



National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A171052

Whether on the frontlines or in reserve Marines were paid monthly in Military Pay Certificates, a substitute for U.S. currency used to curb black market activities. With little to spend it on, most Marines saved their money or had allotments taken out.

Company I, reduced to fewer than two-dozen effectives, regained control of the outpost. Another platoon from the same company immediately moved forward to reinforce the survivors.

Throughout the fighting at Berlin and East Berlin, storms had disrupted the movement of supplies by sending the Imjin out of its banks and destroying a bridge. The bad weather also created mud that hampered movement on the battlefield and brought clouds that reduced visibility from the cockpits of supporting aircraft. At about noon on 8 July, however, four Marine F9Fs took advantage of ground-based Marine radar to attack targets a safe distance from East Berlin. Led by the commander

officer of Marine Fighter Squadron 311, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane, the jets dropped five tons of bombs on bunkers and troop concentrations.

The recapture of East Berlin enabled the last of the Turkish troops to withdraw, in effect completing the relief of the 25th Infantry Division. The 11th Marines, commanded after 5 July by Colonel Manly L. Curry, resumed its normal mission of direct support of the 1st Marine Division, as did the 1st Tank Battalion. By 13 July, the company of amphibian tractors that had been guarding prisoners of war at Ascom City rejoined the battalion under the control of the division. The Reconnaissance Company, the

Kimpo Provisional Regiment, and the Korean Marine Corps regiment also returned to the division's control.

Once it returned to the main line of resistance, the 1st Marine Division again assumed operational control over VMO-6 and HMR-161. Cloud cover at first impeded the aerial observers from VMO-6, but they successfully directed four artillery fire missions on 8 July against targets behind enemy lines. On 10 July, Marine helicopters from HMR-161 delivered some 1,200 pounds of rations, water, and other cargo to Marine outposts.

Ten Days of Patrols

Regaining Outpost East Berlin on 8 July, which coincided with the resumption of truce negotiations at Panmunjom, did not end the Chinese pressure on the Marines. After dark on the 8th, Colonel Glenn C. Funk, who had assumed command of the 7th Marines on 27 March, moved a platoon from the regiment's 3d Battalion and four M-46 tanks into position to strengthen the main line of resistance. The tanks had just arrived at Hill 126, an outcropping just to the rear of the battle line, when the Marines heard the sound of trucks from beyond Chinese lines. From the hilltop, the M-46s directed 90mm fire against known Chinese positions, and the noise of truck motors ended. Chinese troops, who meanwhile had advanced from the assembly area on Vegas, probed Outpost Berlin and struck a stronger blow against East Berlin. Fighting raged for almost two hours before fire from mortars, artillery, and tanks forced the enemy to break off the action at about 0315 on the morning of 9 July.

After Lieutenant Colonel Cereghino's Marines ended this latest

threat to East Berlin, the Chinese remained content to jab at the division rather than try for a knockout. Entire days might pass during which Marine aerial or ground observers and patrols saw few, if any, signs of Chinese. The enemy seemed to be improving his tunnels and bunkers instead of venturing out of them to mount an attack. The Marines still underwent sporadic shelling, but the bombardments did not approach in ferocity those of 8 and 9 July.

Mines for a time proved deadlier than artillery and mortars, as on 12 July when these weapons killed four Marines and wounded eight. At least one minefield contained a new type of Russian-designed weapon that could be detonated by pressure or with a trip wire. Most of the fields employed mines familiar to the Marines, types that may have been newly planted or perhaps had lain dormant under the frozen ground and become deadly when the weather grew

warmer and the earth softer.

Although the enemy did not attack on the scale of 7-8 July, Chinese patrols repeatedly clashed all along the division's front with those sent out by the Marines. On the night of 12 July, for example, a 13-man patrol from the 5th Marines encountered a force of Chinese near Outpost Esther, and a combat patrol from the 7th Marines, looking for the enemy near Elko, engaged in an 18-minute firefight.

As the frequency of patrol actions increased, flooding again interfered with the supply effort. On the night of 14-15 July, the Imjin River reached a maximum depth of 26 feet. Only the solidly-built Freedom Bridge, carrying the road to Panmunjom across the swollen stream, could be used until the water subsided.

On the night of 16-17 July, patrols from the 5th Marines engaged in two firefights, suffering no casualties in the first, near

Outpost Hedy, while killing three Chinese and wounding one. The regiment's second patrol of the night ran into an ambush near Hill 90. The Chinese proved more aggressive than in recent days, pinning down the patrol and unleashing a flurry of mortar and artillery fire that wounded every member of a unit sent to help break the ambush. Another group of reinforcements succeeded, however, in reaching the embattled patrol. After two hours of fighting and several attempts to isolate and capture individual Marines, the Chinese withdrew, having suffered 22 killed and wounded. When seven Marines failed to return to the main line of resistance, a platoon from the 5th Marines searched the battle site and recovered six bodies.

