

PART V  
THE UNRELENTING WAR IN CENTRAL  
AND SOUTHERN I CORPS,  
JULY-DECEMBER 1966



## CHAPTER 12

# The Struggle for An Hoa, Operation Macon

*The First Clash—The Operation Expands—Macon Continues—Macon Ends but Little Changes*

### *The First Clash*

Before Operations Hastings and Prairie diverted Marine forces from the southern TAORs, the three regiments at Da Nang, the 1st, 3d, and 9th Marines, in Operation Liberty,\* had reached the line of the Ky Lam and Thu Bon Rivers, 20 miles south of the airbase. Behind the advance of the infantry, the engineers followed and opened up new lines of communication. On 4 July, the 3d Engineer Battalion completed the first leg of a road, appropriately named "Liberty Road," which ran from the 9th Marines CP on Hill 55 south to Route 4, a distance of roughly 3,500 meters. During their southward push, the Marines forced the enemy *R-20 Doc Lap Battalion*, which had infiltrated north of the Thu Bon and Ky Lam during the spring political crisis, to withdraw again south of the two rivers.<sup>1</sup>

Unexpectedly, the Marines received excellent intelligence which accurately stated the *R-20's* location and intentions. On 1 July, a 28-year-old squad leader from the *1st Company, R-20 Battalion* surrendered in the 9th Marines sector. During interrogation, the prisoner revealed that his unit had retreated south of the Thu Bon when the Marines approached the river. He indicated that the mission of the enemy battalion was to prepare defensive positions and counter any Marine attempt to cross the Ky Lam-Thu Bon line. To secure their defenses, the enemy troops removed the civilian population and built fortifications. The prisoner told his interrogators that the *R-20* contained 300 main force troops and guerrillas, armed with rifles and 60mm and 81mm mortars. The prisoner implied that the morale of the battalion had suffered and that the troops were short of both food and ammunition.<sup>2</sup>

The 9th Marines confirmed some of this information from other sources. On 2 July, Captain George R. Griggs, the S-2 of the 9th Marines, received a report from I Corps, stating that a Viet Cong battalion was operating south of the Thu Bon reinforced by two local guerrilla companies. The I Corps report placed the strength of the battalion at 500 men, armed with five 12.7mm antiaircraft machine guns, three 81mm mortars, and an unspecified number of 57mm recoilless rifles, as well as individual weapons. This report also reinforced the impression that the enemy planned to contest any Marine advance south of the rivers. Marine tactical air observers from VMO-2 reported freshly dug trenches and fortifications in the area, more evidence that the Viet Cong were attempting to establish a stout defense of the An Hoa region.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the intelligence that the Marines had obtained of enemy plans, the Viet Cong initiated the action. On 4 July, the same day the Marines opened Liberty Road, two companies of the *R-20 Battalion*

*This picture presents an overview of the An Hoa industrial area, looking south toward the Que Son Mountains. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines base camp can be seen to the right of the buildings of the complex.*

Marine Corps Photo A187411



\*See Chapter 6 for a description of Operation Liberty.

moved west toward the Thu Bon River. The Viet Cong commander probably was aware that Marine units were operating in the area and took appropriate precautions. That afternoon, he established a three-sided ambush between the hamlets of My Loc (3) and My Loc (4), approximately 2,500 meters south of the river and three miles northeast of the An Hoa airstrip.

At this time, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, which continued to make An Hoa its base of operations since Operation Georgia in May,\* was involved in a routine search and clear mission in its sector. On 4 July, Company I had established a blocking position along the northwest fringe of the battalion's TAOR, the southern bank of the Thu Bon, while Company K advanced from the southeast. Company L was held at An Hoa as security for the airstrip and the battalion CP. Company M had been detached and was operating north of the Thu Bon during this period. Through the morning and early afternoon, the most unpleasant aspect of the operation was the oppressive heat.

The transition to battle was sudden and violent. Company K, pushing to the Thu Bon, entered the VC ambush position. At 1520, VC grenade launcher teams fired into the Marine column, knocking out one of the amphibian tractors supporting the company. Simultaneously, the rest of the ambush party opened up with mortars, machine guns, and small arms. The initial burst killed the crew chief of one of the LVTPs and two other Marines were wounded. Captain Valdis V. Pavlovskis, the company commander, reorganized his troops and ordered his men to close on the VC positions, at the same time reporting his situation to the battalion CP.

When he learned about the ambush of his company, Major George H. Grimes, who had assumed command of the battalion at the end of June, ordered Company I to protect the left flank of the engaged unit. Then he asked the regimental commander, Colonel Edwin H. Simmons, to provide helicopters to carry Company L from the airstrip to Hill 42, two kilometers south of My Loc (4). Grimes also asked for the return of Company M to battalion control. Upon the approval of both requests, MAG-16 received the mission to provide the helicopter support.




Marine Corps Photo A187566  
*LtCol Paul C. Trammell (left), the former commander of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, presents the battalion colors to the new battalion commander, Maj George H. Grimes, in a change of command ceremony at An Hoa during June 1966. Maj Grimes commanded the battalion during the first phase of Operation Macon in An Hoa.*

Company K's situation remained tenuous for the next two hours. Company I tried to move to support Company K, but also ran into heavy Viet Cong opposition. Captain Pavlovskis' company held on, taking every advantage of the cover afforded by the hedgerows and bamboo groves that separated the rice paddies. Seven more Marines were dead, another 14 were wounded, and another tractor was out of commission. Heavy enemy machine gun fire drove off evacuation helicopters. Although the Marines called for artillery fire, Battery F, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, in support of Grimes' battalion, could not fire. The enemy was too close.

When Company I finally reached Company K at 1730, the tide turned. The Viet Cong commander, realizing that he would be hemmed in by superior Marine forces, decided to abandon his ambush site. An aerial observer in a VMO-2 UH-1E spotted 200-250 VC moving northwest and called in airstrikes and artillery. Between 1800 and 1900, MAG-12 A-4s and MAG-11 F-4Bs struck the exposed enemy. In addition, Battery F fired 516 105mm rounds at the Viet Cong troops. Although the wing reported "50 VC KBA, confirmed, and 25 KBA probable," ground estimates of the strikes' effectiveness varied between 12 and 62 VC dead.<sup>4</sup>

As enemy resistance diminished, HMM-265's CH-46As were able to land to take out casualties. Two of the helicopters were hit by enemy antiaircraft fire and one crewman suffered minor injuries. The major

\*See Chapter 5 for a description of Operation Georgia.



action was over, but that night both Companies I and K were harassed by mortars and minor probes.

The Marines continued preparations to trap the elusive *R-20*. In accordance with Major Grimes' plan, MAG-16 helicopters lifted Company L from the An Hoa airstrip to Hill 42 shortly after 1800 and brought Company M back to An Hoa where it became the battalion reserve. At first light 5 July, Companies K and I resumed the offensive against the *R-20 Battalion*. Throughout the day, both Marine companies encountered light resistance.

Even though the intensity of the fire fights never reached that of the previous day, there were several sharp encounters. At 0840, Company K was fired on by a VC squad; one Marine was killed. Captain Pavlovskis requested artillery fire; 150 rounds from Battery F fell on the enemy positions. Marines counted 12 VC bodies. Shortly afterward, Company I, operating just to the west of Company K, observed an enemy platoon 1,500 meters to the northeast. Once again the Marines called in artillery. By midafternoon, Company L had joined the other two companies in the northwest sector of the An Hoa Basin and the search for the *Doc Lap Battalion* continued. By the end of the day, the Marine battalion reported that it had killed 17 more enemy and estimated another 20 to 30 "possibles."<sup>5</sup>

### *The Operation Expands*

During the afternoon of the 5th, General Walt changed the entire dimension of the operation. He believed that the Marines had the opportunity to eliminate the *R-20 Battalion*. The III MAF commander ordered the initiation of Operation Macon, which would involve five Marine battalions in addition to the South Vietnamese forces normally assigned to this sector.<sup>6</sup>

The writing of the Macon operation plan, like so many operations in Vietnam, was completed 24 hours after initial contact had been made. The 3d Marine Division did not publish its "frag" order until 1545 on the 5th, but its mission statement read: "Commencing 4 July 1966 3d MarDiv conducts multi-bn S&D opn in An Hoa area . . ."<sup>7</sup> It was not until the early hours of 6 July, that the 9th Marines, the regiment responsible for the operation, issued orders to its subordinate battalions.<sup>8</sup>

There were several reasons for the time lag be-

tween the issuance of the division and the regimental order. The major one was that the division directive was purposely vague, allowing the regimental commander to fill in the details. The regiment's mission was to destroy "enemy forces, facilities and influence."<sup>9</sup> Colonel Drew J. Barrett, Jr., newly arrived in Vietnam after graduating from the Army War College, became responsible for the operation when he assumed command of the 9th Marines from Colonel Simmons on 5 July. Barrett, a former battalion commander in Korea and veteran of Guadalcanal, immediately told his staff to determine the area of operations for each unit, and the helicopter landing zones within these areas, as well as landing times.

The concept of operations for Macon called for a three-phased operation. In the first phase, which had already begun with the ambush of Company K, Major Grimes' 3d Battalion would continue operations in the An Hoa northern sector, while the other two battalions of the 9th Marines established blocking positions north of the Thu Bon and Ky Lam Rivers. The second phase would consist of the helicopter lift of two battalions from the 3d Marines into two landing zones, one just east of the main north-south railroad and the other 4,000 meters to the southwest of the first. Grimes' battalion would then attack in a northeasterly direction toward the battalion positioned along the railroad. The third phase, if necessary, would be a one-battalion sweep in the area between the Ky Lam and Chiem Son Rivers, east of the main railroad line. General Walt expected the entire operation to end in 14 days, but the course of events extended Macon into the latter part of October.<sup>10</sup>

For all practical purposes, both the division and regimental orders changed very little for the battalions of the 9th Marines. Major Grimes' battalion continued Phase I operations in the An Hoa region, while Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Jones' 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and Lieutenant Colonel John J. Hess' 2d Battalion, 9th Marines conducted operations in their sector of the TAOR and assumed blocking positions north of the Thu Bon and Ky Lam Rivers.

The second phase of Macon began on the morning of 6 July as the 12th Marines fired over 500 rounds of landing zone preparation fire and MAG-12 A-4s strafed the LZs for 20 minutes. At 1000 that morning, 20 CH-46s from HMMs-164 and -265 began the lift of two companies from Lieutenant Colonel



Marine Corps Photo A187575

*Marine tanks and infantry deploy in Operation Macon. The tread marks of the tanks provide a foot path for the troops in the tall grass.*

Robert R. Dickey III's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines to Landing Zone Dixie, 1,500 meters south of the Ky Lam River and east of the railroad track. An hour later, the Marine helicopters completed the lift of two companies of the other battalion, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, into Landing Zone Savannah, southwest of Dixie. In that one hour, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert E. Mendenhall's HMM-265 and Lieutenant Colonel Warren C. Watson's HMM-164 had ferried over 650 troops into the battle area without incident.<sup>11</sup>

The only complication was a mixup in the flight schedule which resulted in a 30-minute delay in the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Earl "Pappy" R. DeLong, the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, and the rest of his command group. Two of his infantry companies were already in the objective area.<sup>12</sup> By noon, both battalions had reached their assigned blocking positions. Dickey's 1st Battalion established defenses along the north-south railroad track, while DeLong's 3d Battalion protected the approaches to the southern foothills.

As the two 3d Marines battalions sealed off the eastern and southern exits of the battlefield on the morning of the 6th, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines attacked from Route 537, its line of departure,

toward the northeast. The battalion was reinforced by tanks and amphibian tractors. On 7 July, six tanks and two LVTs crossed the Thu Bon and entered the operation, later joined by eight tanks, one tank retriever, five LVTP-5s and two LVTP-6s.<sup>13</sup> By 10 July, the infantry and mechanized units reached the lines of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines at the railroad. The second phase of Macon came to an end.

The VC had offered little resistance. The Marines encountered snipers, but no large VC force. Occasionally enemy gunners lobbed mortar rounds into Marine formations, but the anticipated large contact did not materialize. By the end of Phase II, the 9th Marines claimed to have killed 87 enemy, at the cost of eight Marines dead and 33 wounded.<sup>14</sup>

After consulting with General Kyle, on the afternoon of 10 July, Colonel Barrett issued orders to begin Phase III. The next morning, the 9th Marines commander ordered Dickey's battalion to attack east of the railroad together with the 51st ARVN Regiment, while Major Grimes' 3d Battalion, 9th Marines retraced its steps to the west from the railroad. At the same time, Colonel Barrett made some adjustment in his forces. One company and the command group from the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines were released from Macon and the other



Marine Corps Photo A193947  
*SSgt Charles W. Pierce, a tank section leader, scans the landscape in the An Hoa sector during Operation Macon. The M48 tank is armed with .50 caliber (pictured above) and .30 caliber machine guns and a 90mm gun.*



Marine Corps Photo A187262  
*During the sweep in Operation Macon, a Marine checks the identity card of a Vietnamese civilian. The women are using the traditional Vietnamese carrying poles with ropes attached at each end to balance their burdens.*

company was attached to Dickey's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines and the mechanized units also reinforced Lieutenant Colonel Dickey's unit.<sup>15</sup>

Phase III of Macon began shortly after 0600 on the 11th, when two companies of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines crossed the line of departure. From 11 to 14 July, the only significant encounter occurred in the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines area of operations west of the railroad tracks. A VC platoon mortared the battalion command post early on 12 July. At 0250 that morning, 40 to 60 mortar rounds and small arms fire hit in the CP area. Major Grimes called for an artillery mission on the suspected VC mortar site; no results could be observed. Three Marines were slightly wounded by the VC attack.

In the eastern sector of Macon, Lieutenant Colonel Dickey's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, supported by the tanks and LVTs, reached its objective, 7,000 meters east of the railroad on the afternoon of 13 July. The battalion commander summed up his unit's participation succinctly: "The results of this operation were negligible. . . . During a three-day sweep of the area no VC were encountered."<sup>16</sup>

At this point, it appeared to General Kyle that no large VC units were operating in the An Hoa area. On the afternoon of the 13th, he ordered Colonel Barrett to terminate Macon the next day and return

the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines to its parent organization.<sup>17</sup> Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was to return to its own battalion and accompany the armored column to the Thu Bon River. At 0800 14 July, Colonel Barrett reported that Operation Macon was over.

Suddenly, the situation changed. A Marine reconnaissance patrol, operating in the southern foothills, spotted 300-400 Viet Cong moving through a pass into an assembly area seven miles east of the An Hoa airstrip. The patrol called for both artillery and air support. Marine aircraft hit the enemy with napalm, rockets, and bombs, while four supporting artillery batteries fired 105mm, 8-inch, and 155mm shells into the area.\* This air and ground bombardment kill-

\*Over 30 artillery pieces supported Operation Macon during Phases II and III. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines; Battery D, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines; and Battery E, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines maintained firing positions north of the Thu Bon and were controlled by the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines Headquarters. These batteries were reinforced by a platoon of 155mm howitzers from Battery L, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines and a composite battery consisting of two self-propelled 155mm guns and two self-propelled 8-inch howitzers. Only Battery F, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines was located south of the Thu Bon and Ky Lam Rivers. The battery was positioned on the An Hoa airstrip itself. Through 1430 on 14 July, the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines had fired more than 8,500 rounds in support of Macon. 2d Battalion, 12th Marines ComdC, Jul66, p. 3.

ed at least 30 *R-20 Battalion* soldiers, once more frustrating that unit's attempt to move into the An Hoa region.<sup>18</sup>


### *Macon Continues*

Faced with the evident enemy presence in the southern foothills near An Hoa, Generals Walt and Kyle decided not to close out Operation Macon. The III MAF commander reported to General Westmoreland on 14 July that Macon would continue and later that evening General Kyle told the 9th Marines to disregard his previous order to terminate the operation.<sup>19</sup> He advised Colonel Barrett: "Operation in the An Hoa operating area outside presently established 3d MarDiv TAOR will continue to be named Operation Macon on an indefinite basis."<sup>20</sup> The next morning, Colonel Barrett ordered his 3d Battalion to continue operations in the An Hoa area.

The continuation of Macon did not disrupt the plans of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. The battalion

*A member of the South Vietnamese Regional Forces, right, identifies a prisoner captured during Macon as a Viet Cong. The Marines are from the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines.*

Marine Corps Photo A187257



Marine Corps Photo A187258

*A Vietnamese woman tries to comfort her seriously wounded husband as he waits evacuation to a hospital. The Viet Cong had mortared their village.*

had intended to keep its command post at the An Hoa airstrip and conduct clearing operations to support the engineers who had started the extension of Liberty Road beyond the Thu Bon. In fact, at this time, the engineers were working on two extensions of the road, one leading south from Route 4 to the Thu Bon, while the other led north from An Hoa to the river. Macon was reduced to a one-battalion search and clear operation with the missions of keeping the lines of communication open in the An Hoa region and providing security for both the Marine engineers and civilian construction workers.<sup>21</sup>

Interest in the An Hoa region and the extension of the road was not confined to the Marine command. During one of his periodic visits to III MAF, General Westmoreland toured An Hoa in the latter part of July and specifically asked Colonel Barrett what forces were necessary to secure Liberty Road. The Marine colonel replied "We intend to secure it by using the forces we are now using, elements of two Marine companies and part of the 2d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment on the south side . . . of the river."<sup>22</sup>

Although the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was operating primarily against the guerrilla forces remaining in the An Hoa region during this phase of



Marine Corps Photo A187782

*Marine engineers work on the extension of Liberty Road to An Hoa. The troops are laying down abutments for a pontoon ferry which will link An Hoa to Da Nang.*

*The Viet Cong had skillfully hidden grenades in the rice vat pictured below. The opening of the vat had been covered by the simple "trap door" held above.*

Marine Corps Photo A187530



Macon, it continued to be alert to the possibility of enemy main force unit infiltration. Local South Vietnamese authorities indicated that two enemy battalions, neither identified as the *R-20 Battalion*, were in the rugged hills south of An Hoa. One of the battalions was reputed to be North Vietnamese.<sup>23</sup> Throughout the remainder of July and August, Marine reconnaissance patrols spotted small groups of enemy soldiers in the mountainous terrain.

Nevertheless, through August, contact with the enemy in Operation Macon was only sporadic and few enemy units of any size were engaged. Indeed the major action for the 3d Battalion occurred outside of the Macon area of operations in support of a Navy detachment conducting a hydrographic survey of the Thu Bon River. On the morning of 20 August, the battalion with two of its own companies and a company from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines reinforced by tanks and amphibian tractors crossed the river onto the peninsula formed by the Vu Gia and Thu Bon Rivers—the so-called "Arizona Territory" where Operation Mallard had taken place earlier.\*

Shortly after noon, the battalion encountered about 100 VC from the *R-20 Battalion* in the hamlets of Giang Hoa (2) and Phu Long (1) and (2) on the western banks of the Thu Bon. Unwilling to stand up to the Marines who were supported by air and artillery, the VC fought a series of delaying actions and made good their escape to the west and north. The Marines sustained casualties of five dead

\*See Chapter 3.

and 16 wounded while killing at least 10 of the enemy. Most of the Marine casualties were a result of enemy mines. With the completion of the survey, the 3d Battalion returned to its An Hoa base that evening.<sup>24</sup>

In Operation Macon during the month, the battalion confined its activities to ambushes, patrols, and outpost operations along Liberty Road while the VC attempted to disrupt its construction. On three occasions, the Marines caught enemy troops in the open. Enemy mining incidents and ambushes increased markedly during this period, but progress on the road continued. Major Fred D. MacLean, Jr., who relieved Major Grimes at the beginning of the month, later remembered that on 27 August, "the first convoy from Da Nang rolled into An Hoa using the completed Liberty Road."<sup>25</sup>

Macon remained at a low level of activity until 3 September when the 3d Battalion once more met its old adversary, the *R-20 Battalion*. Shortly after 1200, a platoon from Company I encountered a VC company near Cu Ban (1) on the Thu Bon River. In a fire fight that lasted nearly two hours, the Marine platoon

sustained 15 casualties including five dead. Although the Viet Cong unit escaped to the east, it left behind 32 bodies.

This action was not to be an isolated incident. On 5 September, the 3d Company, 2d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment and Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines engaged the rest of the *R-20 Battalion* along Route 537, two kilometers southeast of the site of the fighting on the 3d. Both the American and South Vietnamese companies had just left blocking positions from which they supported a clearing operation by other elements of the Vietnamese battalion. Both Company K and the Vietnamese 3d Company were moving west along the road when enemy troops in sites paralleling the highway opened fire on the ARVN company. The Marines tried to assist the South Vietnamese, but soon were unable to maneuver. Battery D, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, north of the Thu Bon, fired at the enemy positions. Major MacLean ordered Company I to attack southeast from its outpost at Phu Lac (6) to pinch the VC between it and the two engaged companies. Apparently the VC expected the American reaction. No

*The first convoy using the completed Liberty Road rolls into An Hoa on 27 August 1966. The 6x6 Marine truck, carrying C-Rations, passes an honor guard and a reviewing stand during a ceremony marking the occasion.*

Marine Corps Photo A187862



sooner had Company I advanced when enemy gunners, firing a 57mm recoilless rifle, disabled an Ontos supporting the company. By 1130, both Marine companies and the ARVN unit were heavily engaged.

Major MacLean requested more support, both artillery and air. Battery D responded with 158 rounds and was rewarded with "excellent effect on target."<sup>26</sup> At 1330, Marine planes appeared and repeatedly struck the enemy forces, but the VC fought back stubbornly. Marine 8-inch howitzers and 155mm guns reinforced the fires of Battery D and Marine air again bombed and strafed the enemy.

Slowly the Marine and ARVN companies gripped the VC between them in a pincer movement, but Companies I and K were not able to link up and surround the enemy before nightfall. At dawn the next morning, the three allied companies moved forward once more. To no one's surprise, the VC were gone. The Marines did find 29 enemy dead, and surmised that the VC had suffered so many casualties that they had been forced to abandon the bodies.<sup>27</sup> The allied forces were also hit hard: the Marine companies suffered three dead and 83 wounded, and the ARVN unit reported 25 wounded.<sup>28</sup> The 9th Marines intelligence section concluded that the heavy contacts of 3 and 5 September lent "substance to the belief that the area south of the Song Thu Bon is considered by the Viet Cong to be one in which they may still operate in major unit strength, though with increasingly less impunity."<sup>29</sup>

This flareup of action in the first part of September was the last significant engagement during Macon. During the rest of the month, the Marines continued to encounter Viet Cong units of

squad size or less, but always at a distance. After an initial exchange of fire, the enemy troops would break contact and elude Marine pursuit. The Marine battalion reported that the total number of incidents and friendly casualties for September decreased, although enemy mining and boobytrap activity remained the same.<sup>30</sup>

### *Macon Ends but Little Changes*

In October, Operation Macon finally came to an end. During the month, the Viet Cong guerrillas continued to probe Popular Force and Regional Force outposts near the Marine positions, but Marine contact with enemy forces declined significantly. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines encountered no major Viet Cong main force unit. On 27 October, General Walt authorized the termination of the operation and at noon the next day, Macon came to a close, 117 days after it had started. During this period, the Marines had killed about 380 of the enemy, while suffering 196 casualties, 24 of whom were killed.<sup>31</sup>

The ending of the operation had very little meaning for the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Although the 3d Marine Division moved north on 10 October, the 9th Marines remained behind and the 3d Battalion continued to operate in the An Hoa region, even after Macon had officially ended. Major MacLean's battalion provided security for Liberty Road, protected the river crossing, and assisted the South Vietnamese. Behind the Marine infantry, engineers and Seabees entered An Hoa and joined with the Vietnamese to finish construction of the industrial complex.

## CHAPTER 13

# The Continuing War

*Operations Washington and Colorado—The September Election—The Marine TAORs, July-December 1966*

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### *Operations Washington and Colorado*

In the less densely populated sector of the 1st Marine Division at Chu Lai, the Marine command continued to concentrate its efforts on the elimination of the Viet Cong-North Vietnamese main force military structure in southern I Corps. During the early summer, General Fields and his staff completed their preparations for the much postponed campaign in the Do Xa region, the suspected location of the enemy *Military Region V Headquarters*.<sup>\*</sup> With the close out of Operation Kansas at the end of June, on 4 July Fields informed III MAF that he was prepared to carry out the operation, codenamed Washington, in the Do Xa. According to the 1st Division plan, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was to make an extensive reconnaissance of the Do Xa, with the capability of calling in air and artillery on appropriate targets of opportunity. If the reconnaissance Marines determined a large enemy presence in the Do Xa, a two-battalion Marine strike force at Chu Lai stood ready to exploit the intelligence. Thus, Fields planned to use the same tactics that had worked so well earlier in Operation Kansas—first, reconnaissance and then, exploitation.<sup>1</sup>

General Walt agreed to the operation and obtained the necessary concurrences from MACV and the South Vietnamese I Corps command. Westmoreland readily approved the concept and later exclaimed to Admiral Sharp that the enemy could not feel safe in any of his base areas.<sup>2</sup> The South Vietnamese were less exuberant. In his concurring letter, which was

dated 6 July and arrived after the operation already had begun, the I Corps Chief of Staff saw no difficulty with the operation, but requested that the Marines coordinate their activities very closely with the 2d ARVN Division “in order to avoid mistakes.”<sup>3</sup>

On the morning of 6 July, Marine helicopters transported Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Sullivan, commander of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, together with his command group and Company A, to the district town of Hau Duc in the northern fringes of the Do Xa sector, some 30 miles west of Chu Lai. With the establishment of the base camp for the operation, Marine CH-46s brought into Hau Duc the following morning two 105mm howitzers from Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines to provide artillery support. Another 105mm platoon from


*A Marine reconnaissance team scrambles out of a CH-46 helicopter on a mission. The reconnaissance teams usually remained within artillery range and called in artillery and air on unsuspecting enemy. These “Stingray” tactics were used successively in Operations Kansas, Hastings, and in early July during Operation Washington in the enemy Do Xa base area, west of Chu Lai.*

Marine Corps Photo A421476



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<sup>\*</sup>See Chapter 8 for the discussion of the planning relative to an operation in the Do Xa and for a description of Operation Kansas, which caused the last postponement of a Do Xa operation.



Battery D, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, located since Operation Kansas at the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp 17 miles to the north, was in position to reinforce the fires from Hau Doc.<sup>4</sup>

For the next eight days, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion with three of its companies and reinforced by a platoon from the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company ranged over a 280-square-mile area of the Do Xa. Despite the rugged mountainous terrain and the paucity of landing zones, all of the patrol insertions with one exception were by helicopter, with the pilots faking two insertions for every one made. When beyond the range of the supporting artillery, the reconnaissance Marines were able to call in close air support through the use of an airborne radio relay in a C-117 dedicated to the operation. All told, in 46 sightings, the reconnaissance patrols observed 201 VC. As a result of ground combat and supporting arms fire, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion accounted for 13 VC KIA and four prisoners. The most significant encounter occurred on 10 July when a patrol from the 1st Force Recon Company platoon ambushed a group of VC below the Song Tranh, about 10,000 meters west of Hau Duc. Of the nine VC caught in the ambush, the Marines killed two, captured four (two men and two women) while the remaining three escaped. The prisoners, apparently couriers, had documents on them relating to the Communist organization in Quang Tin Province.<sup>5</sup>

With relatively few sightings of organized enemy forces, the 1st Division ended Operation Washington on 14 July without inserting any infantry units into the operations area. Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan, the reconnaissance battalion commander, believed that his unit had disrupted the enemy lines of communication.<sup>6</sup> General Fields, however, was dubious about the importance of the Do Xa region. He stated at a commander's conference that as a result of Operation Washington, "We found that there is nothing big in there [the Do Xa]."<sup>7</sup>

At this point, the 1st Marine Division again became concerned about the 2d (620th) NVA Division which had once more penetrated the strategic Que Son Valley along the Quang Nam and Quang Tin border. Intelligence sources in mid-July reported that the enemy division, which during Operation Kansas had retreated into the mountains north and southwest of Hiep Duc, was once more on the move.

Its 3d NVA Regiment, part of which had engaged



Marine Corps Photo A369470

*A Marine from Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines finishes a cigarette while he waits in an assembly point for the beginning of Operation Colorado. Colorado, in August 1966, was a combined operation in the Que Son Valley, the scene of previous Marine large operations in 1966, Operations Double Eagle II and Kansas, and Operation Harvest Moon in December 1965.*

Sergeant Howard's platoon in the fight for Nui Vu,\* had departed its mountain bastion south of An Hoa and advanced southeast toward the coastal plain. The 21st NVA was believed to be near the district town of Que Son, while the division's remaining regiment, the 1st VC, was positioned somewhere between Que Son and Thang Binh, a village 20 kilometers north of Tam Ky on Route 1.<sup>8</sup>

As early as 18 July, General Fields informed III MAF that he wanted to exploit this intelligence with a multibattalion operation in the Que Son region. On 30 July, the 1st Division commander issued his planning directive to Colonel Charles F. Widdecke,

\*See Chapter 8 for a description of the Nui Vu battle and for a general description of the Que Son area.



Marine Corps Photo A421305  
*LtCol McDonald D. Tweed, Commanding Officer, HMM-361, briefs his pilots prior to the helicopter lift of the 5th Marines into Operation Colorado. Marine helicopters ferried some 3,000 allied troops into the objective area on D-Day for the operation, 6 August 1966.*

the 5th Marines commanding officer, for a search and destroy operation in the Hiep Duc-Song Ly Ly Valleys coordinated with the South Vietnamese 2d ARVN Division.<sup>9</sup> The date for the beginning of the operation was contingent upon the end of Operation Hastings in the DMZ sector.<sup>10</sup> While Colonel Widdecke and his staff worked on the plans, General Fields met on 2 August with General Walt, who decided that the reduction of Marine forces in the DMZ would allow the operation to begin in three or four days. By 4 August, the Marine and ARVN commands had completed their arrangements and issued their implementing orders.<sup>11</sup>

Colorado/Lien Ket-52 was to be a combined operation in which Colonel Widdecke's 5th Marines and the 2d ARVN Division were to locate and destroy the *2d NVA Division*. The command posts of the Marines and ARVN were to be collocated at Tam Ky.\* An ARVN task force, consisting of the 6th ARVN Regimental Headquarters with its 2d and 4th Battalions, reinforced by the 2d and 3d Armored

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\*Brigadier General William A. Stiles recalled that although the 5th Marines in fact controlled the operation, his Task Force X-Ray Headquarters deployed to the field during Colorado and was collocated at Tam Ky. BGen William A. Stiles, Comments on draft MS, dtd 15May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

Personnel Carrier (APC) Troops of the 4th ARVN Armored Cavalry, was to cross the line of departure near Thang Binh on the morning of 6 August and attack in a southwesterly direction toward Que Son. Southwest of Que Son, a task force of three South Vietnamese Marine battalions was to establish blocking positions to support the western thrust of the 2d ARVN Division task force.

While the Vietnamese mounted their operations north of the road, MAG-36 helicopters were to lift a company from Lieutenant Colonel Walter Moore's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines into a landing zone southwest of Hiep Duc. If Moore's troops made contact, the rest of the battalion was to reinforce the initial landing party and exploit the opportunity. If there was no contact, the helicopters were to shuttle the 2d Battalion into new positions, 1,000 meters east of Hiep Duc and repeat the process. The plan required Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. Coffman's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines to reinforce Moore's battalion if necessary, and, if not, to enter the operation on the next day in an area eight miles due south of Que Son. Both Marine battalions were to use the same tactics—search an area, engage the enemy if possible, and if not move on to another objective, either on foot or by helicopter. Colonel Widdecke's 3d Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Bronars, was to remain in reserve, providing security for the proposed artillery positions, just below the Thang Binh-Hiep Duc Road and 2,000 meters west of the railroad. As the operation developed, the battalion was to move southwest to form blocking positions for the southern portion of the Colorado area.<sup>12</sup> Each of the 5th Marines' battalions left one infantry company behind in the Chu Lai TAOR as part of the defense force there.

A large array of allied supporting arms was prepared to back up this offensive by the 5th Marines and 2d ARVN Division. Three destroyers and a cruiser were offshore ready to engage. The U.S. Air Force provided two B-52 Arc Light strikes on 6 and 7 August against targets in the mountains south of the Colorado area where intelligence agencies believed there was a large enemy base and assembly area. Both the South Vietnamese and the Marines furnished artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Joe B. Stribling's 2d Battalion, 11th Marines was in direct support of the 5th Marines with 30 tubes, ranging from 4.2-inch mortars to 8-inch howitzers. At the same time, the wing commander, Major



General Louis B. Robertshaw, ordered both Colonel Richard M. Hunt, the commanding officer of MAG-16, and Colonel William G. Johnson, the commanding officer of MAG-36, to make available for the operation all helicopters that could be spared. Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Zitnik, the S-3 of MAG-36, was in the 5th Marines' operations center at Tam Ky to assist in coordinating the helicopters and the infantry.

On D-Day, 6 August, both helicopter groups ferried 3,000 allied troops into the battle area while MAG-11 and -12 aircraft made landing zone preparatory strikes and provided air support. Marine F-4s, F-8s, and A-4s flew more than 80 sorties on the first day of the operation expending more than 30 tons of bombs, 8.5 tons of napalm, 924 rockets, and 4,500 20mm rounds. In addition to bringing in the infantry, III MAF helicopters carried more than 50 tons of cargo to supply the ground troops.<sup>13</sup>

The only significant action on the first day occurred in the South Vietnamese Marine sector of the battlefield. All three of the Vietnamese Marine battalions encountered heavy rifle fire when they arrived in the landing zones west of Que Son. During the first few hours of 6 August, the South Vietnamese killed 50 enemy and took 20 prisoners. All of the prisoners were from a signal company attached to the *1st Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment*, apparently the rear guard covering the retreat of the rest of the regiment. The South Vietnamese Marines pursued the enemy unit in a northwesterly direction, but contact was lost toward evening. The Vietnamese Marine commander believed that the NVA force had established defenses near the hamlet of Thach Thu'ong (3), close to a small ridgeline 1,000 meters

north of the Ly Ly River. The Vietnamese Marines planned to press the attack the next morning. During the first day's action, the South Vietnamese killed 71 enemy troops at a cost of three killed and 23 wounded. One of the wounded was Captain Cornelius H. Ram, the senior U.S. Marine advisor to the 1st Vietnamese Marine Battalion.<sup>14</sup>

On 7 August, the South Vietnamese waited for U.S. Marine aircraft to pound the enemy positions in Thach Thu'ong (3), before attacking, but the weather favored the entrenched NVA. The entire battle during that day was fought in a driving rainstorm, and because of poor visibility, airstrikes could not take place until 1330 that afternoon. Even then they had only a limited effect on the enemy's defenses. Following the air attack, the Marines tried a frontal assault against Thach Thu'ong (3). The troops had to cross 400-500 meters of flooded paddy land against heavy fire. After two unsuccessful attempts, the South Vietnamese Marine battalions pulled back to their former positions and called for more air and artillery support. Despite the poor visibility, although the rain had stopped, Marine planes, directed by U.S. advisors on the ground, continued to bomb the enemy positions. Artillery and air blasted the enemy-held hamlet throughout the night and into the morning. At 0930 8 August, the Vietnamese Marines once more attacked, still under the canopy of supporting arms. This time, the South Vietnamese met no opposition; the enemy had retreated. When the South Vietnamese entered Thach Thu'ong (3), they found a trench containing the bodies of seven enemy soldiers, while another ditch held the jumbled remains of 30 more.<sup>15</sup> Throughout 8 and 9 August, the South Vietnamese

*A Marine UH-34 lifts off while troops from the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines deploy under cover of smoke during Colorado. The battalion encountered little opposition during the first days of the operation.*

Marine Corps Photo A369410





Marine Corps Photo A371290

*The 5th Marines have established their command post for Operation Colorado on the well-manicured lawn of the Tam Ky District Headquarters. At the request of the South Vietnamese authorities, the Marines had not dug individual holes, but the orders were changed after enemy gunners attacked the CP with recoilless rifle fire and mortars.*

continued to search for the NVA, but without success.

During the first three days of Operation Colorado, the 5th Marines encountered little resistance. Lieutenant Colonel Moore's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines explored the southwestern portion of the Colorado TAOR near Hiep Duc during 6 and 7 August and made no contact. On 8 August, the battalion returned to Tam Ky to provide security for the regimental CP,\* still without meeting any sizeable Viet Cong or NVA force. The next day, the battalion was helilifted into landing zones in the western portion of the Ly Ly River Valley with the mission of cutting off the retreat of the enemy unit which had engaged the Vietnamese Marines. This effort proved futile; on 10 August the battalion returned to Tam Ky.

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\*Colonel Zitnik, who was the air coordinator for the operation, recalled that after the battalion returned to Tam Ky, enemy gunners attacked the CP with recoilless rifle fire and mortars and then made good their escape. Zitnik remembered that the local government headquarters at Tam Ky was "considered safe" and that the Marines at the request of the South Vietnamese had not dug individual bunkers "in the relatively nice lawns." According to Zitnik, "the headquarters grounds took on a new appearance" the following morning. The Marines suffered only a few minor casualties and none of the helicopters were damaged since they had returned to Ky Ha for the night. Col Robert J. Zitnik, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

Lieutenant Colonel Coffman's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines had operated with the same lack of success in its portion of the TAOR east of Que Son and west of Route 1. Coffman's companies had conducted search and destroy missions throughout the area. On the morning of 10 August, he consolidated his battalion near Dai Dong, just south of the Nha Ngu River, approximately six miles west of the railroad. Coffman's objective for the day was the large hamlet of Thon Hai (3), astride the railroad.

As the battalion's three companies moved out in column at 0830, they began to encounter opposition. At first, the enemy used only long-range rifle fire. The Marines answered with their own small arms. At 1100, the battalion arrived at Ky Phu hamlet, the scene of a heavy battle the previous year during Operation Harvest Moon. Lieutenant Colonel Coffman halted the battalion. He discussed the situation with his company commanders and

*Col Charles F. Widdecke, Commanding Officer, 5th Marines (center), discusses the situation with LtCol Harold L. Coffman, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (left), and an unidentified officer in the hamlet of Ky Phu, the scene of heavy fighting in previous operations. The Viet Cong influence is obvious as indicated by the scrawled warning on the wall to U.S. troops.*

Marine Corps Photo A369451





Marine Corps Photo A372957

*Marines of Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines take cover near the hamlet of Cam Khe as they come under enemy automatic fire. The company finally cleared a North Vietnamese trenchline and organized resistance ended.*

*A Marine from the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines leaps across a break in a dike in the flooded rice paddies during Colorado. Some of the heaviest fighting in the operation occurred during a driving rainstorm.*

Marine Corps Photo A369409



ordered them to respond more selectively to enemy harassment. Colonel Widdecke arrived for a short conference and directed Coffman to continue his advance. At 1400, the battalion resumed its march to the east.<sup>16</sup>

Dark clouds massed overhead as the afternoon wore on and soon the Marines were plodding through a heavy rainstorm. Shortly after 1500 the Marines reached the small hamlet of Cam Khe, 1,000 meters northeast of Ky Phu. As Company A pushed through the outskirts of the hamlet, the Marines spotted 30 NVA running across a paddy. In a quick burst of fire, the Marines cut down the enemy force in the open field. Another body of NVA troops took the Marines under fire. All three Marine companies found themselves heavily engaged at close quarters. Armed Hueys from VMO-6 were overhead, but were unable to see, much less provide covering fire for fear of hitting friendly troops. The rain finally stopped at 1730 and the sky cleared, allowing the Hueys and jets to strike. While the armed helicopters provided suppressive fire, two MAG-12 A-4s eliminated two NVA heavy machine guns. Shortly afterward, Company C cleared a trench line of NVA and organized resistance ceased. By nightfall, the enemy had broken contact and the Marines had organized their defenses. Taking no chances, artillery, naval gunfire, and aircraft provided a curtain of fire around the battalion's positions throughout the night.

The next morning, 11 August, the Marines

surveyed the results of the previous day's battle. Although suffering 14 dead and 65 wounded, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines had killed more than 100 North Vietnamese. Among the enemy dead was a company commander whose body yielded several documents. The Marines learned that they had engaged two battalions of the *3d NVA Regiment*. The Marine battalion continued to patrol the previous day's battlefield, but was met by only occasional snipers. The only surprise occurred that afternoon when General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in Vietnam on an inspection tour, visited the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines' sector. He spoke to 1st Lieutenant Marshall B. (Buck) Darling, the commanding officer of Company C, and asked him about the action of 10 August: "Well, General," Darling replied, "we got into a fight with the enemy." The Commandant then asked what he did. "General," he said "we killed them."<sup>17</sup>

But the Marines had not killed all of the enemy. After the heavy fighting on the 10th, the North Vietnamese battalions retreated to the north where they engaged the South Vietnamese Marines three days later. The Vietnamese Marine task force, supported by ARVN APC units, was attacking to the east toward Thang Binh when the North Vietnamese struck just north of the village of Vinh Huy, four miles west of the railroad and nine miles northwest of Cam Khe where Coffman's battalion had met the enemy. At least two NVA battalions contested the Vietnamese Marine advance. The action, which began at 1030 on 13 August, continued through the afternoon. During that time, 1st MAW aircraft flew more than 50 sorties in support of the South Vietnamese units. After the air strikes, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas T. Kane, senior advisor to the Marine task force, noted a marked decrease in enemy fire.<sup>18</sup> Still, the issue was in doubt.

At 1600, the 6th ARVN regimental commander ordered one of his APC troops, reinforced by infantry, to attack the flank of the enemy to relieve the pressure on the Vietnamese Marine battalions. The armored personnel carrier attack had mixed results. Opening up with a furious fusillade from their .50 caliber machine guns, the personnel carriers not only took the enemy under fire but also the Marine battalions. Lieutenant Colonel Kane radioed the U.S. Army advisor with the ARVN regiment and told him about the problem, asking him to try to redirect the



Marine Corps Photo A801848  
*Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, discusses the fighting in Cam Khe with LtCol Coffman, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (right), and 1stLt Marshall B. "Buck" Darling, Commanding Officer, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (center). Lt Darling told the Commandant, "General, we killed them."*

attack of the APCs. The Army advisor replied that the APCs could not be controlled. Kane then asked the advisor to tell the APCs to cease fire, but received the reply "that they . . . only ceased fire . . . when they were out of ammunition."<sup>19</sup> One hour and 50,000 rounds later, the armored personnel carrier assault ended, but not before a number of Marines were casualties. At dusk, the Vietnamese Marine task force commander ordered his battalions to dig in for the night and evacuate the dead and wounded. The Vietnamese Marines lost 26 killed and 54 wounded as a result of this day's action.

On the morning of 14 August, one Vietnamese Marine battalion and the APC troop swept the battle area; the enemy was no longer there, but had left behind 140 of its dead. For the South Vietnamese, this was the last major engagement in Colorado/Lien Ket-52. The Vietnamese Marines ended the Vietnamese portion of the operation when they arrived at Thang Binh that evening.

The U.S. Marines finished Colorado/Lien Ket-52 seven days later. After the heavy action of 10 August, the 5th Marines encountered little opposition. On 12 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines moved to the eastern portion of the Colorado area and conducted a search and destroy mission in the



Marine Corps Photo A369453

*Marines move through typical Vietnamese village during Operation Colorado. The villagers are nowhere to be seen, either having taken refuge in their shelters, or having fled the hamlet altogether.*

“Pineapple Forest,” so named because of its shape on tactical maps. “The Pineapple Forest,” southeast of Ky Phu and Cam Khe, is studded with low lying hills, interspersed by rice paddies and hamlets. The battalion found a large rice cache, but encountered only fleeting resistance from local guerrillas. Before ending their mission in the “forest,” the Marines moved most of the civilian population to more secure areas. In the meantime, on the 13th, Lieutenant Colonel Moore’s 2d Battalion established blocking positions southwest of the Vietnamese Marines when they made contact with the enemy. The North Vietnamese remained far afield from the 2d Battalion and the situation was, “perimeter alert and secure; night ambushes being sent in; no enemy contact.”<sup>20</sup> Moore’s battalion returned to Tam Ky on 15 August and all battalions of the 5th Marines began displacing to the Chu Lai TAOR three days later. Colorado officially ended on 22 August.

Although Colorado/Lien Ket-52 had succeeded in driving the *NVA 2d Division* out of the Que Son

Valley temporarily, the allies only accomplished half of their task. Colorado was supposed to be the first of a series of operations to bring the entire Hiep Duc-Que Son area under the blanket of III MAF security. Because of the increasing commitment of Marine forces near the DMZ after August, General Walt’s plans for pacifying the valley at this time were preempted. In fact, it was not to be until April 1967 that the Marines once more entered the region in force.

### *The September Election*

Despite the North Vietnamese incursion into the DMZ during the fall of 1966, the South Vietnamese were still able to take the first steps toward representative government and attempt to redeem the promises of the Honolulu Conference. On 11 September, a nationwide election selected delegates

to form a Constituent Assembly and draw up a new constitution for the nation.

The decision to hold an election in Vietnam during this period was a precarious undertaking, especially in I Corps. Memories of the spring "Struggle Movement" which had so disrupted the cities of Da Nang and Hue only a few months before were still fresh. Certain Buddhist leaders who had been in the forefront of the opposition asked the people to boycott the election. There was no doubt that the VC also would try to disrupt the electoral process. The fact that the North Vietnamese had drawn several Marine units away from the populated regions into the DMZ area complicated the situation. It was expected that the VC would attempt to exploit any void in local security caused by the departure of Marine units. Considering all of these handicaps, the electoral turnout in I Corps was surprising. Approximately 87 percent of the 900,000 eligible voters, who lived in relatively secure areas where government control existed at least during daylight, voted, compared to 81 percent eligible voter participation in the country at large. In the cities of Hue and Da Nang, voter participation percentages were 81 and 85 respectively.

The success of the electoral process in I Corps was partially attributable to the close cooperation and careful preparation on the part of the Marines, the U.S. civilian advisory organization, and the Vietnamese authorities. As early as July, the Marines noted an increasing awareness of the election among the people. Even in remote areas of Quang Nam Province, the government had distributed posters and banners announcing the election.<sup>21</sup> While the Vietnamese were responsible for conducting the elections and providing security for the polling places, American troops were to see that the enemy was unable to take advantage of the situation.

On 26 August, General Walt established the policy that his forces were to follow during the election. He told his subordinate commanders that they should avoid any semblance of interference in the electoral process. American troops were to stay away from the immediate vicinity of polling places and populated areas. The general observed that the South Vietnamese Army was to stand down from major operations during the electoral period and assume responsibility for protecting the election. Each Marine regiment was to maintain one battalion command group and three rifle companies on an



Marine Corps Historical Collection  
*Vietnamese citizens obtain voting identification cards for the 11 September 1966 election in a voter registration office. Approximately 87 percent of the 900,000 eligible voters in I Corps went to the polls on election day.*

alert status to assist the Vietnamese in the event the VC attacked. Although no large Marine units were to remain in the populated areas, Marine helicopters were to provide aerial surveillance of the III MAF TAOR. In addition, Marine artillery was to increase its harassment and interdiction of suspected enemy lines of communications and at the same time be prepared to support the Vietnamese Army. Most importantly, the Marine infantry battalions were to conduct large screening operations to prevent VC or NVA main force units from entering the populated areas. It was expected that the widely dispersed ARVN forces would be able to handle the local guerrillas.<sup>22</sup>

General Walt was seriously concerned about the VC threats to dismantle the electoral process. In its August report, the Marine command noted that the VC had initiated an all-out propaganda and extortion campaign to prevent the election.<sup>23</sup> The 9th Marines reported that the VC had tasked local cadre and guerrilla forces with most of the operations to counter the government election. Colonel Barrett, the regimental commander, was unable to determine any specific mission for larger enemy formations, but was sure "they will be employed to exploit any opportunity where a larger force is required to

disrupt the election."<sup>24</sup> The Marines were determined that this opportunity would not arise.

During the period 1-11 September, General Walt put nine battalions in the field to conduct search and destroy operations away from the populated areas. The purpose of these operations was to keep the large enemy units off balance and away from the people. They were successful. Although there were 34 Viet Cong incidents on the day of the election in I Corps, no large enemy unit broke through the Marine screen. Most of the enemy incidents were isolated attacks. For example, the 1st Marines reported that two polling areas in its TAOR were hit by mortar fire, three rounds falling on each of the sites, but causing only minor disruption.<sup>25</sup>

Perhaps Colonel Barrett offered the best explanation for the Communist failure to stop the election when he declared:

It is felt that the Viet Cong had never intended to conduct an extensive antielection campaign of a military nature since he did not possess sufficient resources to overcome the preventive measures initiated by the GVN, but rather he hoped that through propaganda against the election and threat of violence against those who participated he would successfully intimidate large numbers of voters and discourage them from going to the polls. His bluff was called as the results show.<sup>26</sup>

#### *The Marine TAORs, Jul-Dec 1966*

Despite the success of the election, there were few victories for the Marine Corps pacification campaign in central and southern I Corps in late 1966. Pacification progress depended upon the individual Marine battalion. The Marine pacification concept dictated that the Marine battalions provide security for local villages and hamlets by constant small unit patrolling. From March through August 1966, III MAF units conducted more than 68,000 patrols, ranging in size from four to 40 men. Only 10 percent of these patrols made contact with the enemy, but the Marines maintained that the remaining 90 percent were equally beneficial. As Colonel Chaisson, the III MAF G-3, explained, "all of these small unit operations are conducted in the guerrilla environment. They are trying not only to kill the guerrillas but to curtail his freedom of movement."<sup>27</sup>

There were other reasons for the extensive patrolling of the Marine TAORs, not the least of which

related to base defense. On the night of 23 July, Viet Cong gunners, from positions behind a Buddhist temple 2,600 meters southwest of the Marble Mountain Facility, lobbed 40-50 81mm mortar shells in a seven-minute barrage onto the airfield parking apron. Although little damage occurred, the attack exposed the vulnerability of the base to such hit and run tactics. Lieutenant Colonel Emerson A. Walker, whose 3d Battalion, 1st Marines was responsible for the southeastern sector of the Da Nang TAOR, recalled that "General Walt let all echelons know that he did not expect this to happen again." Walker remembered that the engineers constructed two 50-foot wood towers in his sector. According to the battalion commander, his Marines mounted a rocket launcher and machine gun on the towers and manned both weapons around the clock. Walker claimed that: "The towers proved to be such a formidable threat that all Viet Cong mortar activity ceased in that area."<sup>28</sup>

The opening of the new front along the DMZ together with the heavy emphasis on base defense

*The 2d Korean Marine Brigade on 20 September 1966 marks the first anniversary of its arrival in South Vietnam in a formal ceremony. The honor guard carries the Korean National flag (left) and the colors of the brigade (right). The Korean Marines reinforced III MAF in August 1966.*

Marine Corps Photo A369489



and pacification in the southern TAORs placed a heavy strain on Marine manpower resources. This was somewhat alleviated with the long-planned deployment of the 2d Korean Marine Brigade to I Corps. The first echelons of the Korean Brigade arrived on 18 August and were assigned a TAOR in northern Quang Ngai Province on the Batangan Peninsula, 17 miles southeast of the Chu Lai Airfield. By the end of the month, the full brigade was established on the peninsula which was incorporated into the Chu Lai TAOR. The command relationship between the Koreans and the American Marines was delicate. General Walt did not have operational control of the Korean Brigade, but he did have coordinating authority. Although the III MAF commander could not order the Koreans to do anything, he and Brigadier General Lee Bong Chool, the Korean Brigade commander, who had attended the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, formed a working arrangement that satisfied both sides.<sup>29\*</sup>

Even with the reinforcement of the Koreans, the increasing demands of the war in the north caused a serious setback to Marine pacification plans. The move of the 3d Marine Division to Phu Bai and the shift of the 1st Marine Division Headquarters to Da Nang not only disrupted the pacification campaign, but ended any chance to join the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORs by the end of the year.

At Chu Lai, the 1st Division established an entirely new command structure. On 10 October, the new division commander, Major General Herman Nickerson, Jr., a holder of the Silver Star and veteran of World War II and Korea, who had just relieved General Fields, moved his headquarters to Da Nang. He spoke with some regret about leaving Chu Lai, "Very pleasant CP, beautiful, but I didn't get to stay there very long."<sup>30</sup>

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\*Victor K. Fleming, Jr., a former Marine captain who served in the 7th Marines S-3 section during this period, recalled that there were some misunderstandings between the Koreans and the Chu Lai Marines before the rough edges in the command relations were smoothed out. On one particular occasion, the Koreans launched an operation near the Marine TAOR without informing the Marine units responsible for that sector. According to Fleming when the American command asked why it had not been notified, General Lee replied, 'Why should I? You don't tell me what you are doing.' This incident led to an immediate overhaul and improvement of liaison between the two commands." Victor K. Fleming, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 17Jun80 (Vietnam Comment File).



