachuting from his burning plane after it was struck by hostile AA fire, Captain Flynn duplicated an earlier action from World War II. In July 1945 he had bailed out of an aircraft similarly hit by fire while on a combat patrol over Japan. Biog File, HRS, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC.

[77] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 185.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[80] *New York Times*, dtd 30 Aug 53, p. 2.

[81] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 79.

[82] *Ibid.*

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

[85] *Ibid.*, pp. 186–187.

[86] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Korean War casualty cards from Statistical Unit, Casualty Section, HQMC.

[87] Leckie, *Conflict*, p. 389.

[88] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 84, reporting news stories in *The Washington Post*, dtd 27 Aug 53, p. 7, and *Saturday Evening Post*, 25 Aug 51, p. 109.

[89] Roster of this May 1951 escape group: 1stLt Cold, H&S/3/7; MSgt Dunis, Military Police Co; SSgt Harrison, MPCo; SSgt James B. Nash, MPCo; Sgt Charles W. Dickerson, 1stTkBn; Sgt Morris L. Estess, 1stSigBn; Sgt Paul M. Manor, A/7 MT Bn; Cpl Clifford R. Hawkins, 1stTkBn; Cpl Ernest E. Hayton, 1stTkBn; Cpl Frederick G. Holcomb, 11thMar; Cpl Leonard J. Maffioli, 1stTkBn; Cpl Theodore R. Wheeler, 1stServ Bn; Cpl Calvin W. Williams, Hq, 1stDiv; PFC John A. Haring, 7thMar; PFC Theron L. Hilburn, 1stTkBn; PFC Charles M. Kaylor, W/2/7; PFC Paul J. Phillips, A/7 MTBn; and PFC Charles E. Quiring, 5thMar. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 260–263.

[90] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 169.

[91] *Ibid.*

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

[93] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE23.2.S8 “CMC Statements on Korean POWs”; Biog File, HRB, HistDiv, HQMC; MacDonald, *POW*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Elliot Harris, *The “Un-American” Weapon—Psychological Warfare* (New York: M. W. Lads Publishing Co., 1967); Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

[94] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 3.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 236–237, address to U.S. Army Chaplain School, 1957.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 220.


[100] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

[101] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[102] *Ibid.*, p. 233.

[103] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

[104] Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, pp. 541–542.



MAP 34


K. White

Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 11. While Guns Cool

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul–Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type “C” Rpt—Defense of “C” Sector, 27 Jul–31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records currently retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland, Md.); 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 30 Jul–31 Aug 53; 1stMar Hist of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul–31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (contains brief histories of 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, AT Co/1, 4.2-inch MortCo/1); 5thMar Hist of Def of “D” Sector, 27 Jul–31 Oct 53, Folder #3; 5thMar Hist, same period, Folder #4 (brief histories of 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, AT Co/5, 4.2-inch MortCo/5, DMZ Police Co/5), dtd 26 Dec 53; 7thMar Hist of Defense, 27 Jul 53–10 Feb 54 (brief histories 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, AT Co/7, 4.2-inch MortCo/7), Folder #5; 1stMarDiv-Type “C” Rpt—Defense of ‘C’” Div Sect, 27 Jul–31 Dec 53, Folder #6 (containing, among others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1st Engr Bn, 1st MT Bn, 7th MT Bn, 1st KMC Regt, 2d KMC Regt).
- [2] 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnl, dtd 2 Aug 53.
- [3] 1stMarDiv ComdD Aug 53, App. VII, Annex E to IMARD–00–10–53, p. 2.
- [4] 7thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #5.
- [5] Co H Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (2), CO 3/5 ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
- [6] 1st KMC Regt Rpt, dtd 7 Apr 54, p. 1, in 1stMarDiv Type “C” Rpt, Folder #6.
- [7] 5thMar Hist, dtd 26 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.
- [8] Other modifications and deadline extensions included: (a) withdrawal of all military forces, supplies, and equipment from coastal islands and waters north of the 38th Parallel within 5 days increased to 10 days; (b) Personnel and equipment to be evacuated from Korea only through those ports of entry specified in the armistice agreement. 1st MAW ComdD, Vol. III, Jun 53, Msg from CinCUNC to CG, AFFE, COMNAVFE, CG FEAF, info 1st MAW and others, dtd 17 Jun 53.
- [9] 1stMarDiv Folder “Withdrawal to and Organization of Post Armistice MBP 1MARD–OP–11–53–July 1953,” dtd 27 Jul 53.
- [10] *Ibid.*
- [11] Co H Rpt, *op. cit.*, p. 1, 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
- [12] 7thMar Hist, dtd 28 Jan 54, p. 5, Folder #5.
- [13] 1/7 Hist, in 7thMar Hist, p. 4, Folder #5.
- [14] 5thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #4.
- [15] 1/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #3.
- [16] 3/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.
- [17] Co I Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (3), CO 3/5 ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
- [18] *Ibid.*
- [19] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #4.
- [20] 1st EngrBn Rpt, dtd 19 Apr 54, p. 3, Folder #6.
- [21] Co G Rpt of Post–Armistice Activities, Encl (1), CO 3/5 ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
- [22] KSC units were deactivated shortly thereafter. Following a EUSAK order in August to begin discontinuing use of the Korean laborers, the number of KSC workers was reduced. By the end of October, the 103d KSC Regiment attached to the division had been completely disbanded.