The third firefight of the night erupted just after midnight in the sector of the 7th Marines, when a 30-man patrol from Company A, 1st Battalion, was ambushed after it passed through a gate in the barbed wire northwest of Outpost Ava. Between 40 and 50 Chinese, supported by mortars, opened fire with grenades and small arms. After a 15-minute exchange of fire in which as many as 18 Chinese may have been killed or wounded, the ambush party vanished into the darkness. As the Marines from Company A returned through the gate, a head count revealed four men missing. A recovery squad crossed and recrossed the area until dawn drew near but found only three bodies. One Marine from Company A remained missing; three had been killed and 21 wounded.

The actions near Outpost Elko and in front of the Ava gate lent credence to Chinese propaganda. Since the 1st Marine Division returned to the main line of resistance, Chinese loudspeakers had

The never tiring doctors and corpsmen treat the wounded. At the forward aid stations patients are examined and their wounds dressed; few are discharged and most prepared for further evacuation.

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gone beyond the usual appeals to surrender, on at least one occasion warning of the fatal consequences of going on nighttime patrols. This threat, however, probably reflected a Chinese policy of maintaining overall military pressure after the resumption of truce talks rather than a specific effort to demoralize the Marines.

Whatever the purpose of the enemy's propaganda, the Marine patrols continued. On the night after the ambush of Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, a combat patrol from the regiment's Company C advanced as far as the Ungok hills to silence a machine gun that had been harassing the main line of resistance and, after a successful 20-minute firefight, left a Marine Corps recruiting poster to mark the point of farthest advance. Meanwhile, the Korean Marines had four patrol contacts with the enemy, none lasting more than a few minutes.

The combat outposts like the Berlins, Esther, and Ava had become increasingly vulnerable. By mid-July, General Pate directed his staff to study the possibility of the 1st Marine Division's shifting from a linear defense—the continuous main line of resistance and the network of outlying combat outposts in front of it—to a system of mutually supporting defensive strongpoints that would result in greater depth and density. The Chinese attacks of 7 and 8 July on Berlin and East Berlin served as a catalyst for the study that General Pate launched. As the I Corps commander, General Clarke, later explained, these actions demonstrated that American minefields and barbed wire entanglements had channeled movement between the main line of resistance and the combat outpost lines into comparatively few routes that had become dangerously familiar to

the enemy. As a result, Chinese mortars and artillery could savage the troops using these well-worn tracks to reinforce an embattled outpost, withdraw from one that had been overwhelmed, or counterattack to regain a lost position. Indeed, General Maxwell D. Taylor, in command of the Eighth Army since February 1953, agreed that the enemy could, if he chose to pay the price in blood and effort, overrun any of the existing outposts, and endorsed the concept that General Pate's staff was studying. The change in tactics, however, had not yet gone into effect when the Chinese next attacked the Marine positions, but the new assault forced 7th Marines to adopt, in a modified form, the principles of depth and density that the division commander was suggesting.

When the enemy again attacked, a ceasefire seemed imminent. President Rhee agreed on 11 July to accept American assurances of future support and enter into a truce. By the 19th, the negotiators at Panmunjom seemed to have resolved the last of the major issues. On this very date, however, the Chinese struck.

The Fighting Intensifies


Heavy downpours hampered frontline combat and grounded the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing for a total of 12 days early in July. Rain fell on 22 days that month, but the wing nevertheless reported 2,668 combat sorties, more than half of them flown in close support all along the United Nations line. The airmen supported their fellow Marines on the ground with some 250 missions, four-fifths of them using ground-based radar by night or day.

The weather improved after mid-month, enabling aerial activity

to increase at a critical moment, for on the night of 19-20 July, the Chinese again assaulted Combat Outposts Berlin and East Berlin—now manned by the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, which had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Cereghino's 2d Battalion—and also menaced Outposts Dagmar and Ingrid, held by elements of the 5th Marines. The positions of the 5th Marines held firm, thanks in part to accurate fire from the 11th Marines, but Berlin and East Berlin were in peril almost from the outset.