Marine Corps Photo A369613  
*MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., (front passenger seat of the jeep) has just arrived at the Chu Lai Airfield to relieve MajGen Lewis J. Fields, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (rear seat). General Nickerson assumed command of the division the following day, 1 October 1966, and a few days later moved the division headquarters to Da Nang.*

Brigadier General Stiles, the assistant division commander, then assumed command of the Chu Lai TAOR. Stiles reformed his Task Force X-Ray command which now consisted of four Marine infantry battalions and supporting forces. The 7th Marines had operational control of the four infantry battalions at Chu Lai while the 5th Marines Headquarters served as a coordinating headquarters for the task force.

At best this was an ad hoc arrangement. The strain on the overly extended units at Chu Lai remained great. Battalions still operated miles from Chu Lai and yet remained responsible for their sector of the TAOR. Lieutenant Colonel Warren P. Kitterman, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, remembered that during an operation in southern Quang Ngai Province during late 1966, he, in effect; maintained three separate command posts. His executive officer "ran the TAOR [at Chu Lai] with four platoons from four different battalions," while his operations officer had "tactical control" of the battalion in the operation. Kitterman, himself, "was coordinating 2/7 with an ARVN Bn, an ARVN

Parachute Company, an ARVN arty battery, and H/3/11."<sup>31</sup>

Much the same situation existed in the Phu Bai TAOR. Although General Kyle had established the 3d Division Headquarters at the Phu Bai base in October, only one or two battalions actually operated in or near the TAOR. The 3d Division Headquarters took over from the 4th Marines, which regiment up to that point had maintained a rear headquarters at Phu Bai and direct control of the TAOR and the units there. This included the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, a provisional artillery battery, and support elements. On 11 October, the newly arrived 2d Battalion, 26th Marines moved from Da Nang to Phu Bai. After operating for a short period just south of the Phu Bai TAOR, the latter battalion began on 29 October Operation Pawnee III in Phu Loc District, north of the strategic Hai Van Pass, with the mission to keep Route 1 open between Da Nang and Phu Bai. In November, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines relieved at Phu Bai the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines which returned to Okinawa under the recently resumed intratheater battalion rotation policy.\* Finally in early December, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines replaced the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, which in turn rotated to Okinawa.<sup>32</sup>

With a lull in Operation Prairie in the north, General Kyle, in mid-December, decided to move a battalion back into the Co Bi-Thanh Tan sector, the old Cherokee and Florida operating area, 13 miles northwest of Hue, and where the enemy was once more active. On 10 December, VC units in well-coordinated attacks struck three South Vietnamese strongpoints, including the Phong Dien District Headquarters and the An Lao Bridge across the Bo River. Suspecting that elements of the 6th NVA again were attempting to infiltrate from their mountain base areas into the coastal populated region, General Kyle, on 17 December, ordered the just-arrived 3d Battalion, 26th Marines from Dong Ha into the Co Bi-Thanh Tan corridor. Travelling by truck from Dong Ha and with an attached artillery



Marine Corps Photo A188089  
*Marines of Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines check the identity cards of suspected Viet Cong. The battalion is participating in Operation Chinook during December 1966 in the old "Florida" area, the Co Bi-Thanh Tan sector in Thua Thien Province.*

battery, the 3d Battalion established, on 19 December, its CP west of Route 1, some 3,000 meters south of Phong Dien. After minor skirmishes with the Marines during the first two days, the enemy 802d VC Battalion launched two sizeable attacks against the Marine positions in the early morning hours of 22 and 23 December. In both cases, the enemy employed the same tactics; a mortar barrage, followed by a ground probe of the Marine perimeter. The VC then would withdraw, taking most of their casualties with them.<sup>33</sup>

At this stage, 23 December, General Kyle elected to expand the operation, now codenamed Chinook, in the Co Bi-Thanh Tan, even further. He reinforced the 3d Battalion with the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, which moved from the Pawnee area into the Chinook sector, north of the O Lau River. At the same time, he ordered the 4th Marines Headquarters to deploy from Prairie and take control of the units in Chinook. These now included, in addition to the two infantry battalions, the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, reconnaissance troops from Phu Bai, and support units. Colonel Cereghino, the 4th Marines commander, opened his CP in the Chinook area on Christmas day. Hampered by the northeast mon-

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\*The arrival of the 26th Marines and its battalions in WestPac in August and September allowed the Marines to reinstitute the intratheater rotation of battalions between Okinawa, Vietnam, and the SLF which had been suspended since March. (See Chapter 4). See Chapter 18 for further discussion of the 26th Marines and the battalion rotation policy.



soon, which limited the availability of both fixed-wing and helicopter support, the two infantry battalions encountered few enemy troops during the rest of the month. The most dramatic event occurred during the supposed New Year's truce period. On 31 December, Marine reconnaissance patrols, screening the foothills to the south of the Co Bi-Thanh Tan, observed more than 1,000 enemy troops, taking advantage of the terms of the standdown and moving north toward the lowlands.

After III MAF convinced MACV that the enemy force presented a clear and present danger to the Marines in Operation Chinook, Marine air and artillery bombarded the Communist troops. Operation Chinook continued into 1967.<sup>34</sup>

In the heavily populated Da Nang TAOR, pacification continued to be the prime concern of the Marine forces there. The TAOR contained both the I Corps National Priority Area and fledgling An Hoa industrial site. During the spring and early summer, the Marine battalions had challenged the long-standing Communist domination south of the air base. This entire pacification effort, however, depended in great part on the ability of the Marines to provide the necessary security in the villages and hamlets.

*The pacification effort south of Da Nang can be an "odorous" job. Troops from the 1st Marines probe a manure pile for hidden weapons.*

Marine Corps Photo A369663



When General Nickerson's 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for the Da Nang TAOR, the 3d Marines was the only infantry regiment to leave Da Nang; both the 1st and 9th Marines remained. Colonel Donald L. Mallory's 1st Marines reverted to 1st Marine Division operational control and retained responsibility for the southeastern portion of the Da Nang TAOR. Colonel Mallory, holder of the Navy Cross and former Assistant G-3 of the 1st Division, had assumed command of the regiment from Colonel Mitchell in August. Colonel Robert M. Richards' 9th Marines took over the western and southern portions of the TAOR formerly held by the 3d Marines. Richards, a 1942 Naval Academy graduate, relieved Colonel Barrett as the regimental commander on 8 October. The U.S. Army's 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry occupied the northern sector of the Da Nang TAOR, including the Hai Van Pass area.\* The Army battalion was not under the operational control of a Marine regiment, but operated directly under General Nickerson. It was planned to hold at least eight infantry battalions in the Da Nang TAOR.<sup>35</sup>

Despite the demands on Marine resources at Da Nang, General Walt continued his unstinted effort to make the An Hoa industrial complex a show case for pacification. He held at least one Marine battalion in An Hoa and pressured the government and MACV to support the industrial development there. Colonel Edward L. Bale, Jr., the 1st Marine Division G-4, remembered that the "extensive efforts of the 1st Marine Division and the Force Logistic Command to supply and support the An Hoa industrial complex . . . at times reduced our own forces . . . as to approach the danger point. Yet, it demonstrated the willingness of III MAF to support the only industrial development in the area."<sup>36</sup>

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\*Col Walter S. Pullar, Jr., who as a major was executive officer and for a short period commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, recalled that when the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines departed for Khe Sanh at the end of September (See Chapter 11), he commanded a provisional battalion consisting of a reinforced company from the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, and one from the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. This battalion assumed responsibility for the northern sector including the Hai Van Pass until relieved by the Army battalion from the 503d Infantry. Col Walter S. Pullar, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 22May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

The An Hoa project had as much difficulty, if not more, with the South Vietnamese Government than with the Viet Cong. Some members of the government believed that the industrial complex was doomed to failure. General Westmoreland had proposed that the U.S. Embassy use its influence with the Vietnamese authorities to support the project. In the meantime, USAID officials began studies to determine the economic feasibility for the industrial exploitation of An Hoa.

One of the greatest threats to the entire An Hoa program was the fact that some of the key officials, including Mr. Can, the project director, were being drafted into the South Vietnamese Army. General Walt believed that if Can departed, progress at An Hoa would cease. The III MAF commander personally asked General Westmoreland to intercede with the South Vietnamese authorities to have Can deferred.<sup>37</sup> By the end of October, a compromise had been reached. The An Hoa employees were to be drafted, but required to serve for only one month in the army. After their month's service, they were to be transferred into the Popular Forces and returned to An Hoa.<sup>38</sup>

The future of An Hoa was still unclear at the end of 1966. The industrial complex depended on coal from the Nong Son mine, 12 miles southwest of the factory site. Viet Cong guerrillas operated in some strength near the mine. Transporting the coal to An Hoa was also a problem. Activities at the industrial complex during this period were largely confined to renovating the plant and obtaining spare parts so the fertilizer factory could start production. According to Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Evans, Jr., the recorder for the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council during much of 1966 and later head of the Civil Affairs Branch at Headquarters Marine Corps: "At this point [December 1966] very little had been accomplished except to focus attention on An Hoa as a potential industrial site."<sup>39</sup>

The main pacification concern of the South Vietnamese officials in I Corps during this period was progress in the National Priority Area, encompassing portions of Hoa Vang, Hieu Duc, and Dien Ban Districts south of Da Nang. Although Marines did not participate directly in the campaign, the entire priority area was in the Da Nang TAOR. Battalions from the 1st and 9th Marines were prepared to assist the South Vietnamese units in the area, and in Oc-



Marine Corps Photo A187438  
*Mr. Le Thuc Can, project director, briefs a visiting team of USAID officials on the An Hoa Industrial Project. Can and other project officials faced induction into the Vietnamese Army, but upon the personal intervention of Generals Walt and Westmoreland, an accommodation was reached with the Vietnamese authorities and the project was continued.*

tober, General Lam, the I Corps commander, assigned the entire 51st ARVN Regiment to the pacification campaign with two battalions operating in the National Priority Area. In addition, four Revolutionary Development teams were working in the priority area and six other teams which were to be assigned were in training at the Vung Tau Training Center. Despite this intensive effort, government forces succeeded in securing only 18 of the 38 hamlets in the National Priority Area that were scheduled to be pacified in 1966.<sup>40</sup>

According to allied plans, the Vietnamese were to take over more of the pacification program in 1967. In I Corps, the ARVN forces were to have the primary mission of supporting Revolutionary Development, while Marine forces were to be deployed more and more against the enemy main force units. Yet, the Marines were still to secure their TAORs and clear the areas in the vicinity of the established bases. In a sense this could be called the beginning of Vietnamization, but several senior Marine officers doubted that the Vietnamese Army was prepared to take over the pacification program. In any event, pacification ended on a sour note in 1966; III MAF reported that no hamlets were added to the secure category in I Corps during December.<sup>41</sup> General English summed up the Marine frustrations for the year: ". . . too much real estate—do not have enough troops."<sup>42</sup>



PART VI  
PACIFICATION: THE ELUSIVE GOAL



## CHAPTER 14

# Marine Corps Pacification

*County Fair and Golden Fleece – Combined Action – Personal Response – Kit Carson – Psychological Warfare – Civic Action – The I Corps Joint Coordinating Council*

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### *County Fair and Golden Fleece*

In developing their pacification concepts, the Marines drew upon a wealth of experience and history. General Walt recalled his early training as a young officer when he learned the fundamentals of his profession from Marines who had fought Sandino in Nicaragua and Charlemagne in Haiti. These veterans had stressed tempering the struggle against insurgents with an understanding and compassion for the people.<sup>1</sup> As early as 1935, the Marine Corps published its *Small Wars Manual* which emphasized the lessons learned by Marines who fought the campaigns against the guerrillas of their day.<sup>2</sup>

According to the 1940 edition of the *Small Wars Manual*, "small wars" involved diplomacy, contact with the lowest levels of the civilian population, and the uncertainties of political disruption. The goal of "small wars" was to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the minimum loss of life. Caution was to be exercised, and the population was to be treated with "tolerance, sympathy, and kindness."<sup>3</sup>

Although this philosophy formed the basic structure of Marine Corps "small wars" theory, III MAF found it necessary to develop pacification tactics to meet the conditions unique to South Vietnam.\*

Two innovations which showed promising potential were the County Fair and Golden Fleece programs. Both had their origins in late 1965 and were refined during the course of 1966.

The 9th Marines initiated prototype County Fair operations in late 1965 and in early 1966 in response to the need for new techniques to secure its area of operations south of the Da Nang Airbase. Containing an extended area dotted with hamlets and villages, the 9th Marines TAOR was one of the most densely populated areas of South Vietnam with over 1,000 inhabitants per square mile. The Marine regiment realized that it had to eradicate the VC guerrillas and political cadre in order to pacify the hamlets. Employing traditional cordon and search tactics, the Marines began a continuing effort in the villages to clear out the VC. The County Fair technique was an outgrowth and elaboration of these tactics.<sup>4</sup>

Begun on an experimental basis in February 1966, this technique emphasized coordination and cooperation with South Vietnamese military and civilian authorities to reestablish government control of a community without alienating the people. While Marines cordoned a village, ARVN troops and police gathered the inhabitants at a designated collection point. The South Vietnamese troops then searched the hamlet for any VC who might still be hiding. During this time, South Vietnamese ad-

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\*Two former III MAF staff officers emphasized that from the very beginning the Marine command had focused on pacification. Colonel Robert B. Watson, as an operations analyst, had earlier served on the staff of the Development Center at Quantico, Virginia. He recalled that in 1962 when General Walt became Director of the Center that the War Games Group had been directed to war game the landing of a reinforced Marine amphibious force at Da Nang. Watson claims that the results of this game, "Operation Cormorant," proved very predictive of later operations by the Marines against the VC guerrilla forces. General Walt had been alerted to the problems of operations against enemy forces where no FEBA [forward edge of the battle area] was established, where the enemy was so elusive and where significant

portions of the offensive force had to be committed to the security of the support areas." Col Robert B. Watson, Jr., Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun 78], (Vietnam Comment File). Colonel Donald L. Evans, who served as the recorder of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, observed that although "some of our [pacification] techniques were still a little ragged and sporadically applied in 1966 . . . I believe that our approach was sound and quite well developed by this . . . time. Many Army folks who believed in pacification or were involved in it in those days readily admitted to me that the Marine approach was sound. . . ." Col Donald L. Evans, Comments on draft MS, dtd 17Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).



Marine Corps Photo A186992

*The 3d Marine Division Drum and Bugle Corps plays for the entertainment of assembled villagers during a "County Fair" in April 1966. County Fair operations were sophisticated cordons and searches, involving U.S. Marines and South Vietnamese troops while local government officials and police checked identity cards and conducted a census. Band concerts helped to provide a festive atmosphere while the other aspects of the operation were completed.*

ministrative officials and police processed the villagers at the collection center, taking a census, issuing ID cards, and interrogating the population about their background and the location of members of their families. In addition, the people were fed, provided medical assistance, and entertained. A significant feature of the entertainment was that it permitted the government to present its case to the villagers in the form of movies, speeches, folk music, and drama.

Throughout these activities, the Marines remained as unobtrusive as possible, except to furnish medical and limited logistical assistance. The idea was not to overwhelm the local populace with the American military presence, but to provide a climate in which the local Vietnamese military, police, and civilian administrators could operate.<sup>5</sup>

One of the more successful of these combined operations was the 9th Marines' County Fair-11 in the hamlet of Thanh Quit (3) during April 1966. The hamlet, located in a small triangle between the Thanh Quit and Vinh Dien Rivers and 1,500 meters east of Route 1 below Da Nang, often served as a haven for local guerrillas. On the morning of 26

April at 0500, Lieutenant Colonel William F. Donahue's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines established blocking positions east of the hamlet while an ARVN company blocked to the west. One hour later, two companies of the 3d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment advanced north from the Thanh Quit River into the hamlet. The South Vietnamese soldiers surprised a guerrilla unit in Thanh Quit (3). Realizing they were trapped, the VC fought stubbornly. The ARVN killed 45 of the guerrillas, captured 17 prisoners, and confiscated 14 weapons. The Marines in the blocking position suffered no casualties while the ARVN battalion sustained one dead and 14 wounded during the action.<sup>6</sup>

The success of this operation and another in April, during which the Marines and South Vietnamese captured a VC district official, caused General Walt to order the expansion of the program throughout the Marine TAORs during the following months. Many of the regiments prepared standing operating orders for the conduct of these operations and developed fairly elaborate procedures to create a festive atmosphere. At the collection points, the tents were decorated with bunting and flags. A Marine division band or drum and bugle corps often played martial airs, followed by South Vietnamese

*In County Fairs, the allies take elaborate measures to ensure that they get their message across to the assembled villagers. In the picture, members of the Quang Ngai Drama Team perform in a skit which condemns Viet Cong terrorism and praises U.S. assistance.*

Marine Corps Photo A369174





Marine Corps Photo A186995

*The County Fair had two faces. While the villagers listen to music, troops from the 51st ARVN Regiment search out suspected VC tunnels and hiding places.*

troubadours who continued to entertain the villagers. Although creating a "county fair" atmosphere, the purpose remained to ferret out the VC. By the end of June, the Marines and the South Vietnamese had conducted 25 of these operations with a fair measure of success. In other corps areas, U.S. Army units adopted the County Fair concept, but changed the name from County Fair to "Hamlet Festival."<sup>7</sup>

In a letter to General Walt on 4 July, General Westmoreland specifically mentioned County Fair as a desirable technique to enhance village and hamlet security. Although he observed that such operations tied down U.S. units and required the retention of a reserve, Westmoreland declared:

The Hamlet Search [County Fair] concept offers a realistic prospect for developing meaningful and lasting security in areas where it is conducted; and to the extent that this is the real objective of all our military operations, every opportunity for successful achievement of this goal should be pursued.<sup>8</sup>

He reminded Walt that County Fair operations were

not necessarily appropriate for universal employment throughout Vietnam and that he did not want any dissipation of U.S. strength "to the detriment of our primary responsibility for destroying main force enemy units."<sup>9</sup>

The MACV commander continued to demonstrate interest in the County Fair program and on 10 July, he requested III MAF to report on its County Fair activities for the preceding four-month period. The Marines were not only to furnish the total number of operations for each month from March through June, but were to provide the following data as well: names and coordinates of hamlets searched; number of suspects detained; number of enemy killed and captured; number and type of weapons seized; and number of hamlets in which the enemy "infrastructure" was considered destroyed.<sup>10</sup>

The month of July was to be the highwater mark for the number of III MAF 1966 County Fair operations. During the month, Marine units conducted 21

such operations near Da Nang: nine by the 3d Marines, eight by the 1st Marines, and four by the 9th Marines. Colonel Bryan B. Mitchell, the 1st Marines commander, observed that his units, cooperating with the South Vietnamese, provided "the first real GVN influence in many of the hamlets during the past three years."<sup>11</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Dickey, III, whose 1st Battalion, 3d Marines had just completed County Fair 4-11 on 28 July in Kim Lien hamlet six miles northwest of the airbase in the 3d Marines TAOR, was less sanguine. He wrote:

Increased search skills and techniques of both Vietnamese and Marines are needed. The villagers aid the VC due to friendship and personal relations, not politics. District officials should get to know needs of people and offer tangible evidence of GVN presence.<sup>12</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel Dickey had touched upon only one of the problems that the County Fair concept was to encounter during the remainder of 1966. By the end of July, General Walt wanted to increase the number of County Fair operations to an average of at least 10 a week, but III MAF never attained this goal in 1966. With the diversion of battalions to the northern battlefront, the Marine regiments did not have the troops in the southern TAORs that would make an expanded County Fair program feasible. Furthermore, South Vietnamese officials on the district level were not fully cooperative. At the close of a visit to Vietnam in early September, General Krulak remarked that Marine commanders had complained to him that the "absence of Vietnamese participants had slowed down our County Fair program far below that of which we are capable and below that which we had planned."<sup>13</sup> Krulak agreed with General Walt's contention that the Marines should not go into a pacification endeavor unless there was adequate South Vietnamese military and civilian representation. Although General Lam had assigned the entire 51st ARVN Regiment to the pacification program in the I Corps national priority area south of Da Nang, the decline in the frequency of County Fair operations continued. By the end of the year, III MAF was conducting an average of four per month.

During the 88 County Fair operations conducted during 1966, over 46,000 South Vietnamese villagers were screened and more than 20,000 of them were provided medical treatment. These same operations accounted for 192 enemy killed and 262 captured. Although this represented an average of only slightly


more than five VC per operation, the enemy casualties were local guerrillas and political cadre, the basis of VC control in the countryside. The loss of these men in sufficient numbers could destroy the Communist influence among the people. The County Fair program was a useful technique of gaining control and extending influence.<sup>14</sup>

In contrast to the frustrations experienced by the Marines in conducting County Fairs, their rice-protection campaign was more successful. Begun during the fall harvest season of 1965 and named Golden Fleece, the concept called for a Marine battalion to maintain security around the rice paddies while the peasants harvested the grain. These operations allowed the Vietnamese farmer to keep his produce, while preventing the Viet Cong from collecting their usual percentage of the crop. The Golden Fleece campaign deprived the VC of badly needed supplies, and furnished the uncommitted South Vietnamese peasant an incentive to support the government cause. Marine staff officers estimated that the III MAF rice protection program kept over 500,000 pounds of rice from the grasp of the enemy during the 1965 harvest season.<sup>15</sup> III MAF expanded these operations during the 1966 harvest seasons. At the end of September, General Walt observed that more rice was withheld from the Viet Cong during the month than during any previous season in years.<sup>16</sup>

One of the most productive of all such operations was Golden Fleece 7-1 carried out by Major Littleton W. T. Waller II's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines in Mo Duc District south of the city of Quang Ngai.\* The Marine battalion entered the district, 25 miles from its Chu Lai area of operations on 8 September to conduct a search and destroy operation. The operation, labeled Fresno, was designed to prevent enemy main force units from disrupting the constitutional election. Although Fresno did end after the election, there was a sudden change of plans. In a conversation with General Walt, General Lam, the I Corps commander, observed that for years the Viet Cong had collected nearly 90 percent of the rice harvested in the Mo Duc region. General Walt suggested that the Marine battalion remain in the area to help pro-

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\*Major Waller is the grandson of Major General Littleton W. T. Waller, USMC, of Boxer Rebellion and Philippine Insurrection fame.





Marine Corps Photo A369608

*Marines of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines conduct Golden Fleece 7-1, a rice protection operation, in the Mo Duc sector of Quang Ngai Province. The Marine on the right is checking identity cards while the Marine on the left stands guard.*

protect the harvest. General Lam agreed and on 16 September, Major General Fields, the 1st Division commander, ordered Colonel Lawrence F. Snoddy, Jr.,\* the 7th Marines commander, to terminate Operation Fresno at midnight and immediately begin Operation Golden Fleece 7-1. Colonel Snoddy visited Major Waller's command post south of the village of Mo Duc and told him of the change in plans.<sup>17</sup>

The informality of the planning for Golden Fleece 7-1 may have deceived the enemy and apparently contributed to the effectiveness of the operation. Major Waller later commented that the operation was approached on a low key:

There was a minimum of fuss and coordination with the ARVN Division in Quang Ngai [the 2d ARVN Division]. Perhaps this low level approach accounted for the enemy not getting the word. At any rate, if he did get the word, he did not seem to think we would affect his plans.<sup>18</sup>

Allied intelligence sources had indicated that two VC battalions, the 38th and 44th were in the area with two local force companies. These forces totaled approximately 900 men and agents reported that the

enemy units were operating freely in the area, the 38th west of Route 1 and the 44th in the paddy lands east of the highway. During Fresno and the period immediately preceding the constitutional election, these enemy battalions had avoided all contact with allied forces in the Mo Duc region. Perhaps believing that the Marine battalion would return to its base area after the election, the Viet Cong commanders became bolder after 16 September.

Although the enemy had at least two battalions in the Mo Duc area, the fighting during Golden Fleece 7-1 was usually on a small-unit level. Marine patrols either sighted or engaged enemy units attempting to move into the fertile lowlands. Marine air, artillery, and naval gunfire was called on to finish the job. Battery G, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines reinforced by five U.S. Navy destroyers offshore provided direct artillery support to the infantry battalion, and Marine aircraft from Chu Lai and Da Nang furnished close air support.

While 2d ARVN Division units were protecting the rice fields east of Route 1, Major Waller sent platoon and squad patrols along the access routes into Mo Duc from the west. The Song Ve constituted the northern and western boundary of the area of operations and Highway 578, the southern. Special South Vietnamese observation units, called *Dac Cong*, supplemented the Marine patrols. By entering the Nui Nham-Nui Coi hill mass, which dominated the en-

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\*Colonel Snoddy in 1972 legally changed his name from Snoddy to Snowden. He retired from active duty in 1979 as a lieutenant general.



Marine Corps Photo A369479

*The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines advance on the hamlet of Van Ha (1) in Operation Golden Fleece 7-1. The hamlet was a known Viet Cong stronghold.*

tire region, the Marines and their South Vietnamese allies probed much further to the west than the VC expected. The roving patrols provided excellent information which resulted in most of the Viet Cong casualties. For example, a *Dac Cong* outpost in the northern area of operations sighted three enemy platoons approaching the Song Ve on the night of 19 September and called for artillery and naval gunfire. A nearby Marine reconnaissance patrol observed and adjusted the fires. This particular action resulted in the death of 47 Viet Cong.<sup>19</sup>

On another occasion, a Marine patrol saw what appeared to be 75 ARVN troops in a position where no friendly units were supposed to be. The patrol leader

quickly checked with the battalion command post and learned that the troops he had spotted were not ARVN, but VC. The Marines opened fire on the enemy and also called in artillery and air as the VC fled. A Marine tactical aerial observer in a UH-1E helicopter, controlling the airstrike, reported at least four enemy killed. When the Marine patrol swept the area, they found a base camp that the enemy had established, apparently for rice collection.<sup>20</sup>

Through 21 September, Major Waller continued the same tactics, deploying small patrols into the hinterlands and conducting company sweeps in the lowlands west of Route 1. On the 21st, the Marines readjusted their boundary with the 2d ARVN Division in order to attack the hamlet of Van Ha (1), 2,000 meters east of Highway 1, long a Viet Cong stronghold. The hamlet was honeycombed with bunkers and interlocking tunnels. The district chief stated that no South Vietnamese Government force had dared to enter this complex for over four years.

Expecting heavy enemy resistance, Major Waller stationed Company A in blocking positions that night and called for an intensive air, artillery, and naval bombardment the next morning. After the bombardment, he launched a three-company attack

*After taking Van Ha (1), the Marines found a granary holding 727 tons of rice. Here a Marine holds a burlap bag open for one of the 8,000 workers that were brought in to take the rice to Mo Duc.*

Marine Corps Photo A369606





Marine Corps Photo A369612

*Marines from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines assist in the evacuation of villagers from Van Ha (1) to resettlement in Mo Duc. Many of the 700 refugees claimed that they had wanted to leave Van Ha, but had been prevented by the VC.*

on the hamlets. Although a few VC had probed Company A's positions during the night, the Marine advance encountered only token opposition. Once they secured the hamlet, the Marines found Van Ha (1) to be a well-established logistic base. A granary within the hamlet held over 727 tons of rice.

Major Waller contacted the district chief and assured him that the Marines would remain in the village, if the South Vietnamese could haul the rice away. The chief agreed and provided a force of more than 8,000 workers to move the rice from Van Ha to Mo Duc, the district capital. In less than 50 hours, the South Vietnamese had removed the rice, as well as the household effects of approximately 150 families living in the village. In addition to the villagers' furniture, they gathered up the cattle, hogs, ducks, and chickens and transferred everything to the district town. Over 700 civilian refugees from Van Ha were relocated to Mo Duc where they were

processed. Many of the villagers claimed that they had wanted to leave Van Ha for some time but were prevented by the VC.<sup>21</sup>

At this point the South Vietnamese Government decided to settle the problem of Van Ha (1), once and for all, so that it could no longer serve Communist purposes. The district chief, a Mr. Lieu, asked Major Waller to destroy the entire village. Waller's men used 13,500 pounds of explosives "to destroy a total of 554 bunkers, 123 houses, 50 caves, 130 sheds, and 125 wells, [in the process] producing 24 secondary explosions."<sup>22</sup>

The battalion left Van Ha (1) on the 26th and closed out Operation Golden Fleece 7-1 the next day. On the 27th, Mr. Lieu hosted a traditional Vietnamese banquet for the Marines in Mo Duc. The Vietnamese officials expressed their appreciation for what the Marines had accomplished and presented gifts to Major Waller. According to the battalion's

report, more than 5,000 South Vietnamese lined the streets of Mo Duc to bid the unit farewell as the Marines boarded trucks for the return to Chu Lai.<sup>23\*</sup>

The results of the operation were impressive both in number of enemy casualties and the amount of rice salvaged from the Communists. Marines claimed 240 enemy dead at the cost of one Marine killed and 19 wounded. The district chief estimated that over 7,000 tons of rice were harvested and kept out of the hands of the enemy. Major Waller doubted that the VC had been able to obtain more than 15 percent of the total crop before the Marines had arrived.<sup>24</sup> Most significantly, none of the harvesters working in rice paddies protected by the Marines had been bothered by enemy troops or tax collectors. Major Waller had nothing but praise for Mr. Lieu and his U.S. Army advisor, Major Richard A. Weaver, both of whom had cooperated fully with the Marine battalion.<sup>25</sup>

Lieutenant General Krulak summed up the accomplishment of the Golden Fleece operations in the following manner:

The Golden Fleece effort by III MAF organizations is keyed to the various times when rice crops become ripe. As such it is nearly a continuous project. Golden Fleece 7-1 was a particularly good example. . . . The VC were determined to get their hands on the rice this time, and came out in the open to fight for it. . . I believe that Golden Fleece, along with County Fair, Combined Action units and the other Revolutionary Development efforts—halting though they are—are giving the Viet Cong basic structure a hard time.<sup>26</sup>

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\*A few months after the Golden Fleece operation, Marines in Operation Sierra returned to Mo Duc where they again enjoyed excellent relations with the local authorities and population. Lieutenant Colonel Warren P. Kitterman, whose 2d Battalion, 7th Marines participated in the latter operation, recalled several instances of friendliness on the part of both officials and villagers. He particularly remembered the "fine food and entertainment" provided by the ARVN battalion at Mo Duc and the villagers on Christmas Eve. Kitterman related: "About midnight, after making prior arrangements with my direct support battery commander, I gave a short 'thank you' speech. I concluded by saying, 'All we need to make it a perfect Christmas Eve is for a star to appear in the east.' At that instant, five illuminating rounds popped in the east in the shape of a star. Everyone was surprised and delighted, including the battalion chaplain." LtCol Warren P. Kitterman, Comments on draft MS, dtd 16Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

### *Combined Action*

The combined action program had its inception in the summer of 1965 at Phu Bai as an expedient to improve base security. The concept involved the assigning of a Marine squad to a South Vietnamese Popular Force (PF) platoon. In the early stages of the program, III MAF accepted only handpicked volunteers for combined action units. These Marines received rudimentary training in Vietnamese language, history, customs, and military and governmental organization. Initially, five combined action platoons were formed at Phu Bai. These Marines entered into the life of their assigned village and were integrated into its defense. They offered military training to the local PF platoons, while at the same time participating in civic action.<sup>27</sup>

In January 1966, General Walt authorized the expansion of the program. A second combined action effort was started at Da Nang, where Marine squads were paired off with the seven PF platoons stationed around the airbase. By July, III MAF had 38 combined action platoons, scattered throughout the three Marine enclaves. The number of platoons grew to 57 by the end of the year: 31 at Da Nang and 13 each at Phu Bai and Chu Lai.<sup>28</sup>

The combined action program, like the County Fair and the Golden Fleece operations, developed into an integral component of the Marine pacification strategy. Both Generals Walt and Krulak gave

*LtGen Krulak, CGFMFPac, inspects a combined action unit on 31 December 1966. Gen Krulak was an avid supporter of the combined action concept which integrated a South Vietnamese Popular Force platoon with a Marine squad.*

Marine Corps Photo A801024



the concept their unstinted support and were avid crusaders, attempting to convince MACV to expand a similar program to all of Vietnam. The Marines assembled very convincing statistics to back up their strong beliefs. A FMFPac report prepared in January 1967 observed that the 22 Vietnamese villages in the Marine TAORs that had an active combined action program for six months or longer averaged a grade of 60 percent on the III MAF pacification scale. This was a rise of nearly 20 percentage points since the combined action platoons were stationed in these villages. The report pointed out one other significant trend. It noted that the South Vietnamese PF, a home guard directly responsible to the district chief for the defense of their particular villages, was generally regarded as the poorest of all the South Vietnamese forces. According to the FMFPac study, the desertion rate from the PF was almost four times that of the ARVN. For the period August through December 1966, the report cited statistics which revealed over 39,000 PF troops had deserted, representing nearly 25 percent of the total nationwide PF strength. During this same period there were no recorded desertions of PFs assigned to the Marine combined action units. Other figures included in the report indicated that the kill ratio of the Marine combined action platoons was 14 VC to 1 Marine or PF soldier, as contrasted with a 3 to 1 ratio for regular PF units. The report concluded:

This tends to underscore the improved military performance that is possible through the melding of highly motivated professional Marines with heretofore poorly led, inadequately trained, and uninspired Vietnamese—who now are finding leaders who are qualified and who take a personal interest in them.<sup>29\*</sup>

The rapid expansion of the combined action program did cause some problems. Although no specific billets had been allotted to the program, there were approximately 2,000 Marines assigned to combined action units. These men came directly out of the manning level of the individual infantry battalions.

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\*One of the most important assets of the combined action platoons was their knowledge of the local situation. Colonel Clyde D. Dean recalled that as S-3 of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines at Da Nang in May 1966 during the political crisis the combined action platoons provided "our best on-site intelligence of who was who and where. . . . I personally felt our CAPs were our best eyes and ears around the base." Col Clyde D. Dean, Comments on draft MS, dtd 27 Aug 78 (Vietnam Comment File).

As could be expected, Marine battalion commanders were often reluctant to send their best and seasoned NCOs and riflemen into the program while receiving no direct recompense in return.<sup>30</sup>

The necessary complexity of command and control of the combined action units was also troublesome. There were two chains of command, one Vietnamese and one American. Coordination and cooperation were the core of the entire program. Two or more combined action platoons were coordinated by a combined action company headquarters, commanded by a Marine captain, with a PF lieutenant as his deputy. The Marine battalion commander was responsible for coordinating patrol activity and combat support of combined units in his TAOR, so for practical purposes, the Marine battalion commander actually exercised operational control of these combined action units.\*\*

Although the district chief, in effect, relinquished command of his PF units assigned to the combined action platoons, he still retained administrative responsibility. In addition, the district chief usually suggested which villages were to be assigned combined action units and made the necessary arrangements with the hamlet and village chiefs. Moreover, the district chief was in a position to undercut the program by simply transferring his PF troops out of the combined action unit.

At the platoon level, cooperation and trust were most important. A typical South Vietnamese PF platoon consisted of one officer and 37 enlisted men, organized into three 11-man infantry squads and a five-man headquarters group. A platoon was usually responsible for an entire village complex, deploying individual squads into the most important hamlets making up the village. The combined action platoon was the unit that resulted from combining a 14-man

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\*\*Colonel Noble L. Beck, the 3d Marine Division G-3, observed that although in theory the battalion commander was to exercise operational control, "it didn't work as smoothly as stated except in those instances where the battalion was in a static situation. Most often, the infantry battalions were on the move from one area to another while the combined action units normally remained in the same location. It was not infrequent that the infantry command was called upon to come to the aid of a combined action unit with its 'tail in a crack' in a situation unknown to the infantry commander in advance, and often this found him in an awkward tactical posture for response." Col Noble L. Beck, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Aug 78] (Vietnam Comment File).



Marine Corps Photo A188181

*A South Vietnamese village chief goes over patrol routes with Cpl John J. Shylo, an assistant combined action unit squad leader. The term combined action company, or CAC as seen on the oil drums, was later redesignated combined action platoon or CAP because of unpleasant connotations in the Vietnamese language.*

Marine rifle squad plus a Navy corpsman, with a PF platoon. The Marine NCO squad leader became the advisor to the Vietnamese platoon leader, while each of the three Marine fire teams was assigned to an individual PF squad. Both the Vietnamese militiamen and the individual Marines soon discovered they each had something to learn from the other. While the Marines taught the PFs basic small-unit tactics and discipline, they themselves obtained knowledge of the terrain, local customs, and valuable intelligence about the enemy. When the combined action platoon functioned properly, there was a mutual exchange that was helpful to both the Americans and South Vietnamese.

The combined action platoon in the village of Binh Nghia in the Chu Lai TAOR provided an excellent example of this process at its best. Located in Binh Son District four miles south of the Chu Lai Marine base in the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines TAOR, Binh Nghia consisted of seven hamlets, three named My Hue and four called Binh Yen Noi. The entire village complex was only two miles long, enclosed on the north by an expanse of sand dunes and on the south by the Song Tra Bong. According to allied intelligence sources, two independent VC companies and one main force battalion were operating in Binh

Son District. The district chief estimated that more than 750 men from Binh Nghia, alone, had left their homes to join the Viet Cong. Despite this apparent loyalty to the enemy, in June 1966 the Marines and South Vietnamese decided to establish a combined action platoon in the village.

The recommendation to establish the combined action platoon in Binh Nghia was made by the district chief. His U.S. Army advisor, Major Richard Braun, convinced General Walt that he should place a Marine squad with the PF in this sector. According to one Marine observer, the conversation between Braun and Walt went as follows:

"If you had them [a combined action platoon] where would you put them?" Walt asked.

"There's a big village not far from here. It sits along a river which the Cong use to move supplies back up into the mountains. As a matter of fact, it's just south of Chu Lai airfield. The government forces were chased out of the village a couple of years ago. A platoon of Cong live there regularly now, and sometimes a company or more come in to resupply or rest."

"Why pick there to start?" Walt asked.

"I didn't, sir. The district chief did. He has this outstanding police chief who's being badmouthed by some of the local politicians. These pols make the mafia look like a bunch of Trappist monks. The district chief's afraid this police chief will say the hell with it and transfer to another district. But his family's from this village and his mother still lives there. The district chief says he'll stick around if we make a play for that village. The police want some Americans along if they're going in there. They don't think too much of the local troops in this district. . . ."

"I'll see that he [the police chief] gets them," Walt replied. "By the way, what's the name of that village?"

"We call it Been Knee-ah, sir."<sup>31</sup>

On 12 June, a Marine squad led by Corporal Robert A. Beebe entered the village. They were met there by Ap Thanh Lam, the police chief mentioned by Braun in his discussion with General Walt. The local force in Binh Nghia consisted of 15 policemen and 18 PF troops, somewhat of a variance from the normal makeup of a combined action platoon. Lam and Beebe set up their headquarters in a villa that had been abandoned by a rich landowner in 1950 when the Viet Minh first entered the district. The old house was on the outskirts of Binh Yen Noi (3), the largest and southernmost hamlet of the village complex. Lam persuaded Beebe that it was too dangerous to live in the hamlets at night and that the Marines and the PFs should transform the villa into a fortified position. Corporal Beebe set the example for the South Vietnamese the first night they



Marine Corps Photo A369600

*A combined action unit in a hamlet in the Chu Lai TAOR presents arms at morning colors as the South Vietnamese flag is raised. By early 1967, the Marines had established 57 combined action platoons.*

were in the hamlet. After working all day erecting the fortifications, he personally led a night patrol. Although Beebe left Vietnam after only a few weeks in the village, he believed that his combined action platoon was accomplishing its mission. In his final report, he wrote:

On June 10th, 1966 one squad of Marines from Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines were picked to join the Popular Force unit at Binh Yen Noi. It is obvious to those who have initiated and followed the PF program that it has been a success. Since the Marines have begun their instructions, the confidence and skill of the PFs have risen considerably. The PFs are now a well-organized efficient combat unit. This program has also strengthened the relationship between the Marines and the PFs and civilians in the area. The effect of this had been the strengthening of the defensive posture of the area.<sup>32</sup>

Beebe had painted too rosy a picture. The Viet Cong were completely aware of the fact that if they allowed a Marine squad and some local militiamen to push them out of the village, their hold over the population would crumble. The morning that Beebe left the village, a VC assassination squad entered the home of Chief Lam's mother and killed Lam who had spent the night there. At the end of June, the Marines suffered their first casualty. Private First Class Lawrence L. Page, the youngest man in the squad, was killed in a Viet Cong ambush while on a night patrol.

Saddened by the deaths, the Marines were determined to stay put. Beebe's successor, Sergeant

Joseph Sullivan, adopted an aggressive program. Marines and PFs conducted night patrols and established ambushes even in the My Hue hamlets north of Fort Page, as the villa was renamed after Page's death. Later in the month, five Marines and three PF troops set up an ambush on the northern bank of the Tra Bong. Apparently the Viet Cong had watched the patrol establish its position and attempted to maneuver around them to hit the ambushers from the rear. The Marine patrol leader had taken no chances and had stationed a PF soldier as a rear lookout. He saw the enemy crawling along the rice paddy dikes and quietly gave the alarm. The patrol leader turned his men around and allowed the VC to approach within 50 yards before giving the order to fire. In eight minutes, it was all over. The patrol counted 21 enemy dead, including a VC company commander and a platoon leader. There were no casualties in the combined action platoon.<sup>33</sup>

Throughout July and much of August, the combined action unit at Fort Page engaged in over 70 firefights and averaged almost 11 contacts a week. The Marines and their PF allies proved themselves superior to the Viet Cong in both night patrolling and fighting. By the end of August, the combined action platoon thought it had wrested control of Binh Nghia from the Viet Cong. There had been no significant contact with an enemy unit for over two weeks. According to Marine estimates, the village's pacification category had risen from the contested stage to a figure of 75 percent pacified.

Once more, however, the Viet Cong forced the Marines to reassess the situation. On the night of 14 September several Marines and PFs were out on patrol, while six of the Americans, including Sergeant Sullivan, remained at the fort with 12 PFs. Although the combined action unit had not engaged the VC for over two weeks, there were disturbing rumors that VC forces across the river had been reinforced by North Vietnamese regulars. To insure the security of the fort, Sergeant Sullivan had asked the South Vietnamese PF leader to place a seven-man detachment in the hamlet of Binh Yen Noi to protect his rear. This detachment discovered nothing unusual in the hamlet and decided to go home to bed, rather than spend the night in the cold drizzle that began to fall. Apparently the enemy had maintained close observation of the fort. A company of North Vietnamese regulars from the 409th NVA Battalion, approximately 60 men, joined 80 Viet

Cong and crossed the Tra Bong River. Probably guided by villagers, the enemy infiltrators slipped through the hamlet of Binh Yen Noi undetected and attacked the fort from two directions. In the ensuing battle, five Americans, including Sergeant Sullivan and the Navy corpsman, were killed. The other Marine in the fort was wounded as were five of the PFs; the remaining seven PF troops held out. A reaction force from Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and the rest of the combined action force came to their rescue and the VC broke contact.\*

Instead of breaking the morale of the combined action platoon, this attack strengthened the bond between the remaining Marines and the PFs. On 15 September, Colonel Snoddy offered the combined action Marines the opportunity to abandon Fort Page and to a man they elected to stay. They had gained a strong affection for Binh Nghia; it was their village and they were determined to protect it. That day the villagers held a funeral service honoring the Marines and PF troops who had died in the defense of Fort Page.

On the night of the 16th, the Viet Cong came back to Binh Nghia; this time they received an entirely unexpected reception. Apparently believing they no longer had anything to fear, they walked boldly down the hamlet's main street toward the market place. They literally bumped into a Marine PF patrol coming from the other direction. Recovering from their surprise first, the Marines and PFs opened fire and gave the alarm. In less than 10 minutes, other members of the combined action unit reinforced the patrol led by Sergeant James White, Sullivan's replacement. The enemy tried to get back to the river bank and cross, leaving a rear guard to provide covering fire. An old woman pointed out to the Marines and PFs the positions of the VC. The unit blasted the enemy rear guard trying to escape in small wicker boats. While the shooting continued, the villagers gathered on the river banks to watch the show. According to one Marine, "You would have thought it was daytime out there . . . it was incredible."<sup>34</sup> The combined units accounted for 10 known dead VC and un-

doubtedly killed others in the water. There were no Marine or PF casualties.

The Marines in this particular combined action unit had gained a new perspective on the war. They realized there was to be no easy victory over the Viet Cong. The PFs were becoming better soldiers, but the Marines had attained something as well. They now understood the villagers and looked upon them as people to be protected and helped. One corporal put it in these words: "Hell, this is our village, it's why we're here."<sup>35</sup> An indication of the acceptance that the Marines had achieved occurred during the last week of December. The villagers held a fair and the Marines were invited, not as guests, but as participants.

Although the Marines in Binh Nghia had achieved a modicum of success in their efforts, the Marine command was not satisfied with the overall progress of the combined action program. General Walt had hoped to establish 74 units by the end of the year, but the government had not provided enough PFs to achieve this aim. Nonetheless, the Marines believed that the combined action concept held promise for the future. General Krulak stated this belief in the following words:

This idea has the greatest leverage of any concept yet to emerge from this war. Here is a case where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The Marines learn from the PF and the PF, mediocre soldiers to say the least—learn volumes from the Marines. They become skillful and dedicated units, and no hamlets protected by a combined action platoon has ever been repossessed by the Communists. . . . It [combined action] set the tone for what I honestly believe may be the key to the whole Vietnam war.<sup>36</sup>

#### *Personal Response*

The combined action program was important because it achieved one of the basic goals of the pacification effort, the unity of interest between the South Vietnamese villager and the individual Marine. For pacification to work in the TAORs, this same unity of interest had to be established between the regular Marine battalions and the local populace. The Marines in the regular, organized units had to realize that their mission was the protection of the people, while the Vietnamese peasant had to learn to overcome his fear of the Americans.

Generals Krulak and Walt were both aware how important attitudes were and both were interested in

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\*The VC had chosen a propitious time for their attack. Most of 1/7 was conducting Operation Fresco/Golden Fleece 7/1, while the remaining elements of the battalion were stretched thin in the Chu Lai TAOR.

means of determining the extent of the problem and developing a program that would avoid unfortunate incidents. The interest reflected by these two Marine generals created the Marine Personal Response Program during the summer of 1966. General Krulak discussed the question with the FMFPac chaplain, Captain John H. Craven, USN. In July 1966, Captain Craven assigned one of his new chaplains to be the Fleet Marine Force Personal Response Officer. His choice was Lieutenant Commander Richard McGonigal, who was not only a chaplain but also held a master's degree in sociology.\*

Chaplain McGonigal arrived in Vietnam on 5 July for a brief indoctrination visit. General Walt expressed his interest in the project and offered the chaplain the full cooperation of his staff. Lieutenant Commander McGonigal decided to take a sample survey of approximately two percent of the total III MAF force and a smaller sample of the South Vietnamese who had a close association with Americans. After refining his questionnaires and interviewing techniques, McGonigal conducted the attitude survey during the first two weeks of September.

The initial sampling revealed that a large percentage of the Marines tested held negative feelings for the South Vietnamese. Only 43 percent of the Marines indicated that they liked the local population. The South Vietnamese, on the other hand, showed a more positive feeling toward the Americans. Over 70 percent of them stated that they generally liked Americans, but 46 percent declared that Americans did not like them.

Other aspects of the survey showed that individual Marines indicated a certain ambivalence toward the

population, rather than an intense dislike. Most importantly, the sampling of combined action platoon Marines and their PF partners revealed an overwhelming feeling of trust and confidence in one another.

Chaplain McGonigal had accomplished a portion of his aims with the September survey. These were to determine the existing attitudes toward the Vietnamese, where the greatest problems were, and how these attitudes were acquired. He believed that he needed a much larger and more refined testing procedure before he could begin to develop a program to overcome frictions between Marines and the Vietnamese. From December 1966-January 1967, he conducted another survey, followed by a third in June 1967. Based on his intensive study of over 10 percent of the Marines assigned to III MAF, Chaplain McGonigal reached the conclusion:

The name of the game in Vietnam is relationship. When a Marine sees the ancient Vietnamese grandmother who smiles at him with her betel nut stained ebony teeth as a *full-fledged human being*, he is ready to operate more effectively than we hoped. He becomes more careful in his use of firepower, more sensitive in dealing with refugees and a better trainer of host counterparts.<sup>37\*\*</sup>

The need for Marines to remember that the Vietnamese civilians were more often victims of the war, rather than the enemy, was dramatized during the latter half of 1966 by three shocking and tragic incidents. In one, a Marine on a combat patrol during August told other members of the patrol that he intended to shoot a Vietnamese villager in order to flush out the VC. No one took the Marine seriously until he suddenly shot a farmer as he was showing

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\*Chaplain Craven observed that Personal Response had "its genesis in Exercise Silverlance in March 1965 when I succeeded in getting Chaplain Robert L. Mole assigned to the staff of the Troops Exercise Coordinator and we were able to crank some realistic problems involving local religions and customs into the Exercise . . . It was on the plane to observe this Exercise that I asked General Krulak about requesting a chaplain for FMF Pacific to work full time in this field, and so the Southeast Asia Religious Research Project was born. This young project grew . . . into the Personal Response Project." Stating that although Chaplain McGonigal was the first specific Personal Response Officer, Captain Craven noted that Chaplain Mole in the summer of 1965 started the project by beginning "first hand research in the religions, customs, and value systems of Southeast Asia." Capt John H. Craven, CHC, USN, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Craven Comments.

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\*\*Colonel Drew J. Barrett, who assumed command of the 9th Marines in July 66 commented on the requirement for such a program: "I felt helpless and inadequate because I had little knowledge of Vietnam, its people, and its culture. As the war progressed we recognized this, and within capability tried to include treatment of these matters in training syllabi and in all orientation materials. However, especially in this kind of conflict, it was impossible to fill this big void with short-cut measures." Col Drew J. Barrett, Comments on draft MS, dtd 5May78 (Vietnam Comment File). Despite such recognition of the value of the Personal Response Project, Chaplain Craven remembered that during his three years as FMFPac Chaplain and five years as the Chaplain of the Marine Corps, "I was always walking a fine line between Marine officers on one hand who questioned the need for any such project, and chaplains on the other hand who felt that chaplains should have nothing to do with the project." Craven Comments.

his ID card. The other Marines reported the outrage when the patrol returned to base. A general court-martial found the Marine guilty of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge.

One month later, another patrol, composed of eight Marines, raided a South Vietnamese hamlet. They killed five villagers and raped an 18-year-old girl. The same month, three other Marines killed an old woman and placed her body in a hay stack which they set afire. As they left the burning pyre, they discovered an elderly man who had observed their actions. They shot him and one of the Marines cut off the man's ear. All the Marines involved in these incidents were charged and faced court-martial by the end of the year.\*

The response of the Marine command to these tragedies reflected General Walt's determination that they would not reoccur. On 17 November, he sent a personal message to General Westmoreland giving the full details of each incident and the actions that he had taken.

More significantly, General Walt reiterated basic guidelines to his senior commanders to prevent future outrages. He made no recriminations, but also allowed no excuses. He stated simply:

I know that all of you are deeply concerned and are taking the actions you consider appropriate. . . . The following observations and suggestions appear to me to be worthy of your consideration. It is an oversimplification to lay the blame on the quality of leadership, at least not as a blanket indictment as it is usually employed. I believe, however, that perhaps the focus of our leadership has been too sharply concentrated on our operational problems and we may need to reorient and broaden this focus to devote more time and attention to the training of our younger, less mature leaders and to more eyeball-to-eyeball talks with all our troops. . . . We have had to rely frequently upon inexperienced noncommissioned officers in positions of great responsibility. To overcome the effects of this we need a period of intensive personal effort by our mature experienced officers and noncommissioned officers to counsel and train their juniors. Formal schools are not practical in our present tactical dispositions, but frequent informal sessions are possible and offer potentially rich

rewards. We need discussions of such fundamental subjects as are illustrated in the material published in connection with the personal response study. Recent events offer convincing evidence that the general attitude toward the Vietnamese people is manifestly poor and must be changed. There are also strong indications that we need personal attention to the responsibilities of leadership and vigorous efforts to weed out those who are ineffective. . . . In coordination with these efforts, I believe we can eliminate some of our future problems by screening our commands to separate those men whose records demonstrate their unfitness or unsuitability for retention, particularly at a time when the demands of our service call for self-discipline in a greater measure than ever before. . . .

The general continued:

A more careful examination of our disciplinary reports and increased efforts to make our trials and punishments as prompt as we can make them, within the law, offers another area for attack against a situation that we all recognize is not going to be resolved by any one magic formula. . . .