- [23] 1/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.
- [24] 4.2-inch Mort Co/5, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.
- [25] 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 3, Folder #4.
- [26] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul-31 Aug 53; Demilitarized Zone Police Co Rpt, dtd 18 Dec 53, in 5thMar Hist, Folder #4; MSgt Paul Sarokin, "DMZ Marines," *Leatherneck*, v. 37, no. 10 (Oct 54), hereafter Sarokin, "DMZ Marines."
- [27] With the exception of the DMZ Police, all persons entering the DMZ for salvage were required to check their weapons at the zone entry.
- [28] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.
- [29] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 53, p. 2.
- [30] Sarokin, "DMZ Marines," p. 23.
- [31] The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission supervised all phases of implementation of the armistice. It consisted of the Secretariat and 20 neutral nations inspection teams staffed by personnel from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
- [32] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 1 Aug 53, msg CG I U.S. Corps to addrees, dtd 31 Jul 53.
- [33] Demilitarized Zone Police Co/5 rpt, p. 4, in 5thMar Hist, Folder #4, *op. cit.*
- [34] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type "C" Rpt Defense of "C" Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records retired in 61 A2265. Box 74, FRC, Suitland, Md.); 1stMar Hist of Defense of "D" Sector, 27 July-31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (contains brief histories of individual units); 5thMar Hist of Defense of "D" Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, in Folders #3 and #4; 7thMar Hist of Defense of "D" Sector, 27 Jul 53-10 Feb 54, in Folder #5; 1stMarDiv Type "C" Rpt Defense of "C" Div Sect, 27 July-31 Dec 53, Folder #6 (containing, among others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1st EngrBn, 1stMTBn, 7th MTBn, 1st KMC Rgt, 2d KMC Rgt).
- [35] 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.
- [36] *Ibid.*
- [37] 5thMar Hist, pp. 6-7, Folder #3.
- [38] 1st EngrBn Rpt, Operations during 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, dtd 19 Apr 53, p. 4, Folder #6.
- [39] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10; AnlRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug 54; AnlRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55; 1st MAW ComdDs, Aug-Sep 53; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs, Aug-Sep 53; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, "Four Star Visit," *Leatherneck*, v. 37, no. 1 (Jan 54).
- [40] *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 6, p. 10-74.
- [41] 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #1, p. 1.
- [42] 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #2, msg ComNavFE to all units, dtd 16 Aug 53.
- [43] AnRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug. 54, p. II-2.
- [44] The Task Force was subsequently redesignated as the 1st Marine Brigade, FMF, in May 1956.
- [45] A fuel bingo is the amount of fuel needed by a pilot to reach home base plus enough additional fuel to divert to an alternate airfield.
- [46] Field, *NavOps, Korea*, pp. 456-457.
- [47] AnlRpt of CMC to SecNav FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55, p. 3, quoting statement made by SecDef in Dec 54 on forthcoming departure of 1stMarDiv from FECOM.
- [48] Postwar commanders of 1stMarDiv to date had been Major General Robert H. Pepper, who succeeded General Pate, and served from 12 May 54-22 Jul 54; Major General Robert E. Hogaboom, 23 Jul 54-17 Jan 55; and General Twining, beginning 18 Jan 55.
- [49] CGs, 1st MAW, in the immediate post-armistice period were: Major General Megee, until 4 Dec 53; Major