After a savage bombardment of both Berlins and nearby segments of the main line of resistance, Chinese troops at 2230 on the night of the 19th stormed the ridgeline where the two outposts were located, attacking East Berlin first and Berlin immediately afterward. Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, commanded by First Lieutenant Kenneth E. Turner, garrisoned both outposts, posting 37 Marines at East Berlin and 44 at Berlin. Mortars, machine guns, howitzers, and 90mm tank guns blasted the advancing Chinese in support of Company I. Despite the firepower massed against him, the enemy overran both outposts within three hours.

A duel between American and Chinese gunners continued after the fall of the two Berlins. The enemy fired some 3,000 rounds while overwhelming the outposts and trying to neutralize the nearby main line of resistance and the artillery batteries behind it. One Turkish and two Army artillery battalions joined three battalions of the 11th Marines—two of 105mm and one of 155mm howitzers—in responding to the Chinese bombardment, battering the assault force, its supporting mortars and howitzers, and the assembly areas used by reinforcements in exploiting the early suc-



cess. Barrage and counterbarrage continued into the morning of 20 July; at 0520, for example, Chinese shells were exploding at the rate of one per second on the main line of resistance immediately behind Outposts Berlin and East Berlin.

Meanwhile, at 0400 Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Jones, in command of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, alerted Companies D and E of the regiment's 2d Battalion, already under his operational control, to counterattack Berlin and East Berlin at 0730. Half an hour before the scheduled time, Jones

received word to cancel the counterattack. Rather than restore the outpost line, General Pate shifted elements of the division reserve, the 1st Marines, to strengthen the main line of resistance in the event the enemy should try to exploit his capture of the two Berlins.

While Colonel Wallace Nelson's 1st Marines reinforced the main line of resistance, air power and artillery tried to neutralize the outposts the Chinese had captured. Since a ceasefire seemed only days away and any attempt to regain the lost ground would result in

severe Marine casualties, there would be no counterattack to restore a position that seemed almost certain to be abandoned when a demilitarized zone took shape after the end of hostilities. Instead, air strikes and fire from tanks and artillery scoured the lost outposts to prevent Chinese from using them to mount an assault on the main defenses. Especially effective were attacks by Marine airmen against Berlin and East Berlin and bombardment by Army 8-inch and 240mm howitzers, adjusted by Marine aerial observers, which shattered bunkers and collapsed almost all the trenches on both enemy-held outposts.

Colonel Jones' 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, estimated that the deadly fighting on 19-20 July had killed perhaps 75 Chinese and wounded as many as 300, thus crippling an enemy battalion that had to be replaced by a fresh unit. The 7th Marines and attached units lost six killed, 118 wounded, and 56 missing, but 12 of the missing men survived as prisoners of war and returned in the general exchange when the fighting ended.

Once the enemy captured Berlin and East Berlin, the critical terrain feature on the right of the sector held by the 1st Marine Division became Hill 119, nicknamed Boulder City, the segment of the main line of resistance nearest the two lost outposts and therefore the likely objective of any deeper Chinese thrust. Company D, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, (attached to the regiment's 3d Battalion) held Boulder City itself. Company E of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, (also attached to the 3d Battalion) joined Companies H and I of the 3d Battalion in defending the high ground extending from behind Boulder City—although within supporting distance—to Hill 111 at




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Marines of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, board armored personnel carriers to be taken to the front. As a result of the critical tactical situation and number of casualties suffered during the Berlin operations, the battalion was positioned in the center of the regimental main line of resistance as the first step in the relief of the 7th Marines.

the boundary between the 1st Marine Division and the Commonwealth Division. The newly-arrived 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Long, moved into position between the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on its right and Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Hadd's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, on its left. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, served as regimental reserve.

The introduction of Lieutenant Colonel Long's battalion, which came under control of the 7th Marines, served as the first step in a planned relief of the 7th Marines by the 1st Marines. For now, the newly arrived battalion added further depth and density to the main line of resistance, organizing Hill 126 and the other commanding heights in its sector. In effect, three





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A173715

Men of the 1st Marines move toward the frontlines to reinforce other Marines fighting at Hill 119, known informally as Boulder City. Little did they know that they would see the last of the war's heavy fighting.

battalions, rather than the two previously defending the regimental area, formed a crescent of strong-points designed to contain and defeat any offensive launched from Berlin and East Berlin.

In the sector held by the 7th Marines, Outpost Ava, manned by a squad from Company A of the regiment's 1st Battalion, survived on the far left, near the boundary between the 7th and 5th Marines. Boulder City, formerly a component of a continuous main line of resistance, now functioned as an outpost of the reconstituted defenses. By 22 July, Company G, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, had taken over Boulder City, from the

regiment's Company D, which reverted to the control of its parent battalion, the 2d, in reserve.