I cannot believe that our men fully understand and appreciate how disastrous their sometimes thoughtless actions can be to our efforts here. One man, through crime, or just plain wanton disregard of human dignity can undo in a few minutes the prolonged efforts of a reinforced battalion. We make propaganda for the enemy with every heedless act toward the Vietnamese as a people and as individuals. At the same time, we undo all the good that had been done. We must get this message across.<sup>38</sup>

*Kit Carson*

Although Chaplain McGonigal's 1966 survey and General Walt's message reflected some of the negative features resulting from Marine infantry units operating in populated areas, Marines more often than not demonstrated that they could work with individual South Vietnamese to bring stability to the countryside. One of the most unusual and yet successful of these attempts was the formation of special cadre made up of former VC. These men, former enemy troops, had taken advantage of the government "open arms" (Chieu Hoi) policy and rallied to the government cause.

The Marines began to use a selected few of these "ralliers" or Hoi Chanhs during the spring of 1966. In May, a group of VC surrendered to units of the 9th Marines, asking for asylum. The enemy immediately started a rumor among the people that the Marines had tortured and killed one of the ralliers by the name of Ngo Van Bay. Colonel Simmons, the regimental commander, asked Bay and two of his

\*In his best selling memoir, Philip Caputo, a former Marine lieutenant, described an earlier incident in 1966 when a patrol led by him killed two Vietnamese villagers. Caputo and five of his men were charged with murder. A court-martial found one of the men innocent and the charges against Caputo and the rest of the men were dropped. Philip Caputo, *A Rumor of War* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1977), pp. 314-336.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

*Former Viet Cong who defected to the government attend an indoctrination class. The Marines recruited several of these "ralliers" or Hoi Chanh as "Kit Carson scouts" to accompany Marine units in the field.*

*A former VC (right), now a Kit Carson scout assigned to the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines in the An Hoa sector, points out a possible enemy hiding place. These former VC were not only a valuable tactical asset, but served to further allied propoganda.*

Marine Corps Photo A370000



compatriots to return to the village and put the rumor to rest for once and for all. The three former Viet Cong agreed and, according to Simmons, this, in a small way, was the beginning of the program.<sup>39</sup>

Other Marine units at Da Nang, and eventually in all of the TAORs, started using former VC as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents. By October 1966, the program was established on a permanent, official basis. General Nickerson, the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, who was part-Indian and a Western history buff, designated the former VC working with the Marines as "Kit Carson scouts." He selected the name because the Hoi Chanh working with the Marines were good scouts, in the tradition of Kit Carson, the famed frontiersman, Indian agent, and soldier.\*<sup>40</sup>

\*The name of Kit Carson was doubly appropriate since Carson had served with Lieutenant Archibald Gillespie, USMC, during his secret mission to California for President Polk in 1846. According to General Nickerson, another reason for the designation Kit Carson was to "provide the initials KC as counter to VC." LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 1May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

From October to December 1966, III MAF credited the Kit Carson scouts with the killing of 47 VC, the capture of 16 weapons, and the discovery of 18 mines and tunnels.<sup>41</sup> The scouts repeatedly proved themselves a valuable tactical asset. For example, in November, one scout attached to the 1st Marines at Da Nang led a Marine company at night over unfamiliar terrain to an objective area, resulting in the surprise and capture of 15 Viet Cong.

The scouts provided more than just tactical capability. They were also a valuable propaganda tool. Villagers were much more ready to listen to them than to representatives of the government. During a December County Fair one scout gave a speech to the gathered villagers and evoked applause from his audience several times. According to the Marine report, the scout then:

... ventured into the VCC/VCS compound and spoke to them. . . . A definite response was observed by the facial expressions of some of the individuals. Attention seemed to follow the Kit Carson Scout wherever he went, including an apparent interest generated among the ARVN troops who participated in the operation.<sup>42</sup>

### *Psychological Warfare*

The Kit Carson program was only part of an intensive psychological warfare campaign that III MAF had begun in the latter half of 1966. In fact, it was an officer in the III MAF Psychological Warfare Section, Captain Stephen A. Luckey, who recommended the formal implementation of the Kit Carson project and it was the Psychological Warfare Section that developed the Kit Carson SOP. The section had consisted of only Luckey and a senior staff NCO until 4 August, when General Walt assigned Colonel Robert R. Read as the psychological warfare officer. In September the section became a special staff section, directly responsible to the III MAF Chief of Staff. According to the force order establishing the section, Colonel Read had four basic missions:

1. to reduce the combat efficiency of the VC;
2. to further the effort of the South Vietnamese Government in establishing control by attempting to modify attitudes and behavior of special audiences;
3. to coordinate psychological operations with civic action programs;
4. and finally to obtain the assistance and cooperation of the South Vietnamese villagers.<sup>43</sup>

General Walt did not expect Colonel Read to accomplish miracles, but he wanted "an increased em-

phasis on psychological operations by all III MAF commands." Colonel Read was to coordinate the III MAF efforts within the command and with the ARVN, MACV, and U.S. Information Agency and its South Vietnamese counterpart. Read remembered that his two initial problems were that "There were no T/O billets for PsyWar personnel and there were no Marines trained in PsyWar operation." He and his small staff took several steps to overcome these difficulties. They persuaded III MAF to direct its subordinate organizations to establish psychological warfare sections and instituted monthly meetings of PsyWar personnel. Moreover, III MAF requested Headquarters, Marine Corps "to provide school trained PsyWar personnel in replacement drafts, which they did." On 18 September, Read obtained operational control of the U.S. Army's 24th Psychological Operations Company's two detachments in I Corps, one at Da Nang and the other in Quang Ngai. Believing that the physical separation seriously hampered the company, Read consolidated both detachments at Da Nang and established there in October a Psychological Warfare Operations Center. By the end of the year, III MAF had a coordinated program that included the preparation of leaflets and broadcasts aimed at the enemy forces, as well as the screening of Hoi Chanh's for employment as Kit Carson scouts. According to Read, the increase in former VC rallying to the Vietnamese Government through the Chieu Hoi program was in part due to the new emphasis on psychological warfare operations.<sup>44</sup>

### *Civic Action*

The people needed more than just words to persuade them to join in the national effort against the Communists. An integral part of the Marine pacification campaign was its civic action program, aimed at improving the lot of the Vietnamese peasant as well as giving him a reason to support the government. According to Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt, General Walt's Chief of Staff during most of 1966, an effective civic action program had to fulfill certain requirements: it had to meet not only the needs of the people but involve them; the Marines should listen to what the people wanted and then offer them material and advice; work had to be done by the populace themselves.<sup>45</sup>



Marine Corps Photo 193952  
*SSgt Gerald E. Anderson from the 3d Tank Battalion assists a Vietnamese farmer to put up a windmill to pump water from the Song Cau Do. Another Marine, Sgt Enos S. Lambert, Jr. (hidden by the windmill except for his arm), helped with the project. The 3d Tank Battalion had a well-coordinated civic action program in the Hoa Tho Village complex south of Da Nang.*

Marines were to ensure that the Vietnamese Government received the credit for the various projects. Provincial, district, and village officials had to be involved from the beginning in both the planning and execution of any project. The entire effort was dependent upon coordination with the Vietnamese Government and U.S. civilian agencies so that the projects had the desired impact upon the local populace.<sup>46\*</sup>

\*General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps during this period, observed that the civic action program in Vietnam "was made possible by a *tremendous* effort mounted in the U.S. to collect medicine, clothing, soap and food. The National Junior Chamber of Congress was largely responsible in the success of the program which resulted in *trainloads* of contributions from manufacturers and the public proceeding to West Coast ports to be loaded on government transports and ships, e.g. aircraft carriers and civilian freighters, for movement to South Vietnam." Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 5May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

The activities of Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson's 3d Tank Battalion in the Hoa Tho village complex, on the northern bank of the Cau Do River, provided an excellent example of a coordinated civic action program. In December, the battalion's civic action team sponsored a farmers' meeting in the hamlet of Phong Bac. The village chief of Hoa Tho and the hamlet chiefs participated in the event; over 80 farmers attended. They discussed raising live stock and a representative from the U.S. Army 29th Civil Affairs Company distributed seed to the farmers. After the meeting, the village chief took the occasion to tell the people of the hamlet about the Marines. He stressed that the Marines were guests of the Government of Vietnam and that they were only trying "to help the Vietnamese people in the struggle for freedom and fight against Communism."<sup>47</sup>

By the end of 1966, the Marines had accumulated impressive statistics reflecting the assistance they had furnished to the South Vietnamese. Marine units entered hamlets and villages 25,000 times during

*A Navy corpsman with the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines at Chu Lai treats an old man's infected foot. Medical assistance was one of the most popular and effective of the Marine Corps civic action efforts.*

Marine Corps Photo A369403



the year for the express purpose of conducting civic action. Navy corpsman and doctors attached to the Marines provided medical treatment for over a million South Vietnamese and trained more than 500 Vietnamese to assist in meeting the health needs of the population. Even more significantly, South Vietnamese villagers and Marines working together, completed 1,100 construction projects. The Marines had supported schools, assisted in the resettlement of victims of the war, provided basic items such as soap and food, and generally attempted to make life somewhat easier for the civilian population, caught in the webs of war. To the Marines, civic action was more than just a giveaway, but a weapon designed specifically to win the people to the government cause.<sup>48</sup> One young Marine officer, First Lieutenant Marion (Sandy) L. Kempner, described the intermingling of the anti-guerrilla war and the civic action program in the following terms:

We have been doing a lot of work in the villages lately, of the community development type, so it looks as though I will never get away from the Peace Corps days. We must be really messing up these people's minds: by day we treat their ills and fix up their children and deliver their babies and by night, if we receive fire from the general direction of their hamlet, fire generally will reach them albeit not intentionally; they must really be going around in circles. But I guess that just points up the strangeness of this war. We have two hands, both of which know what the other is doing, but does the opposite anyway, and in the same obscure and not too reasonable manner—it all makes sense, I hope.<sup>49</sup>

### *The I Corps Joint Coordinating Council*

The Marines never presumed that they had the sole solution for “winning the hearts and minds” of the people. They were among the first to recognize that they needed assistance from the other U.S. agencies in Vietnam, civilian as well as military, and from the Vietnamese themselves. The U.S. Army 29th Civil Affairs Company had arrived in June 1966 to furnish expert assistance to the Marines in their relations with the South Vietnamese civilians. Long before that, General Walt had recognized the need for coordination. In August 1965, he had contacted Marcus Gordon, the chief of the U.S. Operations Mission for I Corps at that time, and suggested the formation of an interagency clearing committee. The result of his efforts was the creation of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council (JCC). Eventually, representatives from American civilian agencies, Marines, and the South Vietnamese I Corps command met weekly to try to give unified direction to the allied civic action effort.

Although the spring political crisis temporarily halted the functions of the council, it began to meet on a regular basis once again in July 1966. By this time the JCC had sponsored several subordinate committees designed to meet specific problems: public health, psychological warfare, roads, commodities distribution, port affairs, and education, and by the end of the month, the council was prepared to expand its activities even further.

*The I Corps Joint Coordinating Committee which was established to provide liaison and direction to the various U.S. and South Vietnamese military and civilian agencies' assistance programs, poses for a group picture in August 1966. LtCol Donald L. Evans, the recorder of the committee, is third from the left in the back row, and MajGen Lewis B. Robertshaw, Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, the chairman of the committee, is fourth from right in the front row.*

Marine Corps Photo A801957 (LtCol R.J. O'Leary)



On 3 August, Mr. Gordon suggested that the JCC should concern itself with all of I Corps. He observed that, until now, the cities of Da Nang and Hue, and the Marines TAORs had received most of the council's attention. He stated that the JCC, as the overseeing body, could function more significantly if it considered all projects in the context of all of I Corps. Major General Robertshaw, Commanding General of the 1st MAW and permanent chairman of the JCC, agreed with Gordon's remarks and suggested that the group should hold one meeting a month in a different provincial capital to give the South Vietnamese provincial officials and their American advisors the opportunity to discuss their particular problems with the JCC.<sup>50</sup> The JCC concurred with General Robertshaw's suggestion. For the rest of the

year, it held its monthly meeting in a different provincial capital, on a rotating basis.

In addition, the JCC encouraged the provinces to establish their own committees to coordinate Revolutionary Development efforts at the provincial level. By the end of December, three provincial committees had been formed. Although the provincial committees mirrored the organization, mission, and functions of the I Corps JCC, they were not subordinate to the larger council, but operated independently. The important aspect of both the I Corps JCC and the provincial committees was that they provided a vehicle for the coordination of the military and civilian aspects of pacification, and at the time the only such organizations at the corps and province levels in South Vietnam.

## CHAPTER 15

# Pacification, the Larger Perspective

### *Pacification Receives Priority—Reorganization and Support of Revolutionary Development—Measurements of Progress*

#### *Pacification Receives Priority*

The actual pacification gains in 1966 were relatively modest. Although the government had hoped to have placed Revolutionary Development teams in over 300 villages by the end of the year, the Vietnamese were only to fulfill approximately one-third of this goal. General Westmoreland estimated that the percentage of the South Vietnamese population that lived in relative security had risen from 50 percent to approximately 60 percent, due largely to the presence of American troops, rather than to any effort on the part of the Vietnamese themselves.<sup>1</sup> The

major element of change in pacification during 1966 was the redirection and new emphasis given to the entire concept by MACV and the South Vietnamese.

The February Honolulu Conference established six primary aims to be accomplished by the end of 1966. Four of these pertained to defeating the enemy's main force units and to opening up lines of communication in the country. The other two applied to the "other war" being waged in the countryside. The allies were to expand secured areas and the government was to complete the pacification of high priority areas.<sup>2</sup>

In April 1966, Deputy Ambassador William Porter established a special task force to determine American interagency priorities to support the South Vietnamese Revolutionary Development Program.

*President Johnson (center of picture with back to camera) meets informally with South Vietnamese leaders and Adm Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command, in Honolulu during February 1966. Seated to the left of the President is the South Vietnamese Chief of State, Nguyen Van Thieu, and on the right is Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky. Adm Sharp is on the sofa facing the President. MACV was a subordinate unified command under Adm Sharp.*

Marine Corps Historical Center



This group made its report in July and in its introduction declared:

After some 15 months of rapidly growing U.S. military and political commitment to offset a major enemy military effort, the RVN has been made secure against the danger of military conquest, but at the same time it has been subjected to a series of stresses which threaten to thwart U.S. policy objectives. . . .<sup>3</sup>

The task force stated that the lack of success was due to a variety of reasons, but in essence, should be attributed to the fact that the South Vietnamese had provided relatively little protection for the hamlets. In its report, the committee made 35 recommendations, which it divided into 16 "highest priority" tasks, followed by 10 "high priority" tasks, and finally a nine-point list of lesser priority programs. One Defense Department historian noted that in at least one of the 35 different priorities one could fit nearly every program and policy then pursued in Vietnam.<sup>4</sup> Although the committee's report lacked a degree of focus, many of its recommendations were accepted. One of these was the formation of still another study group to examine the roles and missions of each of the military and paramilitary organizations in Vietnam.

In July, the U.S. Mission Council directed a staff member, Army Colonel George D. Jacobson, to head an interagency committee which was to study the entire problem of Revolutionary Development. The committee submitted its findings and recommendations to Deputy Ambassador Porter on 24 August. The study group warned that the Revolutionary Development cadres were not a panacea in themselves. According to the study, Revolutionary Development demanded a radical reform within both the Government of Vietnam and its armed forces for success. The committee noted that such a radical change in the government and armed forces was very unlikely, unless the U.S. military and civilian officials exerted strong pressure on the Vietnamese at a very high level. Jacobson's group emphasized that the goal of the Americans in Vietnam was the establishment of a South Vietnamese Government which was capable of gaining popular support and winning the war. The committee commented that although American forces should have the destruction of the enemy's main forces as their primary mission, U.S. troops could join with local ARVN and paramilitary forces in clearing operations

to support Revolutionary Development. The study group specifically cited the Marine combined action and County Fair programs as activities to be encouraged.

The roles and mission group placed major emphasis upon changing the role of the Vietnamese Army. Analyzing the course of the war, the study panel noted that the ARVN had played only a minor part in brunting the challenge of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong regular forces. On the other hand, most of the war against the local guerrillas in the countryside had fallen upon the shoulders of the regional and popular force militiamen, who, by themselves, were unable to meet the challenge. The committee strongly urged that the entire orientation of the regular South Vietnamese Army be directed toward providing security for revolutionary development. Through coordination with the local government forces, the Army could conduct aggressive small-unit operations, night and day, in and around government-controlled hamlets and villages, as well as in areas to be pacified. The report called for an overhaul of the South Vietnamese Army command system in relation to pacification. According to the group's recommendations, most of the ARVN combat battalions should be assigned to area commanders for extended periods of time and Army division commanders should not be permitted to withdraw those battalions during that specified assignment. The aim was to remove the division commanders from the Revolutionary Development chain of command. It was the belief of the study group members that ARVN division commanders and staffs were preoccupied with the large-unit war and would not or could not give revolutionary development the attention it required.<sup>5</sup>

Although General Westmoreland disagreed with the recommendation to take away the division commanders' responsibility for pacification, he, too, was arriving at the opinion that the South Vietnamese Army should be reoriented toward support of Revolutionary Development. In fact, this was to be the main thrust of the U.S.-South Vietnamese Combined Campaign Plan for 1967. The MACV staff had started its planning for 1967 during the spring of 1966 and by midsummer most of the concepts had been worked out. On 7 July, the Mission Council authorized General Westmoreland to establish a planning group to coordinate U.S. planning for Revolutionary Development and to participate with



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*U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk (center of picture) confers in Saigon with South Vietnamese Prime Minister Ky and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Ambassador Lodge was a strong proponent of an active pacification program.*

the Vietnamese in forming the 1967 Revolutionary Development plan.

On 10 August, U. S. Army Major General John C. Tillson III, the MACV J-3, reported to the Mission Council on the progress of the planning effort for 1967. He noted that the MACV concept was coordinated closely with the Jacobson Task Force on Roles and Missions. General Tillson told the Council members that the American staff proposed to the Vietnamese that the ARVN assume the primary mission of direct support for Revolutionary Development, while U.S. military forces met the threat of the VC/NVA main forces and carried offensive operations into the enemy's base areas. According to Tillson, General Westmoreland had already reached an agreement with General Vien of the Vietnamese General Staff that the ARVN would devote at least half of its effort in the I, II, and III Corps areas to direct support of Revolutionary Development. In the Mekong Delta, or IV Corps, where there were no U.S. troops at the time, the South Vietnamese Army was to allocate at least 25 percent of its force to pacification. General Tillson indicated that greater emphasis on the pacification program on the part of the Vietnamese Army would require some changes of South Vietnamese attitudes.<sup>6</sup>

General Westmoreland summed up the entire concept of the strategy that the allied forces were to

follow in a message to Admiral Sharp on 26 August. He stated that American forces would provide the shield behind which the South Vietnamese could shift their troops in direct support of Revolutionary Development. The MACV commander declared, "Our strategy will be one of a general offensive with maximum practical support to area and population security in further support of Revolutionary Development."<sup>7</sup> Although emphasizing Revolutionary Development, General Westmoreland continued to stress that American forces, in coordination with the Vietnamese, had to take the fight to the enemy "by attacking his main forces and invading his base areas."<sup>8\*</sup> He declared that there could be no Revolutionary Development unless the

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\*General Greene, the Marine Corps Commandant during this period, observed in his comments that Westmoreland's strategy as outlined in the message to Admiral Sharp was "Still the search and destroy concept." Greene believed that the South Vietnamese Armed Forces at the time were unable on their own to support Revolutionary Development and that "Westmoreland's 'shield' should have been established on the perimeter of secured areas and great effort devoted to bringing the people into the national fold. . . . The goal should have been positive local security for the population in the villages and hamlets," and that not enough U.S. forces were providing area security. Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 5May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

enemy's main force units were prevented from gaining access to the populated areas. In an appendage to the message, Ambassador Lodge indicated his concurrence with the overall MACV strategy, although stressing more than Westmoreland the importance of pacification. The Ambassador wrote:

After all, the main purpose of defeating the enemy through offensive operations against his main forces and bases must be to provide the opportunity through Revolutionary Development to get at the heart of the matter, which is the population of RVN.<sup>9</sup>

By this time, the combined planning for 1967 was well under way. On 17 September, the MACV and the South Vietnamese staffs published the first draft of the Combined Campaign Plan and submitted it for staffing and coordination. During the following week, representatives from both Vietnamese and American commands visited each of the corps areas and presented copies of the draft plan to the Vietnamese Corps commanders and the American component commands. By the first week in October, all echelons of the Vietnamese and MACV chain of command had commented on the overall plan. In the interim, the Joint U.S. Agency Planning Group, in coordination with General Thang's ministry, had designated the four national priority areas and developed the general guidelines for Revolutionary Development in 1967.<sup>10\*</sup> After incorporating these concepts, as well as the comments from the Vietnamese and American field commanders, the final version of the plan was prepared and on 7 November, General Westmoreland and General Vien, as Chief of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, signed the document in a formal ceremony.

The signing of the combined plan was only the beginning of the real work in forming the strategy for the next year. Much of this burden fell upon the major subordinate American and South Vietnamese commanders who had to prepare their own plans in accordance with the new guidelines. The combined

plan's reemphasis on pacification, redirecting the Vietnamese Army from search and destroy operations to the support of Revolutionary Development, caused further complications. As a result, the military planners had to take into consideration the provincial Revolutionary Development programs which had yet to be completed. On 14 November, General Thang, accompanied by members of his staff and both American civilian and military advisors, began to visit each of the 44 provinces to review and approve provincial Revolutionary Development plans.

One week later, General Westmoreland briefed the Mission Council on the allied objectives as outlined in the new plans. He explained that the primary mission of the Vietnamese Armed Forces was to support the Revolutionary Development activities, with particular emphasis upon the national priority areas. American forces were to reinforce the Vietnamese Army, but destruction of the Viet Cong and NVA main force and base areas was their primary mission. According to the plan, there was to be no clear-cut division of responsibility. ARVN forces would still conduct search and destroy missions while the American forces would continue to provide direct support and assistance to Revolutionary Development activities.

The plan contained two significant innovations. It required the Vietnamese and American subordinate commands to prepare supporting plans designed specifically to accomplish the objectives of the various provincial Revolutionary Development plans. The combined plan also required quarterly reports which would indicate progress in achieving these goals.<sup>11</sup>

On 20 December, General Thang had completed the review of most of the provincial plans. With the reception of the various subordinate campaign plans, on 29 December, General Westmoreland signed a combined MACV/JGS directive which required the preparation of sector security plans to coordinate military support of Revolutionary Development in each province. This directive was published the next month. By the end of the year, the Vietnamese general staff announced that 40 to 50 ARVN battalions were to provide security for the pacification effort in the selected priority areas.

South Vietnamese mobile training teams had already been established to instruct ARVN battalions in Revolutionary Development. These teams

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\*The national priority areas remained much the same as they had been during 1966, although there was some expansion in all of the corps areas with the exception of ICTZ. There was to be no overall Revolutionary Development GVN Plan for 1967. Instead the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, assisted by the Joint U.S. Agency Planning Group, was to develop detailed guidelines for provincial RD plans. Each province then was to develop its individual plan for Revolutionary Development. The aggregate of the 44 provincial plans was to constitute the Vietnamese Government's RD plan.

were to indoctrinate the South Vietnamese troops with a positive attitude toward the population as well as understanding of the pacification mission. All Vietnamese maneuver battalions, with the exception of the general reserve, were slated to receive this training.

*Reorganization and Support  
of Revolutionary Development*

Throughout the latter half of 1966, the Americans and South Vietnamese continued to adjust and examine their pacification organizations and concepts, while still planning for 1967. General Westmoreland, in a message to Admiral Sharp, explained that Revolutionary Development goals and supporting plans were nonexistent when the 1966 combined plan was developed. He noted that in the period from March to December 1966 goals were changed three times. He declared that the 1966 military buildup provided the necessary security which permitted American and South Vietnamese commands to turn their attention toward Revolutionary Development.<sup>12</sup> The general observed that very often Revolutionary Development had not functioned properly because of a lack of command interest, but he believed that with the renewed emphasis upon pacification since July, "the overall organization appears to be functioning more effectively."<sup>13</sup>

One of the basic changes that the South Vietnamese made during the year was to expand General Thang's authority. On 12 July, his title was changed from Minister for Revolutionary Development to Commissioner-General for Revolutionary Development. The new title included responsibility for the Ministries of Public Works, Agriculture, and Administration in addition to his own ministry. Two months later, his authority was expanded again; on 23 September he became Assistant to the Chief, Joint General Staff for Territorial Affairs and Pacification. General Thang still retained control of Revolutionary Development, but had gained the additional responsibility for the development of military policy in support of Revolutionary Development. His new powers also made him responsible for the training, disposition, and employment of the South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces.

The purpose of the reorganizations was to provide the South Vietnamese with a centrally directed

pacification program which could respond to local needs. General Thang organized Revolutionary Development councils on district, province, and corps levels. The chairman of each district council automatically became a member of his provincial council. In like fashion, the chairman of each succeeding council became a member of the next higher level council. General Thang served as Secretary General of the National Central Council and the Revolutionary Development Ministry was the executive agency of the National Council. On each level, the military commander who was responsible for overall security was also a council member, thus integrating the military and civilian aspects of pacification.

During this period, General Westmoreland also modified his 1966 plans to include stronger support for Revolutionary Development. On 20 July, the MACV commander issued a directive outlining the planning programs for his staff. The order, in no uncertain terms, stated that all MACV concepts and plans ". . . must be closely integrated with and support the National Revolutionary Development Program."<sup>14</sup> General Westmoreland noted in his 26 August message to Admiral Sharp that his Southwest Monsoon Planning Directive for the period 1 May through 31 October 1966, which supplemented the 1966 combined plan, required general security and support of Revolutionary Development. Although the overall strategy was to contain the enemy through spoiling attacks against his main force units, the American command was to use all available remaining units for area and population security in support of pacification. The MACV commander declared that all had not gone as planned:

The threat of the enemy forces (VC and NVA) has been of such magnitude that fewer friendly troops could be devoted to general area security and support of Revolutionary Development than visualized at the times our plans were prepared for the period.<sup>15</sup>

In the other supplemental plan for 1966, the Northeast Monsoon Campaign Plan covering the period 1 November 1966 to 1 May 1967, General Westmoreland intended to continue a general offensive "with maximum practical support of . . . Revolutionary Development."<sup>16</sup> He visualized that a large number of American maneuver battalions would be committed to TAOR operations. Their missions were to encompass base security as well as

support of Revolutionary Development. The American forces were to conduct numerous patrols throughout their TAORs, while at the same time maintaining an active civic action program. U.S. troops were to work in close association with ARVN and the local militia, bolstering the South Vietnamese combat effectiveness. Westmoreland believed that American division commanders, working in close association with their ARVN counterparts, would be able to influence the South Vietnamese to pay more attention to pacification.<sup>17</sup>

Throughout the remainder of the year, General Westmoreland periodically reported on the continuing participation of American troops in support of the pacification program. On 16 September, he informed Admiral Sharp that during the period 28 August-3 September, 73 U.S. battalion days were devoted to pacification. He indicated that he planned to employ as many as half of the American infantry battalions to support pacification in their respective TAORs.<sup>18</sup> On 19 September, he told Ambassador Lodge that approximately 40 percent of the U.S. forces were engaged in providing area security, while the other 60 percent were involved in offensive operations against main force units.<sup>19</sup> A few weeks later, Westmoreland indicated to Admiral Sharp that although units with the priority mission of security would be employed against enemy main force troops, they would not be committed out of their TAORs for extended periods of time.<sup>20</sup> General Westmoreland believed the basic contribution of the American forces was their success against regular enemy units, and he contended that this success permitted the development of plans to assign the South Vietnamese Army to Revolutionary Development protection in 1967.<sup>21</sup>

The most important changes in the U.S. pacification organization were to be made in the civilian organization in South Vietnam. For some time, senior American officials had believed that the American civilian apparatus in support of South Vietnamese Revolutionary Development needed better coordination and direction. In mid-August, Presidential advisor Robert W. Komer prepared a memorandum entitled "Giving a New Thrust to Pacification," in which he proposed three alternative means of providing central direction to the pacification effort. These were:

Alternative one—Put Porter in charge of all advisory and pacification activities, including the military.

Alternative two—Unifying the civilian agencies into a single civilian chain of command, and strengthen the military internally—but leave civilian and military separate;

Alternative three—Assign responsibility for pacification to Westmoreland and MACV, and put the civilians in the field under his command.<sup>22\*</sup>

The significance of these proposals was that alternatives two and three foreshadowed the actual changes that were to occur. At the Manila Conference, the South Vietnamese leaders vowed their intent to commit ARVN forces to clear and hold operations in support of Revolutionary Development. Shortly afterwards, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk sent a joint message to Ambassador Lodge directing him to consolidate U.S. civilian support of Revolutionary Development under one office.

According to the authors of the *Pentagon Papers*, "this cable was not repeated to Saigon until after the Manila Conference; presumably in the intervening period, the President had a chance to talk to Lodge and Westmoreland about the matter, since they were both at Manila. . . ."<sup>23</sup> The President arrived in the Philippines on 23 October. The seven-nation conference (the United States, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, Republic of Vietnam, Republic of the Philippines, and Republic of Korea) took place on 24-25 October.<sup>24</sup>

One month later, Ambassador Lodge announced the formation of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO). This office, as an Embassy activity, was to direct all American civilian support of Revolutionary Development. The deputy director of USAID in South Vietnam, L. Wade Lathram, became the first director of the new organization. One of the new

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\*In its comments, the Center of Military History observed that Presidential advisor Komer had agitated for increased support of pacification long before his August memorandum. Several U.S. civilian agencies, specifically the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, "had a stake in some aspect of the pacification process [in Vietnam], and it was the lack of focus of their efforts as well as those of the U.S. military that eventually prompted the President to integrate civil and military support of pacification under Westmoreland and to appoint Komer as Westmoreland's deputy for Pacification." CMH, Comments on draft MS, dtd 17May78 (Vietnam Comment File). For a detailed study of the reorganization of the pacification program, see: Thomas W. Scoville, "Reorganizing for Pacification Support," MS (to be published by CMH).

features of the reorganization was the appointment of a regional director to each of the four corps areas, with full authority over all American civilians in his respective region and responsible directly to Latham.

Latham's organization was to last only a few months. In May 1967, Presidential advisor Komer's third alternative was adopted. General Westmoreland assumed full control of both the American civilian and military pacification effort. Komer became General Westmoreland's Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), with the rank of ambassador, and assumed full responsibility for the entire program.

*Measurements of Progress*

Since 1964, MACV had issued a monthly report, which attempted to depict in map form the status of pacification in South Vietnam. The map showed areas under five categories: 1. pacified; 2. undergoing pacification; 3. cleared of significant VC military units; 4. controlled by neither GVN nor the VC; and, 5. controlled by the VC. Although the American command together with the Embassy made minor modifications in format during 1965 and early 1966, Washington authorities had serious reservations about the objectivity and accuracy of the pacification reporting system.<sup>25</sup>

Independently, the Marine Corps developed its own criteria for pacification in the I Corps TAORs. In February 1966, General Walt inaugurated a reporting system which required subordinate commands to submit a monthly analysis of the degree of pacification in each village in its area of operations. The analysis was made on the basis of five general progress indicators:

1. Destruction of enemy units
2. Destruction of enemy infrastructure
3. GVN establishment of security
4. GVN establishment of local government
5. Degree of development of New Life Program

Each indicator was given a value of 20 points, with 100 points for the entire system. Each general criteria included a further breakdown. Under the heading of "Establishment of Local Government," there were the following subdivisions:

- a. Village chief and council in office . . . . . 4 points
- b. Village chief residing in village . . . . . 3 points
- c. Hamlet chiefs and councils in office . . . . . 4 points

- d. Hamlet chiefs residing in hamlet . . . . . 4 points
- e. Psychological operations and information program established . . . . . 3 points
- f. Minimum social and administrative organization . . . . . 2 points
- TOTAL . . . . . 20 points<sup>26</sup>

Each component of the system was dependent on the other, providing a balance to the total picture. No great achievement in the category "Establishment of Local Government" could be expected unless advances had also been made in the first category, "Destruction of Enemy Units." A high score in "Establishment of New Life Program Development" would only be possible if it were accompanied by gains in security and the establishment of local government apparatus in the villages. A score of 60 points for a village indicated that a "firm GVN/US influence" had been established, and if a village attained the mark of 80 points, it could be considered pacified.

The formulation of the Marine Corps indices of progress was to have an impact that extended beyond the confines of I Corps. In Washington, the Administration had established an interdepartmental committee, headed by George Allen of the Central Intelligence Agency, to come up with a common denominator to measure progress. The Allen study group visited III MAF in May and borrowed freely from the Marine system in preparing its own measurement indices. The result was the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). After a field test in South Vietnam, the U.S. Mission Council, on 13 December, approved the implementation of HES throughout the country as soon as practical.<sup>27</sup>

Although the Allen concept had some very striking similarities to the Marine evaluation system, there were also some basic differences. The most important of these were the assigned report originators and the primary units to be measured. In the Marine report, the Marine field commander attempted to grade the pacification progress of each village in his TAOR. On the other hand, the HES report was made by the U.S. district advisor in conjunction with the South Vietnamese authorities; the American advisor and his Vietnamese counterpart attempted to evaluate each individual hamlet within their district.

There were other differences between the two reporting systems. HES utilized a letter grading procedure to measure the rate of pacification progress, as compared to the Marine numerical designation.

The HES grades ran from A to E with an A-rated hamlet indicating the highest degree of pacification. Yet, according to one Marine Corps source, both evaluation reports eventually complemented one another and told much the same story.<sup>28</sup>

Both reports were attempting to measure what was many was unmeasurable: how to quantify security, or how to give a numerical rating or letter grade to a man's devotion to a cause. Marine staff officers raised these same questions. At a 3d Marine Division briefing in April 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. McCarthy, the division civil affairs officer, observed:

We are required to furnish monthly, a report on the pacification progress of villages located in areas in which we operate. . . . As you can see, it requires a good deal of detailed information about each village and assigns a weight to each item. The total apparently gives a rating of pacification progress. This bothers us a good deal because it is difficult for us to obtain accurate data and the report is only a best estimate on our part. In many cases the score does not represent the real situation. Additionally, there is at least an inference that we are engaged in pacification operations in those villages upon which we report. In most cases this is not true; we are merely providing a modicum of security and conducting some military civic action. We are not equipped, for example, to remove the VC infrastructure, the key element of any pacification operation. We understand that a great deal of credence is placed in this report and that it was the forerunner of the even more detailed hamlet evaluation report which must now be completed every month by subsector and sector advisors. We recognize the pressures for quantifying this information but we hope that those at higher echelons are fully aware of the problems that are inherent in such an approach.<sup>29</sup>

The briefer's remarks placed the measurement reports in perspective. Both evaluation systems were useful tools; they provided American and South Vietnamese commanders and officials with an educated guess about where problems existed and where progress had been made; but the emphasis is on the word "guess." Both reports attempted to establish rational criteria to indicate the status of each village or hamlet. What could not be assessed was the fact that an individual's sense of security and loyalty was not necessarily dependent upon appeals to reason, but also depended upon emotional and psychological factors. The reports were able to furnish general trends in a given area, but could not be an absolute replica of reality, and indeed in most cases were inflated.<sup>30</sup> One Marine general noted, "There are various indices by which a hamlet is judged 'secured' or 'pacified': one of the most pragmatic



Marine Corps Photo A188021  
*LtCol Warren P. Kitterman, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, presents a gift to an elder of a Vietnamese hamlet in the Chu Lai sector. Progress in pacification depended very heavily on the presence of the Marine battalions.*

and useful is whether or not the chief sleeps in his hamlet at night."<sup>31</sup>

Much of the pacification program depended on whether the hamlet or village chief backed it and whether he felt secure in his position. Lieutenant Colonel Warren P. Kitterman, the commander of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, remembered that one hamlet chief told him: "I believe in what you are doing and will cooperate in every way; however, if I openly endorse your presence, what happens to me when you are gone?" The Marine battalion departed Chu Lai for Da Nang in early 1967 and Kitterman recalled: "The chief reminded me of what he had said, with a smile on his face. I understood."<sup>32</sup> This incident in microcosm illustrated the mercurial quality of pacification progress.

PART VII  
SUPPORTING THE TROOPS



## CHAPTER 16

# Marine Aviation in 1966

*Wing Organization and Expansion—The Pilot Shortage—Marine Aircraft: The New and the Old—Relations with the Seventh Air Force—Marine Air Control Systems—Air Defense—Air Operations*

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### *Wing Organization and Expansion*

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was a widely dispersed organization in January 1966. Its headquarters, two fixed-wing tactical groups, MAGs-11 and -12, and two helicopter groups, MAGs-16 and -36, were all operating in I Corps in support of III MAF ground units. One helicopter squadron, HMM-363, was at Qui Nhon in II Corps under the operational control of the Commanding General, U.S. Field Forces, Vietnam. In addition, several other wing organizations, including the helicopter squadron serving with the Special Landing Force of the Seventh Fleet, were located outside Vietnam. Most of the out-of-country wing elements operated under the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear), commanded by Colonel Harry W. Taylor, at Iwakuni, Japan. At this time, 1st MAW (Rear) consisted of Marine Wing Service Group-17 and one fixed-wing group, MAG-13, at the Marine Air Station, Iwakuni, and a Marine transport refueling squadron, VMGR-152, a Marine air control squadron, MACS-6, and the helicopter squadrons at Futema, Okinawa. According to Colonel Taylor, General McCutcheon, the wing commander, in actual practice still retained direct control of the units of the 1st MAW (Rear):

He directed the rotation of fixed-wing squadrons. He delegated and relieved the SLF helo squadrons. He transferred people back and forth. He directed the utilization of the KC-130s on Okinawa.<sup>1</sup>

The III MAF staff noted with concern that the wide dispersal of the wing had caused some fragmentation of the Marine air-ground team. Colonel Edwin H. Simmons, the III MAF G-3, observed in January 1966 that the dispersal and varied responsibilities of the wing, "although not precluding adequate support for III MAF, still had a detrimental ef-

fect on the Marine command's capability to pursue its primary mission."<sup>2</sup> General McCutcheon later observed that the wing's size had increased to such an extent that his staff could not be expected to manage men and equipment spread all over the Pacific.<sup>3</sup>

To ease General McCutcheon's burden, General Krulak ordered the dissolution of the 1st MAW (Rear) on 15 April. Colonel Taylor became the 1st MAW Chief of Staff while the commanding officer of MAG-13, Colonel Edwin A. Harper, became the senior Marine aviation officer in the Western Pacific outside Vietnam. He was responsible for the Marine aviation units not "in-country" and he reported directly to the newly reactivated 9th MAB.\* Colonel Harper and his successor, Colonel Douglas D. Petty, Jr., were charged with the administrative tasks pertaining to wing aviation not in Vietnam. In addition, MAG-13 served as a home base for squadrons as they rotated to and from Vietnam.\*\*

The 1st MAW still continued to grow during 1966. In January, the wing had eight helicopter squadrons and eight fixed-wing squadrons in Vietnam. By the end of the year, the number had grown to 21, 10 helicopter squadrons and 11 fixed-wing squadrons. An additional group headquarters also was added. Colonel Petty brought MAG-13 to Chu

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\*The 9th MAB was reactivated on 1 March 1966 and eventually assumed command of those major Marine ground and air components in the Western Pacific that were not deployed to Vietnam, with the exception of the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa. For further discussion of the 9th MAB see Chapter 17. Another exception was MWSG-17. Although at Iwakuni until September, it remained under the direct operational control of the 1st MAW throughout this period.

\*\*The intratheater squadron rotation program was similar to that later inaugurated by the infantry units. Helicopter squadrons rotated from Futema, Okinawa, to either Vietnam or the Special Landing Force of the Seventh Fleet and vice versa. The fixed-wing squadrons rotated from Iwakuni, Japan, to Vietnam and back again.



Marine Corps Photo A421458  
*Col Douglas D. Petty, Jr. (left), Commanding Officer, MAG-13, poses upon his arrival at Chu Lai Airfield with the 1st Wing commander, MajGen Louis B. Robertshaw. The completion of the 10,000-foot main runway at Chu Lai in September permitted the stationing of another fixed-wing aircraft group at the base.*

Lai in September 1966.\* The wing's personnel strength was over 15,000 in December, an increase of nearly 6,000 over the January figure.

### *The Pilot Shortage*

The rapid deployment of Marine aviation units to Vietnam caused serious personnel problems. During his October visit to Vietnam, General Krulak noted that the two helicopter groups, MAGs-16 and -36, faced shortages in both pilots and certain critical ground personnel. The wing commander, Major General Louis B. Robertshaw, who had relieved General McCutcheon on 16 May, expressed his con-

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\*The completion of the permanent 10,000-foot airfield at Chu Lai, in addition to the SATs field, provided the additional space to accommodate MAG-13. MAG-15's Headquarters arrived at Iwakuni from the U.S. and relieved MAG-13 as the control headquarters for 1st Marine Aircraft Wing aviation outside Vietnam.

cern to Krulak about the adequacy of the pilot replacement program. While visiting one of the Marine attack squadrons, General Krulak took the opportunity to have an informal discussion with the officers. He later remarked:

It was a fine group, and I gained many impressions from them; none particularly new. Their morale is high. None of them feel that they are working too hard, and all of them feel that their equipment is adequate. They are convinced of the wisdom of our actions in Vietnam and proud of their unit and loyal to the Marine Corps. However, several things trouble them, and it is these things which are causing much of our personnel attrition. Specifically they are apprehensive of the frequency with which they are going to have to return to Vietnam for another tour. They certainly do not like the thought of coming back twice before everyone else has gone once.<sup>4</sup>

By October, the pilot shortage had become so acute that the Department of Defense announced on the 17th that it would keep approximately 500 pilots and aviation maintenance officers in service for as long as an extra year.<sup>5</sup> In addition to deferring releases and retirements of Marine aviation officers, the Corps took other short-range actions to ease the situation. Certain aviation billets were filled by ground officers when feasible, and the number of pilots slated to enter professional schools was sharply reduced. Long-term measures included the shortening of the helicopter pilot training program, increasing the number of Marine pilot trainees at the Pensacola Naval Air Station, and turning over some of the training of jet pilots to the Air Force.<sup>6</sup>

Reviewing the major personnel events of the previous year at the July 1967 General Officers Symposium, Major General Jonas M. Platt, the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, stated that the pilot shortage occurred almost overnight. He believed that the rapid buildup of new aviation units, additional overseas deployments, and the active recruitment of pilots by commercial aviation companies placed an unexpected strain on Marine pilot resources.<sup>7</sup> At the same conference, General McCutcheon, now Deputy Chief of Staff (Air), sardonically remarked: "Surely everyone knows there is no pilot shortage; it is merely that requirements exceed resources." McCutcheon then declared:

Requirements increased due to increased deployments, need for a pipeline, and approval for activation of new units both permanent and temporary. Resources have not kept pace. A requested increase in the pilot training rate was refused. Retention of aviators on active duty fell far below our earlier projections. This triple squeeze left us in a real bind.<sup>8</sup>



Marine Corps Photo A421254

*A Marine Douglas A-4 Skyhawk makes a Morrest landing at the Chu Lai SATS Airfield, similar to a landing on a carrier deck. SATS translates into short airfield for tactical support and is an expeditionary airfield characterized by a portable aluminum runway and aircraft landing and recovery devices.*

#### *Marine Aircraft: The New and the Old*

Accompanying the growth in personnel and squadrons in Vietnam was the introduction of several new types of aircraft during the year. As General McCutcheon later explained:

Aviation is a dynamic profession. The rate of obsolescence of equipment is high and new aircraft have to be placed in the inventory periodically in order to stay abreast of the requirements of modern war. In 1965, the Corps was entering a period that would see the majority of its aircraft replaced within four years.<sup>9</sup>


The first of the new aircraft to arrive in 1966 was the Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight. On 8 March, Lieutenant Colonel Warren C. Watson's HMM-164 flew off the USS *Valley Forge* (LPH 8) with 24 Sea Knight helicopters and moved to the Marble Mountain Air Facility near Da Nang.\* On 22 May, a second CH-46 squadron, HMM-265, arrived at Marble

*A Marine Boeing Vertol CH-46 twin-turbine, tandem-rotor transport helicopter from HMM-164, the first CH-46 squadron to arrive in Vietnam, refuels at Dong Ha Airfield during Operation Reno in May 1966. The propeller-driven aircraft facing the helicopter is a Douglas A-1 Skyraider still being flown by the South Vietnamese Air Force and U.S. Air Force air commando squadrons in 1966.*

Marine Corps Photo A187150



\*The CH-46 aircraft was designed to carry a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops, approximately double the load of the older UH-34 helicopter transports. The CH-46 was a twin-turbine, tandem-rotor transport with a combat radius of 115 miles, and a cruising speed of 115 knots, approximately 25 knots faster than that of the UH-34.



Marine Corps Photo A421467

*A Marine mechanic makes adjustments on the rotor blades of a CH-46 helicopter at Marble Mountain Air Facility. During 1966, the Marines equipped these aircraft with newly designed air and fuel filters because of sand and dust getting into the engines and fuel systems. In 1967, rear tail sections on the aircraft began falling off, which required the Marine Corps to ground all CH-46s in Vietnam and return them to Okinawa for structural modification.*

Mountain. By the end of the year, there were four Marine Sea Knight squadrons in Vietnam, the two at Da Nang and HMMs-165 and -262 assigned to MAG-36 at Ky Ha.

After arriving in Vietnam, unforeseen technical difficulties developed with the CH-46. When operating close to the ground, the helicopter's rotors stirred up large quantities of sand and dirt which were sucked into the craft's compressor, burning out the engines. In May, a team of technical experts from the Boeing Vertol Corporation and the General Electric Corporation, the manufacturer of the turbine engine, arrived at Marble Mountain to investigate the situation. They devised an air filter to

be installed on the front of the engines. The first filter kits arrived in July. By this time, the Marines discovered that fine powdered sand and dust were also getting into the fuel system, causing erratic operation of the engines. By 21 July, the wing grounded all of the CH-46s, except for emergency flights. With the assistance of the Boeing Vertol Corporation and the Naval Air Systems Command, the Marines equipped all of the Sea Knight aircraft with both air and fuel filters by the end of September and solved these particular problems.<sup>10\*</sup>

Several new jet aircraft arrived in Vietnam during the latter part of 1966. These were the A6A Grumman Intruder attack aircraft;\*\* the EA6A, the electronic countermeasures version of the Intruder; and the RF-4B, the photo-reconnaissance model of the F4B Phantom II. The EA6A and RF-4Bs were assigned to VMCJ-1, providing the Marine Corps reconnaissance squadron with the most sophisticated aircraft in the U.S. inventory to carry out intelligence missions over both North and South Vietnam.

The arrival of VMF(AW)-242, the A6A Squadron, brought a much needed all-weather capability to the

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\*Colonel Robert J. Zitnik, who commanded VMO-6 and served on the MAG-36 staff in 1966, observed that "Sand and dirt damage was not new to helicopters. . . . Yet the H46 engines were the first engines to be damaged." Col Robert J. Zitnik, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File). The problem with the sand and dirt was not to be the last of the troubles for the CH-46. Both the CH-46A introduced in 1966 and the CH-46D, a newer and more powerful version, which entered Vietnam in 1967, were grounded during 1967 when tail sections on both models started falling off in flight. During the time the aircraft were down, the entire "fleet" of CH-46 helicopters in Vietnam was rotated to Okinawa for structural modification. For further discussion of the problems with the CH-46, see LtCol William R. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters, 1962-1973* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978), pp. 101-2, 121-24; LtCol Lane Rogers and Major Gary L. Telfer, draft MS, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967," Chapter 11. See also Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

\*\*The A6A Grumman Intruder was a twin-jet, low-level attack bomber specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completely obscured by weather or darkness. It was manned by a crew of two and could carry an 18,000-pound payload. It was equipped with a digital-integrated attack navigation system and a Kaiser electronic-integrated display system enabling the pilot to "see" targets and geographical features at night or in bad weather by means of two viewing screens in the cockpit which provided a visual representation of the ground and air below and in front of the aircraft.

wing. During the worst monsoon rains in December, the squadron's 12 A6As dropped nearly 38 percent of the total ordnance dumped over enemy targets by III MAF aircraft.<sup>11</sup> Major General Robertshaw, who just prior to assuming command of the wing had served a tour as Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) at Headquarters Marine Corps, in 1978 remembered that the A6As were introduced into Vietnam so as not to:

... deny support to Marines, yet subtle enough to protect them from Seventh Air Force's eager appetite to commit them primarily to the Northern Route Package Areas [selected bombing target areas in North Vietnam] prematurely. By installation of radar reflectors at various outposts and Special Forces forward bases and limiting their introduction north to the lower Route Package areas [targets in southern North Vietnam], an orderly progression to the most demanding capabilities of A6 [aircraft] was effected to final full exploitation.<sup>12</sup>

The arrival of the new aircraft did not mean the immediate retirement of the older craft. During 1966, the UH-34 transport helicopters continued to be the mainstay "in the troop lift department." One experienced helicopter commander commented that:

The H34s had been stripped of every possible item such as seat pads, windows, doors and whatever else could be spared in order to improve the troop lift capability. . . . These aircraft, with many times overhauled engines, were surprisingly effective under the extreme operating conditions—almost always at their maximum gross weight and frequently over the recommended hovering limits.<sup>13</sup>

*Two Sikorsky UH-34D Sea Horse transport helicopters are seen lifting off after bringing Marine riflemen into a landing zone. The older UH-34s continued to be the mainstay of helicopter troop lift during 1966.*

Marine Corps Photo A421623



Marine Corps Photo A421419

*A Marine F8-E Chance-Vought Crusader from VMF(AW)-232 prepares to attack a Viet Cong position in January 1966. Another Crusader, barely visible in the upper right of the picture, dropped the bomb which caused the explosion pictured here.*

One fixed-wing squadron, VMF(AW)-232, continued to fly the F-8E Chance-Vought Crusader.\* This swept-wing fighter, originally designed for high-speed aerial combat, nevertheless was a respectable close air support aircraft. It was equipped with 20mm cannon and was the only Marine aircraft in

\*The Crusader was eventually to be replaced by the F4B Phantom II.

Vietnam configured to carry a 2,000-pound bomb until the introduction of the A6A.

The workhorse for Marine close air support continued to be the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk. Colonel Jay W. Hubbard's MAG-12, which included four A-4 squadrons at Chu Lai, consistently maintained a high sortie rate. The A-4 was a small, highly maneuverable attack jet and extremely accurate bomber. It could carry a variety of ordnance, and its payload limitation was roughly 8,000 pounds.

The most versatile fixed-wing aircraft in the Marine inventory was the F-4B Phantom II. Although a relatively new addition to Marine aviation, Phantom squadrons were among the first to be deployed to Vietnam in 1965. By the end of 1966, new F-4B squadrons had arrived, one with MAG-11 at Da Nang and three with MAG-13 at Chu Lai. The F-4B was designed for both an air-to-air and air-to-ground role. It was one of the fastest interceptors in the world, but it could also carry a payload of nearly 16,000 pounds, second only to the A6A.

In addition to the 11 fixed-wing and seven helicopter transport squadrons, the 1st MAW by the end of the year had three observation squadrons

*Col Leslie E. Brown (right of picture), Commanding Officer, MAG-12, later relieved by Col Jay W. Hubbard, poses with his squadron commanders at Chu Lai in early 1966. The MAG-12 squadrons flew the highly maneuverable Douglas A-4 Skyhawk, which was the workhorse of Marine close air support in 1966.*

Marine Corps Photo A701486



Marine Corps Photo A189384

*An unarmed Bell UH-1E helicopter approaches an LZ in Operation Prairie. The unarmed "Hueys" were commonly called "Slicks," and used for a variety of missions, not the least of which was medical evacuation. Armed Hueys carried four fuselage-mounted M-60 machine guns and two to four 2.75-inch rocket pods to be used in LZ preparation and in a ground support role.*

(VMO) equipped with UH-1E helicopters.\* The Bell UH-1E or "Huey," as it was popularly known, was the only aircraft assigned to the observation squadrons. The VMO squadrons' mission had been extended beyond observation. Unarmed Hueys, commonly called "slicks," were used for a variety of purposes, not the least of which was medical evacuation. One former MAG-16 commander, Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor, remembered: "I recall having no "Hueys" at times for battalions, colonels, and generals. But the medevac helicopter was a sacred high-priority requirement."<sup>14</sup> Other Hueys were armed and assigned to provide helicopter escort, landing zone preparation, aircraft control for fixed-wing strikes, and close support of ground troops. The gunships were armed with four fuselage-mounted M-60 machine guns, two to four 2.75-inch

\*VMO-2 and -6 were located at Marble Mountain Air Facility at Da Nang and Ky Ha Air Facility at Chu Lai, respectively, during 1966. VMO-3 arrived at Chu Lai on 29 December 1966.