General Albert D. Cooley, 5 Dec 53–25 Mar 54; Brigadier General McCaul, 26 May 54–24 Aug 54; Brigadier General Marion L. Dawson, 25 Aug 54–24 Sep 55; and Brigadier General Jack, 25 Sep 55–30 Jun 56.



Operations in West Korea
Notes
Chapter 12. Korean Reflection

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense, 1951–1954, hereafter *Rpt of SecDef*; *PacFlt EvalRpts*, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; Marine Corps Board Study, An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), vs. I and II, hereafter *USMC Board Rpt*, held in James C. Breckinridge Library, MCDEC, Quantico, Va; A Summary of the General Officers' Conference, HQMC, 19–21 Aug 53, hereafter *Generals' Summary*, at Breckinridge Library; 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, Summary of USMC Action in Korean War; *USMC Ops Korea*, vs. I, II, III, IV, *passim*; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962* (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1962), hereafter Heinl, *Soldiers of Sea*; Release “1st Marine Division ‘The Old Breed’” from 1st MarDiv folder, HRB RefFile; Release “Outline of the First Two Years of the 1st Marine Division in Korea,” HistBr, G–3 Div, HRS Folder; *CheVron*, MCRD, San Diego, Calif., v. 27, no. 31 (2 Aug 68), p. 4–5, “From Camp Pendleton to Inchon—18 Years Later, LtGen E. A. Craig, 1st Provisional Brigade CG, Recalls Experiences in Korea,” Cpl C. N. Damopoulos, hereafter *CheVron*.

[2] *CheVron*, pp. 4–5.

[3] *Ibid.* Even though Marine air and ground forces had on occasion operated jointly ever since the 1920s, air support in the early days was considered a subsidiary rather than integral part of the team. The doctrine of Marine close air support was formulated in WW II but not fully employed before the end of hostilities.

[4] Quoted in *USMC Ops Korea*, v. II, p. 46. Admiral Doyle was Commander of Amphibious Forces for the Pacific Fleet.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[6] Semianl Rpt of SecNav (1 Jan–30 Jun) 1953, p. 185.

[7] See Appendix E. Percentages represent Marine ground only; air casualties have been deducted. Of 1st MAW casualties of 432 (258 KIA, 174 WIA) during the entire war, 103 were KIA and 41 WIA during the April 1952–July 1953 period cited above.

[8] Lynn Montross, “Development of Our Body Armor,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 6 (Jun 55), p. 16.

[9] Statement by Gen Omar N. Bradley, USA, as quoted by Gen G. C. Thomas, Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. and RAdm A. A. Ageton, *The Marine Officer's Guide* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1956), p. 130.

[10] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 6, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 4, Chap. 10; *USMC Board Rpts*, vs. 1–11; *Generals' Summary*; AnlRpt SecNav 1952–1953; *USMC Ops Korea* vs. I–IV, *passim*; Monograph, *A Brief History of Marine Corps Aviation*, (HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1960); Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Sherrod, *Marine Aviation*; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part I, Pusan to the Reservoir: The Acid Test,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 41, no. 5 (May 57), pp. 22–27; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part II, January 1951 to the Armistice,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 41, no. 6 (Jun 57), pp. 22–26; Brochure, Change of Command Ceremonies, 11 Jul 56, First Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, 1st MAW folder, HRB ref. file.

[11] Quoted in Andrew Geer, *The New Breed—The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), pp. 94–95, quoted with permission of the publisher.

[12] LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea,” Part I, *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1957, p. 45.