The Last Battle

Signs of an imminent Chinese attack multiplied as July drew to a close. The probable objectives seemed to include Outposts Hedy and Dagmar, but instead of attacking either in force, the enemy sent only a token force, wearing burlap camouflage, that appeared near Hedy on 21 July. The defenders opened fire, killing three of the Chinese, and the survivors fled.

Marine Fighter Squadrons 115 and 311, released by the Fifth Air

Force to support the United Nations troops fighting in central and eastern Korea, joined Marine Attack Squadron 121 in pounding the Chinese threatening the 1st Marine Division. Recurring cloud cover produced frequent down-pours that interfered with operations during the critical period of 21-23 July, but the three squadrons nevertheless flew more than 15 radar-directed missions that dropped some 33 tons of bombs.

As the threats to Outposts Hedy and Dagmar abated, Chinese forces menaced Boulder City, where Company G, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, commanded by First Lieutenant Oral R. Swigart, Jr.,



manned the defenses after relieving Company D, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. On the evening of 24 July, hostile mortars and artillery began hammering Swigart's perimeter. Marine artillery and 4.5-inch rocket launchers immediately responded against targets that included a Chinese regiment massing behind Hill 139, northwest of enemy-held Outpost Berlin.

At 2030, Chinese troops began probing the right of the 1st Marine Division's line. After a powerful barrage by mortars and artillery, the assault force hit Hill 111 at the far right of the positions held by the 7th Marines, then shifted to Boulder City near the boundary between the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, and the attached 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. As he had on 7 July, when he sought to capitalize on the Marine division's

takeover of the lines of the 25th Infantry Division, the enemy sought to take advantage of the relief of the 7th Marines by the 1st Marines.

When the Chinese attack began, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, attached to the 7th Marines, had already taken over positions that included Boulder City. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Roy D. Miller, was relieving the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, as Company H took over Hill 111 and Company G defended the critical ground at Boulder City.

At about 1930 on 24 July the enemy attacked Hill 111 and soon cracked the perimeter now manned by Company H of Miller's battalion. For about 50 minutes, the Chinese clung to a salient on the hilltop, but then withdrew.

After this flurry of action, apparently intended to divert attention from Boulder City, the enemy ignored Hill 111 until the morning of 25 July, when artillery fire battered the perimeter but no infantry assault followed.

The two Chinese battalions attacking on the Marine right had their greatest success at Boulder City, seizing a portion of the trenchline defended by Company G, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. In an attempt to exploit this foothold, the enemy attacked the Berlin and East Berlin gates, passages through the wire that the Marines had used to supply and reinforce the two outposts before both were overwhelmed. Cloud cover prevented aerial observers from supporting the troops protecting the gates, and the Chinese managed to gain control of Berlin gate and

Second Lieutenant Raymond G. Murphy

An ardent athlete with a major in physical education, Murphy was born in Pueblo, Colorado, in 1930, and was commissioned in the Marine Corps Reserves in 1951. In Korea, he was awarded a Silver Star Medal for his actions on 22 November 1952 in assaulting an enemy strongpoint. Then his heroism, again as a platoon commander with Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on 3 February 1953, resulted in a Medal of Honor with a citation, which read in part:

Undeterred by the increasing intense enemy fire, he immediately located casualties as they fell and made several trips up and down the fire-swept hill to direct evacuation teams to the wounded, personally carrying many of the stricken Marines to safety. When reinforcements were needed by the assaulting elements, Second Lieutenant Murphy employed part of his unit as support and, during the ensuing battle, personally killed two of the enemy with his pistol. With all the wounded evacuated and the assaulting units beginning to disengage, he remained behind with a carbine to cover the movement of friendly forces off the hill and, though suffering intense pain from his previous wounds, seized an automatic rifle to provide more firepower when the enemy reappeared in the trenches.

After the war, he joined the Reserves and was discharged as a captain in 1959.

Hospital Corpsman Francis C. Hammond

Born in 1931, Hammond enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1951. Assigned to the Marine Corps as a "Hospitalman," he gave his life at Sanae-dong, Korea, serving with Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on 26 March 1953. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

Hospitalman Hammond's platoon was subjected to a murderous barrage of hostile mortar and artillery fire, followed by a vicious assault by onrushing enemy troops. Resolutely advancing through the veritable curtain of fire to aid his stricken comrades, Hospitalman Hammond moved among the stalwart garrison of Marines and, although critically wounded himself, valiantly continued to administer aid to the other wounded throughout an exhausting four-hour period. When the unit was ordered to withdraw, he skillfully directed the evacuation of casualties and remained in the fire-swept area to assist the corpsmen of the relieving unit [Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines] until he was struck by a round of enemy mortar fire and fell, mortally wounded.