Marine Corps Photo A189763

*A Marine McDonnell F-4B Phantom II is shown in flight in April 1966. The Phantom was the most versatile of the Marine fixed-wing aircraft in 1966, designed as one of the fastest interceptors in the world and also capable of carrying a payload of 16,000 pounds.*

rocket pods, and two door M-60 machine guns—sufficient to provide an impressive volume of fire.

There was much debate within the Marine Corps about the use of the Huey as a close support weapon. Some commanders argued that there was a tendency on the part of some ground officers to call for Huey close air support when fixed-wing aircraft were available and more appropriate for the occasion.\*

In any event, the increased use of the Huey in a close air support and escort roles reduced its availability for observation and coordination missions. One 3d Marine Division staff officer, Colonel George E. Carrington, Jr., later commented that in

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\*General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps during this period, observed in his comments that some of the opposition to arming the UH-1Es, "was due to the availability of Army armed Hueys to support USMC requirements—"if the Army can provide, why should we?" In October 1964, General Greene had directed the development of a high priority project to develop a weapons kit for Marine Corps UH-1Es. Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 5May78 (Vietnam Comment File) and LtCol William R. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters, 1962-1973* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978) p. 89. For a further discussion of this subject see, "Armed Helicopters," Issues Section, *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1966, v. 50, no. 5, pp. 45-51 and Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*, pp. 85-91.

early 1966 the Marines were "short of AOs [air observers] and artillery observation spotter planes. The helicopters were too expensive, rare, and needed for other purposes and we suffered. . . ."<sup>15</sup> This situation was somewhat alleviated with the arrival in August of a detachment of 10 Cessna O-1C Birdog light fixed-wing observation aircraft which were assigned to Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS) 16 at Marble Mountain. By October, the detachment supported all three Marine enclaves as well as the 3d Marine Division (Forward) at Dong Ha.<sup>16</sup>

Several other independent detachments of specialized aircraft also operated with the wing and most were assigned to the H&MS of the various groups. A detachment of eight Sikorsky CH-37 helicopters was attached to H&MS-16. The CH-37s were being phased out of the Marine inventory and being replaced by the newer Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallions. The wing also had seven C-117 twin-engine Douglas Skytrain transports which were attached to each of the groups, one each to H&MS-11, -12, -13, -16, and -36, and two to H&MS-17. These transports made the routine administrative and logistic flights between the Marine bases and were also employed as flare planes for night operations. One Marine aviator remembered that the crews at



Marine Corps Photo A186825

*A heavy Sikorsky CH-37 twin-engine helicopter is seen recovering a damaged UH-34. The CH-37s were being phased out of the Marine inventory and being replaced by the newer Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion heavy helicopter.*

first threw the “flares out by hand until a more sophisticated chute device was made.”<sup>17</sup>

The KC-130 Hercules aircraft of VMGR-152 provided an even greater logistic lift capability for III MAF. With their 15-17-ton capacity, these transport planes shuttled men and material between bases in Vietnam, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Although permanently based on Okinawa, a detachment of four planes was always maintained at Da Nang. The KC-130 was primarily configured for in-flight refueling missions. In fact, it was this refueling capability of the Marine transports which originally allowed the Marine Corps to have the “Hercules” aircraft in its inventory. When the Marine Corps had initially obtained the aircraft there had been a debate between Air Force and Marine aviation circles whether the KC-130 was basically a tanker or a transport. The Marines used it as both.

#### *Relations with the Seventh Air Force*

A more significant debate between Marine and Air Force officers was over the control of Marine aviation in Vietnam. Much of this problem had been settled by the time the 9th MEB arrived at Da Nang in the spring of 1965. Admiral Sharp and General

Westmoreland, after some initial disagreement, worked out the basic guidelines in May 1965. Major General Joseph H. Moore, the Commanding General, 2d Air Division, later to become the Seventh Air Force, was assigned as the Deputy Commander USMACV (Air). In this capacity, he had “coordinating authority” for tactical air support in South Vietnam, but not operational control of Marine air.\* General McCutcheon, as Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, was the III MAF air commander under General Walt and controlled all aircraft operating in support of III MAF forces. Marine ground units had first priority on 1st MAF aircraft. General McCutcheon furnished General Moore with a copy of all 1st MAF mission orders in order to assist the latter with his coordinating responsibilities. Once the wing had determined the number of missions to be flown in support of III MAF, the Marines notified MACV of any excess sorties which were available. The 2d Air Division was then able to task these aircraft to support other U.S. or allied forces. On 13 July 1965, General Westmoreland promulgated these concepts in his MACV Aviation Directive 95-4.<sup>18\*\*</sup>

During 1965, Generals McCutcheon and Moore made one other major agreement pertaining to American aviation in Vietnam. This understanding applied to air defense operations in the event of North Vietnamese air attack against the south. The Marines recognized General Moore’s overall air defense responsibility in his capacity as Mainland Southeast Asia Air Defense Regional Commander. Questions, nevertheless, remained about how control was to be exercised. These were settled on 6 August 1965. The Air Force was to have overall air defense responsibility, while the Marine wing commander was to designate which forces under his com-

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\*JCS Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* defines coordinating authority as: “A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement.”

\*\*Although a new MACV directive 95-4 was promulgated on 25 June 1966, there was no change in the provisions relating to control of Marine air. The new order reflected the transformation of the 2d Air Division to the Seventh Air Force.

mand would participate in air defense. He agreed that the Air Force "would exercise certain authority over those designated resources to include scramble of alert aircraft, designation of targets, declaration of HAWK missile control status, and firing orders."<sup>19</sup> General McCutcheon observed that this understanding, combined with the MACV July directive, was to provide the basic policy for "command, control, and coordination of Marine aviation in Vietnam until early 1968 and they were entirely adequate as far as III MAF was concerned."<sup>20</sup>

The subject of air control was never a dead issue and the relationship between the Seventh Air Force and the Marines remained extremely sensitive throughout 1966. General Greene, the Marine Corps Commandant, remembered that on visits during the year to Saigon, he:

. . . contested this issue directly with General Westmoreland and General Moore. General Westmoreland always shifted the argument to General Moore—never making a decision about specifics himself. I became firmly convinced that General Moore was attempting to establish a precedent in Vietnam for taking complete control of Marine Corps aviation. . . .<sup>21</sup>

Major General Robertshaw, the wing commander, later wrote:

They [the Seventh Air Force] issued several directive messages limiting our freedom to bomb in and around the DMZ for instance. In each case we referred to 95-4, sent our reply to MACV vice Seventh Air Force who for some strange reason never used the MACV title in issuing such directives. Had he done so [limited the bombing] we would have been severely handicapped and might have had more trouble in conducting air operations as we desired within I Corps anywhere, anytime, and [against] any target. III MAF not only had the right to do so but the responsibility.<sup>22</sup>

Despite differences of opinion pertaining to the interpretation of the MACV directive, the fact remained that III MAF controlled Marine air until "single management" was introduced in the spring of 1968.

### *Marine Air Control Systems*

III MAF exercised control of its aviation assets in Vietnam through its tactical air direction center (TADC) at wing headquarters in Da Nang. The TADC monitored the employment of all Marine aircraft and determined what planes would be assigned to non-preplanned missions. The TADC carried out its mission through two subordinate agencies, the

tactical air operations center (TAOC) and the direct air support centers (DASCs).

While the TAOC, maintained by Marine Air Control Squadron 7 (MACS-7), was the wing's main control center for anti-air warfare and air traffic control, the DASCs were the centers for control of direct air support of ground forces. Two Marine air support squadrons (MASS-2 and -3) provided the personnel and equipment to operate and maintain the DASCs. Originally, a DASC was established with each of the two Marine divisions' organic fire support coordination centers at Da Nang and Chu Lai. When the 3d Marine Division moved to Phu Bai in October and assumed responsibility for the entire northern area, DASCs were established at the division's command posts at Phu Bai and at Dong Ha.

Sometimes smaller "modified" DASCs were created for special operations. For example, during Operation Double Eagle in January and February, General Platt's Task Force Delta established a "mini" DASC in the Johnson City logistic support area (LSA) so the task force could control aircraft assigned to it. During many other operations, airborne DASCs on board KC-130s were employed, when the distance from ground DASCs was such that normal ground-to-air communication was unreliable.

The Marine air support squadrons also provided air support radar teams (ASRTs) equipped with the TPQ-10 radar. The TPQ-10 equipment provided the Marine Corps with the capability to control air support regardless of weather conditions. With their radar the ASRTs could track and control an aircraft equipped with a receiver within a radius of 50 miles, and tell the pilot when to drop his ordnance. The A-4, A-6, and F-4B all carried these receivers. The Marines also used the TPQ-10 radar to guide helicopters to forward bases. By December 1966, the wing had five ASRTs in operation to provide an all-weather air support system to cover the entire ICTZ coastal region and much of the mountainous area to the west. A FMFPac report observed that during the worst of the monsoon season in I Corps, from October-December 1966, the teams controlled 4,993 sorties, 31 percent of the combat sorties flown by Marine aircraft.<sup>23</sup>

### *Air Defense*

In the unlikely event that the North Vietnamese decided to launch air strikes against vulnerable allied

targets in South Vietnam, the American command had made the necessary defensive arrangements and preparations to thwart any such attack. As the Mainland Southeast Asia Air Defense Regional Commander, the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force had the responsibility for air defense in South Vietnam. In I Corps, the Seventh Air Force exercised this jurisdiction through its control and reporting center (CRC) located on Monkey Mountain, east of the city of Da Nang on the Tiensha Peninsula. The air defense battle commander at the CRC reported directly to the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Command Center at Tan Son Nhut Airfield near Saigon. He had the authority to designate aircraft as hostile, to scramble alert aircraft, to establish weapons control status for the Marine Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalions (LAAMs), and to coordinate both fighter interceptors and surface-to-air missiles against enemy aircraft. At the end of 1966, the Seventh Air Force air defense commander in I Corps could call on 69 Marine fighters, 55 U.S. Air Force fighters, 88 U.S. Army multiple .50 caliber or 40mm antiaircraft weapons, and two U.S. Marine LAAM battalions armed with HAWK missiles.<sup>24\*</sup>

In I Corps, the major ground antiair defense was centered around the Marine 1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions, located at Da Nang and Chu Lai respectively. Both battalions had deployed to Vietnam in 1965. Indeed, the 1st Battalion was one of the first contingents to enter Vietnam, arriving at Da Nang in February 1965. In September 1965, the 2d Battalion established its base of operations at Chu Lai. Each battalion had three firing batteries and had as its basic load 108 HAWK missiles (36 per battery) and another 70 in reserve. Both battalions came under the Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1 for administrative control. Each battalion also established its own Antiaircraft Operations Center which was responsive to the Air Force CRC on Monkey Mountain for air defense control and coordination. Both battalions maintained liaison officers with the CRC to enhance this coordination.<sup>25</sup>

At the beginning of 1966, the 1st LAAM Battalion at Da Nang under Lieutenant Colonel Clyde



Marine Corps Photo A421300  
*Marines of the 2d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion at Chu Lai make adjustments to three HAWK missiles mounted on their pod. These mobile, surface-to-air guided missiles were designed to defend against enemy aircraft flying at low altitudes.*

L. Eyer\*\* had a total strength of 479 officers and men. Its Headquarters Battery and Battery A were located on the airfield itself while Battery B was on Hill 327 to the west of the airbase. Battery C was in the northern part of the Tiensha Peninsula to the east of the Air Force CRC. To increase the effectiveness of its defensive coverage, the battalion moved Battery A to new firing positions on Hill 724, north of the Hai Van Pass, in August, after the Seabees had hacked out a base camp for the battery in the rugged terrain. At the same time, the battalion created an Assault Fire Unit with 15 missiles, which in September deployed to Hill 55, south of Da Nang, where it provided coverage for the Vu Gia River Valley.<sup>26</sup>

At Chu Lai, the 2d Battalion, totaling about 460 officers and men under Major Edward F. Penico,\*\*\* remained in basically the same positions throughout the year. Battery A was in position on Ky Hoa Island

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\*The acronym HAWK stands for Homing-All-the-Way-Killer. The HAWK air defense is a mobile, surface-to-air guided missile system designed to defend against enemy low-flying aircraft and short-range rocket missiles.

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\*\*LtCol Eyer later in the year was relieved by Major Thomas G. Davis, who in turn was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Merton R. Ives.

\*\*\*Major Penico was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas I. Gunning at the end of July 1966.

north of Chu Lai while Batteries B and C were located respectively immediately north and south of the airfield. At the end of the year, the battalion planned to move Battery C to Hill 141, further southeast of the airfield to provide better antiair cover for the Song Tra Bong Valley.<sup>27</sup>

During the course of the year neither battalion had occasion to fire any of its missiles with the exception of the accidental discharge of two HAWKs in June at Da Nang. Both missiles "were command destructed after lift-off," with no damage done.<sup>28</sup> Each battalion, nevertheless, kept busy with antiair exercises and practice raids using Marine fixed-wing aircraft as "targets" to test the battalion control and communications system. For example, the 1st Battalion reported in December 1966 that since 1965 it had "engaged" 1,632 of the 1,751 "raids" conducted by friendly aircraft, a successful engagement percentage of 93.3 for that extended period.<sup>29</sup> The 2d Battalion at Chu Lai could boast of similar success.

By the end of 1966, the American command believed that its air defense capabilities were more than adequate to overcome any potential air threat. Specifically, in relation to the LAAM battalions, Admiral Sharp, on 27 August, in a reevaluation of Southeast Asia air defenses decided against a planned deployment of a fourth HAWK battery to each of the missile battalions.<sup>30</sup> Earlier, the battalions had received a new stock of missiles to replace their old, which were suspected of having cracked motor casings.<sup>31</sup> Major General Robertshaw, the 1st Wing commander, later observed that the LAAM battalions were "no small deterrent to the enemy. They had their moments, took their knocks, and prided themselves in being always ready."<sup>32</sup>

### *Air Operations*

While prepared defensively, the 1st MAW made a considerable offensive contribution to the overall U.S. military campaign in Vietnam during 1966. Marine helicopters transported both U.S. and allied forces into battle and sustained them logistically. Huey gunships provided close-in air cover while fixed-wing attack aircraft flew close air support, direct air support, and interdiction missions. Although its primary mission was the support of III MAF ground forces, the Marine wing in accordance with the MACV air directive played a significant role

in Seventh Air Force air operations, both in South Vietnam and out-of-country.

The statistics of Marine flight operations in 1966 present an almost herculean effort. Marine helicopters flew well over 400,000 sorties during the year, averaging more than 30,000 sorties a month. The number of Marine helicopter sorties reached over 40,000 in July when the ground war extended to the DMZ. In December, a fairly representative month, the wing's helicopters, in over 32,000 sorties of which 75 percent were in support of III MAF, transported over 47,000 passengers and lifted 3,549.9 tons of cargo. The Marines lost a total of 52 helicopters, 39 in combat, and had a total helicopter inventory in Vietnam at the end of the year of 234 aircraft.<sup>33</sup>

Fixed-wing jet operational statistics for 1966 also provide an impressive overview of that aspect of the Marine air war. Marine jets flew over 60,000 sorties during the year at a cost of 51 aircraft, 24 of which were shot down by enemy ground fire. Of this total number of sorties, approximately 43,000 supported III MAF and allied operations in I Corps while another 17,000 supported the Seventh Air Force air campaign over South Vietnam, Laos, and North Vietnam.<sup>34</sup>

During the first half of 1966, Marine senior commanders had become concerned about the number of missions that the 1st MAW contributed to the Seventh Air Force, especially to the bombing in the panhandle of southern Laos. In December 1965, as part of the overall "Steel Tiger" air interdiction campaign in Laos, General Westmoreland had inaugurated, with the implicit consent of the Laotian Government, a new bombing effort labeled "Tiger Hound." The concept called for Air Force small fixed-wing observation aircraft, flying up to 12 miles into southeastern Laos, to direct U.S. airstrikes on targets of opportunity.<sup>35</sup> Marine attack aircraft flew 3,629 Steel Tiger/Tiger Hound sorties in support of the Seventh Air Force during the first three months of 1966, over 25 percent of the total wing jet sorties for that period.<sup>36</sup>

Believing that the air campaign in Laos was having an impact on enemy infiltration, General Westmoreland in March presented a plan to Admiral Sharp and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to expand "Tiger Hound" operations to include the southern panhandle of North Vietnam, the so-called Route Package 1 (RP-1), extending 50 kilometers above the DMZ. Up

## 1st MAW Fixed-Wing Jet Sorties, 1966\*

Month	Total**	Support of III MAF and I Corps ARVN Units	Support of 2d AD/7th AF		
			Total	Steel Tiger/ Tiger Hound	Tally Ho/ Rolling Thunder
Jan	4171	2304	1867	1010	857
Feb	4164	2732	1432	960	472
Mar	5550	2546	3004	1659	1345
Apr	4957	2444	2513	1380	1133
May	4428	2518	1910	1134	776
Jun	4538	3028	1510	926	584
Jul	5570	4613	957	284	404
Aug	5761	4699	1062	9	793
Sep	5696	4796	900	16	825
Oct	4766	4154	612	72	535
Nov	5097	4452	645	56	576
Dec	5422	4648	774	233	518
Total	60120	42934	17186	7739	3651

\*Does not include ECM/ElInt or photographic sorties

\*\*Figures derived from 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec 1966

to this point, the air war over North Vietnam had been directly under the command of Admiral Sharp. Westmoreland, in effect, was asking to assume direct control of the air space over what he called the extended battlefield, the Laotian panhandle and southern North Vietnam. On 1 April, Admiral Sharp assigned to General Westmoreland the "primary responsibility for armed [air] reconnaissance and intelligence in the southernmost portion of Northern Vietnam." The other aspect of the Westmoreland plan continued to be discussed at the JCS and Department of Defense level.<sup>37</sup>

Just prior to Sharp's decision, Lieutenant General Krulak at FMFPac alerted the Commandant, General Greene, to the possibility of a new role for MACV in the air war over the north and the implications of such a role for Marine air. Krulak observed that although the 1st MAW was heavily committed to the "Steel Tiger" campaign over Laos, its activity in the "Rolling Thunder" strikes in the north had been limited to electronic intelligence and countermeasures and combat air patrols. While not voicing disagreement with an expanded MACV/Seventh Air Force air authority, Krulak was uneasy about Marine participation in a Seventh Air Force Rolling Thunder campaign. He stated: "There

will be the requirement for operating under two distinct sets of rules in two different geographical areas."<sup>38</sup>

At III MAF Headquarters, both General McCutcheon, the 1st Wing commander, and General Walt expressed reservations about the number of sorties that the wing supplied to the Seventh Air Force. On 7 April, McCutcheon radioed Krulak that he still had not heard from the Seventh Air Force about the way MACV would implement its air campaign in the north when it received the authority. The wing commander remarked, "I am sitting back on this one and waiting to see what they come up with." General McCutcheon then reported to Krulak the extent of Marine jet operations through March and declared that he was cutting down on the sortie rate, observing that he did not want to "push ops any higher and [did not] want to get in a bind on ordnance."<sup>39</sup>

Three days later, 10 April, the commander of the Seventh Air Force, General Moore, visited General Walt at Da Nang, and asked that the Marine command increase its monthly jet sorties for Seventh Air Force missions by 30 percent. Walt denied the request and took his case directly to General Westmoreland. The III MAF commander observed that during March, a record month for Marine fixed-

## VMCJ-1 Electronic Countermeasures, Electronic Intelligence, and Photo Sorties, 1966\*

Month and Aircraft Type	ECM in NVN		ElInt in NVN		ElInt in III MAF or In- Country		Photo support of III MAF	
	7th AF	7th Flt	7th AF	7th Flt	III MAF	In-Country	In-Country	Out-of-Country
<i>Jan66</i>								
EF10B	57	2	73					
RF8A							104	
<i>Feb66</i>								
EF10B	58	20	13	2	6			
RF8A							115	
<i>Mar66</i>								
EF10B	54	37	2			14		
RF8A							160	
<i>Apr66</i>								
EF10B	56	63	2	2				
RF8A							152	
<i>May66</i>								
EF10B	58	70	9			1		
RF8A							148	
<i>Jun66</i>								
EF10B	77	106	1					
RF8A							167	
<i>Jul66</i>								
EF10B	22	142	2		12			
RF8A							168	2
<i>Aug66</i>								
EF10B	15	219	2		1			
RF8A							175	3
<i>Sep66</i>								
EF10B	18	151	8		1			
RF8A							146	10
<i>Oct66</i>								
EF10B	9	94	6	4	8			
RF4B							2	
RF8A							141	2
<i>Nov66</i>								
EF10B	6	70		2	17			
EA6A	4	42	3		9			
RF4B							154	
RF8A							55	
<i>Dec66</i>								
EF10B	31	112			26			
EA6A	16	44			10			
RF4B								
RF8A							115	21
Totals	481	1172	121	10	90	15	1802	38

\*Figures from VMCJ-1 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66.

wing operations, the 1st MAW had given over half of its total sorties to the Seventh Air Force, of which over half supported the bombing campaign over Laos. General Walt frankly stated that he could not sustain that tempo of air operations. Walt estimated, given his resources in spare parts and ordinance, that he could only support a monthly rate of 4,700 sorties per month as compared to the 5,500 figure reached in March. Of these 4,700 sorties, the Marine command required about 2,500 for its own purposes. The remaining 2,000 sorties, Walt declared, would be given to MACV/Seventh Air Force: "You can frag us for whatever are deemed the priority targets, in or out of country. We will fly south, west, or north."<sup>40</sup>

True to Walt's word, 1st MAW fixed-wing attack aircraft during the next two months averaged a monthly sortie rate of 4,700, flying slightly above the mark in April and slightly below in May. Nearly half of these sorties were in support of the Seventh Air Force with close to 60 percent of those missions over Laos. General Krulak continued to worry about the implications of these statistics. In a message to General Walt on 10 June, he declared that he recognized the desire of III MAF to demonstrate Marine flexibility but wondered about the wisdom of providing such a large percentage of Marine fixed-wing operations to the Seventh Air Force. He observed that the CinCPac rationale for the number of Marine fixed-wing squadrons in Vietnam rested on the support required by III MAF ground forces. Krulak feared that the sortie figures could be used against the Marines in interservice differences over the employment of Marine air.<sup>41</sup>

The concerns voiced by Krulak soon became moot since the enemy buildup in northern I Corps absorbed more and more of the resources of both Marine air and ground units. In June, the wing flew over 4,500 jet sorties with over 65 percent of them in support of III MAF. During July, when the Marines began Operation Hastings in northern Quang Tri Province, the wing's attack sorties reached a peak of 5,570 with over 80 percent flown in support of Marine ground units. In Hastings alone, Marine jets flew 1,600 sorties, a record number up to that time for any one operation. At the same time, Marine jets began to fly strikes north of the DMZ. With the beginning of what could be called the "DMZ War," General Westmoreland received the authority to start under his control the bombing campaign of Route Package

1, code named "Tally Ho." Patterned after the "Tiger Hound" operations over Laos, the Seventh Air Force began to fly its first Tally Ho missions over North Vietnam on 20 July. Of the 950 sorties that the 1st MAW provided the Seventh Air Force during July, over 400 were in support of the Tally Ho campaign.<sup>42</sup>

The pattern of wing jet operations established in July continued through the end of the year. During this five-month period, even with the arrival of additional fixed-wing Marine squadrons, the wing still flew 80 percent of its sorties in support of Marine forces. Of the 4,000 sorties provided to the Seventh Air Force, 80 percent of them were Tally Ho missions, thus in effect, supporting the Marine DMZ campaign in Operation Prairie.<sup>43</sup>

One Marine Corps fixed-wing squadron, Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ)-1 played a unique role in the air war. Tasked with the missions of providing aerial photographic reconnaissance and locating and jamming enemy radars and communication networks, the squadron flew over 3,720 sorties during the year. About half of these sorties were photographic reconnaissance missions in support of III MAF flown by both the older Chance-Vought RF-8As, the photoplane version of the Crusader fighter, and the new RF-4Bs, which arrived in October. In contrast to the photographic missions, the vast number of the electronic countermeasure (ECM) and electronic intelligence (ElInt) sorties supported the Seventh Air Force and Seventh Fleet Rolling Thunder campaign over North Vietnam. VMCJ pilots, in both the older Douglas EF-10B, a modified version of the Navy F3D night jet fighter, and the new EA6A aircraft, which arrived in October, flew over 60 percent of these missions in support of the Seventh Fleet. Indeed, one senior Marine aviator, Brigadier General Hugh M. Elwood, who relieved Brigadier General Carl as assistant wing commander in April 1966, later commented, "it was a fact that Seventh Fleet did not launch against Hanoi until a VMCJ ECM plane from Da Nang was on station and doing its thing west of Hanoi."<sup>44</sup>

The Okinawa-based Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR)-152, reinforced with a detachment from VMGR-353, also performed extensive but often unheralded services. In addition to over 130 refuelling missions, both north and south of the 17th Parallel, the Marine KC-130 transports

made over 13,880 flights during the year, over 10,550 of them in South Vietnam. In this period, the transports carried over 124 million pounds of cargo and ferried more than 115,400 passengers.<sup>45</sup> The high water mark for the squadron was the support that it provided for Operation Hastings. From 15 July to 4 August, the Marine KC-130s flew 1,229 missions into Dong Ha, carrying 14,190 passengers and 6,764.1 tons of cargo. During the first five days of the operation, 12 of the squadron's transports made 500 sorties, including 84 night landings at the dirt airstrip at Dong Ha.<sup>46</sup> General Elwood observed that Hastings for the Marine transports "became a crash, all-out effort . . . in the course of which some 20 odd engines were completely chewed up by the laterite at Dong Ha. . . . Hastings simply could not have been without the Marines' own organic air transports."<sup>47</sup>

This statistical review of Marine air operations in 1966 tells only part of the story; it reveals the magnitude of the wing's task, but little of the underlying human drama concealed by mere numbers. For this, we must look to the personal experience of the men themselves, such as that of Lieutenant Colonel House, the commanding officer of HMM-163, who was both awarded the Navy Cross and given a letter of reprimand for his exploits during the evacuation of the A Shau Special Forces Camp.\* Major Luther A. Lono, the VMGR-152 operations officer, in his casual description of KC-130 landings at the Dong Ha airstrip, captured the dangers and difficulties of his squadron's airlift of troops and materiel in Operation Hastings: "When we made our first night landing . . . the only lighting the field had was the lights of a jeep or truck at the approach to the runway. It was a little hairy." The Marines then used flare pots to light up the runway, "but the backwash from the engines kept blowing them out."<sup>48</sup>

In much the same manner, Major Billy D. Fritsch, an F-4 pilot from VMFA-323, told of his adventures during Hastings. On the afternoon of 15 July, Fritsch had just dropped his napalm canisters on three huts approximately 5,000 meters west of the Rockpile when a nearby Air Force forward air controller notified him that he was trailing smoke. The Marine pilot applied full power and pulled back on



Marine Corps Photo A421532  
*A Marine Lockheed KC-130 Hercules refueler transport passes a Marine air traffic control radar after making a ground-control approach landing at Phu Bai. During 1966, these large transports flew over 130 refueling missions both north and south of the 17th Parallel and carried over 124 million pounds of cargo and 115,400 passengers.*

the control stick, but the jet did not respond. When the Phantom failed to clear some tall trees, Major Fritsch and his backseat flight officer, First Lieutenant Charles D. Smith, Jr., ejected and parachuted to the ground. Thirty minutes later, the Marines were rescued by an Air Force evacuation helicopter. When asked to sum up his experience, Major Fritsch lightly remarked: "I highly recommend those ejection seats, they definitely work as advertised."<sup>49</sup> Incidents such as these gave an added dimension to the bare statistics of number of sorties during any given month.

\*See Chapter 4.

## CHAPTER 17

# Artillery Support in 1966

*Organization and Employment, January-June 1966—The Guns Move North and Restructuring the Command, July-December 1966*

### *Organization and Employment, January - June 1966*

At the beginning of the year, only the 3d Marine Division's artillery regiment, the 12th Marines, was in Vietnam. Colonel James M. Callender, the regimental commanding officer, maintained his headquarters west of the Da Nang Airfield and operated directly under the division. There, the regiment ran the division fire support coordination center (FSCC) and had direct operational control of the two artillery battalions in the Da Nang TAOR, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 12th Marines. Two independent units were also under Callender's direct control: the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery (Self-Propelled) (-) and the 3d Platoon of the 3d 155mm Gun Battery (Self-Propelled).

The regiment's 3d Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Leslie L. Page, formed the nucleus of the Chu Lai Artillery Group. Lieutenant Colonel Page commanded the group which consisted of his own unit and the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines. The Chu Lai Artillery Group was under the operational con-

trol of General Platt's command group. The two artillery battalions provided direct support for the infantry regiments at Chu Lai; the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines for the 7th Marines and the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines for the 4th Marines. The 3d 155mm Gun Battery (SP) (-) and the 1st Platoon, 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery, both attached to the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, were responsible for general support artillery missions at the Chu Lai base. Lieutenant Colonel Page also had the added duty of directing FSCC operations for General Platt.

At Phu Bai, the 4th Battalion, 12th Marines provided the artillery support. The battalion, like the infantry battalion, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, in the enclave, was under the operational control of the 3d Marines at Da Nang. Lieutenant Colonel Edwin M. Rudzis, the 4th Battalion commander, had under him a total of 24 artillery pieces, including 105mm howitzers, 107mm howitzers, and both towed and self-propelled 155mm howitzers.\* Another 105mm howitzer battery arrived at Phu Bai in early March and raised the total of guns to 30. Lieutenant Col-

\*See Chapter 4.

*A 155mm M109 self-propelled howitzer prepares to fire from a position near Phu Bai in 1966. Empty shell casings can be seen in the right foreground. The 155mm howitzers had an approximate range of 15,000 meters.*

Marine Corps Photo A188624





Marine Corps Photo A187340

*Sgt Leroy Lavoie from the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines fires a 105mm howitzer in support of Marine infantry in the An Hoa sector south of Da Nang. The 105mm M101A1 is a general purpose light artillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters.*

onel Rudzis later remarked, "that if the Infantry is the Queen of Battle, then at this time, the artillery [at Phu Bai] was a Duke's mixture."<sup>1</sup>

This ad hoc arrangement of III MAF artillery remained in effect for only a brief period. With the incremental arrival of the 1st Marine Division units at Chu Lai, there began a reshuffling of both infantry and artillery battalions between the three enclaves. The 1st Division artillery regiment, the 11th Marines, assumed command of the artillery at Chu Lai and, at the end of March, Lieutenant Colonel Page moved his 3d Battalion Headquarters to Phu Bai. Lieutenant Colonel Rudzis and his 4th Battalion command group then departed for Da Nang where he took over control of two of his own batteries, K and L, and the 1st 155mm Gun Battery (SP). By June, the Marines had achieved a semblance of unit integrity, with 3d Marine Division artillery in most cases supporting 3d Division infantry units and 1st Division artillery its own infantry battalions.

Lieutenant Colonel John B. Sullivan's\* 11th Marines was responsible for artillery support in the

Chu Lai TAOR while Colonel Callender's 12th Marines supported the Da Nang and Phu Bai TAORs. At Chu Lai, Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan had three of his organic battalions under his command: the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines in direct support of the 5th Marines; the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines in direct support of the 7th Marines; and the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines in general support of the Chu Lai TAOR. Colonel Callender, on the other hand, had all of his organic artillery battalions under his command, as well as the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines in direct support of the 1st Marines at Da Nang. The other artillery units at Da Nang had the following missions: 1st Battalion, 12th Marines in direct support of the 3d Marines; the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines in direct support of the 9th Marines; the 4th Battalion, 12th Marines in general support. At Phu Bai, the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines was in direct support of the 4th Marines.\*\*

Although the organization of the III MAF artillery arm was conventional, the nature of the war added a new dimension to its employment. Since there were no frontlines in the sense of a conventional war, artillery had to be able to fire in all directions within the TAOR. The proximity of large airbases and populated areas added restrictions; flight patterns and the possibility of killing innocent civilians were major considerations in the use of artillery.

By mid-1966, both the 11th and 12th Marines had developed several techniques for dealing with these realities. Both the 1st and 3d Division FSCCs put a premium on cooperation and coordination with the wing's DASCs and the ARVN FSCCs in their vicinity. After determining that restrictive fire plans and fire zones were too cumbersome for both Marine air and artillery, the artillery units initiated a procedure called Save-A-Plane to avoid hitting friendly aircraft. The battalion or regimental FSCC involved would radio when and where artillery was going to fire. After receiving this message, it was the pilot's responsibility to avoid the restricted firing areas.

Similarly, procedures were worked out with the South Vietnamese so that Marine artillery could res-

\*Colonel Peter H. Hahn brought the 11th Marines Headquarters to Vietnam on 16 February and assumed command of the artillery units at Chu Lai on 1 March. Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan assumed command of the 11th Marines on 17 June, relieving Colonel Hahn.

\*\*The 5th Marines had arrived in Vietnam in May and assumed control of the TAOR formerly held by the 1st Marines. The latter regiment, which had relieved the 4th Marines at Chu Lai at the end of January, moved to Da Nang in June. The 4th Marines assumed command of the Phu Bai TAOR on 26 March. See Chapters 4 and 8.



Marine Corps Photo A187767  
*A Marine forward artillery observer directs fire in support of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines during Operation Virginia near Khe Sanh. His radioman can be seen sitting in the background relaying target information to the artillery battery.*

pond effectively in support of their infantry units. By February 1966, the 3d Marine Division reported that much of the red tape involved in supporting ARVN troops had been eliminated. Colonel Callender's 12th Marines was able to respond quickly to fire support requests from the ARVN 51st Regiment operating south of the Da Nang base. Prior to that time, it had been necessary for the Marines to obtain clearance from the Da Nang Special Sector Headquarters.<sup>2</sup> By midyear, both the 11th and 12th Marines were supporting ARVN infantry units as a matter of course.

Artillery batteries not only remained in support of infantry units within the TAORs, but often deployed outside of the TAORs either to support specific operations or outposts. Double Eagle provided an excellent example of Marine artillery's mobility. During the operation, more than 45 artillery displacements were made. According to General

Platt, who commanded Task Force Delta in that operation, the batteries were "rapidly displaced inland by helicopter or laterally, in small boats and craft . . . in order to keep the deep-ranging infantry within artillery firing fans."<sup>3</sup> By June, far-flung Marine offensive operations had become routine. Infantry battalions and artillery batteries were married into large task forces, operating far from the Marine bases.

### *The Guns Move North and Restructuring the Command, July-December 1966*

With the movement of the 3d Marine Division north of the Hai Van Pass and the assumption of both the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORs by the 1st Marine Division, the artillery regiments, like all the other components of the two divisions, underwent a major realignment. The 12th Marines moved to the DMZ area, but retained a provisional artillery battalion consisting of two 105mm howitzer batteries, a 107mm mortar battery and the 1st 155mm Gun Battery at Phu Bai. Colonel Benjamin S. Read,\* the 12th Marines commanding officer, established his headquarters at Dong Ha where his 4th Battalion provided general support. His 1st Battalion at the "artillery plateau," which later became Camp Carroll, furnished direct support to the 3d Marines, and the 3d Battalion, divided between Cam Lo and Con Thien, directly supported the two infantry battalions in the eastern DMZ area. Two U.S. Army artillery battalions, the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery, and the 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, armed with 175mm guns (SP) and 105mm howitzers (SP), respectively, reinforced the general support fires of the 4th Battalion, 12th Marines.\*\*

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\*Colonel Read assumed command of the regiment from Colonel Callender in July 1966. The new regimental commander had commanded a battery of the 15th Marines in WW II on Guam and Okinawa. In Korea, in 1950, he commanded an 11th Marines battery.

\*\*One battery, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, was stationed at Khe Sanh in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. Individual batteries of the 13th Marines, the artillery regiment of the 5th Division, arrived in-country with battalions of the 26th Marines. These batteries, like the battalions of the 26th Marines, represented no basic reinforcement of Marine units in Vietnam. They replaced individual batteries of the 11th or 12th Marines, which rotated either to Okinawa or the SLF as part of the intratheater transplacement system. See Chapter 18.



Marine Corps Photo A187980

*Marines from Company K, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines pose on 10 November 1966 (the Marine Corps Birthday) in front of a new sign, carrying the new designation of the former "artillery plateau," renamed Camp J. J. Carroll in memory of the former Company K commander. Capt Carroll died in the assault on "Mutter" Ridge in October.*

Assuming the responsibility for both the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORs severely strained the 11th Marines. The regiment assumed command of its 1st Battalion at Da Nang, as well as the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines at the same base. In addition, the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery at the air base came under the regiment's command. Colonel Glenn E. Norris, an experienced artilleryman fresh from service with the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group on Taiwan, described the problems at his new command post at Da Nang in this manner:

When we moved to the Da Nang TAOR I felt there was a deficiency, especially in heavy artillery . . . we operated with only three 8-inch howitzers and three 155mm guns. As you know, these weapons were old and it was quite a job to keep them up. Six weapons, considering their age and maintenance, were not satisfactory.<sup>4</sup>

At Chu Lai, Colonel Norris had little worry about long-range artillery support. The October arrival of Battery A, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery (USA), with its four 175mm guns, reinforced the 4th Battalion,

*Men from Battery H, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines fill sand bags to place around their 105mm howitzer positions at Dong Ha in May 1966. The artillery battery had accompanied the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines to northern I Corps during Operation Reno, a prelude to the larger deployment north in July.*

Marine Corps Photo A187147





Marine Corps Photo A187834

*Marines from Battery D, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines fire in support of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines during Operation Prairie in September 1966. Individual batteries of the 13th Marines accompanied the battalions of the 26th Marines into Vietnam.*

11th Marines, which was providing general support for the Chu Lai base and the Korean Marines further south.\* One Marine provisional battery of four towed 155mm howitzers was at the Quang Ngai Air Base near Quang Ngai City providing general support for the 2d ARVN Division operating in that area.\*\*

Although the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 11th Marines continued to support the 5th Marines and 7th Marines, respectively, at Chu Lai, individual batteries or platoons operated outside the TAOR. For example, Battery F, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, stationed four 105mm howitzers at the Tien Phouc Special Forces Camp to furnish direct support to the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion's operations. During November, two 105mm howitzers from Battery H, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, moved out of the Chu Lai TAOR to Ha Thanh Special Forces Camp in the mountains 15 miles west of Quang Ngai City.

The move of the 11th Marines Headquarters to Da Nang left only a headquarters detachment with Task Force X-Ray, causing a void in the command and control of the widely dispersed Chu Lai artillery.

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\*In addition to its organic 155mm howitzers (SP), the 4th Battalion had the 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery (SP) of six 8-inch SP howitzers and the 3d 155 Gun Battery (SP) with six 155mm guns under its operational control.

\*\*This battery was also under the operational control of the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines.

General Krulak had recognized this from the very beginning and notified General Walt that he was asking for authority to move the 1st Field Artillery Group (FAG) from Okinawa to Chu Lai. He explained, "This is a pretty able outfit. It has 22 officers and 127 enlisted; communications, motor transport and an operations platoon that includes a fire direction, survey, and meteorological capability." The FAG arrived at Chu Lai on 30 November and the next day, took control of all of the Chu Lai artillery from the 11th Marines (Rear). Lieutenant Colonel Joe B. Stribling, Norris' executive officer, assumed command of the new organization from Lieutenant Colonel Joseph M. Laney, Jr.\*

The new command functioned smoothly. Lieutenant Colonel Stribling observed in his December report that the FAG was directing supporting fires for the defense of the Chu Lai base as well as for operations outside of the TAOR, including support for the ARVN, Koreans, Stingray operations, and search and destroy operations.<sup>6</sup>

These adjustments did not alter the fact that a significant proportion of Marine artillery was in northern Quang Tri Province at the end of the year. Of more than 250 artillery tubes assigned to the two artillery regiments, over 80 pieces, ranging from 4.2-inch mortars to the U.S. Army's 175mm guns,

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\*Lieutenant Colonel Laney, who was junior to Stribling, became the FAG's executive officer.



Marine Corps Photo A188030

*Marines from Battery M, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines fire their 155mm M114A towed howitzers in October 1966 from positions at the Marine "artillery plateau" (redesignated the following month to Camp J. J. Carroll). Marine artillery fired over 28,600 rounds during the month in support of the infantry in the DMZ sector. This expenditure was exceeded in December by 6,000 rounds.*

were strung along the DMZ. Although Marine infantry contact with enemy troops in the area dropped sharply from September and October, the artillery effort did not diminish. In fact, the 12th Marines fired approximately 8,000 more rounds in Quang Tri Province during December than in October.\*

In Thua Thien Province, two changes in the artillery organization occurred in December. First, the 4th Battalion, 12th Marines assumed control of the artillery at Phu Bai. Lieutenant Colonel David G. Jones, the battalion commander, later recalled that General Kyle wanted "a 'numbered battalion' headquarters" there and, on 17 December, Jones established his new command post at the base.<sup>7</sup> One week later, another battalion headquarters, the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, took command of the ar-

tillery committed to Operation Chinook in northern Thua Thien.

The continued depletion of the artillery at Da Nang and Chu Lai to counter the enemy in the north caused some difference of opinion within the Marine command. General Nickerson, the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, in a message to General Walt on 30 November, observed that the artillery at both Da Nang and Chu Lai was insufficient and that the situation at Da Nang would become even worse. He pointed out that the Army artillery battery which supported the battalion from the 503d Airborne Battalion was leaving with that unit and he was receiving no replacements or reinforcements.\*\*

\*The regiment fired 10,388 missions, expending 36,869 rounds during December, as opposed to 6,643 missions and 28,430 rounds during October. See 12th Marines, Table of Ammunition Expenditures and Types of Missions Fired, encl 2, 12th Marines AAR, Operation Prairie I, dtd Feb67.

\*\*Although the 1st Armored Amphibian Company had arrived from the U.S. with 12 LVTH-6s, an armored amphibian assault vehicle mounting a 105mm howitzer, the company represented no true reinforcement for the Da Nang TAOR. Upon the arrival of the company, a platoon of six LVTH's that had been at Da Nang since 1965 moved to the DMZ. Of the remaining two platoons of the company, one stayed at Da Nang while the other joined the SLF.

General Nickerson stated that he needed at least seven direct support batteries at Da Nang instead of six and declared that the "shortage of general support artillery in Da Nang continues to be critical." The 1st Division commander considered it inadvisable to move a general support battery from Chu Lai to Da Nang and requested reinforcement from "external resources."<sup>8</sup> Although sympathetic to General Nickerson's predicament, General Walt was forced to deny the request. The III MAF commander declared that the artillery allocation was "appropriate in light of assets available." He further stated that there was little likelihood of III MAF receiving any additional artillery in the foreseeable future.<sup>9</sup>

Despite General Nickerson's reservations, the tactical deployment of his artillery was such that it could counter any likely attempt by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to overrun Marine positions. The most lucrative targets for Marine supporting arms were provided by the more conventional war in the DMZ where division faced division, rather than the counterinsurgency campaign in the heavily populated area south of Da Nang. In any event, Marine artillery spanned the length of I Corps from the DMZ to Quang Ngai and in the words of Shakespeare: "The cannon have their bowels full of wrath, and ready mounted are they to spit forth their iron indignation."<sup>10</sup>

## CHAPTER 18

# Men and Material

### *Manpower—Logistics, Medical Support, and Construction*

#### *Manpower*

By the beginning of 1966, all of the Armed Forces were feeling the drain on manpower resources. Hanson Baldwin, the military analyst for the *New York Times*, wrote in February 1966, "The Nation's armed services have almost exhausted their trained and ready military units, with all available troops spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and elsewhere."<sup>1</sup>

Baldwin's article touched on the sensitive issue of raising enough troops to fulfill General Westmoreland's increasing Vietnam requirements. In December 1965, Secretary McNamara had approved the deployment of 184,000 troops to Vietnam during 1966, nearly twice the number of American troops already there. Throughout 1966, various echelons of the American command, from the President to MACV, studied and restudied alternative deployment plans. Considerable debate existed within the U.S. Government about the even-

tual size of the American commitment, but, by June 1966, President Johnson and Secretary McNamara had made two important decisions. They rejected any callup of the Reserves and established the projected strength of American forces in Vietnam for the end of the year to be 390,000 men. According to these projections, by December 1966 General Westmoreland would have 79 maneuver battalions and supporting air and ground units under his command.\*

The Marine Corps found itself in the same manpower dilemma as its sister Services. The Corps was committed to a 70,000-man force in Vietnam, which meant that by the end of the year, the entire 1st and 3d Marine Divisions and most of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing would be in Vietnam. Compounding the difficulty for the Marine Corps was the fact that the tour of the individual Marine was 13 months. Not only were new units being deployed to Vietnam, but replacements for Marines whose overseas tours were almost over also had to be sent to Vietnam.\*\* Thus the actual number of Marines that served in Vietnam

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\*This represented an increase of approximately 22,000 troops, including four maneuver battalions over previous projections. During 1966, several deployment plans were approved and then modified. These had several designations, i.e., Phase II, Phase IIA, and Program 3. Other plans were still being studied. For a detailed account of the overall U.S. planning efforts, see "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments 1965-67," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec. IV-C-6, v. I, pp. 25-51. Maneuver battalions referred to both tank and infantry battalions. On 21 December 1966, MACV had 69 infantry and 10 tank battalions. At least one of the Service chiefs, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, disagreed with the decision not to call up the Reserves. In his comments, General Greene refers to this decision as "a fatal mistake. . . ." Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 5May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

\*\*In September 1965, the Marine Corps ended its peacetime intertheater battalion rotation between the Eastern Pacific and Western Pacific and went to an individual replacement system,

although a modified intratheater battalion rotation among battalions assigned to the SLF, Vietnam, and Okinawa was established. Colonel John P. Lanigan, who served as the 3d Marine Division G-1 in 1966, observed that the establishment of the individual replacement system "required a complete reshuffling of personnel between battalions in WestPac [code named Operation Mixmaster]. . . . This had a rather drastic and undesirable effect on the integrity and morale of the battalions concerned." Commenting on this problem from the FMFPac perspective, Colonel John E. Greenwood, who served on both the III MAF and FMFPac staffs, remembered that General Krulak, CGFMFPac at the time, "maintained that the Marine Corps should never again stabilize units or adopt a policy of unit rotation. . . . His [Krulak's] conclusion—organize in peacetime, the way you must organize and operate in war." Col John P. Lanigan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 8Jun78 and Col John E. Greenwood, Note on Lanigan Comments, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File). See Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, p. 117 for discussion of the old transplacement system and Operation Mixmaster.



Marine Corps Photo A187876

*While their gear is being lowered from a troop transport, men of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines wait on board a landing craft before going ashore at Da Nang. The 26th Marines, part of the newly formed 5th Marine Division, arrived in the Pacific in August and during the remaining months of the year, its battalions replaced other battalions in Vietnam as part of the intratheater battalion transplacement system.*

during 1966 was much larger than 70,000. Since there was no Reserve mobilization, the Marines were authorized to accept some draftees and also expand their authorized strength from 231,000 to 286,000.<sup>2</sup>

In December 1965, Secretary McNamara had approved the reactivation of the 5th Marine Division; personnel were to come, partially, from the new augmentation allowed the Marine Corps. On 1 March 1966, the Defense Department officially announced the formation of the division. The base commander of the Marine Base at Camp Pendleton, California, Major General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.,

became the Commanding General, 5th Marine Division, in addition to his other duties.

On 28 July, BLT 1/26, the first unit of the division to be deployed, arrived at Okinawa and became the SLF battalion, relieving BLT 3/5. The 3d Battalion was sent to Chu Lai, bringing III MAF to a strength of 18 battalions, the total authorized for the Marine command in 1966. In August, RLT 26 Headquarters arrived at Okinawa and BLT 2/26 relieved the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines at Da Nang. The latter battalion departed Vietnam for Okinawa. These forces represented no reinforcements for III MAF, but reestablished the Pacific command's capability to meet contingency situations.

Even the earlier deployment of the 1st Marine Division in 1966 had not eased the III MAF manpower situation. Because of the intricacies of the individual replacement system, both the 1st and 3d Divisions were understrength by midyear. In June the 1st Marine Division reported that the average strength of an infantry company was 2.8 officers and 151 enlisted.\* The 3d Division furnished generally the same figures for the month, stating that its average company strength was 2.9 officers and 148 enlisted men. During July, these averages remained at the same level. By August, both Marine divisions indicated that the average infantry company strength had risen to 4.3 officers and 155 men for the 3d Division and 3.8 officers and 160 men for the 1st.<sup>3</sup> By the end of the month, the 1st Marine Divi-

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\*The authorized strength of a Marine infantry company was six officers and 210 enlisted men. Several former battalion commanders commented on the manpower shortages in their respective units. Lieutenant Colonel Emerson A. Walker, who commanded the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines at Da Nang, remembered that he lost 85 percent of his officers and 75 percent of his senior noncommissioned officers within a 60-day period. Another officer, Colonel Birchard B. Dewitt, who commanded the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, recalled that in June 1966, he had only 14 officers in his battalion, including the battalion surgeon and chaplain: "Each infantry company had *one* officer except India which had the luxury of having two." Lieutenant Colonel Ralph E. Sullivan, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, observed, "Rifle company strengths . . . do not begin to tell the story. You might have 148 enlisted on the rolls of a rifle company, but by the time you subtracted those sick, lame, and lazy, R&R, etc., etc., and etc., you were lucky to put 110 men in the field." LtCol Emerson A. Walker, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun78], Col Birchard B. Dewitt, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jul78, and LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

sion was almost at authorized strength, but the 3d was still short 2,000 men.<sup>4</sup>

By October 1966, General Walt was faced with an expanded war. The Marines were moving toward the DMZ, while still conducting major operations and maintaining the southern TAORs. In addition, programs such as combined action were draining men from infantry units. Colonel Chaisson, the former III MAF G-3, stated that although the personnel shortage did not inhibit assigning battalions to a specific mission, "It was a matter of how far people can be pushed."<sup>5</sup>

The presence of the 26th Marines units in the Western Pacific provided some help. It allowed FMFPac to reinstitute the intratheater rotation program which had ended the previous March.\* Under the system, the SLF battalion would relieve a battalion in Vietnam; the latter battalion would displace to Okinawa; a fresh battalion on Okinawa would then become the new SLF battalion with the Seventh Fleet. From August to December 1966, six battalions participated in the program. By the end of the year, all three battalions of the 26th Marines were in South Vietnam.\*\* Although not providing General Walt with additional troops, this intratheater transplacement of battalions allowed him, at least periodically, to refurbish his forces.

During this period, Generals Greene and Krulak also took measures to expedite the movement of personnel to Vietnam. After a visit to III MAF in October, General Krulak reported that the Commandant had inaugurated an increase in programmed replacements which would ease the situation by the end of the year.<sup>6</sup> One of the first steps that Headquarters Marine Corps took was to defer the activation dates of the 5th Marine Division units, with the exception of the 26th Marines, from 1966 to 1967.<sup>7</sup> This allowed the Marine Corps to divert individual Marines who would have been assigned to these units to the Southeast Asia manpower pool. In January 1967, the manpower situation had improved to the extent that most battalions had 1,200 to 1,300 Marines, in comparison to a strength of about 800 men a few weeks before.<sup>8</sup> By July 1967, the Marine

Corps could boast that it had completed both the scheduled buildup to a total strength of 286,000, as well as programmed deployments to the war zone, without missing any target dates.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Logistics, Medical Support, and Construction*

By the beginning of 1966, the rapid buildup of Marine forces had created a grim logistic situation. Shortages occurred in spare parts, fuel, and certain types of ammunition. The wear and tear on equipment caused by heavy usage, heat, sand, and humidity, compounded by the monsoons, created additional frustrations.<sup>10</sup> Complicating the situation even more was the slow unloading of vessels in the undeveloped I Corps ports. For example, cargo unloaded at Da Nang had to be reloaded on LSTs in order to be landed at the shallow draft ramp at Chu Lai. At the beginning of December 1965, 17 ships were in Da Nang Harbor unloading or waiting to be unloaded. The figure had been reduced to 12 by the end of 1965, but seven of these ships had been in port longer than two weeks and four had been there for over a month. General Walt described the III MAF logistic status as follows: "We were operating on a 'shoe string'—a critical period—when only exceptional ingenuity, initiative and extremely hard and dedicated labor kept the supplies flowing to the fighting troops."<sup>11</sup>

Many of the difficulties had been anticipated by the Marine and Navy commanders. Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, at that time Commander, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, commented that he had initiated a number of actions in November 1965 to ease the unloading problem. These included a program for all-weather packaging and pallet loading of cargoes for ships destined for Da Nang or Chu Lai. In December he requested that the Military Transport Management Terminal Service (MTMTS) in San Francisco "assemble full ship loads for direct sail to Da Nang," and that MTMTS segregate Chu Lai cargo so that it could be handled expeditiously at Da Nang. He also instituted a program at Subic Bay for unloading cargo from deep-draft ships onto LSTs. The admiral assigned four LSTs to shuttle supplies between Subic, Da Nang, and Chu Lai. The unloading situation was resolved by close cooperation between the Navy and Marines. Admiral Hooper visited General Walt in December 1965,

\*See Chapter 4.