[13] Technically, FAF had also been the controlling agency for air support during Pusan operations. Marine aviation units, as a component of an integrated Fleet Marine Force, however, were directed to fly support for 1st

ProvMarBrig as their highest priority. Except for the formality of checking in with the FAF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at JOC, 1st MAW units operated under the Marine Corps-Navy CAS doctrine. During the Seoul-Inchon campaign, control of air operations came under ComNavFE, since it was an amphibious operation, and the air system followed Marine-Navy doctrine. USMC Board Rpt, v. I, p. IV-B-9, 14.

[14] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9-82.

[15] "1st MAW in Korea," *op. cit.*, Part II, Jun 57, p. 23.

[16] With phaseout of the Corsairs in 1952, the VMF squadrons were subsequently redesignated as attack units.

[17] In August 1952, FAF had introduced a new policy limiting pilots to one pass on general support or interdiction missions and two passes on CAS flights.

[18] MajGen V. E. Megee, GO 153, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoted in 1st MAW, Part II, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

[19] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 6, Chap. 9; *USMC Board Rpt*, v. I; *Generals' Summary*; *USMC Ops Korea*, vs. I-IV, *passim*; Montross, *SkyCav*.

[20] Montross, *SkyCav*, p. 108.

[21] *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 10 (Oct 55), p. 61 quoting Eugene E. Wilson., *Wings of the Dawn* (Hartford, Conn.: Connecticut Printers, Inc., 1955).

[22] By contrast, in 1945 World War II campaigns the Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal had visited hospital ships and praised the air evacuation methods then in use when he commented, "I went aboard the *Samaritan*, where Navy surgeons and corpsmen were already dealing with the casualties from the day and night before." Capt Clifford P. Morehouse, *The Iwo Jima Campaign*, (Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1946), p. 139.

[23] HistBr outline, p. 4.

[24] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 533-534.

[25] Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 184, comments: "In order to insure a steady flow of replacement craft, he [Ridgway] suggested that procurement be started on a scale that would permit manufacturers to expand production immediately."

[26] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 534.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 535.

[29] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Semianl Rpts of SecDef (including SecNav), 1951-1955; *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; *USMC Board Rpt*, vs. 1-11; *Generals' Summary*; Brochure titled "Historical Outline of the Development of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1941-1950 (Preliminary)," held at HRB; HRS Log Sheet of Korean War Statistics prepared for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC, dtd 21 Aug 67; Ernest H. Giusti, *The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950-1951* (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1967 ed.), hereafter Giusti, *Mobilization, MCR*; *USMC Ops Korea*, vs. I-II; Public Affairs Unit 4-1, *The Marine Corps Reserve—A History, 1916-1966* (Washington: Division of Reserve, HQMC, 1966); HQMC Press Kit, "Men of Color," issued July 1968; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1961).

[30] Historical Outline of the Development of FMFPac, 1941-1950, p. 49.

[31] With 7,779 men in 1stMarDiv and 8,973 in the 2dMarDiv, even "had they been combined into a single unit, its numbers would still have fallen 20 percent short of one war-strength division." Giusti, *Mobilization, MCR*, p. 9.

[32] Semianl Rpt of SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 187.

[33] *USMC Ops Korea*, v. II, p. 23.

[34] Giusti, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[35] Even as late as July 1952, the influx of Class III volunteer reserve pilots, many of whom lacked adequate recent precombat flying experience, had presented a serious wing personnel problem and resulted in on-the-job training for pilots in the VMO-6 fixed-wing section. As another measure to improve squadron operational proficiency and partially correct weaknesses of the individual pilot rotation system and fast turnover, a 100-mission ceiling was inaugurated in February 1953. This applied to aviators in the VMF/VMA tactical units, with the exception of VMF(N)-513 pilots who were rotated after 60 missions.

[36] Assignment of Negro personnel in the armed forces continued to expand as a result of the President's 1948 Executive Order on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity. The Far East Command in July 1951 and the European Command in April 1952 initiated steps towards the racial integration of combat units, followed by similar programs for service units. Semianl Rpt SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun 1952), p. 21.

[37] For detailed breakdown of figures, see 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW ComdDs, Apr 53 and *PacFlt Eval Rpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-54, Chap. 10, p. 10-29. Also, *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8-33 and No. 4, Chap 9, p. 9-26.