After the war, a school in his hometown of Alexandria, Virginia, a medical clinic at Camp Pendleton, California, and the Knox-class destroyer *Francis Hammond* (DE 1067) were named in his honor.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A-49767



Navy Medicine Photo Collection

mount a second determined assault on the Boulder City perimeter. Hand-to-hand fighting raged all along the 700 yards of trench that Lieutenant Swigart's Marines still held. The company's ammunition ran low, and the plight of casualties became increasingly difficult as Chinese fire killed two of Boulder City's eight corpsmen and wounded

most of the others. By midnight, Swigart's company could muster no more than half its earlier strength, but it still clung to the rear slope of Boulder City. In the words of one of Company G's Marines, "only a never-say-die resistance was keeping the enemy from seizing the remainder of the position."

Casualties had further eroded

the strength of the Boulder City garrison, when Captain Louis J. Sartor, at 15 minutes after midnight on the morning of the 25th, led Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, toward the hill to reinforce Swigart's survivors. The Chinese intercepted and correctly interpreted the coded radio message ordering Sartor's Marines forward, thus obtaining information

that enabled enemy artillery and mortars to wound or kill about a third of the reinforcements. Despite the deadly barrage, much of Company I reached Boulder City, joined forces with the remnants of Swigart's garrison, and took part in a counterattack led by

Captain Sartor that recaptured the hill by 0330. Further reinforcements from Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, arrived by 0530 to consolidate the position. A few Chinese, however, continued to

cling to positions on the slopes nearest their main line of resistance.

Since the enemy still controlled the approaches to Boulder City, he was able to mount another attack on that position at 0820, 25 July. Fire from Marine mortars and

Hospital Corpsman Third Class William R. Charette

A native of Ludington, Michigan, Charette was born in 1932 and enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1951. For his actions during the early morning hours of 27 March 1953 in the Panmunjom Corridor, while attached to Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, he was recommended for and later received the Medal of Honor. His citation reads, in part:

When an enemy grenade landed within a few feet of a Marine he was attending, he immediately threw himself upon the stricken man and absorbed the entire concussion of the deadly missile with his body. Although sustaining painful facial wounds, and undergoing shock from the intensity of the blast which ripped the helmet and medical aid kit from his person, Hospital Corpsman Third Class Charette resourcefully improvised emergency bandages by tearing off part of his clothing, and gallantly continued to administer medical aid to the wounded in his own unit and to those in adjacent platoon areas as well. . . . Moving to the side of another casualty who was suffering excruciating pain from a serious leg wound, Hospital Corpsman Third Class Charette stood upright in the trench line and exposed himself to a deadly hail of enemy fire in order to lend more effective aid to the victim and to alleviate his anguish while being removed to a position of safety.

Miraculously surviving his wounds, he rose to the rank of master chief hospital corpsman before retiring in 1977. A hospital facility at the Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, Virginia, is named for Corpsman Charette.



Navy Medicine Photo Collection

Sergeant Daniel P. Matthews

Born in Van Nuys, California, in 1931, Matthews enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1951. After completing recruit training he was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, at Camp Pendleton, California. He sailed for Korea in January 1953, joining Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. On 28 March 1953 he was killed in a counterattack on Vegas Hill. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

Sergeant Matthews fearlessly advanced in the attack until his squad was pinned down by a murderous sweep of fire from an enemy machine gun located on the peak of the outpost. Observing that the deadly fire prevented a corpsman from removing a wounded man lying in an open area fully exposed to the brunt of the devastating gunfire, he worked his way to the base of the hostile machine-gun emplacement, leaped onto the rock fortification surrounding the gun and, taking the enemy by complete surprise, single-handedly charged the hostile emplacement with his rifle. Although severely wounded when the enemy brought a withering hail of fire to bear upon him, he gallantly continued his valiant one-man assault and, firing his rifle with deadly effectiveness, succeeded in killing two of the enemy, routing a third and completely silencing the enemy weapon, thereby enabling his comrades to evacuate the stricken Marine to a safe position. [He died of] his wounds before aid could reach him.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A76499

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

Staff Sergeant Ambrosio Guillen

Born in La Junta, Colorado, in 1929, Guillen grew up in El Paso, Texas; he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1947. After sea duty and serving as a drill instructor at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, he was assigned as a platoon sergeant with Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Korea. He died of wounds incurred near Songuch-on 25 July 1953. Ironically, the ceasefire was signed two days later. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

With his unit pinned down, when the outpost was attacked under cover of darkness by an estimated force of two enemy battalions supported by mortar and artillery fire, he deliberately exposed himself to the heavy barrage and attacks to direct his men in defending their positions and personally supervise the treatment and evacuation of the wounded. Inspired by his leadership, the platoon quickly rallied and engaged the enemy force in fierce hand-to-hand combat. Although critically wounded during the course of the battle, Staff Sergeant Guillen refused medical aid and continued to direct his men throughout the remainder of the engagement until the enemy was defeated and thrown into disorderly retreat.