\*\*The 3d Battalion, 26th Marines arrived in the Western Pacific during October.



U.S. Navy Photo K-34274

*An aerial view of the Da Nang River, going past Museum Landing Ramp to the Bridge Cargo Facility at Da Nang. Da Nang was second only to Saigon as a port in Vietnam.*

*A Navy petty officer stands on a "city block" of C-Rations at a Da Nang pier. The Naval Support Activity, Da Nang was responsible for common item support for U.S. forces in I Corps.*

U.S. Navy Photo K-31372



afterward noting that General Walt was particularly cooperative — as always:

I briefed him and key staff officers after dinner at his quarters then on a hill west of Da Nang. He offered the help of his troops whenever needed, and then took steps to improve the flow of trucks during peak periods. The Marine shore party did its part until the last remnant at Da Nang was relieved. . . .<sup>12\*</sup>

As a result of these steps, by the end of January 1966, General Walt could report that the Chu Lai backlog had been reduced to the lowest figure in over five months.\*\* In late February, the III MAF

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\*The Marine shore party was attached to the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, which was responsible for common item support to U.S. forces in I Corps as well as the operation of the unloading activities of all beaches and ports in I Corps. Until the Support Activity reached full strength on 11 March, elements of the 3d Shore Party Battalion assisted the Navy in the unloading of ships at Da Nang. Until 1 April, the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang reported directly to General Walt in his capacity as Naval Component Commander. See Chapter 1 and Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam*, 1965.

\*\*In relation to the situation at Chu Lai, Admiral Hooper observed, "I don't believe that anyone who was not there at the time can appreciate the difficulties of getting supplies in by sea and over the beach, especially during the Northeast Monsoon Season . . . . The shuttling of supplies by sea by NavSupAct [Naval Support Activity], Da Nang and beach operations were tough and go for a long time, especially since the dredge we requested from Saigon, and expected momentarily, kept being delayed. . . . It was not until mid-January 1966 that a 11-foot deep pass had been made through the shoal water at the mouth of the Troung River, and not until 20 March that a 14-foot channel was available." VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [May78] (Vietnam Comment File).



Marine Corps Photo A371256

*An aerial view of Force Logistic Support Group Bravo at Chu Lai. The group was a component part of the III MAF Force Logistic Command and provided centralized control of supplies, construction, and administrative support at Chu Lai.*

commander was able to declare that for the first time there were no ships in the Da Nang Harbor waiting to be unloaded.<sup>13</sup> Admiral Hooper commented, "From there on in [late February 1966], no other port ever matched the performance of Da Nang."<sup>14</sup>

The Marine Corps had initiated several of its own measures to ease the logistic strain. Late in 1965, General Krulak introduced the Red Ball and Critipac programs. The Red Ball system, started 22 September 1965, had as its basic purpose the identification of the critical logistical problems in the Western Pacific. When an important item was found to be in short supply it was given a Red Ball, or high priority, designation. All FMFPac supply echelons were then alerted and individual action officers were assigned to monitor the status of these items. These officers had the responsibility of insuring that the Red Ball item was shipped to Vietnam as quickly as possible. FMFPac inaugurated the Critipac system in November 1965. Under this concept, the Marine Corps Supply Center at Barstow, California sent each major Marine unit in Vietnam, usually battalion-size, one 400-pound box of critical supplies normally required on a routine basis, but rapidly expended by the deployed units.<sup>15</sup>

Both of these systems continued to be refined after their inception. At the beginning of 1966, General Walt had declared that only those repair parts for equipment, the loss of which would substantially reduce unit combat effectiveness, could be placed in Red Ball status. The III MAF commander also made similar recommendations for the Critipac program. The Red Ball system had improved the stock level of critical supplies to the extent that the criteria for Red Ball now included such items as "blank forms and typewriters."<sup>16</sup> During March, General Walt ordered III MAF to computerize Red Ball records to reduce his headquarter's administrative workload.<sup>17</sup> At the end of the month, General Greene formally recognized the FMFPac Red Ball program and ordered all Marine supply activities to support the system.<sup>18</sup>

The most important logistic development during this period was the establishment of the Force Logistic Command on 15 March. Until that time, Colonel Mauro J. Padalino's Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) had been the central supply agency for III MAF. During 1965, the FLSG had grown from slightly less than 700 personnel to more than 3,000 officers and men by the end of the year. Based



U.S. Navy Photo K-34273

*An aerial view of Force Logistic Support Group Alpha at Da Nang. The group performed the same services at Da Nang as Bravo did at Chu Lai.*

on the nucleus of the 3d Service Battalion, the FLSG had been reinforced by 1st Service Battalion units and elements of the 3d Force Service Regiment.\* The FLSG Headquarters was at Da Nang while two Force Logistic Support Units (FLSU) were established at Chu Lai and Phu Bai. As early as September 1965, General Krulak was of the opinion that it was necessary to transform the FLSG into a Force Logistic Command, but the first steps toward the transformation were not taken until early 1966. In mid-January, Colonel Padalino chaired a three-week conference at FMFPac Headquarters in Honolulu at which a mission, and provisional Tables of Organization (T/O) and Equipment (T/E), for the new command were determined.<sup>19</sup> On 19 February, General Krulak provided General Walt the basic guidance for the establishment of the logistic command.

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\*The 3d Force Service Regiment was responsible for logistic activities on Okinawa. Although separate units of the regiment were stationed in Vietnam, the regimental flag never left Okinawa. The 1st Service Battalion was the logistic support battalion of the 1st Marine Division, just as the 3d Service Battalion supported the 3d Marine Division. As indicated in the text, the service battalions became part of the Force Logistic Support Group which operated directly under III MAF rather than the divisions.

General Walt's headquarters published its standing operating procedures on 13 March and the Force Logistic Command (FLC) came into existence two days later.<sup>20</sup>

The establishment of the FLC was more of a change in name than function. At Da Nang, the FLSG became FLSG Alpha and remained under the command of Colonel Padalino. He also retained control of the FLSU at Phu Bai. The FLSU at Chu Lai became FLSG Bravo which reported directly to the FLC. Colonel George C. Axtell, Jr., formerly General Walt's III MAF Chief of Staff, assumed command of the FLC.<sup>21</sup>

One of the basic problems facing the new command was the lack of covered storage space. To alleviate the situation, III MAF allocated nine of the first 12 Butler buildings to arrive in Vietnam to the logistic command.<sup>22</sup> By the end of April, FLC had funded over 40 million dollars for facilities construction. The funding included the development of an entirely new cantonment for FLSG Alpha at Da Nang. Seabees of the 30th Naval Construction Regiment (NCR) had already erected 16 Butler buildings in the logistic group's new location on Red Beach, seven miles northwest of the old FLSG site. At Chu Lai, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 4

from the 30th NCR was working on semipermanent construction for FLSG Bravo. In addition, the FLC had contracted with civilian firms for construction of a second ammunition supply point at Chu Lai and for the improvement of the existing ammunition supply point at Da Nang, as well as the construction of a second Da Nang ammunition supply point.<sup>23</sup>

By midyear, the FLC was in full operation. Despite the disruptions of the spring political crisis, the construction program was generally on schedule. More significantly, the command had grown to a strength of over 5,300 officers and men; nearly 2,000 personnel had joined since March. During this period, the III MAF logistic organization processed more than 127,000 requisitions. In addition, the FLC began to perform limited 4th echelon maintenance of deadlined equipment which previously had to be evacuated to Okinawa for repair.<sup>24</sup>

The true test of the Marine logistic organization came when Marine operations moved into northern Quang Tri Province. During Operation Hastings, for

*A view of the III MAF ammunition dump at Dong Ha. With the movement of the 3d Marine Division to the DMZ sector, the Marines established another logistic support area.*

Marine Corps Photo A188161



example, more than 4,000 tons of supplies were flown from Da Nang to the makeshift airfield at Dong Ha. Furthermore, two Navy barges ferried over 240 tons of ammunition to Dong Ha from Marine stockpiles at Da Nang.<sup>25</sup> General Westmoreland expressed his surprise at the Marine logistic flexibility to General Krulak. According to General Krulak:

In connection with deep operations of the Hastings variety, General Westmoreland commented that he had been concerned earlier with the possibility that the Marines might be incapable of sustaining such large endeavors logistically. He observed that their excellent logistic performance throughout Hastings had gratified and reassured him. I replied that basically, the Marines have a balanced logistical system, capable of sustaining operations such as Hastings.\*<sup>26</sup>

With the continuation of the DMZ war and the movement of the 3d Marine Division north, the Dong Ha logistic base expanded. In early October, the Dong Ha Logistic Support Area (LSA) contained a sizeable ammunition dump as well as a rations dump, operated by a 150-man team. The Marine logisticians had prepared plans for the buildup of the Dong Ha LSA to provide a 30-to-45-day level of supply to support division units operating in the DMZ area. Colonel Axtell noted that the Marine command was examining the feasibility of removing a sand bar blocking the Cua Viet River so that LCUs could enter and leave the stream and resupply Dong Ha on a 24-hour basis.<sup>27</sup> Admiral Hooper commented that when the water was low, shifting sand bars blocked the way upstream, but Naval Support Activity, Da Nang mounted a crawler crane with a "clam shell" on a LCU for dredging and was able to keep the river route open. The Naval Support Activity and the FLC provided the Marines with over 35,000 tons of supplies via the water passage to Dong Ha.<sup>28</sup>

By the end of the year, the logistic organization in the northern two provinces had been revamped. The FLSU at Phu Bai had become FLSU-2, responsible for logistic support at Phu Bai and Dong Ha, as well as the Marine battalion at Khe Sanh. FLSU-2 was now a major subunit of the FLC. Its new status was

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\*For a detailed account of Operation Hastings, see Chapter 10.

officially recognized on 1 December when the unit became independent of FLSG Alpha reporting directly to the FLC. By the end of December, the unit had reached a strength of nearly 900 men, over a third of whom were engaged in support of the Prairie Operation.<sup>29</sup>

By the end of 1966, the Marine Corps had completed major modifications of its logistic system to support Marine combat operations in the five northern provinces. Its world-wide logistic network extended from Albany, Georgia, and Barstow, California, through the 3d Force Service Regiment, Okinawa, and then to the I Corps Tactical Zone. The III MAF FLC monitored all logistic activities under its control with electronic data processing systems.

Despite the refinements in the logistic system, shortages still existed in certain areas. Colonel Franklin C. Thomas, Jr., commanding officer of MAG-11, observed that high-level statistical analysis did not always reflect the needs of the units in the field. He recalled:

It took me a long time to find out why we could only obtain 250-pound bombs when we consistently requisitioned 500-, 750-, and 1,000- pound bombs. All we had in any numbers were 250's and so that is what we were using, although for most of our targets they were almost ineffective. Finally, it became apparent that our resupply was being done on the basis of our usage reports rather than from our requisitions. To my shame I began falsifying my usage data, and within two months we began to receive the heavier weapons which increased our effectiveness (not to mention our morale).<sup>30</sup>

In a somewhat lighter vein, Colonel James M. Callender, the commander of the 12th Marines, remembered that during an inspection trip, General Krulak asked one of the artillery section chiefs if he had any problems:

The sergeant's reply was "only one, General; I'm trying to clean this 105mm howitzer with a 90mm bore brush!" . . . within three days, the 12th Marines had a corner on most of the bore brushes in the western world.<sup>31</sup>

Even with shortages, III MAF was able to support all tactical operations and Marine logisticians by the end of the year had initiated remedial actions. At the end of 1966, the FLC and the 3d Force Service Regiment were filling 85 percent of all requisitions. Maintenance also improved; the deadline rate for combat-essential material was reduced from over 12 percent to eight percent by the end of December,

although the deadline rate of Marine engineer equipment and generators still remained high. One Marine logistician, Colonel Edward L. Bale, Jr., the 1st Marine Division G-4, summed up the logistic situation as follows: "III MAF was faced with supply, maintenance, construction tasks not previously confronting Marine Corps forces. The ability to support the combat elements from CONUS via Okinawa with the limited stock fund assets, maintenance, and construction was, in many ways, remarkable."<sup>32</sup>

Colonel Axtell, who was relieved as commanding officer of the FLC by Brigadier General James E. Herbold, Jr., described the role of the FLC in the following words:\*

The FLC has a role to provide an organization by relieving the operational commander of many of the day to day details in services. We think of it as a maintenance and supply function, but there are also other attendant services that can be provided to relieve divisions and wings . . . such as a transient center . . . handling reports, and an administrative headquarters to administer force units. I would like to suggest the FLC in its role reflects the capability of the Marine Corps to organize and adjust its forces to use the minimum of resources to accomplish a task.<sup>33</sup>

No logistic discussion would be complete without an account of the medical support provided by the Navy. Responsible for all medical assistance to the Marines, naval medical personnel managed all of the III MAF medical facilities down to the individual battalion and squadron aid stations. At the lowest level, a Navy corpsman accompanied each Marine rifle platoon into action. Part of the Marine division organization, two medical battalions, the 1st and 3d, reinforced at the end of 1966 by the 1st Hospital Company, were responsible for the Marine intermediate medical facilities at Chu Lai, Da Nang, Phu Bai, and later in the year at Dong Ha, as well as direct support for individual operations. Commanded by a Navy doctor, each battalion consisted largely of naval personnel reinforced by a few Marines for administrative and support purposes. For the most serious and more complex cases, the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang ran its own hospital. Opening in

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\*General Herbold, an experienced logistician, was Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps Supply Activity, Philadelphia prior to his promotion on 8 September 1966 to brigadier general. He assumed command of the FLC on 3 October 1966.

January with only 50 beds, this hospital had room for over 400 beds at the end of the year. Besides X-ray and modern laboratory facilities, the hospital had departments and clinics in neurosurgery; urology; eye, ear, nose, and throat ailments; and preventive medicine. In March 1966, the newly refitted hospital ship *Repose* (AH 16) arrived off I Corps to provide additional medical support for the Marines. With 560 beds, the *Repose* had medical facilities and equipment to rival a modern hospital in the United States. During Operations Hastings and Prairie, Marine helicopters often evacuated casualties directly from the battlefield to the *Repose* with as many as 98 brought on board the ship in one day.<sup>34</sup>

The operating room, like the battlefield, had its dramatic moments. One of the more spectacular involved the removal of a live grenade from the throat of a wounded Marine private on 20 December 1966 at the 3d Medical Battalion facility at Da Nang. Apparently the grenade entered the Marine's mouth in a downward trajectory, broke the jaw, and lodged into the heavily-muscl'd part of the tongue, pushing aside the voice box. Since the X-ray only showed a gray opaque object in the throat, the naval surgeon, Lieutenant Commander James G. Chandler, was unaware of the presence of the grenade until he made his incision. At first, Chandler thought the object to be some sort of detonator and consulted with another surgeon. The two doctors then decided that "it would be pretty safe to remove anything which had cracked the jaw." With his forceps unable to secure the object, Chandler used his fingers and "popped it into his hand." The Navy surgeon recalled that he then asked what the thing was and "someone said a M-79 grenade." Carrying the grenade gingerly in his left hand, Chandler then walked out of the operating room to a ditch some distance from the medical facility. He gently placed the grenade inside the ditch, "took about four steps calmly and then ran like hell." A Marine demolition team later safely exploded the live grenade. The patient also recovered.<sup>35</sup>

Although the Navy doctors and corpsmen played a large role in the Marine Corps civic action program, treating well over a million South Vietnamese civilians in 1966, their greatest and most important contribution was the saving of the lives of the wounded. With the use of the helicopter, a wounded Marine, on the average, could expect to be at a

medical facility within a half hour after the evacuation aircraft was requested.<sup>36</sup> Of the nearly 6,400 Marines and sailors of III MAF wounded during 1966, 214 died of their wounds, a mortality rate of less than four percent.<sup>37</sup> The following excerpt from the Navy Unit Commendation awarded to the 3d Medical Battalion applied as well to the entire Navy medical support in I Corps:

The officers and men . . . despite shortages of personnel and medical supplies—and adverse conditions of heat, humidity and monsoon rains—succeeded in reducing the mortality rate of wounded U.S. Marines to the lowest figure in wartime history.<sup>38</sup>

Another unsung effort was the massive construction work in I Corps accomplished by the Navy construction battalions (Seabees), civilian construction firms, and Marine engineer battalions. The Seabees

*Marines during Operation Texas carry a wounded comrade to a waiting evacuation helicopter in March 1966. A wounded Marine, on the average, could expect to be at a medical facility within 30 minutes after the helicopter was requested.*

Marine Corps Photo A186817






Marine Corps Photo A187510

*Navy Seabees are seen at work constructing hard-back tents in the base area of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines at Da Nang. Seabees and civilian construction firms were largely responsible for the building of the large base facilities in the Marine enclaves.*

and the civilian contractors were largely responsible for the building of the large base facilities at the various Marine enclaves and airfield construction including the extension of the Da Nang runway and 10,000-foot permanent airfield at Chu Lai.\* They helped to modernize port facilities with the construction of three deepwater piers, all of which were

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\*During 1966, nearly 1,295,000 square feet of storage and maintenance facilities were built. Colonel Fred J. Frazer, the 1st MAW G-4, observed that although most of the construction was under Navy control, "III MAF and the Wing were extremely active in the planning and the allocation of construction resources." Col Fred J. Frazer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 16Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File). At least one Marine officer, Colonel Drew J. Barrett, Jr., who served both as Commanding Officer, 9th Marines and III MAF G-3, had his reservations about the extent of the base buildup in Vietnam: "The theatres, big messes, supermarket PX's, pools, bowling alleys, and the like merely created targets for the enemy, and additionally built up a fixed-base attitude in the minds of everyone except frontline troops. For what these installations cost us we could have provided three or four R&R's [Rest and Recuperation] for everyone and retained a lean and mean attitude." Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 5May78 (Vietnam Comment File).



Marine Corps Photo A189769

*Marine engineers construct a pontoon bridge across the Da Nang River. The new bridge, together with the old permanent one, connects the Tiensha Peninsula with the main base at Da Nang.*

operational by the beginning of 1967 and increased the Da Nang port capacity by 5,140 short tons per month.<sup>39</sup>

Marine engineers also made their contribution. By the end of 1966, five Marine engineer battalions were in Vietnam: the 1st and 3d Engineers supported the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions respectively, while the heavy engineer battalions, the 7th, 9th, and 11th, operated directly under III MAF.\*\* During the year the engineers built 107 miles of new roads, improved 1,582 miles of existing roads, and erected 48 bridges of all types, ranging from foot treadways to Class-60 bridges capable of supporting Marine M-48 tanks. They assisted the Seabees and

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\*\*The 3d and 7th battalions were in Vietnam at the beginning of the year. The 1st Engineer Battalion arrived with the 1st Division in March. The 9th Engineers deployed to Vietnam in May and assumed responsibility for the larger engineering tasks at Chu Lai while the 7th operated in the Da Nang area. The 11th did not arrive until November 1966 and moved to Dong Ha, where it reinforced the hard-pressed 3d Engineer Battalion in the struggle along the DMZ.



Marine Corps Photo A187722

*A Marine sweeps a road with a mine detector while the rest of the squad follows him. The men are students at the mine warfare school established by the 3d Engineer Battalion at Da Nang to reduce mine casualties.*

private firms in base construction at Chu Lai and Da Nang. At Dong Ha and Khe Sanh, they assisted in the improvement of base areas, as well as the improvement of the airfield facilities at both locations. Moreover, Marine engineers provided combat support to the infantry by conducting daily road sweeps,

and mine clearing, and destroying enemy tunnels.\* Perhaps the best summation of the entire I Corps support effort, including that of the engineers, in 1966, is contained in the following excerpt from a 1st MAW report: "Much was accomplished, much more remains to be done."<sup>40</sup>

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\*Lieutenant Colonel Conway J. Smith recalled that through June 1966, "the young Marines of the 3d Engineer Battalion performed daily mine sweeps over more than 20 miles of tactical roads. These same Marines also provided demolition support during most infantry operations. They also constructed more than 600 weapons bunkers and built up an additional 48 miles of tac-

tical roads and 60 pioneer bridges. In addition to this, a cadre of engineer mine warfare NCOs conducted a mine warfare school which instructed and indoctrinated more than 4,500 Marine (and some Army) personnel in the technicalities of Viet Cong mines and booby traps." LtCol Conway J. Smith, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).



PART VIII  
THE SLF, ADVISORS, OTHER  
MARINE ACTIVITIES, AND A FINAL  
LOOK AT 1966



## CHAPTER 19

# The SLF of the Seventh Fleet

*The SLF, Double Eagle, and Doctrinal Debates—The Okinawa Conference—Changes in Command and Composition—Further Operations and Changes in Commands and Units—The May Conference—The SLF to the End of the Year*

### *The SLF, Double Eagle, and Doctrinal Debates*

With the commitment of most Okinawa-based Marine forces to Vietnam by the end of 1965, the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force (SLF) was the Pacific command's only strategic reserve for all of the Far East.\* It consisted of a SLF Marine command and staff, approximating the organization of an infantry regimental staff; a Marine battalion landing team, consisting of a Marine infantry battalion reinforced by artillery and other support elements; and a Marine helicopter squadron. The Marine SLF commander reported directly to the Navy amphibious ready group commander. Although under the overall operational control of the Seventh Fleet, the SLF was readily available to General Westmoreland for specific operations in Vietnam.

At the beginning of 1966, Colonel John R. Burnett was the SLF commander; his headquarters was on board the USS *Valley Forge* (LPH 8). Lieutenant Colonel William K. Horn's BLT 2/3 and Lieutenant Colonel Mervin B. Porter's HMM-261 made up the ground and aviation components. On 5 January, Lieutenant Colonel James Aldworth's HMM-362 replaced HMM-261. Burnett moved his headquarters from the *Valley Forge* to the attack transport *Paul Revere* (APA 248) on the same

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\*Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, who had commanded Amphibious Group 1 in the Far East in 1962, observed that "under Commander Seventh Fleet, the Western Pacific Amphibious Force and, except for units committed to Vietnam, Fleet Marine Force had to be prepared on little or no notice to conduct operations anywhere in the Far East and Western Pacific. This was especially true in the case of the Amphibious Ready Group and Special Landing Force." VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [May78] (Vietnam Comment File).



Marine Corps Photo A422636  
*LtCol James Aldworth, Commanding Officer, HMM-362, is seen talking to LtCol Mervin B. Porter, Commanding Officer, HMM-261, on board the USS Valley Forge (LPH 8). HMM-362 relieved HMM-261 as the helicopter squadron of the SLF on 5 January 1966.*

date.\*\* From 5-26 January 1966, Burnett's staff was occupied with the planning effort for Operation Double Eagle.

Double Eagle, which began on 28 January and terminated on 1 March 1966, was the largest amphibious operation yet held in the Vietnam war. Task Force Delta, which included the SLF as well as III MAF units, landed first in Quang Ngai Province and then moved into the Que Son Valley further north. Despite extensive preparation and the lengthy duration of Double Eagle, the Marines failed to engage any large NVA or VC main force unit.

Double Eagle brought to a head some of the basic differences between III MAF and the SLF concerning

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\*\*The other ships of the amphibious task force were the attack transport ship USS *Montrose* (APA 212) and the landing ship dock USS *Monticello* (LSD 35).

its employment. According to amphibious doctrine, the amphibious task force commander, always a Navy officer, was to have operational control of all forces, including aviation, in the amphibious objective area until the amphibious portion of the operation was over.\* He was to exercise control of the ground forces through his deputy, the landing force commander, either a Marine or an Army officer, depending on the composition of the landing force. As the landing force commander for Double Eagle, Colonel Burnett was to turn over command of the ground forces to General Platt, the Task Force Delta commander, once the landing was completed. Since bad weather delayed the completion of the amphibious portion of the operation, an awkward command relationship resulted. According to Colonel Burnett:

The command relationship . . . in effect created a dual command structure for the period D thru D plus 3. Although the Landing Force Commander had responsibility and ostensibly command, this command was diluted . . . . When Task Force Delta did not assume OpCon [operation control] of Landing Force elements on D-Day as expected, but rather the Commander Landing Force retained OpCon, Task Force Delta in order to execute its original plan was forced to transmit its desires to the Commander Landing Force.<sup>1</sup>

Burnett claimed that "Although this did not adversely affect the operation, it caused some delay and confusion which in other situations . . . might have been disastrous." Furthermore, the SLF commander maintained: "Command and responsibility are inseparable and the person designated as Commander Landing Force with his commensurate responsibilities must have the requisite authority and control of all forces to execute the plan."<sup>2</sup>

III MAF Marine officers had another perspective of the situation. Although they recognized the SLF commander's desire to maintain autonomous command and control, many members of the III MAF

staff believed that:

. . . once the battalion is committed, let's commit it under the regimental commander who has that sector and the division commander who has that sector . . . terminate the amphibious [portion of the] operation more rapidly than we normally do. In fact, terminate them almost as soon as you get them ashore, so that we can then have one maneuver commander . . . to wit, Platt, [the in-country commander] in Double Eagle.<sup>3\*\*</sup>

General Krulak's FMFPac Headquarters supported the amphibious commander's point of view. The FMFPac commander was less worried about III MAF commanders assuming control of amphibious forces, than the fact that the Double Eagle example would set a precedent for other corps areas in South Vietnam. General Krulak was also perturbed about the lengthy period that the SLF had been committed to Double Eagle. He did not want the SLF to be considered an "in-country" organization. According to FMFPac, the integrity and independence of the SLF, as distinct from Marine units assigned to III MAF, had to be safeguarded.<sup>4</sup>

It was obvious before the end of Double Eagle that some of these questions had to be resolved. On 15 February, answering a request from Admiral Roy L. Johnson's Pacific Fleet Headquarters for a Seventh Fleet and FMFPac review of the effectiveness of the past amphibious operations, General Krulak proposed that he host a conference at Okinawa later in the month. Admiral Johnson concurred in the recommendation and ordered Krulak to proceed. General Krulak's motives for holding the conference were obvious. As he explained to General McCutcheon, acting CG III MAF at the time, the purpose was "to get everyone talking the same language."<sup>5</sup> The FMFPac commander wanted to smooth the internal Navy/Marine relationship, cut down planning and reaction time, and make SLF operations more effective.

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\*Departments of the Navy and the Army, *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (Washington: July 1962) was published by the Navy as Naval Warfare Publication 22A, by the Marine Corps as Landing Force Manual 01, and by the Army as FM31-11. The Air Force was not a party to any agreement upon amphibious operations at this time.

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\*\*Lieutenant General Hugh M. Elwood, who served as both assistant wing commander and III MAF chief of staff in 1966, stated the III MAF point of view as follows: "The basic points were that the SLF was badly needed by CGIIIMAF. Yet under another command, they landed frequently where they weren't really needed, where the enemy mostly wasn't and, on occasion, required the shore-based Marines to move in order to make room for them." LtGen Hugh M. Elwood, Comments on draft MS, dtd 4Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

tive. Colonel Chaisson, the III MAF representative to the Okinawa conference, recalled:

I think we were trying to get our ducks in order with regard to how the SLF would be used in-country . . . [and] what sort of an agreement should be entered into between PacFleet and MACV with regard to the routine employment or the abnormal employment of the SLF.<sup>6</sup>

### *The Okinawa Conference*

The conference was held during the period 25 February - 1 March 1966, attended by representatives from the major Pacific Fleet and Marine commands in the Western Pacific. The conferees were able to resolve most of the differences that had arisen. The representatives reaffirmed the validity of the Navy-Marine amphibious doctrine, as outlined in NWP 22(A), but in their report the conferees noted that in the area of command relationships the fundamental doctrine required detailed exposition "so that all concerned will conduct planning and operations uniformly and in strict conformance . . . ."<sup>7</sup>

In its study of command relationships, the conference report observed that there were four types of amphibious situations which the Marines would face in South Vietnam:

1. The landing force is the SLF and the amphibious operation though independent is a supporting operation of a larger operation. [The Dagger Thrust operations of 1965 were cited since they supported the overall MACV campaign].
2. The landing force is the SLF and the amphibious operation is an integral part of "a specific in-country operation in which in-country forces ashore are also employed, but are not embarked. . . ."
3. The landing force is the SLF and in-country forces are usually elements of III MAF.
4. The landing force is composed entirely of III MAF forces.<sup>8</sup>

The Committee on Command Relations, headed by Colonel Chaisson, examined each of the four situations.\* It recommended to the conference that

\*The other members of this committee were Captain William Stroud, USN, representing Navy Task Force 76; Colonel Joseph E. Loprete, representing the Seventh Fleet; Colonel Robert H. Barrow, representing FMFPac; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Gleason, representing the SLF; and Major Peter L. Hilgartner, representing CinCPacFlt.

whichever commander had the predominance of forces normally should have overall authority. It also reaffirmed the authority of the commander of the landing force, whether he be from III MAF or from the SLF, in the amphibious objective area (AOA) during the amphibious phase of the operation. The conferees emphasized that the amphibious phase should be terminated as "expeditiously as practicable, and the Landing Force passes soonest to the operational control of the commander of the forces ashore."<sup>9</sup> Even in the AOA, the Chaisson committee recognized that the authority of the landing force commander was limited because of the presence of South Vietnamese forces in the area. The landing force commander had no operational control of allied units although, obviously, he should attempt to secure coordinating authority. In fact, the entire emphasis of the conference report, which incorporated the committee's recommendations, was the necessity of effective liaison and preplanning between the involved command echelons to avoid any possible misunderstanding about command and control.<sup>10</sup>

The conference arrived at several broad recommendations for consideration by the senior U.S. commanders in the Pacific. The representatives of the CinCPacFlt components agreed that amphibious operations were a vital element in the war and they emphasized compliance with amphibious doctrine, the acquisition of timely intelligence, early and detailed concurrent planning, and improved reaction time. The conferees proposed bolder exploitation of the helicopter by conducting deeper inland operations. Most importantly, the conference recommended that portions of its report should be developed as "Fleet Policy," to be given wide distribution, most particularly to include CinCPac and ComUSMACV.<sup>11</sup>

### *Changes in Command and Composition*

At the time the Okinawa conference was ending its deliberations, important changes were occurring in the Marine chain of command relative to the SLF. Until the end of February, the 1st Marine Division Headquarters on Okinawa had administrative control of the SLF. With the pending departure of the division headquarters for Vietnam, a new parent had to be found for Marine forces remaining on Okinawa and afloat with the Seventh Fleet. On 1 March,

General Krulak activated the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade under the command of Colonel Herman Hansen, Jr., a World War II flying ace and holder of the Navy Cross and two Silver Stars. The new command assumed operational control of most Marine units on Okinawa and, as Navy Task Force 79, administrative control of the SLF.\*

In early March, the question arose whether the SLF should continue to be embarked at Okinawa or be formed in Vietnam and embarked there. On 4 March, Admiral Sharp, CinCPac, while on an inspection tour of Vietnam, spoke to General McCutcheon, acting CG III MAF, about using III MAF battalions for the SLF and Da Nang and Chu Lai as SLF embarkation ports. McCutcheon answered that although the proposal was feasible, he was under the impression that plans called for Okinawa to serve as the rotation base for Marine units and for the SLF. After Sharp's departure, General McCutcheon reported the details of the conversation to General Krulak. General Krulak agreed with McCutcheon that the SLF battalions should be home-based on Okinawa. The short flurry of concern about SLF basing came to an end in mid-March when General Westmoreland advised Sharp that he supported the Marine position.<sup>12</sup>

By this time, the SLF had a change in composition. After Double Eagle, Lieutenant Colonel Horn's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines reverted to its parent regiment's control at Da Nang. Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. Coffman's BLT 1/5, which had arrived at Subic Bay on 28 February from Camp Pendleton, California, became the new SLF battalion. The battalion had sailed in west-coast-based amphibious shipping which included the USS *Princeton* (LPH 5), USS *Pickaway* (APA 222), and USS *Alamo* (LSD 33). Colonel Burnett, his staff, and Lieutenant Colonel Aldworth's squadron on board the *Valley Forge* joined the amphibious task force in the Philippines. On 5 March, both the SLF headquarters and the squadron transferred from the *Valley Forge* to the *Princeton*. After a short amphibious exercise on the island of Mindoro in the Philippines, the SLF was ready for the next amphibious landing in South Vietnam.

\*General Fields established the 1st Marine Division Headquarters at Chu Lai in March. Until 1 March, General Fields had also been Commander, Navy Task Force 79, the naval designation for Marine forces with the Seventh Fleet.

### *Further Operations and Changes in Commands and Units*

The site for the operation was the Rung Sat Special Zone south of Saigon. Taking advantage of the protection of the swampy mangrove jungle of this region, VC gunners fired on ships using the main river channel to the Vietnamese capital. On 27 February, the enemy attacked a Panamanian ship, causing serious damage, and, again on 3 March, a South Vietnamese oil barge. To prevent the interdiction of Saigon's vital waterborne supply route, General Westmoreland requested authority to use the SLF to clear the Rung Sat. The request was granted and the result was Operation Jackstay, lasting from 26 March until 6 April 1966.

Complications concerning command and control arose during the planning phase. After preliminary

*Marines of BLT 1/5 hurry to waiting helicopters to begin Operation Jackstay. The operation took place in the Rung Sat sector south of Saigon to prevent the VC from closing the river route to the Vietnamese capital.*

Marine Corps Photo A413986



plans had already been completed, the South Vietnamese Government told General Westmoreland that it wanted two battalions of South Vietnamese Marines to participate in Jackstay with the U.S. forces. General Westmoreland agreed to the request, and U.S. and South Vietnamese Marine liaison officers met on board the command ship to assist in developing coordinating instructions. The Vietnamese Marine battalions were not to enter the operation until April and were assigned operational areas in the northwest sector of the Rung Sat, an area distinct and separate from the Marine battalion's operating area. In a sense, Jackstay was a combined operation because the South Vietnamese 4th and 5th Marine Battalions were under the *de facto* operational control of the commander of the amphibious task force.

On 22 March just before Jackstay began, General Westmoreland radioed Vice Admiral John J. Hyland, commander of the Seventh Fleet, indicating that he had reservations about the way in which the

*Marine helicopters take off from the deck of the USS Princeton (LPH 5) during Operation Jackstay. With few available helicopter landing zones, the Marines had limited mobility in the swampy mangrove jungles of the Rung Sat, often operating waist-deep in water.*

Marine Corps Photo A704376




operation was being organized, and asked Hyland to meet him in Saigon. He told the Seventh Fleet commander that he had promised the South Vietnamese General Staff that he would review and concur in the plan and stated that unless certain modifications were made in it, he would have to ask for a postponement of the operation.<sup>13</sup>

The two commanders met on 26 March. After listening to a briefing on the Jackstay plan, General Westmoreland expressed concern about the fact that he did not have direct control over the operation. He pointed out that a Navy captain, the amphibious task force commander, and a Marine colonel, the landing force commander, not under his command, were going to be conducting an operation for which he personally would be accountable. General Westmoreland suggested that Admiral Ward, the senior MACV naval advisor, be made the commander of the amphibious task force. Admiral Hyland replied that this procedure would not be in accordance with published amphibious doctrine. On the other hand, the Seventh Fleet commander proposed that he assign Rear Admiral Don P. Wulzen, Commander, Task Force 76, as commander of the amphibious task force.\* General Westmoreland finally agreed to this arrangement, but only after receiving Admiral Wulzen's assurance that he would be responsive to advice from MACV and that the operation would be terminated whenever MACV desired. The MACV liaison officers on the ships of the amphibious task force were to report directly to Admiral Ward, designated MACV senior liaison officer for the operation.<sup>14</sup> Although the question of command and control had been resolved for the time being, the subject was sure to come up again.

Jackstay was only partially successful in its attempt to eliminate the Viet Cong forces in the Rung Sat. Operating waist-deep in water with few suitable helicopter sites, the Marines would have been literally stuck in the mud, but for the availability of Navy boats and landing craft. The Viet Cong always seemed to be one step ahead and chose not to make a stand. Despite these handicaps, Lieutenant Colonel Coffman's troops did find and destroy enemy

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\*The amphibious ready group, the Navy task group that carried the Marine SLF, was assigned the Navy designation TG 76.5, and thus was a subordinate command to TF 76 in the Seventh Fleet chain of command.



workshops, bunkers, food stocks, clothing supplies, and weapons. During the course of the operation, the Marines were able to experiment with riverine techniques such as mounting an Ontos on a LCM for fire support. Although the enemy main body of troops withdrew, small groups of Viet Cong remained to provide some resistance to the Marine advance. The SLF claimed to have killed at least 63 of the enemy, while suffering 5 killed, 2 missing in action, and 25 wounded. For the time being, the shipping channel to Saigon was clear.<sup>15</sup>

After Jackstay, the commanders and composition of both 9th MAB and the SLF were changed. Colonel Richard A. Brenneman relieved Colonel Burnett as SLF commander on 7 April 1966. Two days later, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Somerville's HMM-364 flew on board the *Princeton* replacing HMM-362. In the meantime, Brigadier General William A. Stiles, the assistant 1st Marine division commander, had arrived on Okinawa from Camp Pendleton and assumed command of the 9th MAB from Colonel Hansen on 20 March. When General Stiles left for Chu Lai, he relinquished command of the MAB to Brigadier General Michael P. Ryan. General Ryan's command included both Colonel Harper's MAG-13 at Iwakuni and Colonel Widdecke's 5th Marines Headquarters and its 3d Battalion on Okinawa.\* The newly organized 26th Marines was slated to relieve the 5th Marines as the RLT headquarters for the MAB.

In late April, after the command and unit changes had been accomplished, the SLF conducted an amphibious operation, codenamed Osage, in the Phu Loc District of Thua Thien Province. The Marine BLT was assigned the mission of destroying a VC main force battalion and elements of a NVA regiment reported to be operating in the coastal region. With the exception of delaying and harassing tactics, the enemy again chose not to fight. During Osage, which lasted from 27 April until 2 May, the Marines killed eight enemy while suffering casualties of eight dead and nine wounded.

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\*The 9th MAB controlled FMFPac's major ground and air components in the Western Pacific outside Vietnam. Exceptions were the 3d Force Service Regiment and Marine Wing Service Group 17. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines sailed from Okinawa for Chu Lai on 7 April.

### *The May Conference*

By this time, both MACV and the Navy desired to reexamine the SLF employment in Vietnam. On 10 May, General Westmoreland radioed Admiral Sharp suggesting that the changing nature of the war in Vietnam made the original SLF mission, conducting amphibious raids to disrupt the buildup of enemy forces in the coastal regions, too narrow in scope. In General Westmoreland's opinion, the growth of U.S. forces in Vietnam and their expanded operations, combined with the Navy's Market Time campaign, had severely restricted enemy sea infiltration and the freedom of movement of Communist main force units. The MACV commander stated that he realized that enemy troop concentrations in coastal areas would continue to occur, but he wanted to develop, in concert with the Seventh Fleet, a more responsive procedure to destroy these forces. Admiral Johnson, CinCPacFlt, who had received an information copy of the MACV message, agreed that a more definite determination had to be made of the role of the SLF. He asked Admiral Sharp for authorization, which he readily obtained, to establish direct liaison with MACV. In a 17 May message to MACV, Admiral Johnson agreed with General Westmoreland that improvement should be made in SLF responsiveness, but pointed out that the basic concept of the SLF, as worked out the previous year, was still valid, but needed some modification. Johnson proposed holding a conference on Okinawa during which the two commands could determine the best means of SLF employment.<sup>16\*\*</sup>

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\*\*Colonel Francis F. Parry, a member of the MACV staff at the time, recalled in 1982 that he had initiated the Westmoreland message. He learned from his immediate superior, Brigadier General William K. Jones, who headed the MACV Combat Operations Center, that General Westmoreland was "grumbling about the Seventh Fleet. . . ." Parry told Jones that he "thought Westy was needlessly concerned. I had known of Johnny [Vice Admiral John J.] Hyland in the Pentagon and he had a reputation for being smart and easy to get along with. I suggested that I could straighten the emerging difficulties out in a hurry if I could deal directly at the staff level. Westy agreed to our proposing a MACV-PacFlt meeting in Okinawa and to my heading the MACV contingent. An Army colonel from FFI [1 Field Force, Vietnam] was included to keep an eye on me." Col Francis F. Parry, Comments on draft MS, dtd 23Feb82 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Parry Comments.

MACV concurred and the conference took place from 25-28 May; officers representing components of both MACV and CinCPacFlt attended. With Captain Herman J. Trum, the senior CinCPacFlt representative as chairman, the conferees were organized into four committees to study the problems and arrive at a new agreement concerning amphibious relations for the signature of both General Westmoreland and Admiral Johnson.

The conference completed its work on 28 May and forwarded its proposed joint agreement to CinCPacFlt and to ComUSMACV. Its main provisions called for the:

1. Proper application of the time-tested Army-Navy-Marine Corps approved doctrine contained in NWP-22(A).
2. Early CinCPac approval for the conduct of these amphibious supporting operations.
3. Early concurrent and parallel planning at the Commander, Amphibious Task Force and Commander, Landing Force level, in accordance with decisions mutually agreed to by ComUSMACV and CinCPacFlt.
4. The acquisition of timely, detailed and accurate intelligence, requiring close coordination between the fleet and in-country intelligence agencies in accordance with procedures agreed upon by ComUSMACV and CinCPacFlt.
5. Improving amphibious reaction by streamlining procedures in order to improve the responsiveness of the ARG/SLF to ComUSMACV operations in RVN.<sup>17\*</sup>

The MACV commander had one major objection to the original draft agreement. He believed that the requirement for CinCPac approval prior to committing the SLF was too restrictive for rapid reaction. This provision was modified, and a few editorial changes were made. The final signed agreement was almost identical to the one concluded by the conferees. General Westmoreland concurred in the joint

agreement on 24 August 1966. Both Admiral Johnson and General Westmoreland had reason to be satisfied. The agreement furnished Westmoreland with more flexibility when calling for the SLF, while Admiral Johnson received assurance that the command relationship contained in NWP-22(A) would pertain to all amphibious operations in Vietnam as much as possible.\*\*

### *The SLF to the End of the Year*


An outgrowth of the May amphibious conference was the decision to initiate a broader type of amphibious operation, codenamed Deckhouse. The Deckhouse operations were designed to complement allied operations against enemy units. The first of the new series, Deckhouse I, took place in II Corps from 18-30 June 1966, in support of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division's operation Nathan Hale. Although the Marines encountered only scattered resistance, Nathan Hale developed into a nine-battalion operation during which the allied forces killed over 400 of the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Bronars' BLT 3/5, which had replaced BLT 1/5 on 7 May, was the landing force for the operation.

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\*\*A revised edition of the *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* was published in 1967 as NWP-22(B). Most of the modifications from the older version were of a technical nature and beyond the scope of this history. The major importance of the new edition lay in the fact that NWP-22(B) was also published as an Air Force Manual as well as a Marine, Navy, and Army publication. The new NWP did not alter the agreement reached by General Westmoreland and Admiral Johnson, which was approved by CinCPac in November 1966. The issue over control, despite the agreement, remained a sensitive issue between MACV and the Navy. Admiral John J. Hyland, the Seventh Fleet commander, remarked that "the Army never ceased trying to obtain operational control of the SLF and the other assets of the Seventh Fleet which were operating in support of MACV. . . . The Army never liked the concept of the Navy 'operating in support,' because of the fear that the Navy might pull out at any time it felt that a threat outside the MACV area was greater than the threat inside that area. Actually, of course, the Navy would never pull out unless the highest authorities in Washington believed it was needed more in another area." Adm John J. Hyland, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File). For a further discussion of the impact of the Vietnam War on amphibious doctrine, see LtCol Peter L. Hilgartner, "Amphibious Doctrine in Vietnam," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 53, No. 1 (Jan 1969), pp. 28-31.

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\*Colonel Parry remembered that when he arrived on Okinawa he found the Navy and FMFPac representatives "loaded for bear . . . [and] decided to . . . defuse the situation." He recommended that the conference break into committees to address each of the issues. While he and the senior Fleet and FMFPac representatives "repaired to the Kadena Golf Course . . . the ltcols and majors types worked[ed] things out. I'm sure our hours on the golf course over the next two days did more to ensure the success of the conference than anything else. . . . When we briefed Westy upon return to Saigon I believe he was not a little surprised at the degree of cooperation. Years of Navy-Marine hard-iron teamwork paid off!" Parry Comments



Marine Corps Photo A704379

*Two medium landing craft lay-to near the USS Thomaston (LSD 28) during Deckhouse IV. In this operation, the SLF battalion, BLT 1/26, landed near the DMZ and participated in Operation Prairie.*

During the two months following Deckhouse I, the SLF once more rotated helicopter and infantry units. On 4 July, Lieutenant Colonel James D. McGough's HMM-363 relieved Lieutenant Colonel Somerville's HMM-364. Both Bronars' battalion and McGough's squadron participated in Deckhouse II during Operation Hastings.\* On 4 August, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Monti's BLT 1/26, newly arrived from the United States, became the SLF battalion. After a brief training phase in the Philippines, the newly constituted SLF conducted Deckhouse III on the Vung Tau Peninsula 60 miles southwest of Saigon, in conjunction with the U.S. Army's 173d Airborne Brigade. The results were disappointing; only two enemy were killed at the cost of four Marine dead and 21 wounded.

During the rest of the year, Seventh Fleet SLF forces focused on the northern battle zone. As an adjunct to Operation Prairie, which followed Hastings, the SLF once more landed below the DMZ in Opera-

tion Deckhouse IV.\*\* Although the SLF ended its active participation in Operation Prairie on 24 September, the amphibious forces maintained an anxious eye on the DMZ. From October through November, a Marine BLT remained afloat off the northern coast to reinforce III MAF if the NVA renewed the offensive.

Concern about the DMZ caused a brief period of reinforcement of Seventh Fleet Marine amphibious units. Following Deckhouse IV, Lieutenant Colonel Garland T. Beyerle's BLT 3/26 replaced BLT 1/26 and Lieutenant Colonel Marshall B. Armstrong's HMM-362 relieved HMM-363. The reconstituted SLF was slated for an amphibious exercise in the Philippines. General Westmoreland, fearing that a major enemy thrust could occur in the DMZ during this time, asked Admiral Sharp to provide another contingency force to be stationed off the northern coast of South Vietnam. Approval was granted and

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\*See Chapter 10 for a detailed description of Deckhouse II.

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\*\*See Chapter 11 for a detailed description of Deckhouse IV.



Marine Corps Photo A187883

*Marines from BLT 1/26 return to their quarters on board the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) after the completion of Deckhouse IV. Although accounting for about 200 of the enemy, the battalion sustained 203 casualties, including 36 killed.*

General Ryan's 9th MAB on Okinawa was ordered to provide the force. Colonel John J. Padley, the commanding officer of the 26th Marines, which had arrived on Okinawa in August, embarked his headquarters and assumed the additional designation Commander, Task Group 79.2. The Task Group consisted of BLT 3/3, under Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. "Pappy" Delong, and HMM-163, under Lieutenant Colonel Rocco D. Bianchi. Padley's units remained off northern I Corps until 1 November. At that time, it was relieved by the regular SLF, TG 79.5, now under Colonel Harry D. Wortman. Task Group 79.2 was dissolved on 8 November and two days later TG 79.5 resumed its normal operations. With the easing of the fighting on the northern front, the special alert for the SLF was over.

In December, one more change occurred in SLF

composition when Major James L. Day's BLT 1/9 relieved BLT 3/26 as the landing force battalion. Colonel Wortman and his staff immediately began planning for Deckhouse V which was to take place in the Mekong Delta in early 1967.

With few exceptions, SLF operations, to that point, had little resemblance to classical amphibious warfare. For the most part, Marine amphibious operations in Vietnam were either administrative landings, exploitations of an already existing battle situation, or amphibious raids. Marine landing forces were not assaulting hostile shores; they were landing where large U.S. and allied ground and air forces were already present. Colonel Chaisson later observed that the SLF operations "by and large were sort of contrived. It was almost a concept looking for a home."<sup>18</sup>

## CHAPTER 20

# Other Marine Activities

*Staff and Security in Saigon—Marine Advisors to the VNMC—Rung Sat Marines—Marine I Corps Advisors—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison*

### *Staff and Security in Saigon*

The composition of the MACV staff reflected the predominance of U.S. Army forces in Vietnam. Despite the fact that over two-thirds of the nearly 3,000 members of the joint MACV staff were Army personnel, General Westmoreland maintained a reputation of impartiality in dealing with the U.S. component commands in Vietnam. Brigadier General William K. Jones, the senior Marine on the MACV staff, observed that the Army officers who filled key staff positions took pains to ascertain the viewpoints of other services and "tried to develop a teamwork that was necessary to run the command."<sup>1</sup>

Brigadier General Jones had arrived in December 1965 for the express purpose of organizing the MACV Combat Operations Center. According to Jones, who had held a similar billet as Chief of the General Operations Division in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during 1961-62, "It was a brand new proposition in which I was given plenty of leeway by both General Rosson and General DePuy to set up the overall operation."<sup>2\*</sup>

The MACV Combat Operations Center eventually developed into a smaller version of the National Military Command Center in Washington, performing the same nerve-center function for Westmoreland as the latter did for the Joint Chiefs. The operations center had direct radio and teletype connections with Admiral Sharp's headquarters in Honolulu and the National Military Command



Marine Corps Photo A187971

*LtGen Walt, Commanding General, III MAF (left), and BGen Jonas M. Platt, III MAF Chief of Staff (right), pin on the "stars" of newly promoted BGen John R. Chaisson, the III MAF operations officer. As a general officer, Chaisson relieved BGen William K. Jones as Director of the MACV Combat Operations Center.*

Center. General Jones remained in command of the center until November 1966, when he was relieved by Marine Brigadier General John R. Chaisson, just promoted to his new rank after completing his tour as III MAF's G-3.\*

The number of Marines on the staff at MACV Headquarters in Saigon grew from less than 80 in December 1965 to 185 by the end of 1966. In addition to Generals Jones and Chaisson, Colonel Francis F. "Fox" Parry, Lieutenant Colonel Paul B.

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\*General Jones had earned the Navy Cross and Silver Star in World War II. His assignment prior to his arrival in Vietnam was Commanding General, Force Troops, FMFPac. Major General William B. Rosson, USA, was the MACV Chief of Staff while Major General William E. DePuy was the MACV J-3. The latter was relieved by Major General John C. Tillson III in March 1966.

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\*Colonel Francis F. Parry, who was Jones' deputy, recalled that before General DePuy departed, he insisted that the operations center have an Army deputy as well as a Marine. Parry recommended to Generals Jones and Tillson "that the two deputies divide up their duties with the Marine having responsibility for activity in I Corps, II Corps, and air and naval matters; the Army taking III Corps, IV Corps, and Special Forces operations both in and out of country. This retained a Marine hand directly involved in those areas of most interest to us." Parry Comments.

Haigwood, and Lieutenant Colonel Heman J. Redfield III served in the Combat Operations Center. Other Marines were scattered throughout the MACV staff. Administratively, the Marines in Saigon were carried on the rolls of Headquarters Marine Corps in Washington. General Jones later commented that a separate administrative subunit in Saigon should have been established for these Marines declaring "having to go clear to [HQMC] . . . didn't make any damned sense at all."<sup>3</sup>

The Marine Security Detachment at the American Embassy, which was charged with protecting other U.S. civilian buildings as well as the Embassy, also increased in number during the year because of the proliferation of U.S. Government agencies in the South Vietnamese capital. Reflecting the augmented size and larger security responsibility of the detachment, 1st Lieutenant Phillip E. Tucker assumed command in April from Gunnery Sergeant Jerry N. Lorelli. By the end of 1966, the detachment had reached a strength of 68 Marines.

#### *Marine Advisors to the VNMC*

From the beginning of the Vietnamese Marine Corps in 1954, U.S. Marines, starting with Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat, served as advisors with its units. By January 1966, the U.S. Marine Advisory Unit, headed by Colonel John A. MacNeil, consisted of 25 officers and five enlisted men. The Marine Advisory Unit was part of the U.S. Naval Advisory Group; Colonel MacNeil as the senior advisor reported directly to Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward, Chief of the U.S. Naval Advisory Group, who, in turn, was responsible to General Westmoreland.

The senior Marine advisor and his staff advised the Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps in all matters pertaining to the organization and employment of the South Vietnamese Marines. Complementary to this function was the senior Marine advisor's responsibility for coordinating the planning for the projected growth of the Vietnamese Marine Corps with Admiral Ward and the South Vietnamese.

Although all of the senior Marine advisors had worked toward the development of a larger independent, self-sufficient Vietnamese Marine Corps, the exigencies of the war forestalled many necessary but

ancillary activities. For example, the continuous need for infantry advisors in late 1965 and early 1966 prevented the assignment of the U.S. Marine operations and training advisor to his primary staff function until March 1966.