[38] Previously, Marine Corps views had been represented at the JCS level by the SecNavn or CNO.

[39] *Generals' Summary*, p. 1.

[40] Thomas, Heintz, and Ageton, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[41] *Generals' Summary*, p. 96.

[42] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 1, 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9, 10; *USMC Board Rpt* vs. I-II; 1st Marine Division Training Bulletin No. 5-53, "Lessons Learned," dtd 10 Jun 53, hereafter *Lessons Learned 5-53*; *Generals' Summary*; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Heintz, *Soldiers of Sea*.

[43] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-2.

[44] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-5. Subsequently, the division's ground readiness was rated as excellent; a conservative estimate placed individual unit amphibious readiness at between 25 and 60 percent; and indicated a 30-day training period would bring the division to complete amphibious readiness. *Generals' Summary*, p. 53.

[45] *Lessons Learned 5-53*, p. 19.

[46] Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*, p. 107.

[47] *Lessons Learned*, *op. cit.*

[48] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-84.

[49] Basically, these consisted of a no-hostile-act three-mile circular area radiating from Kaesong; a six-mile radius forbidding FAF planes in the skies over Kaesong and another two-mile, no-fly radius over Panmunjom; and various other prohibitions on military craft, air-dropped leaflets, and firing of artillery to include propaganda shell leaflets.

[50] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-78.

[51] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9-37.

[52] *Generals' Summary*, p. 39.

[53] Between December 1950-July 1953, the 1st Marine Division took 2,445 *NKPA/CCF*, with an additional 656 enemy seized by its attached 1st KMC/RCT, or a total of 3,101. Marine capturing units included Headquarters Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, the three infantry regiments, and 7th Motor Transport Battalion. An additional 4,792 POWs were also taken by the 1st Division in the early Inchon-Seoul operations. G-1 Folder, Aug 53 (Box 4), "Personnel Periodic Rpt." No. 94, dtd 15-31 Aug 53; *USMC Board Rpt*, v. I, p. II-B-46.

[54] *Generals' Summary*, p. 39.

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] Much of the unwritten but basic policy mitigating against full use of Allied air superiority stemmed from the desire to employ "humanitarian" standards in the UNC war effort. Following WW II there had been wide criticism of the "moral wrong of massed air bombardment" as well as employment of the atomic bomb by the

U.S. to hasten the end of the war. The UNC goal, in Korea, was to avoid needless civilian casualties and for air strikes to be directed against purely military targets. Futrell, *USAF Korea*, p. 41.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 402.

[58] Comments Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 430–431: “Despite the fact that responsible Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force commanders had decided that the rail-interdiction attacks would best accomplish the United Nations mission in Korea, Eighth Army subordinate commanders were gravely dissatisfied with the limitations [96 sorties daily for the entire Eighth Army front, decided upon by EUSAK-FAF in November 1951] placed on close support.” One of those dissenting subordinates at the time was CG, 1st Mar Div. Following the September 1951 heavy fighting in the Punchbowl area, General Thomas officially described the Marine division’s air support as unsatisfactory and stated his division had “taken unnecessary casualties because its air support had not been adequate or timely.” Average elapsed time between the division’s CAS requests and its 187 approved missions that month had been nearly two hours. Only 32 immediate air-support requests had been filled within 30 minutes.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 432.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 435–436.

[62] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9–58.

[63] Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*, p. 270.

[64] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 437–438.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 434.

[66] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9–45.

[67] By contrast: in FY 1951, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1stMarDiv were 7,000 of total 14,028 CAS sorties, or 50 percent; for FY 1953, the figure was 4,912 of total 14,540 CAS sorties, or 32.4 percent. *Generals’ Summary*, Chart C, following p. 58.

[68] Quoted in Heinl, *Soldiers of Sea*, p. 647.

[69] MajGen V. E. Megee, “Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), p. 17.

[70] The bomblines had been moved in to an average of 3–4,000 meters from the MLR in December 1952 to expose more targets to the “mass” strike treatment.