A middle school in El Paso, Texas, is named for Staff Sergeant Guillen.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 407003

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

artillery, and from the 90mm weapons of 10 tanks dug in on the Marine positions, played the key role in breaking up the new assault, although the last of the attackers did not withdraw until afternoon. The M-46 tanks proved deadly against advancing Chinese troops, but also presented an inviting target for Chinese artillery and mortar crews, who directed some 2,200 rounds at the armored vehicles. Aircraft also helped repulse the 25 July attack on Boulder City, as when Panther jets flew nine missions, guided by Marine radar on the ground, against hostile positions threatening Boulder City and nearby defensive strong-points.

Before midnight on 24 July, in an attack perhaps loosely coordinated with the thrust at Boulder City, Chinese forces hit the positions held by the 5th Marines. After probing the defenses of Outposts Dagmar and Esther, the enemy concentrated against the latter, manned by elements of Company H, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. The Chinese tried to isolate Outpost

Esther by shelling and patrolling the routes leading there from the main line of resistance and succeeded in overrunning outer portions of the perimeter. The defenders, commanded by Second

Lieutenant William H. Bates, prevailed because of the skillful use of their own weapons, including flamethrowers and the support of mortars, machine guns, tanks, and the always-deadly artillery. The 3d

Aerial view of the pockmarked terrain in front of Boulder City taken from an HMR-161 helicopter. Although the monsoon rains of July limited normal support missions, when weather conditions cooperated planes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing worked from morning to sundown unleashing tons of ordnance on Chinese positions seen just beyond the Marine sector of the line.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A173886





National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A173809

A Marine holds a wounded buddy onto an armored personnel carrier being brought to the 3d Battalion, 1st sector.

Battalion, 11th Marines, fired 3,886 rounds against Chinese troops attacking Outpost Esther, and hostile gunners matched this volume of fire. The Marines suffered 12 killed and 98 wounded in the fighting that began at Dagmar and continued at Esther, while Chinese casualties may have totaled 195 killed and 250 wounded.

Dawn on 26 July brought a lull in these last battles. Chinese attempts to revive their attack by infiltrating reinforcements through the site of Outpost Berlin failed, thanks to accurate fire from Marine riflemen and machine gunners. The 1st Marines completed its relief of the 7th Marines at 1330. That

night, the enemy probed Boulder City for the last time, sending a patrol from captured Outpost Berlin that failed to penetrate the defensive wire and shortly after midnight dispatching another platoon that prowled about before Marine fire repulsed it.

Although the last of the Chinese attacks seized Outposts Berlin and East Berlin, they failed to wrest Boulder City from its Marine defenders. Had the enemy captured Boulder City, he might have exploited it and seized the high ground to the south and east, from which he could have fired directly into the rear areas that sustained the 1st Marine Division in its posi-

tions beyond the Imjin River. In fighting the Chinese to a standstill during July 1953, the division suffered 1,611 casualties—killed, wounded, and missing—the most severe losses since October 1952 when savage fighting had raged at Outposts Carson, Reno, and Vegas, and on the Hook. Chinese losses during July 1953 may have exceeded 3,100.

The Final Patrols

During the last few nights of combat in July, Marines continued patrolling aggressively, even though a truce was fast approaching. *The Last Parallel*—a wartime

memoir by Martin Russ, a corporal in Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, in July 1953—describes an action that took place just before the truce, as the 1st Marines was taking over from the 7th Marines. A Lieutenant from Company A, 7th Marines, led a 30-man combat patrol, made up of men from Companies A of both regiments, that set out from Outpost Ava near midnight and

crossed a rice paddy on the way to raid Chinese positions on the Hill 104. A reconnaissance probe, which had preceded the raiding party, reported the presence of Chinese on the approaches to the objective.

The route to Hill 104 followed a trail flanked by waist-high rice, growth that not only impeded off-trail movement, but also might conceal a Chinese ambush. The

soft muck in which the rice thrived provided poor support for some types of mines, thus reducing one threat to the patrol, but moving through the paddy would have snapped the brittle rice stalks and created noise to alert any lurking ambush party. Balancing less noise against greater danger from mines, the Marines decided to follow the trail.