In the spring of 1966, Colonel MacNeil undertook a long delayed review of South Vietnamese Marine mission, organization, and objectives. In June, he submitted a Force Structure Plan for the Vietnamese Marine Corps to Admiral Ward. The plan was eventually incorporated into the MACV Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1972 (JSOP).<sup>\*</sup> MacNeil visualized the expansion of the Vietnamese Marine Corps from a brigade to a division. Specifically, the plan called for the growth of the Vietnamese Marine Corps from a strength of approximately 7,000 men organized into five infantry battalions and support elements in 1966 to a strength of approximately 11,700 men organized into nine infantry battalions and support units by 1970.

In addition to adding to the number of infantry battalions, the Force Structure Plan restructured the Vietnamese headquarters and support elements. In 1968, a headquarters battalion was to be established containing a brigade/division headquarters, a headquarters and service company, a signal company, a reconnaissance company, and a military police company. The amphibious support battalion, which provided most of these services in 1966, was to be dissolved, while two new support battalions, a service battalion and a medical battalion, were to be established. The artillery battalion was to remain basically the same, with the exception of the addition of a 105mm battery by 1968 or 1969; then Vietnamese Marine artillery would consist of three 105mm batteries and two 75mm pack howitzer batteries.<sup>4</sup>

In 1966, the Vietnamese Marine Corps operated as an element of the general strategic reserve and, in effect, as a sort of "fire brigade" whenever trouble erupted. Its highly respected Commandant, Lieu-

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<sup>\*</sup>JSOP is a mid-range objectives plan which translated United States national objectives and policies for the time frame five to eight years into the future, into terms of military objectives and strategic concepts and defined basic undertakings for cold, limited, and general war which might be accomplished with the projected force levels. The MACV JSOP was for five years, thus the fiscal year 1972 JSOP was prepared in 1966.



Marine Corps Photo A186608

*South Vietnamese Marines cross a fast-rushing stream in Kontum Province using a make-shift bamboo bridge. The Vietnamese Marines were part of the RVN strategic reserve and used as a "fire brigade" wherever needed.*

tenant General Le Nguyen Khang, not only headed the Marine Corps, but was the military governor of Saigon as well. In May, he assumed yet another duty when he became the commanding general of the South Vietnamese III Corps, which included those provinces of South Vietnam in the vicinity of the capital city. Khang's additional assignments caused no diminishment of the effectiveness of the Marine brigade. For the day-to-day administrative duties, he relied heavily upon his efficient and scholarly chief of staff, Colonel Bui The Lan. At least one Marine battalion remained in the Saigon area, while the other battalions, in task force organizations, were deployed throughout Vietnam wherever the need was greatest.

In the spring of 1966, the government sent two battalions of Marines, without their U.S. advisors, to put down the insurrections in Da Nang and Hue.\* During the rest of the year, a Vietnamese Marine task force continued to operate in I Corps. During Operation Hastings, two Vietnamese Marine battalions were the I Corps reserve, but were never committed. In August, Vietnamese Marines participated with the 5th Marines during Operation Colorado in the Que Son Valley northwest of Tam Ky and, dur-

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\*See Chapters 5 and 6. U.S. advisors were excluded for obvious reasons.



Marine Corps Photo A332793 (Col Nels E. Anderson) *Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, LtGen Le Nguyen Khang (right), accompanied by Col Nels E. Anderson, the senior U.S. Marine advisor to the VNMC, reviews his troops. All U.S. Marine advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps wore the South Vietnamese Marine uniforms.*

ing Prairie, the Vietnamese Marines supported ARVN 1st Division operations in Quang Tri Province.

The Vietnamese Marines spent nearly 90 percent of the time in the field during 1966. With the activation of a sixth infantry battalion in September, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade's battalion rotation system for refitting and retraining achieved more flexibility. Thereafter, one battalion could be held at its base camp. Despite constant hardships, the Vietnamese Marines maintained a six to one kill ratio over enemy forces. Colonel Nels E. Anderson, Colonel MacNeil's successor, described the readiness and effectiveness of the Vietnamese Marines at the end of the year in the following terms:

At the present time, although the Vietnamese Marine Brigade comprises a little over one percent of the total RVNAF personnel structure, it contributes a great deal more than that in combat against the insurgents. The South Vietnamese Marine Corps at present returns more mileage for the money in the terms of devoted service, combat efficiency, and combat readiness.<sup>9</sup>

### *Rung Sat Marines*

The Naval Advisory Group contained another group of Marine advisors; those operating under the U.S. senior advisor of the Rung Sat Special Zone Advisory Detachment, a Navy commander. The Rung Sat, which literally translated means Forest of Assassins, is a dense mangrove swamp southeast of Saigon in Quang Xuyen and Can Gio Districts of Bien Hoa Province. Roughly circular in shape and about 20 miles in diameter, it covers more than 400 square miles. Its major importance lies in the fact that it encompasses much of the Long Tao River, the main shipping channel from the sea to Saigon. No road net exists in the Rung Sat and most movement was along the streams which are narrow, shallow, and winding. The Vietnamese Navy was responsible for the administration and defense of the Rung Sat. A Vietnamese Army battalion, or occasionally a Vietnamese Marine battalion, normally operated in the Rung Sat area under the operational control of the Navy. The Rung Sat was traditionally a haven for fugitives from the law, and the Viet Cong took advantage of its physical characteristics to elude government forces while harassing shipping. Major McLendon G. Morris, the senior Marine, and two other officers and four enlisted Marines, served as infantry, psychological warfare, and intelligence advisors to the Vietnamese ground units in the Rung Sat. Several years later, Major Morris remembered the frequent Rung Sat search and destroy operations, "conducted in the unforgettable gray mud, up to hip-depth, which sucked one's energy away with every step, especially non-Vietnamese, who tended to sink more deeply with each step than did their counterparts."<sup>6</sup>

### *Marine I Corps Advisors*

The largest number of Marines serving as advisors to the Vietnamese were assigned to the MACV I Corps advisory organization. General Walt, as senior advisor for I Corps, had overall responsibility for the U.S. advisory program in the five northern provinces. The advisory effort was entirely separated from III MAF and, in fact, was administered by the I Corps deputy advisor, an Army colonel. Colonel Howard B. St. Clair, St. Clair served in this capacity until relieved on 1 March 1966 by Colonel Archelaus

L. Hamblen, Jr. During the year, the number of U.S. advisors was reduced for fear that too many advisors could stifle South Vietnamese initiative. The number of I Corps advisors was cut in January 1966 from 700 (65 of whom were Marines) to 630 (49 of whom were Marines) by the end of the year. The spring political crisis hampered the advisory effort to the 1st ARVN Division, but by December, the South Vietnamese unit was well on its way toward regaining its reputation as one of the best divisions of the Vietnamese Army. The 2d Division, which had not participated in the Struggle Movement, continued to improve throughout the year.

#### *Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison*

Subunit-1 of the 1st ANGLICO (Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company), Force Troops, FMFPac, although not in the normal III MAF chain of command and small in size, was vital to the successful use of all available supporting arms. The ANGLICO organization is specifically designed to support allied and U.S. Army forces in the employment of Marine close air support and naval gunfire.

Subunit-1, under Major Richard E. Romine, had been in South Vietnam since 1965. By January 1966, Major Romine, headquartered in Saigon, had a force of 55 men divided into 11 teams stationed throughout South Vietnam. In February, Lieutenant Colonel Carrol B. Burch assumed command of the detachment from Major Romine. Although nominally under III MAF, the subunit acted as an independent command under MACV. In September, formal operational control was transferred to General Westmoreland's headquarters. By December, the subunit had grown to a strength of 146 men, divided into 13 detachments. The largest detachment was attached to the Korean Marines at Binh Son, Quang Ngai Province. During the year,



Marine Corps Photo A188080  
PFC Bennie C. Belton, a member of Subunit-1, 1st ANGLICO, assists a South Korean officer to call in Marine close air support near Binh Son in Quang Ngai Province. ANGLICO is an acronym standing for Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, a unit made up of Marine and Navy personnel and specifically designed to provide support to U.S. Army and allied forces.

the subunit controlled more than 5,000 naval gunfire missions in support of U.S. and allied forces and was credited with killing 3,000 NVA/VC and destroying over 20,000 enemy structures.\*

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\*Records do not indicate the number of airstrikes controlled by the subunit; only the detachment with the Koreans performed the air-liaison function in Vietnam.

## CHAPTER 21

# At the End of the Year

### *Plans for Reinforcing the Marines in I Corps—Planning the Barrier—Conclusion*

#### *Plans for Reinforcing the Marines in I Corps*

Ironically, just when MACV and the South Vietnamese began emphasizing pacification, the Marines in I Corps found their personnel reserves available for that purpose stretched almost to the breaking point. III MAF was in the difficult position of pursuing an antiguerrilla campaign in its southern TAORs while at the same time containing a North Vietnamese incursion in the north.

The American command could only speculate about the reasons behind the North Vietnamese offensive in the summer of 1966. General Westmoreland expressed the belief that the enemy wanted to divert allied forces from the populated area around Saigon and suspected that the North Vietnamese had hoped to exploit the recent political crisis by establishing a "liberation government" in the northern two provinces.<sup>1</sup> Generals Krulak and Walt thought that the Communist leaders wanted to draw the Marine battalions out of the populated I Corps coastal plain into a campaign of attrition in the almost uninhabited rugged interior of northern Quang Tri Province. Much later, in 1967, General Krulak quoted a leading member of the North Vietnamese Government, Nguyen Van Mai, to support this argument:

The National Liberation Front will entice the Americans close to the North Vietnamese border and will bleed them without mercy. In South Vietnam, the pacification program will be destroyed.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever their estimates of North Vietnamese reasons for opening the new front, Generals Westmoreland and Walt were in total agreement that the enemy forces had to be thrown back. The MACV commander compared his position to the stance of a boxer, who jabs with his left to keep the enemy off balance, while holding his right to protect

vital areas.<sup>3</sup> In a sense, Operations Hastings and, later, Prairie were launched as jabs to counter the enemy offensive. As Prairie continued, the 3d Marine Division was deployed to the two northern provinces and an Army infantry battalion was moved in to reinforce the Marines at Da Nang. The enemy had expanded the war; the allied commands had little choice but to respond.

The realignment of forces was not a spontaneous decision. Early in 1966, the MACV and III MAF staffs prepared contingency plans for countering a North Vietnamese invasion through the Demilitarized Zone. With the beginning of Operation Hastings, the contingency planning effort took on an air of urgency. During a visit to General Walt on 12 July, Westmoreland discussed the long-range implications. The MACV commander believed that the NVA were preparing for a sustained drive in Quang Tri Province and asked Walt to prepare for it. The next day, General Westmoreland ordered III MAF to develop a plan for the employment of a Marine division in northern I Corps, based on two different sets of assumptions. According to the first, labeled Phase I, General Walt was to stop other operations, maintain defense of the base areas, and move a division north to counter the enemy offensive. During this phase, he would not receive reinforcements. Under Phase II assumptions, III MAF was to develop plans for the use of a three-battalion Army brigade to be placed under the operational control of the Marine command. The Army troops were to come from either I Field Force or II Field Force. On 16 July, MACV notified General Larsen, Commanding General, I Field Force, to prepare a plan for the movement of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to I Corps. The entire contingency planning effort was given the designation South Carolina.<sup>4</sup>

During the summer and fall of 1966, General Westmoreland and his subordinate commanders continued to prepare contingency plans which presumed the reinforcement of III MAF by Army units. By the end of September, the American com-

mand had produced three planning directives which addressed this subject, codenamed South Carolina, North Carolina and Tennessee. All three plans were designed to cope with the manpower drain on III MAF as a result of a North Vietnamese drive in the north. If South Carolina were implemented, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in II Corps was to reinforce III MAF in northern I Corps. In the North Carolina plan, the 173d Airborne Brigade in III Corps reinforced Da Nang, while the 3d Marine Division moved north and concentrated in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. According to the Tennessee plan, a brigade from the Army's 1st Cavalry Division was to move from II Corps to Chu Lai if more Marines were required in the northern two provinces.<sup>5</sup>

While this contingency planning was continuing, General Westmoreland was studying other alternatives. On 25 July, he stated that he was considering the establishment of a blocking force to prevent the enemy from moving through the DMZ. Westmoreland believed that there might be some merit in making this an international force, including Korean and Australian troops. Under his concept, observation posts would be established on the hills and mountains just south of the DMZ, while the blocking units would be inserted in the valleys.<sup>6</sup> At the meeting of the U.S. Mission Council the following week, General Westmoreland brought up the subject again. He stated that:

The organization would be known as the KANZUS Force from its national components: Korean, Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. As presently visualized, the organization would be brigade-size, with two U.S. Marine and one ROK battalion as the combat elements. Individual battalions would retain their national identity. Formation of the command headquarters supporting structure would provide a place for incorporating token remaining national contributions from Australia and New Zealand and others such as the Philippines, should this become suitable. . . . The organization, commanded by a USMC Marine officer, possibly a brigadier general, would operate in the U.S. tactical chain of command in close coordination with and in support of the ARVN.<sup>7</sup>

The proposal received a favorable response from most of the participants at the meeting. Ambassador Lodge notified the State Department that such a force might provide the U.S. with a basis for the eventual creation of an international force under:

UN or Asian regional sponsorship which would inherit the anti-infiltration role of KANZUS. An eventual suc-

cessor would function obviously as a political and psychological cordon sanitaire, and not of course, as a military Maginot Line.<sup>8</sup>

At the same time, General Westmoreland forwarded his concept to the Joint Chiefs through Admiral Sharp's headquarters in Hawaii. According to the MACV historians, the American Ambassadors to Australia, New Zealand, and Korea all thought the idea had merit and concurred in the project.<sup>9</sup>

By 18 August, the MACV staff had completed its planning directive entitled "Operation Short Stop," which outlined the necessary actions to discover and disrupt the infiltration of enemy units through and around the DMZ into northern Quang Tri Province. Operation Short Stop required the improvement of Route 9 to Thon Son Lam and the stationing of the brigade-sized KANZUS force on the Dong Ha-Cam Lo-Thon Son Lam axis. The KANZUS brigade was to have a surveillance reaction mission under the operational control of III MAF. According to the timetable, road work and the positioning of the brigade would have to be accomplished before the onset of the northeast monsoon.<sup>10</sup>

Time was of the essence for General Westmoreland. On 21 August, he asked both the State and Defense Departments to furnish approval and guidance for the KANZUS project. He noted that base camps had to be erected, lines of communication opened, and supply points stocked by 1 October, or no sizeable force could operate in northern Quang Tri during the rainy season. The general then stated that there was also a minimum amount of time "for the assembly and shakedown of components of the force."<sup>11</sup>

In spite of MACV's sense of urgency, the international ramifications of the KANZUS proposal caused Washington authorities to take a long deliberate look at the concept. Several complications arose which had to be solved before troops could be deployed. Some exception even was taken to the designation KANZUS on the grounds that it was too restrictive and precluded additional nations from joining the force. Admiral Sharp noted that the ground rules for operations in the DMZ had to be reconsidered. He recommended that the KANZUS force should have the authority to move into the South Vietnamese portion of the DMZ to prevent the North Vietnamese from using the area as a sanctuary. It was feared that the establishment of KANZUS could pose legal problems with the Interna-

tional Control Commission, which was charged by the 1954 agreements with supervision of the DMZ.<sup>12</sup>

The uppermost question was whether KANZUS would require more manpower. General Westmoreland was able to furnish a breakdown of his estimate of the required force on 19 September. At that time, he told Admiral Sharp that the KANZUS force would consist of two Marine infantry battalions and either a Korean Marine or Army battalion. Supplementing these units would be two firing batteries, one Korean and one New Zealander, and an Australian reconnaissance company. All of these components were then in South Vietnam; no further augmentation was required. The complicating factor was whether the allied nations would release these troops for the DMZ mission; a definite answer to this critical question could not be determined until the KANZUS project was accepted by Washington. As far as U.S. forces were concerned, the only additional reinforcements not yet in Vietnam that were required were a helicopter company or squadron and additional headquarters personnel. The needed additional headquarters personnel included a Marine brigadier general to be the brigade commander and 10 other officers. A Marine regimental headquarters company was to form the nucleus of the brigade staff; the other allied units represented in KANZUS were to provide liaison personnel to the brigade headquarters.<sup>13</sup>

Despite all of the detailed planning, KANZUS became a moot point. It soon was obvious that approval would not come before 1 October, the date that General Westmoreland had set as the deadline for deployment before the monsoon rains. As fighting intensified in late September during Operation Prairie, the question also arose whether a brigade-size force would be adequate to meet the threat in the north. Subsequent events made the implementation of the KANZUS plan impractical.

On 6 October, Generals Westmoreland and Walt activated part of the North Carolina plan. The 3d Marine Division was moved into the two northern provinces, while the 1st Marine Division assumed the responsibility for both the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORs. General Westmoreland dispatched the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade from Bien Hoa to I Corps, with supporting artillery.

General Westmoreland anticipated that if it were necessary to implement the rest of North Carolina and the other contingency plans, the sequence

would be North Carolina, South Carolina, and then Tennessee, realizing that circumstances could cause change to this order of events. The MACV commander considered the possibility of reinforcing Chu Lai before sending an Army brigade to the DMZ area, or even executing both options simultaneously. Westmoreland also thought that he could integrate RLT 26 into this sequence, either to reinforce the Army troops or even as a reinforcing regiment in lieu of them. All Marine and Army forces that might be introduced into I Corps under these contingencies were to be under III MAF operational control.<sup>14</sup>

After action in the DMZ area tapered off and forces were redeployed in early October, the threat of an all-out enemy offensive in the north receded. In November, General Westmoreland ordered the return of the Army infantry battalion to III Corps; it left the next month. During December, the 3d Division pulled the 4th Marines Headquarters away from the border region and reassigned it to Thua Thien Province to conduct Operation Chinook. By the end of the year, General Walt had reduced his DMZ forces to five battalions.

Despite the limited standoff in the northern area at the end of the year, the enemy could still reactivate this front at any time and the American command had to take this fact into consideration. As a countermeasure during December, the MACV and III MAF staffs completed operation plans Georgia I and Georgia II, the deployment of the Army's 9th Division to reinforce the Marines in I Corps. III MAF was extended from Chu Lai to the DMZ, which development had a drastic effect on Marine operations, especially on pacification. There was little doubt that if the enemy renewed the offensive along the northern boundary, U.S. Army units would have to beef up allied strength in I Corps.

### *Planning the Barrier*

Secretary McNamara was interested in an entirely different alternative to meet the DMZ threat. During early 1966, the Defense Department began to look seriously at the possibility of establishing a physical barrier across the DMZ and the Laotian panhandle to stop North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. In April, the Secretary directed that a special study group composed of leading U.S. scientists examine the technical feasibility of such a



Marine Corps Historical Collection

*U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (left) is greeted on one of his early trips to Vietnam by South Vietnamese General Nguyen Huu Co (right) and former U.S. Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam, U. Alexis Johnson (right). Secretary McNamara in 1966 directed that the U.S. study the feasibility of establishing a physical barrier across the DMZ.*

barrier. Under the aegis of a private consulting organization, the Institute for Defense Analyses, 67 scholars took part in the study. Reporting on 30 August, the study group concluded that an air-supported barrier, not manned by ground troops, could be operational in approximately one year after the decision was made. The proposed barrier was to consist of two parts, one antipedestrian and the other antivehicular; the foot barrier was to extend along the southern edge of the DMZ into Laos while the antivehicular system would be located further to the west. According to the study, the barrier system was to include a series of minefields positioned at strategic points within the entire barrier region. These minefields were to be augmented by electronic acoustic and seismic sensors which would in-

dicade attempted penetration. Patrolling on a 24-hour basis, U.S. Air Force monitoring aircraft would analyze sensor signals and call in air strikes against any suspicious movement.<sup>15</sup>

On 8 September, the Joint Chiefs forwarded the study group's conclusions to Admiral Sharp for his comments. In his reply, one week later, Sharp expressed his doubt about the practicality of the entire venture. He contended:

... that a barrier system must be tended. If not, it could be breached with ease, while the flow of men and material to the VC/NVA continued. An aerial delivered obstacle would not be expected to support the need for soldiers on the ground, and the time, effort, and resources of men and material required to establish a ground barrier would be tremendous.<sup>16</sup>

The Joint Chiefs, although concerned that the barrier would require funding from current service resources, agreed with Secretary McNamara that the program should receive further study. On 15 September, the Secretary appointed Lieutenant General Alfred Starbird, USA, to head Joint Task Force 728 within the Department of Defense to determine the feasibility of the barrier. General Starbird asked General Westmoreland to provide him with an estimate of what countermeasures the North Vietnamese might take. While not commenting on the practicality of the concept, General Westmoreland, in his reply, made it clear that any barrier project would present problems. He declared:

. . . whether the enemy attempted to go over, through, or under the barrier it must be expected that these operations will be accompanied by coordinating harassing and diversionary operations elsewhere. With forces available in NVN and SVN, the enemy will be able to harass a fixed barrier at selected times and places both during and after the construction phase. Work will be hampered by sniper, AW [automatic weapon] and mortar fire and by equipment sabotage. Small units and working parties will be vulnerable to surprise attacks in superior strength. The enemy will make full use of the "bait and trap" technique in attempts to lure friendly elements into prepared ambushes. Extensive harassment, aimed at producing attrition of friendly forces and facilitating infiltration, could be directed not only at the barrier but simultaneously against our lines of communication. . . . Our enemy is self-confident, determined, ingenious and uses terrain and weather to his advantage. His solutions to problems are usually elemental, simple and practical from his view point.<sup>17</sup>

Despite his reservations about barriers, on 3 October, General Westmoreland ordered his own staff to prepare a study of the various defensive options in the DMZ area. The MACV planning group briefed the general on its preliminary findings six days later. It suggested the best defense would be a mobile one conducted behind a major barrier system. A 30-kilometer-long linear barrier system could be constructed in the coastal and piedmont regions south of the DMZ, envisioned as 1,000 meters wide and containing barbed wire, a minefield, remote sensor devices, bunkers for outpost forces, watch towers at periodic intervals, and an extensive communications network. A mobile force with good organic firepower, supported by artillery and air, was to conduct screening and delaying actions both in front of and behind the barrier. The planning group

suggested that an ARVN armored cavalry regiment would provide depth to the defense. III MAF would continue normal operations in the northern provinces, but would be prepared to block, counterattack, or eliminate any enemy intrusion.

West of the linear barrier, the MACV planners proposed a strongpoint type of defense. The idea was to establish strongly fortified outposts at strategic positions in the mountainous terrain, forcing the enemy into the narrow defiles. There the enemy would be subjected to allied air and supporting arms. The MACV Staff proposed 20 outposts, extending from the western end of the linear barrier to the Laotian border. To man this strongpoint system, they recommended the deployment of at least an infantry division, possibly Korean, since the terrain in the area resembled that of the Korean Armistice Line. If the frontage to be covered proved too great for a single division, or if enemy deployments in and south of the DMZ or west of the outpost line posed a major threat, the staff suggested that the Koreans could be reinforced with a U.S. Marine regiment.

In its conclusions, the MACV planning group noted that the terrain in the coastal plain and foothills in the eastern DMZ favored the allied defensive measures, but the rugged mountains in the western region provided significant advantages to the infiltration tactics of the North Vietnamese. Considering these two factors, the planners stated that the defensive trace, which they had outlined in the body of the report, was the most advantageous of the various options studied. The group, however, made clear that if a barrier system were to be built, it would be a massive undertaking. In addition to an armored cavalry regiment and a ROK infantry division, the barrier would require a supporting artillery group and the equivalent of an Army aviation battalion for helicopter support. The greatest obstacle would be the building of the barrier itself and the subsidiary tasks of upgrading and constructing roads and logistic facilities to support the barrier and its defending forces. The MACV group finally warned that the North Vietnamese still would have the capability of outflanking the defenses by moving through Laos, posing a major threat to the integrity of the barrier. Despite all of the difficulties, the planning group proposed that its outline concept for the barrier be approved for guidance to MACV staff

agencies in their preparation of detailed supporting plans.<sup>18</sup>

After discussing the various barrier projects with General Starbird, General Westmoreland met with Secretary McNamara on 10 October in Vietnam. At this meeting, the MACV commander presented his alternative conventional barrier and strongpoint system for the Secretary's consideration in lieu of the Washington proposal. During his visit, Secretary McNamara flew over the DMZ and apparently was impressed by the difficulties that the northwestern terrain would pose for the construction of a barrier. In any event, he indicated to General Westmoreland that he was receptive to Westmoreland's strongpoint system in this portion of the DMZ area.<sup>19</sup>

On his return to Washington, McNamara continued to advocate the building of some sort of barrier in this area of South Vietnam in spite of the difficulties. In a memorandum to President Johnson proposing the installation of the barrier near the 17th Parallel, he stated:

The barrier may not be fully effective at first, but I believe that it can be made effective in time and that even the threat of its becoming effective can substantially change to our advantage the character of the war. It would hinder enemy efforts, would permit more efficient use of the limited number of friendly troops, and would be persuasive evidence both that our sole aim is to protect the South from the North and that we intend to see the job through.<sup>20</sup>

In his conversation with General Westmoreland the Secretary left no doubt that the MACV planning for the barrier should continue. He also declared that General Starbird's Washington group would continue to function. It would be charged with obtaining and delivering munitions and sensors to support the barrier. At the same time General Westmoreland was to determine his requirements for forces and material to support his concept. The MACV barrier planning effort would be designated Practice Nine.<sup>21</sup>

Shortly after the Secretary's visit, General Westmoreland ordered his subordinate commands to study the concept that his staff had prepared. The Seventh Air Force was tasked with the development of the air barrier, while III MAF, in conjunction with the MACV Combat Operations Center, was to provide the concept for the conduct of a "Mobile Defense/Conventional Barrier."<sup>22</sup>

General Walt ordered the 3d Marine Division to

prepare the Marine version. He told General Kyle, the division commander, that a statement should be made at the outset that III MAF disagreed with the barrier concept.<sup>23</sup> In a letter to Walt, General Kyle noted that he, also, had serious reservations about the entire program. He believed that the proposed linear barrier in the east would require at least a division for monitoring and defense, rather than an armored cavalry regiment; this division would be in addition to the 1st ARVN and 3d Marine Divisions. He argued that the MACV proposal to use the latter two units to provide depth to the barrier defense nullified the only possible advantage of the plan. Instead of freeing these two divisions for operations in southern Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, it would confine them to the border region. General Kyle also objected to positioning a Marine regiment in the western strongpoint area. He reiterated that the barrier defense system "should *free* Marine forces for operations elsewhere — *not freeze* such forces in a barrier watching defensive role."<sup>24</sup>

General Kyle presented a counterproposal to the MACV plan. He declared that it was obvious that whether there was a defensive barrier or not, at least two divisions would be needed to halt enemy infiltration through the DMZ. The 3d Marine Division commander stated that a two-division mobile defense force could accomplish the same mission as a barrier without tying down more forces to fixed positions, and this course of action would have the additional advantage of requiring a much less extensive engineering effort.<sup>25</sup>

Nevertheless, General Kyle's mobile two-division defense plan did require a great deal of engineering construction. The general pointed out five tasks which would have to be accomplished, irrespective of which plan was ultimately adopted. They were: (1) the upgrading of Route 9 to a two-lane paved road from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh; (2) widening Route 1 from Phu Bai to the vicinity of Gio Linh; (3) constructing two alternate roads from Route 1 eastward to the Cua Viet, one road emanating from Dong Ha and the other from Quang Tri City; (4) constructing a road from Quang Tri City through the Ba Long Valley to join Route 9 to Ca Lu; and (5) finally, the upgrading of the dock facilities at both Dong Ha and at Cua Viet to the level of a major port. General Kyle reemphasized his contention that this preliminary road construction and port development, combined with the insertion of a mobile two-



Marine Corps Photo A188167

*Gen William C. Westmoreland, ComUSMACV (left) is seen on a visit to the 3d Marine Division Headquarters at Phu Bai together with MajGen Wood B. Kyle, Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (right), and LtGen Lewis W. Walt, Commanding General, III MAF (following behind). Generals Kyle and Walt both objected to any linear barrier in the DMZ sector.*

division force, were all that was required to secure the northern area.<sup>26</sup>

Although General Walt agreed with his subordinate commander, neither he nor General Kyle had any choice in the matter. As General Walt later wrote to HQMC, he had commented to MACV that if he had the additional forces projected by the barrier planners, "a far better job of sealing the DMZ could be accomplished without the barrier itself." He also had recommended to MACV that any additional forces for manning the barrier should not come from III MAF; "we are already too short of troops to divert any of them to a function of this nature." Walt observed, however, that his "position has so far not prevailed."<sup>27</sup>

By the end of the year, the MACV and III MAF planners nearly had completed the first phase of

their barrier planning. MACV had presented its Practice Nine Requirement Plan on 26 November and III MAF submitted its formal operation plan at the end of December. The concept envisioned the completion of the construction and the manning of the eastern portion of the barrier by 1 August 1967. According to the concept of operation, the 3d Marine Division would conduct a series of clearing operations in the vicinity of the strongpoint/barrier locations. Work would also be started on the improvement on the lines of communication in the area to include the dredging of the Cua Viet. On 1 August 1967, a South Korean division would take over responsibility of the western sector, which included all of the area west of Dong Ha Mountain. An ARVN regiment would man the 34 kilometers of the eastern linear barrier extending from Dong Ha Mountain to the South China Sea. The 3d Marine Division would then be free of the immediate responsibility for barrier defense.<sup>28</sup>

In January 1967, General Westmoreland made some modifications in the barrier plans, but the basic concept remained the same. There were also some changes in semantics. The term "anti-infiltration system" was substituted for "barrier," because the latter word connoted an impregnable defense. More substantially, the deadlines for the building and manning of both the eastern and western defense systems were pushed back. In its Practice Nine Requirements Plan of 26 January 1967, MACV now called for the completion of the eastern portion by 1 November 1967 instead of 1 August. In the western sector, logistic considerations caused the MACV planners to postpone the introduction of large forces in the area until November, although the Marine unit at Khe Sanh was to construct a strongpoint. While the original plan had envisioned the complete installation of the western strongpoint system by November, the new plan only stated that "the remainder of the system in this area will be completed subsequent to 1 November 1967." No provision was made for the construction of a base camp for the Korean division. This version of the barrier concept, according to its originators, reduced the costs by a third and cut down the number of troops required to man the defenses during the initial period. General Westmoreland submitted the new plan to Admiral Sharp and the Joint Chiefs for consideration. The barrier concept, even after the decision was made to

implement part of the MACV plan in March 1967, was to be the subject of a great deal of controversy throughout that year.<sup>29</sup>

The Marine Corps was consistent in its opposition to the entire concept of a defensive barrier. Colonel Chaisson, the III MAF G-3, represented the feeling of most of his fellow officers when he declared in November 1966:

All of the barrier plans are fantastic, absolutely impractical, and III MAF is opposed to all because of engineer requirements . . . and the installations must tie down troops to protect the barrier.<sup>30</sup>

General Walt even went further and declared that the entire barrier discussion placed undue emphasis on the infiltration problem. He believed that the primary enemy remained the guerrilla, and that the infiltrator, who came from the north, could only support the local forces, but not replace them. Walt observed:

. . . the mass of infiltrators must be considered as NVA or main force VC types. As the record shows, we beat these units handily each time we encounter them. In my mind, therefore, we should not fall into the trap of expending troops unduly seeking to prevent the entry of individuals and units who pose the lesser threat to our ultimate objective, which remains the people of South Vietnam.<sup>31</sup>

As a 3d Marine Division briefing officer stated in January 1967:

To sum it all up, we're not enthusiastic over any barrier defense approach to the infiltration problem—if there is such a problem in our area. We believe that a mobile defense by an adequate force—say one division give or take a battalion—would be a much more flexible and economical approach to the problem.<sup>32</sup>

### *Conclusion*

During 1966, the III Marine Amphibious Force

doubled in size. The 40,000 Marine manpower base in January had been expanded during the year and was rapidly approaching the 70,000 mark by the end of December. At the end of the year, General Walt's command consisted of the reinforced 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, the reinforced 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and the Force Logistic Command.

Despite the rapid buildup of Marine forces, III MAF's high hopes for pacifying and unifying its three enclaves during 1966 had been dashed. The political upheaval caused by the removal of the powerful and popular Nguyen Chanh Thi, the I Corps commander, brought Marine pacification efforts to a complete standstill in the spring. At the same time, Marine units at Phu Bai and Chu Lai found themselves confronted by North Vietnamese and VC main force battalions and regiments in Thua Thien Province and southern I Corps. The North Vietnamese threat grew during the summer when an enemy division crossed into northern I Corps through the DMZ. In October, the 3d Marine Division deployed north of the Hai Van Pass to counter a new NVA offensive, while the 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for Da Nang and Chu Lai. Although by the end of the year, the Marines had parried successfully the NVA thrust in the north, the pacification effort in the southern enclaves suffered.

At the end of 1966, the two Marine divisions of III MAF were fighting two separate wars: the 3d Marine Division conducting a more or less conventional campaign in northern I Corps, while the 1st Marine Division continued the combination of large unit and counter guerrilla operations south of the Hai Van Pass. Although General Walt wanted to reduce the size of his forces along the DMZ,<sup>33</sup> this pattern of warfare would continue into 1967.



# Notes

## PART I

### The Marine Base Areas in Early 1966

#### CHAPTER 1

#### A LARGER FORCE FOR A GROWING WAR III MAF IN JANUARY 1966

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from MilHistBr, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff MACV, Command History, 1966, hereafter, MACV Comd Hist 1966; HqFMFPac, U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67, n.d., 2 vols., hereafter, FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67"; III MAF ComdCs Nov65-Feb66; Vietnam Comment File; Jack Shulimson and Major Charles Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965: The Landing and the Buildup* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, 1978), hereafter Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*; Dep of Defense, *United States Vietnam Relations, 1945-67*, 12 bks (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter *Pentagon Papers* with appropriate section title and book, volume or tab, and page numbers; Adm Ulysses S.G. Sharp, USN, CinCPac, and Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, ComUSMACV, *Report on the War in Vietnam* (As of 30 Jun 1968) (Washington: GPO, 1968), hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Gen Louis W. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy, A General's Report on Vietnam* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970), hereafter Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1965-66," *Naval Review*, 1968 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 2-35, hereafter Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

#### III MAF, I Corps, and the Three Marine TAORs

Additional sources for this section are: HqFMFPac, III MAF Operations, Jan 1966, n.d., hereafter III MAF Ops with specific month; III MAF ComdC, Jan66; Biographical Files (Historical Reference Section, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Biog Files (HRS).

1. Gen Lewis W. Walt biographic data in Biog Files (HRS). See also Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 208.

2. See Gen Keith B. McCutcheon biographic data in Biog Files (HRS).

#### Command Relations

Additional source for this section is MajGen Lewis W. Walt, Address to Staff and Students, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico,

Va, dtd 3Mar66 (No. 6010, OralHistColl, His&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Walt address to MCS, Mar66.

3. Office of Air Force History, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File).

4. Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, Comments on draft MS, dtd 27May78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Westmoreland Comments, May 78.

5. Lester A. Sobel and Hal Kosut, eds., *South Vietnam: U.S. Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 1966-67* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1969), v. 2, p. 211.

6. Walt address to MCS, Mar66.

7. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 15Jan66, encl 17, III MAF ComdC, Jan66.

#### Planned Deployment of the 1st Marine Division

8. "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-67," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, v. 1, p. 25 and FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67," v. I, pp. 7-6, -7, -8.

9. Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, Chap. 8.

10. LtCol Roy E. Moss, Comments on draft MS, Capt Moyers S. Shore III, "Marines in Vietnam," pt III, dtd 10Dec69 (Vietnam Comment File).

#### The Enemy Buildup

11. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 3.

12. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 100.

#### The Marine Counter guerrilla War Versus the MACV Perspective

13. See FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. I, p. 9-1, v. 2, p. 97 and III MAF Ops, Jan 66, p. 30.

14. Walt address to MCS, Mar66.

15. Col George W. Carrington, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 15May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

16. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [May 78] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Krulak Comments, May 78.

17. CGFMFPac, "Pacific Operations," Tab F, HQMC, General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, pp. F6-F7.

18. Westmoreland Comments, May 78.

19. Ibid.

20. BGen William E. DePuy, ACS J-3, memo to Gen Westmoreland, dtd 15Nov65, Subj: The Situation in I Corps (Gen William E. DePuy Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.).

21. Gen William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co, Inc., 1976), pp. 165-66, hereafter

Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*.

22. HistDiv, Memo for the Record, dtd 9Mar72, Subj: Conference with BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Director of Marine Corps History and Museums (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Simmons Conference. For a further discussion of the Marine Corps and Army strategy see Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66," p. 23 and Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, Chap 8.

23. Krulak Comments, May 78.

24. Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 5 May 78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Greene Comments, May 78.

#### Marine Mission and Future Plans

25. ComUSMACV ltr to CG III MAF, dtd 21Nov65, Subj: Letter of Instruction (LOI-4), encl 2, III MAF ComdC, Nov65.

26. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 340.

27. HqIIIMAF, G-3 Section, "Presentation for LtGen Krulak," dtd 1Feb66, encl 18, III MAF ComdC, Feb 66, hereafter Krulak Presentation, Feb66.

28. Ibid.

## CHAPTER 2

### EXPANDING WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist 1966; III MAF Ops, Jan-Feb66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Feb66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Feb66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Feb66; Vietnam Comment File; Capt Moyers S. Shore III, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun 1966," pt III of LtCol Ralph F. Moody *et al.*, "Marines in Vietnam," MS (HistDiv, HQMC), hereafter Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III;" Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

#### The Chu Lai TAOR

Additional sources for this section are: 4th Mar ComdC, Jan66; 7th Mar ComdC, Jan66, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan66.

1. 7th Mar ComdC, Jan66.

2. 4th Mar ComdC, Jan66; 1/4 ComdC, Jan66.

3. LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9May78, (Vietnam Comment File).

4. 7th Mar ComdC, Jan66. See 7th Mar FragO 1-66, dtd 18Jan66, encl 3, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan66.

5. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan66; 1/4 ComdC, Jan66.

#### Operation Double Eagle

Additional sources for this section are: TF Delta AAR Double Eagle I and II, 28Jan-1Mar66, dtd 15Mar66, hereafter TF Delta AAR Double Eagle; MAG-36 AAR Double Eagle I and II, 28Jan-28Feb66, dtd 20Mar66, encl to MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter MAG-36 AAR Double Eagle; III MAF Jnl File, Opn Double Eagle, Dec65-4Feb66, hereafter III MAF Double Eagle Jnl

File; CTF 79.5 AAR, Operation Double Eagle I and II, dtd 17Mar66, Tab F, TG 79.5 ComdC, Jan-May66, hereafter CTF 79.5 AAR Double Eagle.

6. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 359.

7. Col Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 1Dec69, (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Peatross Comments, Shore MS.

8. See Walt address to MCS, Mar66 and MajGen Oscar F. Peatross intvw by Oral HistU, HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 12Apr73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), pp. 38-39, hereafter Peatross Intvw, 73.

9. Walt address to MCS, Mar66.

10. CTF 79.5 AAR Double Eagle; III MAF, Summary of Significant Events in Planning Operation Double Eagle, n.d., encl 8, III MAF ComdC, Jan66, hereafter III MAF Planning Summary, Double Eagle.

11. III MAF, Memo for the Record, dtd 13Jan66, Subj: I Corps/II Corps Conference, I Corps Headquarters, 0930-1130, 13 January 1966, encl 7, III MAF ComdC, Jan66, hereafter, III MAF M/R, I Corps/II Corps Conference.

12. III MAF OpO 307-66, dtd 15Jan66; G-3, HQMC, Point Paper, dtd 19Jan66, Subj: Status Report of all USMC units and replacements now deploying or ordered to deploy (HQMC, G-3 Div, Point Papers-West Pac, Jan-Jun66).

13. See TF Delta, OpO 1-66, dtd 24Jan66; III MAF Planning Summary, Double Eagle; Col William G. Johnson, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 9Dec69 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Johnson Comments.

14. See "Concept of Operations," in TF Delta AAR Double Eagle, pp. 10-12 and TF Delta OpO 1-66, Operation Double Eagle, dtd 24Jan66.

15. See 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan 66; 3d MarDiv FragO 359-66, Operation Birdwatcher II, dtd 7Jan66, encl to 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan66; 1st MAW Sit Repts, Jan66; 1st Force Recon Co, OpO 2-66, dtd 12Jan66, encl 64, 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jan66.

16. Hateful Patrol AAR, dtd 23Jan66, encl to 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, 20Jan-Feb66.

17. LtCol Ernest L. Defazio, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," *circa* 1969 (Vietnam Comment File).

18. Col Nicholas J. Dennis, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun78] (Vietnam Comment File).

19. CTG 75.5 AAR Double Eagle; Rpt on Double Eagle, D-Day in III MAF Double Eagle Jnl File.

20. Col Robert J. Zitnik, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

21. Ibid.

22. Rept on Double Eagle, D plus 1 in III MAF Double Eagle Jnl File.

23. Col William G. Johnson intvw by FMFPac, dtd 13Sep66 (No. 202, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Johnson Intvw.

24. Johnson Comments.

25. Capt James R. Hardin intvw by HQMC, dtd 17Jan67 (No. 292, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

26. 3dBrig, AirCavDiv, CAAR, Opn Masher/White Wing, dtd 10Mar66 (CMH).

27. TF Delta AAR Double Eagle; BGen Jonas M. Platt intvw by III MAF, dtd 6Dec66 (No. 268, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Platt Intvw.

28. Ibid.

29. TF Delta AAR Double Eagle and MAG-36 AAR Double Eagle.
30. TF Delta AAR Double Eagle.
31. 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, 20Jan-Feb66.
32. SMA, MACV, 2dInfDiv, AAR Lien Ket-22, 29Jan-12Feb66, dtd 16Feb66 (SMA, MACV AARs 1966).
33. TF Delta AAR Double Eagle.
34. Ibid.
35. Maj Alex Lee, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 28Nov69, (Vietnam Comment File).
36. Capt Edwin W. Besch, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
37. Col Glen E. Martin, Comments on draft MS, dtd 5Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
38. LtCol Alex Lee, Comments on draft MS, dtd 26May78 (Vietnam Comment File).
39. TF Delta AAR Double Eagle.
40. Platt Intvw.
41. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [May78](Vietnam Comment File).
42. 1/4 Sit Rep No. 266, dtd 27Jan66 in 1/4 ComdC, Jan66.
43. 7th Mar ComdC, Feb66.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE WAR IN CENTRAL I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist 1966; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; Vietnam Comment File; Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam 1965-66."

#### The Da Nang TAOR

Additional sources for this section are: 9th Mar ComdCs, Jan66; 3d Mar ComdC Jan66; MAG-16 ComdC, Jan66; 12th Mar ComdC, Jan66; MajGen Donald M. Weller, Unprocessed Working Papers on Pacification, hereafter, Weller Working Papers; Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*.

1. Reports on Quang Nam Pacification Program, Nov 1965-Feb66 in Weller Working Papers.
2. Ibid. See Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, Chap 8 and Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66," pp, 23 and 25.
3. See Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, pp. 86-88 and Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66," p. 31.
4. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 27Dec71 (Vietnam Comment File).
5. 3d Mar AAR, Operation Mallard, dtd 6Feb66, encl 41, 3d Mar ComdC, Jan66.
6. *Sea Tiger*, dtd 26Jan66, pp. 1 and 8.
7. III MAF ComdC, Jan66, p. 2.
8. Report on Refugees at Dai Loc District Headquarters Resulting from Operation Mallard, encl 4, 3d Mar AAR, Operation Mallard, dtd 6Feb66. See also 3/7 AAR, Operation Mallard,

dtd 22Jan66 in 3/7 ComdC, Jan 66 for a further description of the operation.

9. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 88.

#### Honolulu and the Reemphasis on Pacification

Additional sources for this section are: 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66; 3d Mar ComdC, Feb66; MAG-16 ComdC, Feb66; Weller Working Papers; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, 9th Marines Notebook, hereafter 9th Marines Notebook; Pentagon Papers; Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Rinehart, Holt & Winston, 1971), hereafter Johnson, *The Vantage Point*.

10. "Re-emphasis on Pacification, 1965-67," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 6, Sec. IV-C-8, p. 27 and MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 504.
11. "Declaration of Honolulu," *The Department of State Bulletin*, v. LIV, no. 1392 (28Feb66), pp. 305-06.
12. Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 243.
13. Westmoreland Comments, May 78. See also Memorandum entitled "1966 Program to Increase the Effectiveness of Military Operations and Anticipated Results thereof," circa 8Feb66, encl, Westmoreland Comments, May 78, and Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 160-1.
14. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, pp. 504-506.
15. Quang Nam Priority Area in Weller Working Papers.
16. Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam 1965-66," p. 28.
17. 1/9 ComdC, Feb66. See Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, Chap 8 for the background of the Combined Action Program.
18. Quoted in 9th Marines, Brief Narrative of Activities, Mar65-Jun66, dtd 4Jul66, p. 2. See also 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66; 3/3 ComdC, Feb66; and 9th Mar Sit Reps for 23-25Feb66.
19. Notes for Battalion Commander's Conference, dtd 27Feb66 in 9th Marines Notebook.
20. G-3 Section, Hq, III MAF, Agenda Memo, dtd 19Feb66, Subj: Operation Sparrow Hawk, encl 17, III MAF ComdC, Feb66.
21. 9th Mar Sit Rep No. 56, dtd 25Feb66, 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66.
22. See 9th Marines Casualty Chart in 9th Marines Notebook and 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66.
23. Col Joshua W. Dorsey III, Comments on draft MS, dtd 24Jul78 (Vietnam Comment Files). See also 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66.
24. Col Nicholas J. Dennis, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun78] (Vietnam Comment Files). See also 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66.
25. 3d Mar ComdC, Feb66.

## CHAPTER 4

### A NEW THREAT IN NORTHERN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Mar66; FMFPac Sit Reps, Jan-Mar66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Feb-Mar66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; DOD, Current News (daily extract of newspaper and magazine clippings as well as TV/Radio news transcripts), hereafter "Current News"; Vietnam Comment File; Gen William

C. Westmoreland Papers (CMH), hereafter Westmoreland Papers (CMH); Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III."

### The Buildup at Phu Bai

Additional sources for this section are: HQMC Msg File; 1/1 ComdCs, Feb-Mar66; 2/1 ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; 4/12 ComdCs, Jan-Mar66.

1. 2/1 ComdC, Jan66
2. Krulak Presentation, Feb66.
3. Ibid.
4. 3d Mar ComdC, Feb66.
5. Ibid. See also CGFMFPac Sit Reps for 16-28Feb66.
6. 3d MarDiv OPlan 375-66, dtd 24Feb66, encl 7, and 3d MarDiv OPlan 376-66, dtd 23Feb66, encl 8, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb66.
7. 2/1 msg to 3d MarDiv, dtd 28Feb66, encl 5, 2/1 ComdC, Feb66, hereafter 2/1 msg, 28 Feb66.
8. 2/1 AAR, Opn New York, Pho Lai Village and Phu Thu Peninsula, dtd 6Mar66, encl 4, 2/1 ComdC, Feb66, hereafter 2/1 AAR, Opn New York.
9. Ibid. and Col Edwin M. Rudzis, Comments on draft MS, dtd 26 May78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rudzis Comments.
10. 2/1 msg, 28Feb66.
11. 2/1 AAR, Opn New York.
12. *Passim.*, III MAF Jnl & Msg File, 28Feb-2Mar66.
13. 1/1 ComdC, Mar66. See also III MAF COC, report of Phone Msg, dtd 2Mar66 and CG3dMarDiv msg to IIIMAFCO, dtd 1Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).
14. 1/1 AAR 4-66, Opn Troy, dtd 21 Mar 66, Tab C, 1/1 ComdC, Mar66.
15. HQMC, G-3 Div, Point Paper, dtd 8Mar66 in G-3 Div, HQMC Point Papers 1966; CGFMFPac Sit Rep No. 340, dtd 5Mar66 (FMFPac Sit Reps 1966); 3dMarDiv SitRep No. 302, dtd 4Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File); 3d Mar msg to TG Foxtrot, dtd 4Mar66, encl 1, 3d Mar ComdC; CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 2Mar66 and 3dMarDiv msg to COC III MAF, dtd 3Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). See also Rudzis Comments.
16. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 4Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).
17. Ibid.
18. ComUSMACV, Memo for the Record, dtd 10Mar66, Subj: MACV Commanders's Conference, 20Feb66 (Westmoreland Papers, CMH).
19. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 4 Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).
20. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 23Feb66 (HQMC Msg File).
21. CGFMFPAC msg to CMC, dtd 9Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).

### The Fall of A Shau

Additional sources for this section are: U.S. Army 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) 2-12 Command Reporting Files, 1965-66, Box 14, Accession No. 69A729 (WFRC), hereafter, 5th SFG 2-12, 14 (69A729 WFRC); III MAF, A Shau Incident Jnl, 9-12 Mar66, hereafter III MAF, A Shau Incident; Col Francis J. Kelly *U.S. Army Special Forces—Vietnam Studies* (Washington: Dept of the Army, 1973), hereafter Kelly, *Special Forces*.

22. FMFPac Sit Rep No. 353, dtd 18Mar66 (FMFPac Sit Reps,

1966).

23. III MAF G-2 msg to 3d MarDiv G-2, dtd 5Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). See also A Shau Analysis in 5th Special Forces Miscellaneous Report, 5th SFG 2-12, 14 (69A729 WFRC), hereafter A Shau Analysis.

24. Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces*, p. 92. See also Det C-1, 5th SFG, AAR, Battle for A Shau, dtd 28Mar66, 5thSFG 2-12, 14 (69A729 WFRC), hereafter 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau.

25. A Shau Analysis and 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau

26. Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," p. 11-3.

27. Det C-1, 5th SFG, Jnls, 9-12 Mar66 in 5th Special Forces Miscellaneous Report, 5th SFG 2-12, 14 (69A729 WFRC), hereafter 5th SFG, Jnls.

28. III MAF COC, Resume of tele con w/ C/S I Corps, dtd 9Mar66 (III MAF Msg & Jnl File); entry for 9Mar66, 1/1 Jnl, Tab P, 1/1 ComdC, Mar66.

29. BGen Marion E. Carl, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 5Dec69 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Carl Comments, 69.

30. LtCol Charles A. House, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun 78] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter House Comments.

31. Transcript of MajGen Marion E. Carl intvw by Hist & Mus Div, 1973 (Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), pp. 31-32, hereafter Carl Transcript.

32. IIIMAFCO msg to MACVCOC, dtd 9Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

33. 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau.

34. BGen Leslie E. Brown, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 4Dec69, (Vietnam Comment File).

35. Entries for 10Mar66, 5th SFG, Jnls.

36. MajGen Marion E. Carl, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun 78] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Carl Comments, 78. See also Carl Comments, 69.

37. Col Roy C. Gray, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 20Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Gray Comments.

38. 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau.

39. Entries for 10Mar66, 5th SFG, Jnls.

40. Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter O'Connor Comments.

41. "TV Defense Dialogue, Broadcast of 14Mar66," Current News, dtd 15 Mar66, p.4, hereafter "TV Defense Dialogue, 14Mar66." See also 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau and ComUSMACV msg to SecDef, (OASD P/A), dtd 16 Mar66 (III MAF Jul & Msg File), hereafter MACV msg to SecDef, 16 Mar66.

42. 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau and 1st MAW Sit Rep No. 297, dtd 10Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

43. "Radio-TV Defense Dialogue, 14Mar66," Current News.

44. MACV msg to SecDef, 16Mar66.

45. Notes on Personnel Rescued at A Shau, dtd 12Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

46. MACV msg to SecDef, 16Mar66.

47. House Comments. See also MAG-16 ComdC, Mar66.

48. MACVCOC msg to NMCC, dtd 15Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

49. Carl Transcript, p. 31. See also Carl Comments, 78 and House Comments.

50. O'Connor Comments.

51. Gray Comments.

52. 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau, and Notes on Helicopter Sorties, n.d., in III MAF, A Shau Incident.

53. G-3, 3d MarDiv msg to COIIIIMAF, dtd 10Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

54. Passim., III MAF Jnl & Msg File, 10-13Mar66; 1/1 ComdC, Mar66; FMFPac Sit Rep No. 349, dtd 14Mar66 (FMFPac Sit Reps, 1966).

55. CGICorps msg to JGS, dtd 15Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

56. LtCol Raph E. Sullivan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9May78 (Vietnam Comment File). See also MajGen Harold A. Hatch, Comments on draft MS, dtd 5May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

57. SA, 1st Inf Div, Hue msg to ComI Corps Adv Gp, Da Nang, dtd 16Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

58. III MAF ComdC, Mar66 and Delta Team Reports, 17-29Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). For organization of Delta Teams, see Kelly, *Special Forces*, passim.