[71] *PacFlt EvalRpt* Chap. 1, No. 6, p. 1–15.

[72] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 10–3.

[73] For a penetrating discussion of interservice problems dealing with air-ground liaison and communications, use of FACs, and CAS capability, etc., see U.S. Congress, Rpt of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the Committee on Armed Services, Otis G. Pike, Chairman (House of Reps., 89th Congress, 1 Feb 66), Washington: GPO, 1966.

[74] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 1, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9; *Generals’ Summary; Lessons Learned 5–53*; 1stMarDiv PIR 942, dtd 7 Aug 53; 1st MAW PIR 127–53, dtd 7 May 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy Ground Situation #1–53 (end-of-war analysis); 1st MAW PIR 169–53, dtd 18 Jun 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy Air Situation 1–53, dtd 20 May 53 (end-of-war analysis); 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI: Comments on Tactics, Techniques, and Equipment, pp. 1–12; J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime—The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969); S. L. A. Marshall, *The Military History of the Korean War* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963); S. L. A. Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill—The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, Spring 1953* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1956), quoted with permission of the publisher; Ridgway, *Korean War*; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; Batterton, *Korea Notes*.

[75] If the enemy advanced closer than 50 yards, by closely following under heavy preparatory fires, he could

- penetrate the position. At this close range, normal box-me-in artillery fires were not close enough to break up the attack. *Lessons Learned 5-53*, p. 10.
- [76] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-29.
- [77] Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill*, p. 24.
- [78] *Ibid.*, p. 116.
- [79] *Lessons Learned, 5-53*, p. 11.
- [80] 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI, p. 4.
- [81] Batterton, *Korea Notes*, p. 34.
- [82] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6 p. 9-58 citing Eighth U.S. Army PIR No. 948.
- [83] *Lessons Learned 5-53*, p. 2.
- [84] Col F. P. Henderson, "Amphibious Artillery of the Future," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), p. 30.
- [85] See Chapter VI.
- [86] Marshall, *Military History of Korean War*, p. 72.
- [87] 1st MAW PIR 127-53, Encl (1), p. 1.
- [88] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-41.
- [89] *Ibid.*, No. 5, p. 8-31.
- [90] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-82.
- [91] *Ibid.*
- [92] Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill*, pp. 20-21.
- [93] Marshall, *Military History of Korean War*, pp. 77, 78.
- [94] Semianl Rpt SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun), 1951, p. 187.
- [95] Joy, *Truce Negotiations*, p. 39.
- [96] *Ibid.*, pp. 166-173, *passim*.
- [97] Col J. C. Murray, "Prisoner Issue in the Korean Armistice Negotiations," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 9 (Sep 55), p. 30.
- [98] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- [99] See "1stMarDiv, 1st KMC Regt. and Its Relationship to the 1stMarDiv," "SAR" File (Korea), Type "C" Rpt.
- [100] The course of the war, particularly its protracted and static nature, had led to growing national apathy and opposition, particularly on the U.S. home front. In late 1950, national opinion polls found that 80 percent of the people were in favor of the war and seven months later that 67 percent were against it. On the Korean front lines, morale was generally highest during heavy ground actions or large scale air attacks. *Washington Post*, dtd 12 Jul 70, p. A-17; *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 1-16.
- [101] Rees, *Korea*, p. 33.
- [102] Ridgway, *Korean War*, p. viii.
- [103] Rees, *Korea*, p. 431. In the three years of war, North Korea had gained 850 square miles of territory southwest of the Parallel, while the ROK acquired 2,350 square miles north of the original June 1950 boundary.
- [104] Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 175.
- [105] Official records show that the 1stMarDiv inflicted approximately 59,805 CCF casualties (11,957 KIA; 15,111 estimated WIA or KIA; 32,643 estimated WIA; and 94 POWs) during the Apr 52-Jul 53 period on the western front. For the same time, Marine infantry casualties were approximately 13,000 plus some 2,500 for its 1st KMC/ RCT.
- [106] Marshall, *Military History of Korean War*, p. 2.
- [107] Anl Rpt of the CMC to SecNav, FY 1955, p. 3.
- [108] Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 3-4.