The patrol's point man, as he approached the far end of the rice paddy, found a trip wire stretched across the trail and followed it to a Russian-built, antipersonnel mine attached to a stick thrust deep into the mud and aimed to scatter deadly fragments low across the surface of the trail. The patrol halted, bunching up somewhat as the members tried to see why the lieutenant was moving forward to confer with the point man. At this moment, Chinese soldiers crouching hidden in the rice opened fire from as close as 50 feet to the Marines.

The fusillade wounded the patrol leader and within 10 seconds killed or wounded nine of the first 10 men in the patrol. Dragged into the paddy by members of the ambush party, the lieutenant disappeared until he surfaced in the exchange of prisoners after hostilities ended. The point man proved luckier, however, hurling himself to the ground as soon as he realized what was happening, finding cover beside the trail, and escaping injury. From the rear of the patrol, the other survivors fired at the muzzle flashes of the Chinese weapons. Marine firepower prevailed, silencing the enemy after five or so minutes, although not before six members of the patrol had been killed, 14 wounded, and the wounded lieutenant carried off as a prisoner. The survivors regrouped and moved forward, retrieving as many

Two members of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, quickly clean a semi-automatic M-1 carbine with grenade launcher after firing in support of a night patrol. A third Marine take a break in one of the sandbagged culverts, which provided overhead cover along the trenchline.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A173671





National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-625731

Flanked on the left by Gen Otto P. Weyland, USAF, commanding general of Far East Air Forces, and on the right by VAdm Robert P. Briscoe, Commander, Naval Forces Far East, and VAdm Joseph J. Clark, Seventh Fleet commander, Gen Mark W. Clarke, commander in chief of United Nations forces, countersigns the armistice agreement at Munsan-ni.

as they could of the dead and wounded. A half-dozen Marines covered the patrol's withdrawal, preventing the Chinese from encircling the group. When the men who had helped evacuate the wounded returned from the aid station and reinforced the firepower of the hastily formed screening force, the Chinese vanished into the night.

The Marines kept up their patrolling until the moment the truce took effect. On the night of 27 July, according to Martin Russ, his company sent out a patrol

scheduled to return shortly before the fighting would end at 2200. As the Marines prepared to move out, Chinese mortars fired on Outpost Ava, through which the patrol staged, and nearby portions of the main line of resistance. The bombardment wounded five members of the patrol and two of the Marines defending the outpost.

The patrol returned as planned, and at 2200, Russ, who was not a member, watched from the main line of resistance as white star clusters and colored flares cast a pulsating light that set the shadows

dancing in ravines and paddies and on hillsides, while the final shells fired in the 37-month war exploded harmlessly. As Russ described the scene:

A beautiful moon hung low in the sky like a Chinese lantern. Men appeared along the trench, some of them had shed their flak jackets and helmets. The first sound we heard was the sound of shrill voices.... The Chinese were singing. A hundred yards or so down the trench, someone



National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-626455

Marines take a well-deserved rest after word of the armistice is passed. Less than 24 hours after the signing of the armistice, Marine units began withdrawing from the Demilitarized Zone to their new battle positions.

was shouting the Marine Corps Hymn at the top of his lungs. Others joined in belting the words. All along the battle line, matches flared and cigarettes glowed, but no snipers peered through telescopic sights to fire at these targets. The war had ended.

After the Ceasefire

The ceasefire agreement, which was signed on the morning of 27 July and went into effect 12 hours later, required that both the United Nations forces and the Communist enemy withdraw from the most advanced positions held when the fighting ended. In effect, the abandoned area formed the trace of a Military Demarcation Line, as the opposing armies fell back 2,000 yards to organize new main battle positions, thus creating the 4,000-yard Demilitarized Zone between them. The Marines built as they destroyed, evacuating certain portions of the old main line of resistance, giving up some of its out-

posts, and dismantling fortifications simultaneously with their construction of the new line and its mutually supporting strongpoints.

A No-Fly Line supplemented the controls imposed by the Demilitarized Zone. Restrictions on the movement of aircraft applied throughout the Demilitarized Zone and in a corridor extending from the vicinity of Panmunjom to Kaesong. Only helicopters could fly beyond the No-Fly Line, provided they remained 500 yards from the Military Demarcation Line.

Establishing the Demilitarized Zone

The armistice document set a timetable for the creation of the Demilitarized Zone. Within 72 hours after the ceasefire went into effect, the combatants were to remove “all military forces, supplies, and equipment” and report the location of “demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards” capable of imped-

ing the safe movement of the organizations that would oversee the armistice—the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. For 45 days following the initial 72 hours, the parties to the ceasefire would salvage the materials still in the designated Demilitarized Zone, using only unarmed troops for the task. Meanwhile, during the 10 days after 27 July, Chinese or North Korean troops took over all offshore islands, east coast and west, that lay north of the 38th Parallel. The United Nations retained control of Taechong-do, Paengyong-do, Sochong-do, and Yongpyong-do, along with U-do, Tokchok-to, and Kangwha-do, all of them off the west coast and south of the demarcation line.

Since the agreement of July 27 called for a truce rather than peace—indeed, it sought to ensure a cessation of hostilities until “a final peaceful settlement is achieved”—the possibility existed that the fighting might resume. Despite the shower of flares and the singing that marked the moment the truce went into effect, some battle-tested Marines fully expected a Chinese attack in the hours after the ceasefire. As the skies lightened on the morning of 28 July, Chinese commanders obtained permission to recover the bodies of their men killed in the final assaults on Marine positions. The sight of “the enemy moving around within a stone’s throw of our front lines” underscored the possibility of renewed attacks, but nothing happened, and as the morning wore on, it became obvious that the truce was holding—at least for the present.

Like the Chinese, the Marines used the first morning of the ceasefire to recover the bodies of men killed in recent days. Most of the



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Following the armistice, the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, MajGen Randolph McC. Pate, his chief of staff, Col Lewis W. Walt, and the commanding officer of the 1st Marines, Col Wallace M. Nelson, survey the aftermath of the battle for Boulder City.

dead had fallen at Hill 111 and Boulder City. By the end of the day, all the bodies had been retrieved and were on the way to the rear.

In the three days immediately after the armistice took effect, some 50 companies of Marine infantry, both American and South Korean, began dismantling the old defenses, with the help of elements of the division's engineers. Working day and night—taking frequent breaks during the daytime heat, sleeping during the three hours after noon when the heat was most enervating, and using

portable lighting to take advantage of the comparative cool of the night—the Marines and the Korean service troops helping them removed supplies and ammunition, tore apart bunkers, and stacked the timbers for shipment to the new battle line. Some of the work parties treated the bunkers like trenches and filled them with earth, which then had to be shoveled out to provide access to the salvageable timbers.

Dismantling the old battle line required the removal of some structures on elements of both the combat outpost line and the main

line of resistance, while at the same time building the new main battle position and sealing off the Demilitarized Zone that the truce established between the contending armies. Some of the former Marine outposts like Bunker Hill, Esther, and Ava lay north of the Military Demarcation Line. As a result, the Marines could be sure of having access to them only during the 72 hours after the ceasefire began. Moreover, anything salvaged from Bunker Hill or nearby Outpost Hedy had to travel over a primitive road described as “particularly tortuous,” which made the

transfer "of first the ammunition and then the fortification materials a physical ordeal." Further complicating the dismantling of these distant outposts, a horde of reporters, photographers, and newsreel cameramen arrived, eager to record the activity of both the Marines and the Chinese soldiers who could be seen tearing down their own defenses on nearby ridgelines or hilltops.

Salvaging building materials proved to be hard work, whether tearing apart structures on the combat outpost line or on the main line of resistance. The picks, shovels, and steel pry bars available to the infantrymen could not remove timbers, measuring up to 12 inches square and secured by

spikes 10 to 24 inches long, that formed the skeleton of bunkers measuring perhaps 12 by 20 feet. Wherever possible bulldozers bore the brunt, but heavy trucks fitted with power winches and even tow trucks helped out, as did medium tanks, their guns removed so they could enter the demilitarized area. The Marines found that the fastest method of dismantling a bunker was to uncover it, winch it out of its hole, and bounce it down the hill it had guarded.

Once the bunker had been disassembled, the Marines manhandled the timbers onto vehicles, usually several two-and-one-half-ton trucks, although heavier vehicles saw service during the first 72 hours until the ban took effect on

disarmed tanks, tank retrievers, and other vehicles that fit the armistice agreement's imprecise definition of "military equipment." Fortunately, two-and-one-half-ton trucks could still be used over the next 45 days, although restricted to designated routes of access into the Demilitarized Zone.

As the dismantling of the abandoned defenses went ahead on schedule, the 1st Marine Division moved into its new positions, a transfer completed by the morning of 1 August. The main battle position, to the rear of the former line, consisted of a succession of strongpoints. From the division's right-hand boundary near the Samichon River, the new line formed a misshapen arc encom-

Marines begin the task of dismantling bunkers on the abandoned main line of resistance after the ceasefire went into effect on 27 July. Trenchlines were filled in, tank slots bull-

dozed under, and usable timber carried to salvage collection points.

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