#### Continuing Reinforcement of Phu Bai and Operation Oregon

Additional sources for this section are: 4th Mar ComdC, Mar66; 1/1 ComdC, Mar66; 2/1 ComdC, Mar66; 1/4 ComdC, 28-31 Mar66; 3/4 ComdC, Mar66; 3/12 ComdC Mar66; 4/12 ComdC, Mar66; TG Foxtrot AAR, Opn Oregon, dtd 10Apr66, hereafter TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon; 1/4 AAR, Opn Oregon, dtd 14 Apr66, encl, 1/4 ComdC, 28-31Mar66, hereafter 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon.

59. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 13Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).

60. 4th Mar ComdC, Mar66 and CGFMFPac Sit Rep. No. 352, dtd 17Mar66 (FMFPac Sit Reps, 1966)

61. G-3, III MAF note, Task Group Foxtrot Opn for 19 Mar 66, dtd 19 Mar 66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). See also III MAF Jnl & Msg File, passim., 19-23Mar66.

62. TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon and 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon.

63. Ibid. and III MAF COC, Opn Oregon Rept, dtd 20Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

64. 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon. See also passim., III MAF Jnl & Msg File, 19-20Mar66.

65. TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon and 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon.

66. Ibid. See also IIIIMAFCOG msg to MACV, dtd 21Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

67. 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon and TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon.

68. Rudzis Comments.

69. TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon.

70. 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon and TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon.

71. G-3 Div, HQMC, Point Paper, Subj: Distribution of Personnel in Vietnam as of 28Mar66, dtd 28Mar66 (G-3, HQMC, Point Papers, 1966); 4th Mar ComdC, Mar66; 4/12 ComdC, Mar66; 3/12 ComdC, Mar66; Provisional Recon Group Bravo, 3d Recon Bn ComdC, 28-31Mar66; 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Mar66.

72. 4th Mar ComdC, Mar66 and 1/4 ComdC, 28-31Mar66. See also 3d MarDiv OpO 378-66, dtd 26Mar66, encl 25, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar66.

73. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 13Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).

74. MACV, AC/S J-2, report, n.d. [24?Mar66] Subj: The Threat in Northern I Corps (Westmoreland Papers (CMH)).

75. ComUSMACV, Memo for the Record, n.d. [24?Mar66], Subj: Meeting at Chu Lai on 24Mar66 (Westmoreland Papers [CMH]).

## PART II

### Crisis and War in Central I Corps, Spring 1966

#### CHAPTER 5

#### A TROUBLED SPRING

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; III MAF Ops, Mar-Jun66; III MAF ComdCs, Mar-Jun66; Shore, "Marines in Vietnam Jan-Jun66, pt III"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

#### The Beginnings of the Political Crisis

Additional sources for this section are: MCCC, Chronology of Political Unrest in I Corps, 9Mar-23Jun66, covering ltr dtd 24Jun66, hereafter MCCC Chronology of Political Unrest; and Facts on File Inc., *South Vietnam; U.S. Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 1966-67* (New York: 1969), v. 2, hereafter Facts on File, *South Vietnam 1966-67*.

1. *Washington Post and Times Herald*, 11Mar66, p.1.

#### Restructuring the Command

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac ComdC, Jan-Jun66; 1st MarDiv ComdCs Jan-Jun66; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar66; FLC ComdC, Mar66.

2. CinCPacFlt, CinCPacFlt Inst 5440.11, Status, Responsibilities, and Tasks of Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, n.d. [Mar 66], App 1, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, Historical Summary, Apr66 (OAB, NHD).

3. ComUSMACV ltr to CGIIIMAF, dtd 30Mar66, Subj: Letter of Instruction in MACV Historical Records, 69A702, Box 5, File VA (Marine).

#### The Beginnings of the Da Nang Offensive

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF Opn Kings Jnl File; 1st MAW ComdC, Mar 66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, MarApr66; 3d Mar ComdC, Mar 66; 9th Mar ComdCs, Mar-Apr66; Col Edwin H. Simmons, Presentation to HQMC, Washington, D.C., Jul66 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist and Mus Div, HQMC), hereafter Simmons Presentation; Simmons, 9th Marines Notebook.

4. 1/3 OpO 302-66, dtd 14Mar66 in 1/3 ComdC, Mar66.

5. 2/3 ComdC, Mar66.

6. Simmons Presentation.

7. Ibid. and Status Rept for LtGen Walt, n.d. (Mar66) in Simmons, 9th Marines Notebook.

8. Col Joshua W. Dorsey III, Comments on draft MS, dtd 24Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dorsey Comments.

9. 3/9 AAR for 4-5 Mar66, dtd 14Mar66, encl 19, 3/9 ComdC, Mar66.

10. Quoted in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar66, p. 19

11. 3/3 and 3/9 ComdCs, Mar66.

12. 3d MarDiv OpO 382-66, dtd 18Mar66 in III MAF Opn Kings Jnl File.

13. LtCol William F. Donahue, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Donahue Comments. See also Dorsey Comments.

14. 2/9 AAR, Opn Kings, dtd 28Mar66 in 2/9 ComdC, Mar66.

15. 9th Mar ComdC, Mar66, pp. 2-7-2.8

16. Ibid., p. 2-13.

17. 1st MAW Sit Rep 312, dtd 26Mar66 in 1st MAW ComdC, Mar66.

18. 3/3 ComdC, Mar66 and 9th Mar ComdC, Mar66, p. 3-2.

19. Simmons Presentation.

20. 9th Mar ComdC, Mar66, p. 2-9.

21. Ibid., Apr66.

22. Mr. Paul Hare, Summary Notes on Pacification as contained in Regl Dir I Corps USAID, Da Nang memo to Dir USAID/Vietnam, USAID, Saigon, dtd 14Apr66, Subj: Ngu Hanh Son Campaign in Weller Pacification Material.

#### "Keep Out . . . Da Nang Has Troubles"

23. CO TG Foxtrot msg to CGIIMAF, dtd 26Mar66 (III MAF Jnl Files).

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. MACV msg to NMCC, dtd 27Mar66 (III MAF Jnl Files).

27. Quoted in Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," p. 10-9.

28. Facts on File, *South Vietnam, 1966-67*, pp. 214-216.

29. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 117-19.

30. 9th Mar Sit Rep 99, dtd 9Apr66 in 9th Mar ComdC, Apr66.

31. Chaisson Intvw, Mar69.

32. Donahue Comments.

33. 9th Mar Sit Rep 99, op.cit.

34. MCCC Chronology Of Political Crisis.

35. See various msgs between MACV and III MAF for 15May66 in III MAF Political Crisis Folder.

36. See Col Williams msg to Col Weyl, dtd 15May66 and III MAF C/S msg to Col Laverge, dtd 15May66 in Ibid.

37. Chaisson Intvw, Mar69. See also Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, pp. 125-30.

38. Gen Lewis W. Walt, Comments on draft MS, dtd 13May78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Walt Comments.

39. Chaisson Intvw, Mar69.

40. III MAF COC msg to MACV COC, dtd 18May66 in III MAF Political Crisis Folder.

41. MACV msg to NMCC, dtd 18May66 in Ibid.

42. Walt Comment. See also LtGen Hugh M. Elwood, Comments on draft MS, dtd 4Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

43. Ltcol Paul X. Kelley intvw by HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 16Aug69 (No. 6145, OralHistColl, Hist and MusDiv, HQMC).

44. Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," p.10-13.

45. Copy of Westmoreland msg to Sharp, dtd 27May66 in v. 6 (24Apr-28Apr66), Tab D/25, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).

46. Chaisson Intvw, Mar69.

47. Ibid.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE ADVANCE TO THE KY LAM

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: III MAF Ops, Apr-Jun66; III MAF ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 9th Mar ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; Simmons Presentation; Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III"; Simmons, "Marine Operations, 1965-66."

#### April Actions and Operation Georgia

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF Jnl File, Opn Georgia; 3/9 ComdCs, Apr-May66; 3/9 AAR, Opn Georgia, 20Apr-10May66, dtd 14May66, hereafter 3/9 AAR Opn Georgia.

1. Simmons Presentation.

2. 2/9 AAR for Company H engagement, dtd 16Apr66, encl to 9th Mar Sit Rep 106-66, dtd 16Apr66, Tab B, Sit Reps, 9th Mar ComdC, Apr66.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. See 3d MarDiv OpO 369-66 (Georgia), dtd 1Apr66, encl 3, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr66 and 9th Mar OpO 111-66, dtd 14Apr66, Tab H, 9th Mar ComdC, Apr66.

7. 3/9 AAR Opn Georgia, pp. 2-7-2.8.

8. Artillery Supplement, encl 1, 3/9 AAR Opn Georgia.

9. Reconnaissance Supplement, encl 5, 3/9 AAR Opn Georgia.

10. Col Paul C. Trammell, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

11. Amphibian Howitzer Supplement, encl 4, 3/9 AAR Opn Georgia.

#### The May Ky Lam Campaign

Additional sources for this section are: 1/9 ComdC, May66; 2/9 ComdC, May66; 2/4 ComdC, May66.

12. 9th Mar ComdC, May66, p. 3-1.

13. 9th Mar OPlan 118-66 Ky Lam, dtd 4May66, Tab H, 9th Mar ComdC, May66.

14. 9th Mar ComdC, May66, p. 3-1.

15. Simmons Presentation.

16. 1/9 AAR for unnamed opn 9-15 May66, dtd 19May66, Tab 4, 1/9 ComdC, May66. The description of the 1/9 action below Dai Loc in the following paragraphs is taken from this account as supplemented by the 9th Mar S-3 Jnl and Sit Reps. All quotations are from the 1/9 AAR.

17. 3d MarDiv ComdC, May66, p. 7.

18. 9th Mar ComdC, May66, p. 2-10.

19. Ibid., p. 3-2. The comparative figures for Marine and VC casualties for the month are found on pp. 1-1 and 2-11 respectively.

**Operation Liberty**

Additional sources for this section are: 3d Mar ComdC, Jun66; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun66.

20. 9th Mar FragO 153-66, dtd 2Jun66, Tab C, FragOs, 9th Mar ComdC, Jun66.

21. 3d MarDiv OpO 399-66, dtd 5Jun66, encl 4, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

22. See 9th Mar FragO 157A-66, dtd 6Jun66, Tab C, FragOs and 9th Mar OPlan 118A-66 Ky Lam, Jun66, Tab G, 9th Mar ComdC, Jun66.

23. Col Van D. Bell, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 15Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File) and III MAF ComdC, Jun66.

24. 9th Mar ComdC, Jun66, p. 9-1

25. 9th Mar Sit Rep 162-66, dtd 11Jun66, Tab B, 9th Mar ComdC, Jun66.

26. 9th Mar ComdC, Jun66, p. 2-4.

**PART III****Spring Fighting in Southern I Corps****CHAPTER 7****"THEY'RE NOT SUPERMEN," MEETING  
THE NVA IN OPERATION UTAH, MARCH 1966**

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: III MAF Ops, Mar66; III MAF ComdC, Mar66; III MAF Jnl File, Operation Utah, 4Mar-7Mar66, hereafter Utah Jnl File; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW Sit Reps, Mar66; MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66; TF Delta AAR 3-66, Operation Utah, dtd 7Apr66, encl 6, 7th Mar ComdC, Mar66, hereafter TF Delta AAR Opn Utah; 1/7 AAR Opn Utah, dtd 15Mar66, Tab 9, 1/7 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 1/7 AAR Opn Utah; 2/7 AAR Opn Utah, dtd 12Mar66, App A-1, 2/7 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 2/7 AAR Opn Utah; 2/4 AAR, Opn Utah, dtd 9Mar66, Tab G-1, 2/4 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 2/4 AAR Opn Utah; 3/1 AAR Opn Utah, dtd 11Mar66, encl 3, 3/1 ComdC Mar66, hereafter 3/1 AAR Opn Utah; Vietnam Comment File; Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III"; BGen Oscar F. Peatross and Col William G. Johnson, "Operation Utah," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 50, no. 10 (Oct66), pp. 20-27, hereafter Peatross and Johnson, "Operation Utah"; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam 1965-66."

**First Contact with the NVA**

1. Maj Alex Lee, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 28Nov69 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Lee Comments. See also Col Robert J. Zitnik, Com-

ments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Zitnik Comments; TF Delta AAR, Opn Utah; Platt Intvw; and Peatross and Johnson, "Operation Utah," pp. 20-21 for further detail concerning the preparation for the operation.

2. MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW Sit Rep No. 291, dtd 4Mar66; Zitnik Comments; LtCol Elmer N. Synder, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 22Dec69 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Snyder Comments and Peatross and Johnson, "Operation Utah," p. 22.

3. Johnson Intvw.

4. Peatross Comments, Shore MS; MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File); Zitnik Comments; Snyder Comments.

5. Platt Intvw and LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 20 Nov69 (Vietnam Comment File).

6. Col Leon N. Utter, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 2Mar70 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Utter Comments, Shore MS.

7. 2/7 AAR Opn Utah.

8. LtCol Jerry D. Lindauer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

9. Utter Comments, Shore MS.

10. Ibid.

11. LtCol Martin E. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 24May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

12. 2/7 AAR Opn Utah.

13. Utter Comments, Shore MS.

14. Copy of Capt Jerry D. Lindauer ltr to LtCol Leon N. Utter, dtd 16Mar66, encl to Maj Jerry D. Lindauer, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 4Dec69 (Vietnam Comment File).

15. Ibid.

16. Utter Comments, Shore MS.

17. Ibid. See also Lee Comments.

18. Utter Comments, Shore MS; 2/7 AAR Opn Utah.

19. Snyder Comments; TF Delta AAR Opn Utah.

20. Utter Comments, Shore MS.

21. Brown Intvw. See also 1st MAW Sit Rep No. 292, dtd 5Mar66.

22. Snyder Comments; 3/11 ComdC, Mar66.

**Operation Utah Expands**

23. TF Delta AAR Opn Utah; Utah Jnl File.

24. Snyder Comments; MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66.

25. 2/4 AAR Opn Utah.

26. 3/1 AAR Opn Utah. See also MGySgt J. J. McDowell and LtCol Timothy B. Lecky, Comments on draft MS, dtd 23Mar79 (Vietnam Comment File).

27. LtCol Paul X. Kelley, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," n.d. (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Kelley Comments; 2/4 AAR Opn Utah.

28. Snyder Comments.

29. Ibid. See also Company B, 1/7 Special CAAR, n.d., encl to 1/7 AAR Opn Utah.

30. TF Delta AAR Opn Utah; 3/1 AAR Opn Utah; 2/7 AAR Opn Utah. See also Utah Jnl File.

31. Utter Comments, Shore MS.

## CHAPTER 8

**FURTHER FIGHTING AND AN EXPANDING  
BASE OF OPERATIONS, CHU LAI,  
MARCH-JUNE 1966**

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: III MAF ComdCs, Mar-Jun66; Vietnam Comment File; Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III"; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

**A Bloody March**

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF Jnl File, Opn Texas, hereafter Texas Jnl File; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW Sit Reps, Mar66; TF Delta AAR Opn Texas, dtd 10Apr66, encl 8, 7th Mar ComdC, Mar66, hereafter TF Delta AAR Opn Texas; 7th Mar ComdC, Mar66; MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66; 3/1 AAR Opn Texas, encl 4, 3/1 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 3/1 AAR Opn Texas; 2/4 AAR Opn Texas, dtd 29Mar66, Tab G, 2/4 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 2/4 AAR Opn Texas; 3/7 AAR Opn Texas, dtd 31Mar66, App F, 3/7 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 3/7 AAR Opn Texas; Artillery AAR Opn Texas, dtd 31Mar66, Tab b, 3/11 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter Arty AAR Opn Texas.

1. MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW Sit Rep No. 305, dtd 19Mar66; various msgs and entries for 19Mar66 in Texas Jnl File.
2. See Texas Jnl File for 19Mar66 and TF Delta AAR Opn Texas.
3. Kelley Comments.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., and Zitnik Comments.
6. Zitnik Comments.
7. Texas Jnl File for 20-21 Mar66.
8. Kelley Comments.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., and 2/4 AAR Opn Texas.
11. Arty AAR Opn Texas; III MAF COC Spot Report to MACV COC, dtd 21Mar66 in Texas Jnl File; Zitnik Comments.
12. Kelley Comments.
13. CGIIIMAF Operational Summary to CGFMFPac, dtd 21Mar66 in Texas Jnl File, hereafter IIIMAF Op Sum, 21Mar66; 3/7 AAR Opn Texas.
14. Zitnik Comments.
15. TF Delta AAR Opn Texas; 3/1 AAR Opn Texas; MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66.
16. 3/1 AAR Opn Texas and III MAF Op Sum, 21Mar66.
17. For ARVN action see 7th Mar (Fwd) msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 21Mar66 in Texas Jnl File.
18. MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Peatross Comments, Jun78 and III MAF Op Sum, 21Mar66.
19. III MAF Op Sum, 21Mar66.
20. TF Delta AAR Opn Texas.
21. LtCol R. A. Savage, informal rept to CG 1st MAW, dtd 25Mar66, Doc 15, Miscellaneous Documents, Operation Texas, 1st MAW Sit Reps, Mar66. This miscellaneous file will hereafter

- be referred to as 1st MAW Sit Rep Miscellaneous File, Opn Texas.
22. 3/7 AAR, Opn Texas.
  23. TF Delta AAR Opn Texas and Texas Jnl File.
  24. 2/4 AAR Opn Texas.
  25. Quoted in CGIIIMAF msg to 3d MarDiv, dtd 25Mar66, Doc No. 12, 1st MAW Sit Rep Miscellaneous File, Opn Texas.
  26. For Operation Indiana, see account in III MAF Ops, Mar66 and 7th Mar AAR 1-66, Operation Indiana, dtd 7Apr66, encl 7, 7th Mar ComdC, Mar66.
  27. Peatross Comments, Jun78.

**Expansion at Chu Lai**

Additional sources for this section are 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Mar-Jun66; 1st Mar ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 5th Mar ComdCs, May-Jun66; 7th Mar ComdCs, Apr-Jun66.

28. CGFMFPac msg to CG 1st MarDiv, dtd 26Mar66, encl 14-35, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Mar66.
29. Col Glen E. Martin, Comments on draft MS, dtd 5Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
30. LtGen Lewis J. Fields, Comments on draft MS, dtd 15Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
31. For comparison, see III MAF Ops for Apr and Jun66 respectively.

**Operation Kansas**

Additional sources for this section are III MAF Jnl File, Opn Kansas, hereafter Kansas Jnl File; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jun66; Task Force X-Ray ComdC, 1-26Jun66, hereafter TF X-Ray ComdC, Jun66; 1st Recon Bn CAAR Opn Kansas, dtd 28Jun66, encl 15, 1st Recon Bn, ComdC, Jun66, hereafter 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Kansas; 11th Mar AAR Opn Kansas, dtd 1Jul66, Tab 8, 11th Mar ComdC, Jun66 hereafter 11th Marines AAR, Opn Kansas; Staff Sergeant Jimmie L. Howard intvws by 1stMarDiv and MCRD, San Diego, dtd 6Feb67 and 24Apr67 (No. 367 and 677, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Howard Tapes; Capt Francis J. West, *Small Unit Action in Vietnam, Summer 1966* (Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1967), hereafter West, *Small Unit Action*.

32. Task Force X-Ray ComdC, Jun66; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 16Jun66 in Kansas Jnl File.
33. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. 1, p. 4-49.
34. Task Force X-Ray ComdC, Jun66; CG1stMarDiv msgs to CGIIIMAF, dtd 13-15Jun66 in Kansas Jnl File.
35. Ibid.
36. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 18Jun78 in Kansas Jnl File.
37. The account of Howard's patrol on Nui Vu is drawn from the following sources: West, *Small Unit Action*, pp. 15-30; Howard Tapes; various msgs in Kansas Jnl File; 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Kansas.
38. Quotations are from West, *Small Unit Action*, pp.18-19.
39. Zitnik Comments.
40. Quote is from West, *Small Unit Action*, p. 25. See Also Capt Marshall B. Darling, Comments on Shore, MS, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 22Jan70 (Vietnam Comment File).
41. TF X-Ray ComdC, Jun66, and CGIIIMAF msg to MACV, dtd 16Jun66 in Kansas Jnl File.

42. 11th Mar AAR Opn Kansas; 3/1 ComdC Jun66.
43. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 17Jun66 in Opn Kansas Jnl File.
44. 11th Mar AAR Opn Kansas.
45. 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Kansas.
46. TF X-Ray ComdC, Jun66. See also CGIIIMAF msg to MACV, dtd 22Jun66 in Kansas Jnl File.
47. 11th Mar AAR Opn Kansas and 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Kansas.
48. 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Kansas.
49. III MAF Ops, Jun66, p.27.

## PART IV

### The DMZ War

#### CHAPTER 9

#### THE ENEMY BUILDUP IN THE NORTH

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; III MAF ComdCs, Apr-Jul66; III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Apr-Jun66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 4th Mar ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; HQMC Msg Files; Vietnam Comment File; Westmoreland Papers (CMH).

#### Speculation about the Enemy's Intentions

Additional sources for this section are: Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, and Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*.

1. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 168; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, pp. 115-16; General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, dtd 17Jun66, v. 7, Tab F, Westmoreland Papers (CMH); MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 33.
2. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 168; MACV Comd Hist, 1966, pp 21, 25, 33; Notes on MACV Commanders' Conference, dtd 24Apr66, v. 6, Tab A, encl 2, Westmoreland Papers (CMH); George McGerrigle, "Shift to the North," draft MS (CMH), pp 5, 10; MACV, AC/S J-2 Report, n.d., Subj: The Threat in Northern I Corps, [24?Mar66], v. 5, Tab B, encl 3, Westmoreland Papers (CMH), hereafter, MACV, The Threat in Northern I Corps.
3. III MAF ComdC, Apr66.
4. Col Donald W. Sherman intvw by FMFPac, dtd 6Aug66 (No. 199, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
5. Notes on MACV Commanders' Conference, dtd 24Apr66, loc. cit.
6. Quoted in CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 22Apr66 (HQMC Msg File).
7. Transcript of LtGen John R. Chaisson intvw by Hist&MusDiv, dtd 3Apr72 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), p. 376, hereafter, Chaisson Intvw, 1972.

#### Reconnaissance at Khe Sanh, Operation Virginia

Additional sources for this section are: HQMC G-3, Point

Papers, 1966; 1/1 ComdC, Apr66; 1/1 CAAR 5-66, Operation Virginia, dtd 5May66, Tab E, 1/1 ComdC, Apr66, hereafter, 1/1 AAR Opn Virginia; Opn Virginia Jnl File in III MAF Jnl & Msg File, hereafter, Virginia Jnl File.

8. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 336.
9. ComUSMACV, Memo for the Record, n.d. [24Mar66], Subj: Meeting at Chu Lai on 24Mar66, v. 5, Tab B, encl 1, Westmoreland Papers (CMH). See also, MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 33; MACV, The Threat in Northern I Corps; Virginia Jnl File, 13-20Mar66.
10. Col Van D. Bell, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 15Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, Bell Comments. See also, 3dMarDiv OpO 374-66, dtd 27Mar66, encl 28, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Mar66.
11. 1/1 AAR Opn Virginia; 1/1 OpO 8-66 (Opn Virginia), dtd 3Apr66, Tab C, 1/1 ComdC, Apr66; HQMC G-3, Point Paper, dtd 20Apr66.
12. Col George W. Carrington, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 15May78 (Vietnam Comment File).
13. Chaisson Intvw, 1972, p. 371-72.
14. 1/1 AAR Opn Virginia. See also Bell Comments.
15. 1/1 AAR Opn Virginia.

#### Marine Operations in Thua Thien, April-May 1966

16. Col Francis F. Parry intvw by FMFPac, dtd 15Aug66 (No. 198, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter, Parry Intvw.
17. ComUSMACV, Historical Briefing, dtd 10May66, v. 6, Tab B, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).
18. LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9May78 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 4th Mar ComdC, May66 and III MAF Jnl Files.

#### Contingency Planning and Reconnaissance at Dong Ha

19. Minutes of MACV Commanders' Conference, dtd 24Apr66, v. 6, Tab A, encl 2, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).
20. Quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 1Apr66 (HQMC Msg File).
21. Quotes are from CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac and CMC, dtd 22Apr66 (HQMC Msg File). See also Parry Intvw and CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 4Jun66 (HQMC Msg File).
22. III MAF ComdC, May66 and III MAF Jnl and Msg File, 19-22May66.
23. LtGen Krulak msg to Gen Greene, dtd 27May66 (HQMC Msg File); CGIIIMAF msg to CG1stMAW and CG3dMarDiv, dtd 28May66 and ICorps TOC telecon with IIIMAFCO, dtd 29 May66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File); 4th Mar FragO 212-66, Opn Reno, dtd 30May66, encl 7, 4th Mar ComdC, May66; 4th Mar ComdC, May66, p. IV-5.
24. MACV msg to NMCC, dtd 5Jun66 and COC 3dMarDiv msg to COCIIIMAF, dtd 8Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).
25. III MAF ComdCs, May-Jun66.

#### Politics and War

Additional source for this section is: 4th Mar AAR, Operation Florida, dtd 25Jun66, hereafter, Florida AAR.

26. III MAF ComdCs, May-Jun66; CGIIIMAF msg to Com-USMACV, dtd 1Jun66, v. 7, Tab A, encl 10 and MACV msg to NMCC, dtd 2Jun66, v. 7, Tab A, encl 16, Westmoreland Papers (CMH); IIIMAFCOOC msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 3Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

27. III MAF ComdC, Jun66.

28. 4th Mar ComdC, Jun66, p. IV-1; Florida AAR.

29. Col Boston telecon to IIIMAFCOOC, dtd 7Jun66, and 3dMarDiv COC msg to IIIMAFCOOC, dtd 8Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

30. IIIMAFCOOC, Note on Political Situation, dtd 8Jun66, and Col Wegley telecon to Col Quanti, dtd 8Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

31. Florida AAR.

32. Ibid.

33. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, dtd 22Jun66, v. 7, Tab C, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).

34. DepSAICorps telecon to IIIMAF, dtd 17Jun66; IIIMAFCOOC, Notes, Political Events, dtd 19Jun66; IIIMAFCOOC msg to MACVCOOC, dtd 18Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

35. III MAF ComdC, Jun66 and III MAF Jnl and Msg Files, 20-23Jun66.

#### Heavy Fighting in Thua Thien Province

Other sources for this section are: 4th Mar AAR, Opn Jay, 25Jun-2Jul66, dtd 19Aug66, 10 encls, hereafter, Jay AAR; Capt Thomas E. Campbell, MAU, NAGMACV, AAR, Ambush of 29Jun66, dtd 19Jul66 (SMA, MACV, AARs, 1966), hereafter, Campbell AAR.

36. III MAF and 4th Mar ComdCs, Jun66.

37. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 1Jun66, encl 2, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

38. Ibid.

39. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 10Jun66, encl 10, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jun 66.

40. CG3dMarDiv msg to CO4thMar, dtd 11Jun66, encl 12, and CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 13Jun66, encl 16, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

41. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 19Jun66, encl 34, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

42. III MAF and 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jun66.

43. Jay AAR.

44. 4th Mar FragO 4-66, Opn Jay, dtd 24Jun66, Tab 14, 4th Mar ComdC, Jun66.

45. Jay AAR. See also sections on Air Support and Naval Gunfire, encls 1 and 3; 3/12 AAR Opn Jay, dtd 9Jul66, encl 2; 2/1 AAR, Opn Jay, dtd 8Jul66, encl 9; 2/4 AAR Opn Jay, dtd 8Jul66, encl 10, Jay AAR, hereafter, name of unit, Jay AAR.

46. Jay AAR.

47. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

48. 3/12 Jay AAR.

49. Jay AAR.

50. 2/4 Jay AAR.

51. Jay AAR.

52. CG3dMarDiv msg to CO4thMar, dtd 28Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

53. Jay AAR and 3/12 Jay AAR.

54. 3/12 Jay AAR.

55. Jay AAR.

56. Campbell AAR.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Jay AAR and 3/12 Jay AAR. See also Campbell AAR; Capt Edwin W. Besch, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, Besch Comments; IIIMAFCOOC msg to MACVCOOC, dtd 29Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File), hereafter, IIIMAFCOOC 29Jun msg.

60. Jay AAR and IIIMAFCOOC 29Jun msg.

61. Besch Comments. See also, Jay AAR and Campbell AAR.

62. Besch Comments; Jay AAR; Campbell AAR; IIIMAFCOOC 29Jun msg; SMA NAG, SitRep, 24-30Jun66, dtd 1Jul66 (SMA, NAG, MACV, SitReps, 1966).

63. Campbell AAR.

64. Jay AAR and ICorps G-2 AdvGp 1st ARVN Div msg to IIIMAFCOOC, dtd 30Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

65. Col Samuel M. Morrow, Comments on draft MS, dtd 23May78 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 4th Mar msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 30Jun66, Tab 13, 4th Mar ComdC, Jun66 and III MAF ComdC, Jul66.

#### Further Reconnaissance in the North

66. III MAF ComdC, Jun66.

67. HqUSMACV, Memo for the Record, dtd 20Jun66, Subj: MACV Commanders' Conference, 5Jun66, v. 7, Tab B, encl 1, Westmoreland Papers (CMH), hereafter, MACV Commanders' Conference 5Jun66.

68. Quoted in Robert Shaplen, *The Road from War, Vietnam, 1965-1970* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 98.

69. MACV Commanders' Conference 5Jun66; 3d MarDiv msg to IIIMAF, dtd 20Jun66, encl 35, and 3d MarDiv FragO 405-66, dtd 20Jun66, encl 36, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

70. 3d Recon Bn, Prov Group Bravo ComdC, 28Mar-27Apr66; Company B, 3d Recon Bn ComdC, 28Apr-May66; Company B, 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jun66; 1st Force Recon Co ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 8Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

71. 4th Mar ComdC, Jun66, pp. IV-3, IV-4 and Task Unit Charlie OpO 1-66, dtd 23Jun66, encl 12, 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, Jun66.

72. Ibid.

73. LtCol Dwain A. Colby, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

## CHAPTER 10

### MARINES TURN NORTH, OPERATION HASTINGS

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from MACV Comd Hist, 1966; III MAF ComdC, Jul66; 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jul66; 1st MAW ComdC, Jul66; Task Force Delta AAR Opn Hastings, dtd 17Sep66, hereafter TF Delta AAR; III MAF Jnl File, Opn Hastings, 22Jun-7Aug66, hereafter Hastings Jnl File; MajGen Lowell E. English, Personal Notes, Operation Hastings, n.d., hereafter English Personal Notes; Vietnam Comment File; Westmoreland Papers; Sharp and Westmoreland,

*Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66"; Robert Shaplen, *The Road from War, Vietnam, 1965-1970* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), hereafter Shaplen, *Road from War*; Robert Shaplen, "A Reporter at Large, Hastings and Prairie," *The New Yorker*, v. XLII, no. 43 (Dec 17, 1966), pp. 129-93, hereafter Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie."

#### Finding the Enemy

1. LtCol Dwain A. Colby, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File) and 2/1 ComdC, Jul66.
2. Maj Ernest L. DeFazio intvw by MCB, Camp Lejeune, dtd 8Mar67 (No. 466, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
3. TF Delta AAR.
4. Ibid.
5. Transcript of MajGen Wood B. Kyle intvw by HistDiv, dtd 9, 12, and 16Jun69 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), p. 185.
6. TF Delta AAR and 4th Mar msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 11Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).
7. CG3dMarDiv msg to 4th Mar, dtd 11Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).
8. Gen Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, dtd 17Jul66, v. 7, Tab F, Westmoreland Papers (CMH). See also Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 197 and Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 100.

#### Reactivation of Task Force Delta and Heavy Fighting Along the DMZ, 12-25 July 1966

9. Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie," p. 157 and BGen Lowell E. English, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File). See also TF Delta AAR.
10. CGTFDelta FragO 1, dtd 12Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File) and TF Delta AAR. See also Col Sumner A. Vale, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Vale Comments.
11. TF Delta AAR and various msgs in Hastings Jnl File, 12-15Jul66.
12. TF Delta AAR. See BGen Edward J. Doyle, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun 78] (Vietnam Comment File) relating to air-ground coordination.
13. 3/4 AAR Operation Hastings, encl 5, TF Delta AAR, hereafter 3/4 AAR; MAG-16 ComdC, Jul66; Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 104.
14. 3/4 AAR.
15. Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 104.
16. LtCol John J. W. Hilgers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Sep78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hilgers Comments.
17. Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 105. See also TF Delta and 3/4 AARs.
18. Col Arnold E. Bench, Comments on draft MS, dtd 20Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bench Comments. See also Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie," p. 158.
19. TF Delta AAR.
20. Ibid., and 3/4 AAR.
21. Bench Comments.
22. 2/4 AAR, encl 4, TF Delta AAR, hereafter 2/4 AAR.
23. Detailed AAR on 15-18Jul66 by Company Commander, Company K, encl 3, 3/4 AAR, hereafter Company K AAR.

24. III MAF SitRep, Opn Hastings, No. 12, dtd 17Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File). See also III MAF SitRep No. 9, dtd 16Jul66 and COC 3dMarDiv msg to COC III MAF, dtd 16Jul66 (Ibid).
25. English Personal Notes, p. 3. See also III MAF COC msg to MACV COC, dtd 18Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).
26. BLT 3/5 AAR Opn Hastings, encl 6, TF Delta AAR, hereafter BLT 3/5 AAR.
27. Bench Comments and Hilgers Comments. See also 2/4 AAR.
28. Vale Comments.
29. Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 109.
30. Ibid., p. 110.
31. Vale Comments.
32. Company K AAR.
33. III MAF COC msg to MACV COC, dtd 19Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).
34. Quoted in Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 110.
35. TF Delta msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 18Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).
36. English Personal Notes. See also 2/4 AAR.
37. Hilgers Comments.
38. BLT 3/5 AAR.
39. 2/1 AAR Opn Hastings, dtd 7Aug66, encl 2, TF Delta AAR.
40. *Washington Post*, 26Jul66, pp. 1 and 3; FMFPacISO msg to IIIMAFISO, dtd 28Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File). See also BLT 3/5 AAR; English Personal Notes; HM2 Victor R. Marget intvw by Hist Sec, III MAF, dtd 22Mar67 (No. 742, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Marget Tape.
41. Marget Tape.
42. BLT 3/5 AAR.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid. and English Personal Notes.
45. FMFPacISO msg op. cit.; see also Marget Tape and BLT 3/5 AAR.
46. BLT 3/5 AAR; Hastings Jnl File; English Personal Notes.
47. CG3dMarDiv msg to TF Delta, dtd 25Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).

#### Hastings Comes to an End, 26 July-3 August 1966

48. TF Delta AAR.
49. Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie," p. 169. See also Bench Comments and Hilgers Comments.
50. 2/4 AAR.
51. Bench Comments.
52. Hilgers Comments.
53. West, *Small Unit Action*, p. 59.
54. TF Delta AAR; 3/12 AAR Opn Hastings, encl 7, TF Delta AAR; West, *Small Unit Action*, p. 74.
55. Capt Francis J. West, "Sting Ray 70," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 95, no. 11, (Nov69), pp. 26-37.
56. 1st Force Recon Co AAR, Operation Hastings, encl 14, TF Delta AAR.
57. English Personal Notes and TF Delta AAR.
58. MAG-16 ComdC, Jul66; HMM-164 ComdC, Jul66; HMM-165 ComdC, Jul66; English Personal Notes. See Chapter 16 for a further discussion of the CH-46A problem.
59. As quoted in Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 111.

60. TF Delta AAR.
61. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 141.

## CHAPTER 11

### THE DMZ WAR CONTINUES, OPERATION PRAIRIE

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jul66-Jan67; III MAF ComdCs, Jul66-Jan67; 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jul66-Jan67; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jul66-Jan67; III MAF Jnl File, Opn Prairie; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; LtCol Ralph F. Moody and Maj Thomas E. Donnelly, "Introduction of North Vietnamese Regulars," pt IV of LtCol Ralph F. Moody et. al., "Marines in Vietnam," MS (HistDiv, HQMC), hereafter Moody and Donnelly, "Introduction of North Vietnamese Regulars"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Shaplen, *Road from War*; Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie"; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-1966."

#### Reconnaissance in Force, 3Aug-13Sep66

Additional sources for this section are: CMC WestPac Trip Rpt, Aug66 in Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Personal Official Files, hereafter CMC WestPac Trip, Aug66; CGFMFPac, Rpt of WestPac Trip, 29Aug-7Sep66, n.d., hereafter CGFMFPac Trip Rpt 29Aug66-Sep66; 4th Mar AAR Operation Prairie, 31Aug-30Sep66, n.d., and enclosures, hereafter 4th Mar AAR; Col Alexander D. Cereghino intvw by FMFPac, n.d. (No.450, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Cereghino Intvw; LtCol Arnold E. Bench et. al. intvw by III MAF, n.d. (No. 1083, OralHistColl), hereafter Bench et. al. Intvw; LtCol Jack Westerman intvw by III MAF, n.d. (No. 269, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Westerman Intvw.

1. CGFMFPac msg to III MAF, dtd 22Jul66 (HQMC Msg File); HQMC AO2C Brief, dtd 28Jul66, Subj: Enemy Threat Capabilities in ICTZ in HQMC Staff Briefs Suitable for Discussion with CinCPac and ComUSMACV (CMC WestPac Trip Aug66, Bk. I); MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 26; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 198.

2. 2/4 AAR Opn Prairie, dtd 28Sep66, encl 5, 4th Mar AAR, hereafter 2/4 AAR 28Sep66.

3. Bench et. al. Intvw.

4. 2/4 Special Operation Debriefing Rpt, dtd 13Aug66 in 2/4 AAR 28Sep66.

5. Ibid. and Bench et. al. Intvw. See also Col Vincil W. Hazelbaker, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Aug78] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hazelbaker Comments.

6. LtCol Howard V. Lee, Comments on draft MS, dtd 14Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

7. Hazelbaker Comments.

8. Bench et. al. Intvw.

9. See Special Operation Debriefing Rpt, op. cit.; Bench et. al. Intvw; Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie"; MAG-16 ComdC, Aug66; VMO-2 ComdC, Aug66 for detailed account of action.

10. Cereghino Intvw.

11. LtCol John J.W. Hilgers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Sep78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hilgers Comments, 6Sep78.

12. 2/4 Special Operation AAR No. 2, dtd 5Oct66 in 2/4AAR, 28Sep66, hereafter 2/4 Special AAR No. 2.

13. Ibid. and Hilgers Comments, 6Sep78.

14. 2/4 Special AAR No. 2 and Capt Edwin W. Besch, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Besch Comments.

15. LtCol John J.W. Hilgers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Sep78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hilgers Comments, 2Sep78.

16. Ibid.

17. Besch Comments.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. 2/4 Special AAR No. 2.

22. Hilgers Comments, 2Sep78 and Col Arnold E. Bench, Comments on draft MS, dtd 20Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File).

23. Hilgers Comments, 2Sep78.

24. 2/4 Special AAR No. 2.

25. Statement of Capt John J.W. Hilgers concerning recommendation for award, case of Second Lieutenant Stephen Snyder, n.d., encl to LtCol John J.W. Hilgers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 14Aug78 (Vietnam Comment File).

26. Besch Comments.

27. LtCol Arnold E. Bench, Comments on draft MS, Moody and Donnelly, "Introduction of North Vietnamese Regulars," dtd 12Sep69 (Vietnam Comment File); 3/12 AAR, dtd 5Jan67, encl 2, 4th Mar AAR.

28. Westerman Intvw.

29. Col Alexander D. Cereghino, Comments on draft MS, dtd 17Aug78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Cereghino Comments.

30. Ibid.

31. Westerman Intvw.

#### Assault from the Sea, Deckhouse IV

Additional sources for this section are: CAF Seventh Flt, Hist of Amphib Ops; MCOAG, Study on SLF Opns; 1/26 ComdC, Aug-Sep66; 1/26 AAR Opn Prairie, 19-23Sep66, dtd 16Nov66, hereafter 1/26 AAR; TG79.5 ComdC, Sep66.

32. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 2Sep66, encl 2, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Sep66.

33. MCOAG, Study on SLF Opns, pp. A-21-A-22.

#### The Continued Fighting for Nui Cay Tre (Mutter) Ridge and the Razorback

Additional sources for this section are: 3dMarDiv AAR Opn Prairie I, Oct66-Jan67, dtd 28Apr67, hereafter 3dMarDiv AAR; 4th Mar AAR; 3/4 AAR Opn Prairie, 17-30Sep66, dtd 7Jan67, encl 6, 4thMar AAR, hereafter 3/4 AAR, Sep66; 3/4 AAR Opn Prairie, 1Oct66-24Dec66, dtd 29Jan67, encl 13, 3dMarDiv AAR.

34. Westerman Intvw.

35. 2/7 AAR, dtd 5Oct66, encl 8, 4th Mar AAR, hereafter 2/7 AAR.

36. 1stLt Robert T. Willis intvw by 1stMarDiv, dtd 16Jun67 (No. 1084, Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
37. 2/7 AAR.
38. Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie," p. 184.
39. Quoted in Ibid.
40. Ibid., pp. 184-5.
41. Ibid.
42. Quoted in Ibid., p. 186.
43. 3/4 AAR, Sep66.
44. Maj Robert G. Handrahan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Quoted in Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie," p. 188.

#### The Opening of Khe Sanh and the 3d Marine Division Moves North

- Additional sources for this section are: 3dMarDiv AAR; 1/3 ComdCs, Sep66-Jan67.
48. CGFMFPac Trip Rpt, 29Aug-7Sep66, p. 5.
  49. BGen Lowell E. English intvw by FMFPac, n.d. (No. 402, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
  50. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 36.
  51. Transcript of intvw with Col John R. Chaisson by FMFPac, dtd Nov66 (No. 327, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), pp. 4-5, hereafter Chaisson Intvw, Nov66.
  52. 1/3 AAR, dtd 7Feb67, encl 4, 3dMarDiv AAR.
  53. Chaisson Intvw, Nov66, p. 5.
  54. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 29 Sep66 in III MAF Jnl File, Opn Prairie.
  55. Cereghino Comments.

## PART V

### The Unrelenting War in Central and Southern I Corps, July-December 1966

#### CHAPTER 12

#### THE STRUGGLE FOR AN HOA, OPERATION MACON

Unless otherwise noted the material for this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jul66; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; III MAF Opn Macon Jnl File, 5Jul-28Oct66, hereafter Opn Macon Jnl File; HQMC Msg File; Moody and Donnelly, "Introduction of North Vietnamese Regulars."

#### The First Clash

1. 9th Mar ComdC, Jul66, p. 2-2.
2. 9th Mar Int Sum No. 182, dtd 2Jul66 in 9th Mar Int Sums, Jul66.

3. Ibid.

4. 1st MAW Op Rep 5-004, dtd 4Jul66 in 1st MAW Daily Op Reps, App 16, 1st MAW ComdC, Jul66; 9th Mar ComdC, Jul66, pp. 2-3; 9th Mar Int Sum No. 185, dtd 5Jul66 in 9th Mar Int Sums, Jul66.

5. 9th Mar Sit Rep No. 186, dtd 5Jul66 in 9th Mar Sit Reps, Jul66.

#### The Operation Expands

6. IIIMAF msg to MACVCOC, dtd 5Jul66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

7. 3d MarDiv, FragO 408-66, Opn Macon, dtd 5Jul66, encl 10, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul66.

8. 9th Mar FragO 186-66, Operation Macon, dtd 5Jul66 in 9th Mar FragOs, Jul66.

9. 3d MarDiv FragO, Opn Macon, op.cit.

10. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 6Jul66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

11. 1st MAW Op Rep 5-006, dtd 6Jul66 in 1st MAW Daily OpReps, App 16, 1st MAW ComdC, Jul66; 9th Mar Sit Rep No. 187, dtd 6Jul66 in 9th Mar Sit Reps, Jul66; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul66, p. 13.

12. 3/3 AAR, Opn Macon, dtd 19Jul66, encl 88, 3d Mar ComdC, Jul66.

13. See 9th Mar Sit Reps and FragOs for period 6-8Jul66.

14. 9th Mar Special Sit Rep No. 17, Opn Macon, dtd 10Jul66 in 9th Mar Sit Reps, Jul66.

15. 9th Mar FragO 191-66, dtd 10Jul66 in 9th Mar FragOs, Jul66.

16. 1/3 AAR, dtd 24Jul66, encl 1, 1/3 ComdC, Jul66, p. 1.

17. CG3dMarDiv msg to CO9thMar, dtd 13Jul66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

18. 9th Mar, Special Sit Rep No. 32, Opn Macon, dtd 15Jul66 in 9th Mar Sit Reps, Jul66.

#### Macon Continues

19. IIIMAF msg to MACVCOC, dtd 14Jul66 and CG3dMarDiv msg to CO9thMar, dtd 14Jul66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

20. CG3dMarDiv msg dtd 14Jul66 cited in Opn Macon Jnl File.

21. IIIMAF msg to MACVCOC, dtd 15Jul66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

22. CO9th Mar memo to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 28Jul66, Subj: Visit of General Westmoreland to An Hoa, in Opn Macon Jnl File.

23. 3/9 ComdC, Jul66, p. 2.

24. 3/9 AAR, Opn Swannee, encl 6, 3/9 ComdC, Aug66.

25. LtCol Fred D. MacLean, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 25April78 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 3/9 ComdC, Aug66.

26. 12th Mar S-3 Jnl in 12th Mar ComdC, Sep66.

27. 3d MarDiv Sit Rep No. 245, Opn Macon, dtd 6Sep66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

28. 9th Mar ComdC, Sep66, p. 3-1 and III MAF COC, Record of Telephone Call, dtd 6Sep66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

29. 9th Mar ComdC, Sep66, p. 2-5.

30. 3/9 ComdC, Sep66, p. 2.

#### Macon Ends but Little Changes

31. 9th Mar ComdC, Oct66, p. 3-1.

## CHAPTER 13

## THE CONTINUING WAR

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Dec66; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Dec66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Dec66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jul-Dec66; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jul-Dec66; HQMC Msg File; III MAF Jnl and Msg Files; Moody and Donnelly, "Introduction of North Vietnamese Regulars"; Vietnam Comment File; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-1966."

## Operations Washington and Colorado

Additional material for this section include: 1st Recon Bn, AAR, Opn Washington, dtd 23Jul66, encl 19, 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jul66, hereafter 1st Recon Bn, AAR, Opn Washington; Miscellaneous Messages, Operation Washington, in 1st MAW Daily SitReps, 1st MAW ComdC, Jul66, hereafter Miscellaneous Messages, Opn Washington, III MAF Op Washington Jnl and Msg File, hereafter Washington Jnl File; 5th Mar AAR, Opn Colorado, 6-22Aug66, dtd 5Sep66, hereafter 5th Mar AAR Colorado; SMA, MACV AAR Lien Ket-52, 6-14Aug66, n.d. in SMA, MACV AARs, 1966, hereafter SMA AAR Lien Ket 52; III MAF Opn Colorado Jnl and Msg File, hereafter Colorado Jnl File; West, *Small Unit Action*.

1. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 4Jul66 and CG1stMarDiv OpO 308-66, dtd 4Jul66 in Miscellaneous Messages, Opn Washington.

2. MACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 8Jul66, v. 7, Tab E, encl 1, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).

3. 1st Tactical Area msg to III MAF G-3, dtd 6Jul66 in Washington Jnl File.

4. 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Washington and 2/11 ComdC, Jul66.

5. 1st MarDiv PerIntRep No. 2, Anx C, dtd 22Jul66, encl 83, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jul66. See also 1st MarDiv Special SitRep No. 13, dtd 10Jul66 in Washington Jnl File and 1st Recon Bn AAR, Opn Washington.

6. 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Washington.

7. Minutes of MACV Commanders' Conference, 24Jul66, dtd 17Aug66, v. 8, Tab B, encl 1, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).

8. 1st MarDiv PerIntRep No. 2, dtd 22Jul66 and No. 3, dtd 28Jul66, encl 83 and 101, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jul66.

9. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 18Jul66, encl 75, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jul66.

10. CG 1st MarDiv Planning Directive Opn Colorado, dtd 30Jul66, encl 1, 5th Mar AAR Colorado.

11. See the various messages pertaining to planning and orders in Colorado Jnl File.

12. III MAF msg to MACVCOC, dtd 4Aug66 in Ibid.

13. 1st MAW SitRep No. 444, dtd 6Aug66 in 1st MAW SitReps, App. 9, 1st MAW ComdC, Aug66.

14. See LtCol Alexander S. Ruggiero, USMC, memo to G-3, III MAF, dtd 6Aug66 Subj: Resume of Flight to Tam Ky and Que Son, in Colorado Jnl File and SMA AAR Lien Ket-52, pp. 3-4 for a detailed description of the VNMC action.

15. SMA AAR Lien Ket-52, p. 4.

16. West, *Small Unit Action*, p. 91.

17. Ibid., p. 119.

18. SMA AAR Lien Ket-52, p. 8.

19. Ibid.

20. 2/5 AAR, Opn Colorado, dtd 26Aug66, encl 6, 5th Mar AAR Colorado.

## The September Election

Additional material for this section includes: 9th Mar ComdC, Sep66; 3d Mar ComdC, Sep66; Weller Pacification Material; MACV Historical Records, 69A702.

21. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul66, p. 18.

22. CGIIIMAF msg to subordinate units, dtd 26Aug66 in Folder No. VA(1)(7), Impact of Political Developments on Operations (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

23. III MAF ComdC, Aug66, p. 11.

24. 9th Mar ComdC, Aug66, p. 2-6.

25. 1st Mar ComdC, Sep66.

26. 9th Mar ComdC, Sep66, p. 2-6.

## The Marine TAORs, July-December 1966

Additional material for this section include: TF X-Ray ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 9th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 4th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 5th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 7th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 1st Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 4th Mar AAR Opn Chinook I, 25Dec66-20Jan67, dtd 12Mar67, hereafter 4th Mar AAR Opn Chinook; MACV Historical Records 69A702; Weller Pacification Material; CGFMFPac Trip Rept, 29Oct-3Nov66, n.d., hereafter FMFPac Trip Rep, Oct-Nov66; LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr. intvw by Hist Div, HQMC, dtd 10Jan73 (OralHistColl, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC), hereafter Nickerson Intvw; Col Donald L. Evans, Jr. intvw by Hist Div, HQMC, dtd 18Feb72 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Evans Intvw.

27. IIIMAFCOG msg to MACVCOC, dtd 5Sep66 in III MAF Jnl and msg File. The message was drafted by Col Chaisson.

28. LtCol Emerson A. Walker, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun78] (Vietnam Comment File); CO MAG-16 rept to CG 1st MAW, dtd 24Jul66 Subj: Viet Cong Attack on Marble Mountain, 23Jul66, App. B, MAG-16 ComdC, Jul66.

29. III MAF and 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Aug66.

30. Nickerson Intvw.

31. LtCol Warren P. Kitterman, Comments on draft MS, dtd 16Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

32. 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Dec66.

33. Ibid., Dec66 and 3/26 AAR, Opn Chinook I, dtd 26Feb67, encl 2, 4th Mar AAR, Opn Chinook.

34. 4th Mar AAR, Opn Chinook; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec66. See also Col Alexander D. Cereghino, Comments on draft MS, dtd 30May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

35. FMFPac Trip Rep, Oct-Nov66, p. D-71.

36. Col Edward L. Bale, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 14Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

37. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 9Oct66 in Folder No. VA(1) Marine (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

38. FMFPac Trip Rep, Oct-Nov66, p. D-71.

39. Evans Intvw.

40. III MAF ComdC, Dec66.

41. Ibid., p. 42. See also III MAF Campaign Plan 1-67, dtd 26Dec66, encl 3, III MAF ComdC, Dec66.

42. BGen Lowell E. English intvw by FMFPac, n.d. (No. 402, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

## PART VI Pacification: The Elusive Goal

### CHAPTER 14

#### MARINE CORPS PACIFICATION

##### County Fair and Golden Fleece

Additional material for this section is derived from: 9th Marines ComdC, Jan-Apr66; 1st Mar ComdC, Jul66; 3d Marines ComdC, Jul66; 7th Mar ComdC, Sep66; 1/7 AAR Golden Fleece 7-1, 17-27 Sep66, dtd 28Sep66, hereafter 1/7 AAR Golden Fleece 7-1; LtCol Littleton W.T. Waller, II, Comments on Moody and Donnelly draft MS, "Marines in Vietnam," pt IV (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Waller Comments; Simmons, 9th Marines Notebook; U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington: 1940), hereafter *Small Wars Manual*.

1. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 29.
2. For a detailed description of the background of the *Small Wars Manual*, see LtCol Kenneth E. Clifford, *Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the U.S. Marine Corps 1900-1970* (Washington, D.C.: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1973), pp. 36-37 and Ronald Schaffer, "The 1940 Small War Manual and the Lessons of History," *Military Affairs*, Apr 72, v. 36, no. 2, pp. 46-51.
3. *Small Wars Manual*, p. II-32.
4. See Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, pp. 141-142, and Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66," pp. 28-29.
5. See 9th Marines OpO 117-66 (County Fair), dtd 4May66 in Folder no. VA (1) Marine, Box 5 (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
6. 9th Marines ComdC and SitReps, April 66.
7. FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Apr, May, Jun, Jul 66; Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 121.
8. ComUSMACV ltr to CGIIIMAF, dtd 4Jul66. Subj: Military Support for Revolutionary Development, encl 9, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul66.
9. Ibid.
10. ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 10Jul66, in Folder No. VA (1) (8) Tactical Innovations, Box 6 (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
11. 1st Marines ComdC, Jul66.
12. 1/3 AAR County Fair 3-14, dtd 30Jul66 in 1/3 ComdC, Jul66.
13. CGFMFPac, WestPac Trip Report, 29Aug-7Sep66, n.d. p. 4.
14. FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec 1966, pp. 54-55.
15. See Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, pp. 138-141.
16. III MAF ComdC, Sep66, p. 30.
17. 1/7 AAR; Waller Comments; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Sep66, pp. 15-16.

18. Waller Comments.

19. 1/7 AAR Operation Golden Fleece 7-1, p. 8.
20. Ibid., p. 8.
21. Ibid., p. 22.
22. Ibid., p. 18.
23. Ibid.
24. Waller Comments.
25. Moody, "Marines in Vietnam," pt V, pp. 13-14—13-25 and Waller Comments.
26. CGFMFPac Trip Rpt, Oct-Nov66, p. 5.

##### Combined Action

Additional material is derived from: FMFPac, The Marine Combined Action Program, Vietnam, Aug65-Jan67, n.d., hereafter FMFPac, "The Marine Combined Action Program"; Capt John J. Mullen, Jr., "Modification to the III MAF Combined Action Program in the Republic of Vietnam," Student Staff Study, Class 1-69, Amphibious Warfare School, Ed Center, MCDEC, Quantico, hereafter Mullen, "III MAF Combined Action Program"; Francis J. West, Jr., *The Village*; (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1972), hereafter West, *The Village*; Capt Francis J. West, Jr., "Fast Rifles," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 51, no. 10 (Oct67), pp. 38-44, hereafter West, "Fast Rifles"; Capt Francis J. West, Jr., "Something of Significance," unpublished MS (Vietnam Reference Material), hereafter West, "Something of Significance."

27. See Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, pp. 132-138 and Mullen, III MAF "Combined Action Program" for the formation of the Combined Action Program in 1965.
28. FMFPac, "The Marine Combined Action Program," p. 22.
29. Ibid., p. 14.
30. See Mullen, "III MAF Combined Action Program."
31. West, *The Village*, p. 9.
32. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 46-47.
33. See West, "Fast Rifles," p. 40.
34. Ibid., p. 42.
35. West, "Something of Significance," p. 3.
36. HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1967, pp. F-18 and F-32.

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Additional material for this section is derived from John J. O'Connor, "Cross Cultural Interaction: An Evaluation of some Conceptual Approaches" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 1970), hereafter O'Connor, "Cross Cultural Interaction."

37. Quoted in O'Connor, "Cross Cultural Interaction," p. 189. Most of the material in the preceding paragraphs pertaining to Personal Response is derived from the O'Connor dissertation. One should consult this source for the full ramifications of the Personal Response Project and for the sociological implications that cannot be covered in this monograph on Marine operations.
38. CGIIIMAF msg to CG 1st MarDiv, CG 1st MAW, CG 3d MarDiv and CG ForLogCom, dtd 27Nov66 (HQMC Msg File).

##### Kit Carson

39. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, remarks to Kit Carson Scout Graduation, dtd 21Aug70 (Vietnam Comment File).

40. See Parker, *Civil Affairs*, p. 70 and Nickerson Interview.

41. Parker, *Civil Affairs*, p. 82.

42. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec 1966, p. 8. For a detailed history of the Kit Carson Program through February 1967 see "Returnee Exploitation, the Kit Carson Scout Program Development," encl 9, III MAF ComdC, Feb67.

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43. HqIIIMAF, ForceO 5401.2, dtd 5Sep66, Subj: Establishment of the Psychological Operations Section, attached to Anx E, Pt II, Sec IX, III MAF ComdC, Feb67. See also Col Robert R. Read, Comments on draft MS, dtd 7Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Read Comments.

44. Read Comments. See also PsyOps Section ComdC, 1Jul66-31Dec66, Anx E, Pt II, Sec IX, III MAF ComdC, Feb67.

#### Civic Action

45. MajGen Jonas M. Platt, "Military Civic Action," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 54, no. 9 (Sep70) pp. 20-26.

46. Ibid.

47. 3d TankBn ComdC, Dec66.

48. FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec 1966, pp. 51-52.

49. Lt Marion Lee "Sandy" Kempner, "Letters from Sandy," *American Jewish Archives*, v. 31, no. 1 (Apr79) pp. 7-34, p. 16.

#### The I Corps Joint Coordinating Council

Additional material for this section is derived from the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council Minutes Folder, 1965-66, hereafter ICJCC Minutes Folder.

50. ICJCC Minutes Folder, 2Aug66.

## CHAPTER 15

### PACIFICATION, THE LARGER PERSPECTIVE

Unless otherwise noted, material for this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Dec66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; MACV Historical Records, 69A702; HQMC Msg File; Weller Pacification Materials; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; *Pentagon Papers*; Parker, *Civil Affairs*; Stolfi, *Marine Corps Civic Action*; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

#### Pacification Receives Priority

1. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 116.

2. See Parker, *Civil Affairs*, the bottom of pp. 63-64 for the listing of the Honolulu goals.

3. Quoted in "Re-Emphasis on Pacification 1965-67," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 6, sec IV-C-8, p. 80.

4. Ibid., p. 8.

5. See Ibid. pp. 83-87 for detailed analysis of the "Roles and Missions" Report.

6. Tillson Briefing, encl to Minutes of the Mission Council

Meeting of 8 Aug 66, dtd 10 Aug 66 in Mission Council Memo Folder (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

7. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 26Aug66 in Folder VA (1) (1) Guidance from ComUSMACV (MACV Historical Records, 69A703), hereafter ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, 26Aug66. Part of this document is reprinted in "Re-Emphasis on Pacification," op. cit., p. 90.

8. Ibid.

9. Quoted in "Re-Emphasis on Pacification," op. cit., p. 90.

10. See ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd Oct66 in Folder VA (1) (1) Guidance from ComUSMACV, Box 1 (MACV Historical Records, 69A703).

11. See also MACV J-3, Historical Summaries Files, Box 2 (MACV Historical Records, 69A703) and MACV, Combined Campaign Plan (Excerpts) in Weller Working Materials.

#### Reorganization and Support of Revolutionary Development

12. MACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 18Dec66 in Folder VIIIB Rural Construction, Box 6 (MACV Historical Records, 69A702), hereafter MACV msg to CinCPac, 18Dec66.

13. Ibid.

14. MACV Planning Directive 4-66, dtd 20Jul66, Subj: MACV Planning Cycle in Folder VA (1) (1), Guidance from ComUSMACV, Box 5 (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

15. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, 26Aug66.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 16Sep66 in Folder VA (1) (14) After Action/Lessons Learned, Box 6 (MACV Historical Records 69A702).

19. Minutes of the Mission Council Meeting of 19Sep66, dtd 22Sep66 in Mission Council Memo Folder (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

20. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 13Oct66 in Folder VA (1) (1) Guidance from ComUSMACV, Box 1 (MACV Historical Records, 69A703).

21. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 18Dec66.

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23. Ibid., p. 108.

24. For the texts of the conference and the President's speech at Cam Ranh Bay, see: "President Johnson's Trip to Asia: Seven Nations Declare Unity at Manila Conference; President Johnson Visits American Troops at Cam Ranh Bay," *The Department of State Bulletin*, v. LV, no. 1429 (14Nov66), pp. 730-39.

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25. Bole and Kobata, "An Evaluation . . . of the Hamlet Evaluation System," pp. 13-18; CMH Reporting Systems Folder; MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 543.

26. For a chart depicting the detailed breakdown of the Marine reporting system, see Stolfi, *Marine Corps Civic Action*, p. 76.

27. Evans Interview; CMH Reporting Systems Folder; MACV Comd Hist, p. 546.

28. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. I, p. 5-36.

29. Hq3dMarDiv, Brochure for Briefing MajGen Robert E. Cushman, 17-22Apr67, encl to 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr67, p. 2-4.

30. Bole and Kobata, "An Evaluation . . . of the Hamlet Evaluation System," pp. x-xi.

31. Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66," p. 34.

32. LtCol Warren P. Kitterman, Comments on draft MS, dtd 23Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

## PART VII Supporting the Troops

### CHAPTER 16

#### MARINE AVIATION IN 1966

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: CinCPac Comd Hist 1966; MACV Comd Hist 1966; FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67"; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Dec66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; MAG-11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; MAG-12 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; MAG-13 ComdCs, Sep-Dec66; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; MAG-36 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; LtCol Ralph F. Moody, Maj Thomas E. Donnelly, and Capt Moyers S. Shore III, "Backing Up the Troops," pt VIII of Moody et. al., "Marines in Vietnam," hereafter Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*; LtCol William R. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters, 1962-1973* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978), hereafter Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-70," *Naval Review 1971* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1971), pp. 122-55, hereafter McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation"; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

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1. Col Harry W. Taylor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

2. G-3 Sec, Hq, III MAF memo, dtd 4Jan66, Subj: Fragmentation of Marine Air-Ground Team, encl 12, III MAF ComdC, Jan66.

3. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," p. 133.

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4. FMFPac Trip Rept, Oct-Nov66, p. 6.

5. *Baltimore Sun*, 18Oct66, p. 1.

6. BGen Jonas M. Platt, ACS, G-1, Personnel Presentation,

HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1967, Tab G, p. 13.

7. Ibid.

8. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, DCS, Air, Aviation Presentation, Ibid., Tab H, p. 13. See also Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 5May78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Greene Comments.

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9. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," p. 134.

10. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*, pp. 101-102 and FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec66, p. 77.

11. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. I, p. 6-19.

12. LtGen Louis B. Robertshaw, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun78] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Robertshaw Comments, 1978.

13. Col Robert J. Zitnik, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Zitnik Comments.

14. Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

15. Col George W. Carrington, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 15May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

16. H&MS-16 ComdCs, Sep-Dec66.

17. Zitnik Comments.

#### Relations with the Seventh Air Force

18. Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, p. 152.

19. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," p. 136.

20. Ibid.

21. Greene Comments.

22. LtGen Louis B. Robertshaw, Comments on draft MS, Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops," n.d. (Vietnam Comment File).

#### Marine Air Control Systems

23. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. I, p. 6-16.

#### Air Defense

Additional sources for this section are: 1st and 2d LAAM Bns, ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; AAM-6, Point Paper, n.d., Subj: LAAM Posture in RVN, DCS Air, HQMC, Point Papers, 1967, hereafter, "LAAM Posture in RVN."

24. FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec66, p. 62 and "LAAM Posture in RVN."

25. 1st and 2d LAAM Bns ComdCs, Jan-Dec66 and "LAAM Posture in RVN."

26. 1st LAAM Bn ComdCs, Aug-Sep66.

27. 2d LAAM Bn ComdC, Dec66.

28. 1st LAAM Bn ComdC, Jun66.

29. Ibid., Dec66.

30. "LAAM Posture in RVN."

31. 1st and 2d LAAM Bns ComdCs, Mar-Apr66.

32. Robertshaw Comments, 1978.

### Air Operations

33. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. I, p. 6-20; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec66, pp. 65, 67; MCCC, Status of Forces, Dec66.
34. 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec66 and MCCC, Status of Forces, Dec66.
35. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 196; Office of Air Force History, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Air Force History Comments.
36. 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Mar66.
37. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 24; CinC-Pac Comd Hist, 1966, v. II, pp. 494 and 497; MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 428.
38. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 28Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).
39. CG1stMAW msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 7Apr66 (Ibid.)
40. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 11Apr66 (Ibid.)
41. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 11Jun66 (Ibid.)
42. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 196; Gen Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, dtd 24Jul66, v. 8, Tab A, Westmoreland Papers (CMH); Air Force History Comments. For the statistics of Marine jet operations, see 1st MAW ComdCs, Jun-Jul66.
43. 1st MAW ComdCs, Aug-Dec66.
44. LtGen Hugh M. Elwood, Comments on draft MS, dtd 4Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Elwood Comments; VM CJ-1 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66.
45. VMGR-152 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66.
46. CG1stMAW ltr to SecNav, dtd 19Oct66, Subj: Recommendation for Navy Unit Commendation, App A, VMGR-152 ComdC, Jul-Dec66.
47. Elwood Comments.
48. *The Rotor Blade*, dtd 5Aug66, p. 5.
49. *Sea Tiger*, dtd 27Jul66, p. 5. See also Maj. Fritsch's debrief, dtd 15Jul66 in VMFA-323, Debriefing Reports, 6-31Jul66.

## CHAPTER 17

### ARTILLERY SUPPORT IN 1966

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist 1966; FMFPac "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67"; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Dec66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 1st FAG ComdCs, Nov-Dec66; HQMC msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Moody, et. al., "Backing Up the Troops"; MCCC, Status of Forces, Jan-Dec66; Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*.

#### Organization and Employment, January-June 1966

1. Col Edwin M. Rudzis, Comments on draft MS, dtd 26May78 (Vietnam Comment File).
2. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb66, p. 21.

3. "Commander's Analysis, Techniques Utilized and Lessons Learned, Operation Double Eagle I and II," n.d., encl 32, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr66, p. 3.

#### The Guns Move North and Restructuring the Command, July-December 1966

4. Col Glenn E. Norris, intvw by FMFPac, dtd 3Jul67 (No. 1386 OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
5. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 9Oct66 (HQMC msg File).
6. 1st FAG ComdC, Dec66.
7. Col David G. Jones, Comments on draft MS, dtd 4Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
8. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 27Nov66, encl 70, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Nov66.
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10. Quoted in Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1966), p. 40.

## CHAPTER 18

### MEN AND MATERIAL

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist 1966; FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67"; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Dec66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops"; Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*.

#### Manpower

Additional material for this section is derived from HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1966; HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1967; *Pentagon Papers*.

1. Clipping from *New York Times*, dtd 21Feb66 in Current News, dtd 21Feb66.
2. LtGen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., "View from the Top—Assistant Commandant's Overview," HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1967, Tab B, p. 1, hereafter Chapman, "View from the Top."
3. See entries for Jun, Jul, Aug, 1966 in Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, "Commandant's Chronology, 1954-71," MS.
4. See briefing for CMC in the respective 1st and 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Aug66.
5. Chaisson Intvw, Nov66.
6. FMFPac Trip Rpt, Oct-Nov66, p. C-26.
7. Supplement to General Officers Symposium, dtd 20Jan67, HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1966, p. B-1.
8. BGen Lowell E. English intvw by FMFPac, n.d. (No. 402, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
9. Chapman, "View from the Top," p. B-2.

## Logistics, Medical Support, and Construction

Additional sources for this section are: FLSG ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; FLC ComdCs, Mar-Dec66; 1st Med Bn ComdCs, Feb-Dec66; 3d Med Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 1st Engr Bn ComdCs, Mar-Dec66; 3d Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 9th Engr Bn, ComdCs, May-Dec66; 11th Engr Bn, ComdCs, Nov-Dec66; Col George C. Axtell, Jr. intvw by FMFPac, dtd 5Oct66 (No. 219, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Axtell Intvw; Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*.

10. Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, Ch 12.
11. LtGen Lewis W. Walt, Comments on draft MS, Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops," dtd 19Feb70 (Vietnam Comment File).
12. Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 85.
13. III MAF ComdCs, Jan and Feb66.
14. Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 85.
15. Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, pp. 184-5.
16. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb66.
17. III MAF ComdC, Mar66.
18. FMFPac, ComdC, Jan-Jun66, p. 26.
19. Ibid., p. 7, and Col Mauro J. Padalino, Comments on draft MS, Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops," dtd 10 Mar70 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Padalino Comments.
20. III MAF ComdC, Mar66 and III MAF ForceO P40005, dtd 13Mar66, Subj: Standing Operating Procedures for Logistics, encl 8, III MAF ComdC, Mar66.
21. FLC ComdC, Mar66.
22. Padalino Comments.
23. FLC ComdC, Apr66.
24. Ibid., Jun66.
25. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul66.
26. CMFMFPac Trip Rpt, 29Aug-Sep66, p. 6.
27. Axtell Intvw.
28. Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 119.
29. See FLC ComdCs, Oct-Dec66.
30. Col Franklin C. Thomas, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 19May78 (Vietnam Comment File).
31. Col James M. Callender, Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
32. Col Edward L. Bale, Jr. Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
33. Axtell Intvw.
34. FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Nov66, p. 51; FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. 1, pp. 8-38—8-39; Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 77.
35. *Sea Tiger*, 21Dec66, pp. 1 and 11. See also 3d Med Bn ComdC, Dec66.
36. Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops," pp. 22-34—22-35.
37. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar-Sep67, Statistics," v. 2, pp. 87-88.
38. Quoted in *Sea Tiger*, 18Jan67, p. 1.
39. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. 1, pp. 8-23—8-24.
40. 1st MAW G-5 Narrative Summary, App. 5, encl 2, 1st MAW ComdC, Aug66.

## PART VIII

### The SLF, Advisors, Other Marine Activities, and a Final Look at 1966

#### CHAPTER 19

#### THE SLF OF THE SEVENTH FLEET

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Dec66; TG 79.5 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; FMFPac, Report of Amphibious Operations Conference held at direction of CinCPacFlt, 26Feb-1Mar66, n.d., hereafter FMFPac, Amphib Conference Rept; CinCPacFlt, Report of the CinCPacFlt-ComUSMACV Amphibious Conference Report, 25-28 May66, dtd 29Jun66 (OAB, NHD), hereafter CinCPacFlt-ComUSMACV Amphibious Conference Rept; HQMC Msg File; MACV Historical Records 69A702; LtCol Ralph F. Moody and Benis M. Frank, "SLF Operations in Vietnam," MS, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC; Chaisson Intvw, 1972.

#### The SLF, Double Eagle, and Doctrinal Debates

1. CTF 79.5 AAR Operation Double Eagle I and II, dtd 17Mar66, Tab F, TG 79.5 ComdC, Jan-May66.
2. Ibid.
3. Chaisson Intvw, 1972, pp. 380-81.
4. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIIMAF, dtd 18Feb66, (HQMC Msg File).
5. Ibid.
6. Chaisson Intvw, 1972, p. 379.

#### The Okinawa Conference

7. FMFPac, Amphib Conference Rept, p. 1-6.
8. Ibid., pp. 2-1—2-2.
9. Ibid., p. 2-5.
10. Ibid., pp. 2-1—2-10.
11. Ibid., pp. 1-9—1-10.

#### Changes in Command and Composition

12. CGIIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 4Mar66; CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIIMAF, dtd 6Mar66; AdminOFMFPac to CGFMFPac, dtd 14Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).

#### Further Operations and Changes in Command and Units

13. ComUSMACV msg to ComSeventhFlt, dtd 22Mar66, File No. VA (1) (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
14. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 26Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).
15. For a detailed description of Operation Jackstay, see LtCdr Robert E. Mumford, Jr., "Jackstay: New Dimensions in Amphibious Warfare," *Naval Review, 1968* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 68-87.

### The May Conference

16. CinCPacFlt-ComUSMACV Amphibious Conference Rept and MACV Comd Hist, 1966, pp. 416-18.

17. CinCPacFlt-ComUSMACV Amphibious Conference, pp. I-1 and I-3.

### The SLF to the End of the Year

18. Chaisson Intvw, 1972, p. 391.

## CHAPTER 20

### OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist 1966 and MACV Strength Reports, 1966.

#### Staff and Security in Saigon

Additional material from this section is derived from HQMC, Status of Forces, 1966; LtGen William K. Jones intvw by OralHistU, HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 23Apr73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Jones Intvw.

1. Jones Intvw.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

#### Marine Advisors to the VNMC

Additional material for this section is derived from MACV, NAG, Joint Tables of Distribution, 1966 (OAB, NHD); Senior Marine Advisor (SMA), NAG, Monthly Historical Summaries, 1966; SMA, NAG, AARs, 1966; SMA, NAG, Ltr to CMC, dtd 13Jul66, Subj: Organization, Employment, and Support of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, (MacNeil Report), hereafter MacNeil Report.

4. Marine Advisory Unit, Naval Advisory Group, MACV, Force Structure Plan for Vietnamese Marine Corps, dtd 4Jun66, encl 1, MacNeil Report.

5. SMA, NAG, Monthly Historical Summary for Dec 1966, dtd 1Jan67.

6. LtCol McClendon G. Morris, Comments on draft MS, dtd 13Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

#### Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison

Additional material for this section is derived from 1st ANGLICO ComdCs, 1966.

## CHAPTER 21

### AT THE END OF THE YEAR

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; MACV Historical Records, 69A702; III MAF ComdCs, Oct66-Feb67; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct66-Jan67; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1967; *Pentagon Papers*.

#### Plans for Reinforcing the Marines in I Corps

1. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 116.
2. Quoted in HQMC, General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, pp. F-6—F-7.
3. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 190.
4. See ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 12Jul66; ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 13Jul66; MACVJO3, Memo for the Record, dtd 13Jul66, Subj: Conference-Situation in I CTZ; CGIForceV msg to CG1stBde, 101st Abn Div, dtd 16Jul66. All four documents are in Box 5, File No. VA(1) Marine (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
5. See MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 367, and planning directives attached to 3d MarDiv and 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Sep-Oct66 for further discussion of these plans.
6. Minutes of the Mission Council Meeting of 25Jul66, dtd 26Jul66, Box 5, Mission Council Action Memo Folder (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
7. Quoted in "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec. IV-C-6, v. I, p. 64.
8. Ibid.
9. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 85.
10. HqUSMACV Planning Directive 6-66, Operation Short Stop, dtd 18Aug66, Box 5, File No. VA (1) Guidance from MACV (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
11. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 85.
12. Ibid.
13. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 10Sep66, Box 5, File No. VA (1) Marine (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
14. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 30Oct66, Box 5, File No. VA (1) Marine (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

#### Planning the Barrier

Additional material for this section are III MAF OPlan 121-66, Practice Nine, dtd 26Dec66, hereafter III MAF OPlan 121-66; Chaisson Intvw, Nov 66; Chaisson Intvw, 1972; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967," *Naval Review*, 1969 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1969), pp. 112-141, hereafter Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations, 1967."

15. See "Air War in the North, 1965-1968," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 6, sec. IV-C-7, v. I, pp. 156-59; "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec. IV-C-6, v. I, p. 65; Office of Air Force History, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File).

16. Quoted in "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec. IV-C-6, v. I, p. 66.

17. ComUSMACV msg to DCPG Washington, dtd 25Sep66, Box 8, Barrier/Starbird Folder (MACV Historical Records 69A702).

18. The account in the previous three paragraphs is largely based on working papers attached to CG3dMarDiv ltr to CGIIIMAF, n.d., Subj: ComUSMACV Concept of Defensive Operations in

the Vicinity of the DMZ, encl 2, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct66.

19. Ibid.

20. Quoted in "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec. IV-C-6, v. 1, p. 83.

21. MACV Working Paper, dtd 18Oct66, Subj: Barrier Study Conference, attached to encl 2, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct66.

22. Ibid.

23. Chaisson Intvw, 1972.

24. CG3dMarDiv ltr to CGIIIIMAF, n.d., op. cit.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. LtGen Lewis W. Walt, CGIIIIMAF ltr to LtGen H.W. Buse, Jr., Acting Chief of Staff, HQMC, dtd 29Dec66, covering ltr to III MAF OPlan 121-66, hereafter Walt ltr, 29Dec66.

28. See Briefing Paper, Practice Nine Requirement Plan of

26Nov66, encl 7, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67.

29. See Briefing Paper, Practice Nine Requirement Plan of 26Jan67, encl 6, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67; LtCol Lane Rogers and Major Gary L. Telfer, draft MS, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967," Ch 9; and Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations; Vietnam, 1966-1967," pp. 133-34.

30. Chaisson Intvw, Nov66.

31. Walt ltr, 29Dec66.

32. 3dMarDiv Practice Nine Briefing for UnderSecNav Baldwin, dtd 12Jan67, encl 3, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67.

#### Conclusion

33. See Walt ltr, 29Dec66.

# Appendix A

## Marine Command and Staff List January-December 1966

### MARINE COMMAND AND STAFF LIST, 1 January - 31 December 1966\*

*\*Unless otherwise indicated, dates refer to the period a unit was in South Vietnam. With the exception of 3d Marine Division (Fwd) and Task Force X-Ray and Force Logistic Command, Marine organizations of battalion/squadron-size and above are listed below (For a complete listing of location and strength of Marine units in the Western Pacific, see Appendix G.).*

#### III MAF Headquarters 1Jan-31Dec66

CG MajGen Lewis W. Walt	1Jan-9Feb66
MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon (Acting)	10Feb-8Mar66
LtGen Lewis W. Walt	9Mar-31Dec66
DepCG MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon	1Jan-28Mar66
(Additional Duty)	
MajGen Lewis J. Fields	29Mar-30Sep66
(Additional Duty)	
MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.	1Oct-31Dec66
(Additional Duty)	
C/S Col George C. Axtell, Jr.	1Jan-14Mar66
BGen Jonas M. Platt	15Mar-5Dec66
BGen Hugh M. Elwood	6Dec-31Dec66
G-1 Col Don W. Galbreath	1Jan-7Jun66
Col John L. Mahon	8Jun-31Dec66
G-2 Col Leo J. Dulacki	1-24Jan66
LtCol Joseph T. Odenthal	25-31Jan66
Col John E. Gorman	1Feb-3May66
Col Thell H. Fisher	4May-31Jul66
Col Carl A. Sachs	1Aug-6Sep66
Col Roy H. Thompson	7Sep-31Dec66
G-3 Col Edwin H. Simmons	1Jan-12Feb66
Col John R. Chaisson	13Feb-8Nov66
Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr.	9Nov-31Dec66
G-4 Col Harold A. Hayes, Jr.	1Jan-19Feb66
Col Steve J. Cibik	20Feb-20May66
Col Joseph F. Quilty, Jr.	21May-31Dec66
G-5 Maj Charles J. Keever	1Jan-31Jan66
Col Eric S. Holmgren	1Feb-31Dec66

### 1st Marine Division\*

*\*The 1st Marine Division was placed under the operational control of III MAF on 29Mar66. Individual units were in Vietnam at that time and many arrived later. The listing below reflects administrative rather than operational organization.*

#### 1st Marine Division Headquarters 29Mar-31Dec66

CGMajGen Lewis J. Fields	29Mar-30Sep66
MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.	1Oct-31Dec66
ADC BGen William A. Stiles	29Mar-31Dec66
C/S Col Gordon H. West	29Mar-9Sep66
Col Sidney J. Altman	10Sep-31Dec66
G-1 Col William F. Fry	29Mar-4Aug66
Col Charles C. Crossfield II	5Aug-31Dec66
G-2 Col John J. O'Donnell	29Mar-31Dec66
G-3 Col Louis H. Wilson, Jr.	29Mar-26Jun66
Col Herman Poggemeyer, Jr.	27Jun-31Dec66
G-4 Col William R. Bennett	1Jan-31Aug66
LtCol William E. Bonds	1Sep-1Oct66
Col Edward L. Bale, Jr.	2Oct-31Dec66
G-5 Maj James S. Ready	29Mar-5Apr66
Col Louie N. Casey	6Apr-30Sep66
Col Walter Moore	1Oct-31Dec66

#### Headquarters Battalion

CO Col James P. Treadwell	29Mar-31Mar66
LtCol Neil Dimond	1Apr-25Jul66
Col Warren A. Leitner	26Jul-31Dec66

#### Task Force X-Ray 10Oct-31Dec66\*

*\*TF X-Ray was established at Chu Lai on 10Oct66 when the 1st Marine Division Headquarters moved to Da Nang.*

CG BGen William A. Stiles	10Oct-31Dec66
C/S Col Charles F. Widdecke	10Oct-25Dec66
Col Fred E. Haynes, Jr.	26Dec-31Dec66
G-1 LtCol Paul A. Lorentzen	10Oct-6Dec66
LtCol Roland L. McDaniel	7Dec-31Dec66
G-2 Maj Glenn K. Maxwell	10Oct-31Dec66
G-3 LtCol Robert E. Hunter, Jr.	10Oct-15Nov66
LtCol Edward J. Bronars	16Nov-31Dec66
G-4 LtCol William E. Bonds	10Oct-10Dec66
LtCol Louis A. Bonin	11Dec-31Dec66

G-5 Maj James S. Ready	10Oct-8Dec66	Maj Littleton W. T. Waller, II	4Sep-21Oct66
Maj Joseph T. Smith	9Dec-31Dec66	LtCol Basile Lubka	22Oct-31Dec66
<b>1st Marines*</b>			
<i>*The headquarters arrived in RVN on 16Jan66.</i>			
CO Col Bryan B. Mitchell	16Jan-18Aug66	CO LtCol Leon N. Utter	1Jan-4Jun66
Col Donald L. Mallory	19Aug-31Dec66	LtCol John J. Roothoff	5Jun-9Oct66
<b>1st Battalion, 1st Marines</b>			
CO LtCol Harold A. Hatch	1Jan-31Mar66	Maj Warren P. Kitterman	10Oct-31Dec66
LtCol Van D. Bell, Jr.	1Apr-31Dec66	<b>3d Battalion, 7th Marines</b>	
<b>2d Battalion, 1st Marines</b>			
CO LtCol Robert T. Hanifin, Jr.	1Jan-1Jul66	CO LtCol Charles H. Bodley	1Jan-28May66
LtCol Jack D. Spaulding	2Jul-9Oct66	LtCol Birchard B. Dewitt	29May-31Aug66
Maj William F. Hohmann	10Oct-16Oct66	LtCol Raymond J. O'Leary	1Sep-31Dec66
LtCol Haig Donabedian	17Oct-31Dec66	<b>11th Marines*</b>	
<i>*The regimental headquarters arrived in RVN on 16Feb66.</i>			
<b>3d Battalion, 1st Marines*</b>			
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 16Jan66.</i>			
CO LtCol James R. Young	16Jan-10Jun66	CO Col Peter H. Hahn	16Feb-16Jun66
LtCol Emerson A. Walker	11Jun-25Oct66	LtCol John B. Sullivan	17Jun-12Sep66
LtCol Hillmer F. Deatley	26Oct-31Dec66	Col Glenn E. Norris	13Sep-31Dec66
<b>1st Field Artillery Group*</b>			
<i>*The headquarters arrived in RVN on 30Nov66.</i>			
CO LtCol Joe B. Stribling	30Nov-31Dec66	<b>1st Battalion, 11th Marines*</b>	
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 16Jan66.</i>			
<b>5th Marines*</b>			
<i>*The regimental headquarters arrived in RVN on 22May66.</i>			
<i>With the establishment of TF X-Ray on 10Oct66, the 5th Marines became largely an administrative headquarters.</i>			
CO Col Charles F. Widdecke	22May-25Dec66	CO LtCol Willard C. Olsen	16Jan-29Mar66
Col Fred E. Haynes, Jr.	26Dec-31Dec66	LtCol James C. Gasser	30Mar-23Jun66
<b>1st Battalion, 5th Marines*</b>			
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 8May66.</i>			
CO LtCol Harold L. Coffman	8May-18Sep66	Maj Lee C. Reece	24Jun-28Dec66
LtCol Edward R. Watson	19Sep-3Nov66	LtCol Mark P. Fennessy	29Dec-31Dec66
Maj Peter L. Hilgartner	4Nov-31Dec66	<b>2d Battalion, 11th Marines*</b>	
<i>*The headquarters arrived in RVN on 27May66.</i>			
<b>2d Battalion, 5th Marines*</b>			
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 5Apr66.</i>			
CO LtCol Robert H. Uskurait	5Apr-23May66	CO LtCol Joe B. Stribling	27May-20Aug66
LtCol Walter Moore	24May-30Sep66	Maj Ivil L. Carver	21Aug-31Dec66
Maj Leonard E. Wood	1Oct-2Oct66	<b>3d Battalion, 11th Marines</b>	
LtCol William C. Airheart	3Oct-31Dec66	CO LtCol Paul B. Watson, Jr.	1Jan-29Mar66
<b>3d Battalion, 5th Marines*</b>			
<i>*The battalion was assigned to III MAF on 2Aug66.</i>			
CO LtCol Edward J. Bronars	2Aug-14Nov66	LtCol John P. O'Connell	30Mar-13Aug66
Maj Jim T. Elkins	15Nov-22Dec66	LtCol Robert E. Young	14Aug-21Dec66
LtCol Dean E. Esslinger	23Dec-31Dec66	LtCol Alexander S. Ruggiero	22Dec-31Dec66
<b>7th Marines</b>			
CO Col Oscar F. Peatross	1Jan-3Apr66	<b>4th Battalion, 11th Marines*</b>	
Col Eugene H. Haffey	4Apr-31Jul66	<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 23Feb66.</i>	
Col Lawrence F. Snoddy, Jr.	1Aug-31Dec66	CO LtCol John F. Crowley	23Feb-30Jun66
<b>1st Battalion, 7th Marines</b>			
CO LtCol James P. Kelly	1Jan-25Apr66	LtCol George R. Lamb	1Jul-31Dec66
LtCol Frederick S. Wood	26Apr-3Sep66	<b>1st Reconnaissance Battalion*</b>	
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 22Mar66.</i>			
<b>1st Anti-Tank Battalion*</b>			
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 27Mar66.</i>			
CO LtCol Walter Moore	27Mar-22May66	CO LtCol Arthur J. Sullivan	22Mar-7Aug66
Maj Robert E. Harris	23May-9Nov66	LtCol Donald N. McKeon	8Aug-31Dec66
Maj Martin F. Manning, Jr.	10Nov66	<b>1st Anti-Tank Battalion*</b>	
Maj John J. Keefe	11Nov-31Dec66	<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 27Mar66.</i>	

<b>1st Tank Battalion*</b>			
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 28Mar66.</i>			
CO LtCol Albert W. Snell	28Mar-10Jun66	C/S Col Donald W. Sherman	1Jan-23Jan66
Maj Lowell R. Burnette, Jr.	11Jun-11Jul66	Col Leo J. Dulacki	24Jan-1May66
Maj Robert E. B. Palmer	12Jul-1Sep66	Col John B. Sweeney	2May-31Dec66
Maj John W. Clayborne	2Sep-31Dec66	G-1 Col Robert M. Port	1Jan-18May66
<b>1st Motor Transport Battalion*</b>		LtCol Karl T. Keller	19May-28May66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 1Apr66.</i>		Col Glen E. Martin	29May-7Jul66
CO LtCol John J. Roothoff	1Apr-3Jun66	Col John P. Lanigan	8Jul-30Nov66
Maj John H. Doering, Jr.	4Jun-7Sep66	Col Robert M. Jenkins	1Dec-31Dec66
Maj Russell E. Johnson	8Sep-22Dec66	G-2 LtCol Richard J. Schriver	1Jan-3Jan66
Maj Jim T. Elkins	23Dec-31Dec66	Col George W. Carrington, Jr.	4Jan-30Jun66
<b>1st Engineer Battalion*</b>		Col Thomas M. Horne	1Jul-7Nov66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 17Jan66.</i>		LtCol Jack L. Miles	8Nov-31Dec66
CO LtCol James R. Aichele	17Jan-19Aug66	G-3 Col Don P. Wyckoff	1Jan-20Feb66
LtCol Charles O. Newton	20Aug-31Dec66	Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr.	21Feb-19May66
<b>1st Medical Battalion*</b>		Col Noble L. Beck	20May-30Jul66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 20Mar66.</i>		Col William F. Doehler	31Jul-12Dec66
CO Cdr Robert H. Mitchell (MC)USN	20Mar-31Dec66	Col Edward E. Hammerbeck	13Dec-31Dec66
<b>1st Shore Party Battalion*</b>		G-4 Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr.	1Jan-6Feb66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 20Mar66.</i>		Col James F. McClanahan	7Feb-11Jun66
CO LTCol Roma T. Taylor, Jr.	20Mar-4Aug66	LtCol Charles S. Wilder	12Jun-9Jul66
Maj Stanley G. Roberts, Jr.	5Aug-9Sep66	Col Robert M. Richards	10Jul-7Oct66
LtCol Edward H. Jones	10Sep-31Dec66	Col John F. Mentzer	8Oct-31Dec66
<b>1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion</b>		G-5 Maj John Colia	1Jan-28Feb66
CO LtCol William D. Pomeroy	1Jan-5Aug66	LtCol Edward H. Mackel	1Mar-3Aug66
Maj Walter W. Damewood, Jr.	6Aug-31Oct66	Col Edward R. McCarthy	4Aug-31Dec66
Maj Albert R. Bowman, II	1Nov-31Dec66	<b>Headquarters Battalion</b>	
<b>7th Motor Transport Battalion*</b>		CO Maj John E. Watson, Jr.	1Jan-2Jan66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 6Mar66.</i>		LtCol Robert J. Perrich	3Jan-4May66
CO LtCol Louis A. Bonin	6Mar-27Jun66	Col Edwin G. Winstead	5May-24Jun66
Maj Arthur C. Stephens, Jr.	28Jun-8Sep66	Maj Herbert L. Fogarty	25Jun-9Jul66
Maj Sydney H. Batchelder, Jr.	9Sep-31Dec66	Col Robert M. Jenkins	10Jul-30Nov66
<b>7th Communications Battalion*</b>		LtCol Thomas J. Johnston, Jr.	1Dec-31Dec66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 1Jul66.</i>		<b>3d Marine Division (Fwd)*</b>	
CO Maj James H. Bird, Jr.	1Jul-24Nov66	<i>*Established at Dong Ha on 10Oct66.</i>	
LtCol William M. Clelland	25Nov-31Dec66	CG BGen Lowell E. English	10Oct-31Dec66
<b>11th Motor Transport Battalion*</b>		C/S Col Alexander D. Cereghino	10Oct-24Oct66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 29Dec66.</i>		<b>3d Marines</b>	
CO Maj Lee V. Barkley	29Dec-31Dec66	CO Col Thell H. Fisher	1Jan-15Apr66
<b>3d Marine Division</b>		Col Harold A. Hayes, Jr.	16Apr-18Aug66
<b>3d Marine Division Headquarters 1Jan-31Dec66</b>		Col Edward E. Hammerbeck	19Aug-12Dec66
CG MajGen Lewis W. Walt	1Jan-9Feb66	Col John P. Lanigan	13Dec-31Dec66
BGen Lowell E. English (Acting)	10Feb-9Mar66	<b>1st Battalion, 3d Marines</b>	
LtGen Lewis W. Walt	10Mar-18Mar66	CO LtCol Robert R. Dickey III	1Jan-22Sep66
MajGen Wood B. Kyle	19Mar-31Dec66	LtCol Peter A. Wickwire	23Sep-31Dec66
ADC BGen Lowell E. English	1Jan-31Dec66	<b>2d Battalion, 3d Marines*</b>	
BGen Jonas M. Platt	1Jan-14Mar66	<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN from duty as SLF Battalion on 28Feb66.</i>	
		CO LtCol William K. Horn	28Feb-30Jun66
		LtCol Fredric A. Green	1Jul-31Jul66
		LtCol Victor Ohanesian	1Aug-31Dec66

**3d Battalion, 3d Marines\***

*\*The battalion departed RVN for Okinawa on 30Aug66 and returned to RVN on 29Oct66.*

CO LtCol Joshua W. Dorsey III 1Jan-29Jun66  
LtCol Earl R. DeLong 30Jun-31Dec66

**4th Marines**

CO Col James F. McClanahan 1Jan-23Jan66  
Col Donald W. Sherman 24Jan-29Jul66  
Col Alexander D. Cereghino 30Jul-31Dec66

**1st Battalion, 4th Marines\***

*\*The battalion departed RVN for Okinawa on 16Dec66.*

CO LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan 1Jan-26Jun66  
LtCol Jack Westerman 27Jun-16Dec66

**2d Battalion, 4th Marines\***

*\*The battalion departed RVN for Okinawa on 5Nov66.*

CO LtCol Rodolfo L. Trevino 1Jan-21Feb66  
LtCol Paul X. Kelley 22Feb-6Jul66  
LtCol Arnold E. Bench 7Jul-5Nov66

**3d Battalion, 4th Marines\***

*\*The battalion arrived in RVN from Okinawa on 18Mar66.*

CO LtCol Sumner A. Vale 18Mar-27Jul66  
LtCol William J. Masterpool 28Jul-31Dec66

**9th Marines**

CO Col John E. Gorman 1Jan-15Feb66  
Col Edwin H. Simmons 16Feb-4Jul66  
Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr. 5Jul-7Oct66  
Col Robert M. Richards 8Oct-31Dec66

**1st Battalion, 9th Marines\***

*\*The battalion departed RVN for Okinawa on 29Sep66.*

CO LtCol Verle E. Ludwig 1Jan-5Jan66  
LtCol William F. Doehler 6Jan-31May66  
LtCol Richard E. Jones 1Jun-25Sep66  
Maj James L. Day 26Sep-29Sep66

**2d Battalion, 9th Marines**

CO LtCol William F. Donahue, Jr. 1Jan-23Jun66  
LtCol John J. Hess 24Jun-9Nov66  
Maj John J. Peeler 10Nov-31Dec66

**3d Battalion, 9th Marines**

CO LtCol William W. Taylor 1Jan-7May66  
LtCol Paul C. Trammell 8May-22Jun66  
Maj George H. Grimes 23Jun-31Jul66  
Maj Fred D. MacLean, Jr. 1Aug-4Dec66  
LtCol Sherwood A. Brunnenmeyer 5Dec-31Dec66

**12th Marines**

CO Col James M. Callender 1Jan-30Jun66  
Col Benjamin S. Read 1Jul-31Dec66

**1st Battalion, 12th Marines**

CO LtCol Warren E. McCain 1Jan-28Feb66  
LtCol Adolph J. Honeycutt 1Mar-18Apr66

LtCol Thomas J. Johnston, Jr. 19Apr-4Nov66  
LtCol Marshall S. Campbell 5Nov-30Dec66  
LtCol Lavern W. Larson 31Dec66

**2d Battalion, 12th Marines**

CO LtCol Eugene O. Speckart 1Jan-28Feb66  
LtCol Joris J. Snyder 1Mar-30Jun66  
LtCol James R. Gallman, Jr. 1Jul-8Dec66  
LtCol Willis L. Gore 9Dec-31Dec66

**3d Battalion, 12th Marines**

CO LtCol Leslie L. Page 1Jan-31May66  
Maj Samuel M. Morrow 1Jun-30Aug66  
LtCol Charles S. Kirchmann 31Aug-31Dec66

**4th Battalion, 12th Marines**

CO LtCol Edwin M. Rudzis 1Jan-30Apr66  
Maj Paul E. Wilson 1May-31Jul66  
LtCol David G. Jones 1Aug-31Dec66

**3d Reconnaissance Battalion**

CO LtCol Roy R. Van Cleve 1Jan-5May66  
Maj Thomas R. Stuart 6May-4Jul66  
LtCol Gary Wilder 5Jul-31Dec66

**3d Anti-Tank Battalion**

CO LtCol Bruce A. Heflin 1Jan-12Jul66  
Maj Eddis R. Larson 13Jul-16Aug66  
Maj Karl E. Sharff 17Aug66  
Maj Donald E. Newton 18Aug-22Oct66  
Maj Charles R. Stiffler 23Oct-31Dec66

**3d Tank Battalion**

CO LtCol Milton L. Raphael 1Jan-2Aug66  
Maj James G. Doss, Jr. 3Aug-5Sep66  
LtCol William R. Corson 6Sep-31Dec66

**3d Motor Transport Battalion**

CO Maj Freddie J. Baker 1Jan-5Aug66  
LtCol Edwin W. Killian 6Aug-23Aug66  
Maj Richard F. Armstrong 24Aug-31Dec66

**3d Engineer Battalion**

CO LtCol Nicholas J. Dennis 1Jan-31May66  
Maj Conway J. Smith 1Jun-1Jul66  
Maj Charles D. Wood 2Jul-30Sep66  
LtCol Garry M. Pearce, Jr. 1Oct-31Dec66

**3d Medical Battalion**

CO Cdr Almon C. Wilson, MC, USN 1Jan-31May66  
Cdr John T. Vincent, MC, USN 1Jun-31Dec66

**3d Shore Party Battalion**

CO Maj John M. Dean 1Jan-30Apr66  
Maj Thomas W. Jones 1May-30Sep66  
LtCol Donald E. Marchette 1Oct-31Dec66

**3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion\***

*\*The battalion arrived in RVN on 3Mar66.*

CO LtCol Leroy C. Harris, Jr. 3Mar-28Mar66  
LtCol Richard E. Campbell 29Mar-5Jun66

Maj William J. Dinse	6Jun-30Sep66	MWHG-1	
Maj Jack D. Rowley	1Oct-31Dec66	CO Col Edward I. Lupton	1Jan-31May66
<b>9th Motor Transport Battalion</b>		Col William L. Atwater, Jr.	1Jun-31Dec66
CO Maj Joseph F. Jones	1Jan-30Jun66	MAG-11	
Maj Emmett R. Haley	1Jul-25Aug66	CO Col Emmett O. Anglin, Jr.	1Jan-6Jul66
Maj Donald R. Tyler	26Aug-31Dec66	Col Franklin C. Thomas, Jr.	7Jul-31Dec66
<b>11th Engineer Battalion*</b>		MAG-12	
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 30Nov66.</i>		CO Col Leslie E. Brown	1Jan-7Jul66
CO LtCol Ross L. Mulford	30Nov-31Dec66	Col Jay W. Hubbard	8Jul-31Dec66
<b>5th Marine Division Units in RVN</b>		MAG-13*	
<b>1st Battalion, 26th Marines*</b>		<i>*The group arrived in RVN on 25Sep66.</i>	
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN from duty with the SLF on 27Sep66.</i>		CO Col Douglas D. Petty, Jr.	25Sep-31Dec66
CO LtCol Anthony A. Monti	27Sep-23Oct66	MAG-16	
LtCol Donald E. Newton	24Oct-31Dec66	CO Col Thomas J. O'Connor	1Jan-26Mar66
<b>2d Battalion, 26th Marines*</b>		Col Richard M. Hunt	27Mar-15Oct66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 27Aug66.</i>		Col Kenneth L. Reusser	16Oct-21Nov66
CO LtCol James J. Wilson	27Aug-14Sep66	Col Frank M. Hepler	22Nov-31Dec66
Maj Walter S. Pullar, Jr.	15Sep-26Sep66	MAG-36	
LtCol James M. Cummings	27Sep-31Dec66	CO Col William G. Johnson	1Jan-23Aug66
<b>3d Battalion, 26th Marines*</b>		Col Victor A. Armstrong	24Aug-31Dec66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN from duty with the SLF on 11Dec66.</i>		MWSG-17*	
CO LtCol Garland T. Beyerle	11Dec-31Dec66	<i>*The group arrived in RVN on 12Sep66.</i>	
<b>1st Marine Aircraft Wing</b>		CO Col Orlando S. Tosdal	12Sep-31Dec66
CG MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon	1Jan-15May66	H&HS-1	
MajGen Louis B. Robertshaw	16May-31Dec66	CO Maj Chester A. Liddle, Jr.	1Jan-31Jan66
AWC BGen Marion E. Carl	1Jan-11Apr66	Maj Carl C. Foster	1Feb-31Dec66
BGen Hugh M. Elwood	12Apr-30Nov66	H&MS-11	
BGen Robert G. Owens, Jr.	1Dec-31Dec66	CO LtCol William H. Bortz, Jr.	1Jan-8Apr66
C/S Col Thomas G. Bronleewe, Jr.	1Jan-18Apr66	Maj Don A. Mickle	9Apr-9Jun66
Col Harry W. Taylor	19Apr-31Aug66	LtCol Francis C. Opeka	10Jun-30Nov66
Col Edward J. Doyle	15Sep-31Dec66	LtCol Raymond A. Cameron	1Dec-31Dec66
G-1 Col Wilbur D. Wilcox	1Jan-15Jun66	H&MS-12	
LtCol Robert O. Carlock	16Jun-11Aug66	CO Maj William E. Garman	1Jan-31Mar66
Col Dan H. Johnson	12Aug-31Dec66	Maj Richard E. Hawes, Jr.	1Apr-20Aug66
G-2 LtCol Billy H. Barber	1Jan-1Aug66	LtCol Roger A. Morris	21Aug-5Dec66
Col George H. Dodenhoff	2Aug-31Dec66	LtCol Paul G. McMahon	6Dec-31Dec66
G-3 Col Roy C. Gray, Jr.	1Jan-30Apr66	H&MS-13*	
Col Edward J. Doyle	1May-31Aug66	<i>*The squadron arrived in RVN on 26Sep66.</i>	
Col Arnold A. Lund	1Sep-11Nov66	CO LtCol Walter E. Domina	24Sep-31Dec66
Col Guy M. Cloud	12Nov-31Dec66	H&MS-16	
G-4 Col Robert J. Lynch, Jr.	1Jan-6Jun66	CO LtCol Jerome L. Goebel	1Jan-19Mar66
Col Fred J. Frazer	7Jun-21Aug66	LtCol Leslie L. Darbyshire	20May-14Oct66
Col Herbert H. Long	22Aug-31Dec66	LtCol Manning T. Jannell	15Oct-28Oct66
G-5 LtCol George W. King	1Jan-31Jan66	LtCol Lucius O. Davis	29Oct-31Dec66
Col Fred J. Frazer	1Feb-6Jun66	H&MS-36	
LtCol Ernest J. Berger	7Jun-31Dec66	CO LtCol Thomas G. Mooney	1Jan-5Sep66
		LtCol William C. Carlson	6Sep-31Dec66

**HMM-161\***

*\*The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Apr66 and departed 31Oct66.*

CO LtCol William R. Quinn	1Apr-9Aug66
LtCol Samuel F. Martin	10Aug-4Oct66
LtCol Charles E. Wydner, Jr.	5Oct-31Oct66

**HMM-163\***

*\*The squadron departed RVN on 1Aug66 and returned to RVN on 1Nov66.*

CO LtCol Charles A. House	1Jan-11Aug66
LtCol Rocco D. Bianchi	12Aug-31Dec66

**HMM-164\***

*\*The squadron arrived in RVN on 7Mar66.*

CO LtCol Warren C. Watson	7Mar-31Dec66
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**HMM-165\***

*\*The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Oct66.*

CO LtCol William W. Eldridge, Jr.	1Oct-31Dec66
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**HMM-261\***

*\*The squadron arrived in RVN on 6Jan66 and departed RVN on 26May66.*

CO LtCol Mervin B. Porter	6Jan-26May66
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**HMM-262\***

*\*The squadron arrived in RVN on 4Dec66.*

CO LtCol Ural W. Shadrick	4Dec-31Dec66
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**HMM-263\***

*\*The squadron departed RVN on 23May66 and returned to RVN on 1Aug66.*

CO LtCol Truman Clark	1Jan-19Mar66
LtCol Jerome L. Goebel	20Mar-30Sep66
LtCol Manning T. Jannell	1Oct-14Oct66
LtCol Leslie L. Darbyshire	15Oct-31Dec66

**HMM-265\***

*\*The squadron arrived in RVN on 22May66.*

CO LtCol Herbert E. Mendenhall	22May-27Sep66
Maj Frank B. Ellis	28Sep-31Dec66

**HMM-361\***

*\*The squadron departed RVN on 1Apr66 and returned to RVN on 26May66. It departed RVN again on 16Dec66.*

CO LtCol Lloyd F. Childers	1Jan-9May66
LtCol McDonald D. Tweed	10May-15Dec66

**HMM-362\***

*\*The squadron departed RVN on 8Jan66 and returned to RVN on 9Apr66. It departed RVN again on 28Sep66.*

CO LtCol James Aldworth	1Jan-22Apr66
LtCol Alfred F. Garrotto	23Apr-31Aug66
LtCol Marshall B. Armstrong	1Sep-27Sep66

**HMM-363\***

*\*The squadron departed RVN on 4Jul66 and returned to RVN on 28Sep66.*

CO LtCol George D. Kew	1Jan-16Mar66
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LtCol James D. McGough	17Mar-5Oct66
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LtCol Kenneth E. Huntington	6Oct-31Dec66
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**HMM-364\***

*\*The squadron departed RVN on 9Apr66 and returned on 3Jul66. It departed RVN again on 1Nov66.*

CO LtCol William R. Lucas	1Jan-22Mar66
LtCol Daniel A. Somerville	23Mar-31Oct66

**MACS-7**

CO LtCol Richard R. Miller	1Jan-18Jun66
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LtCol Charles E. Showalter	19Jun-22Nov66
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Maj Thomas K. Burk, Jr.	23Nov-31Dec66
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**MASS-2**

CO LtCol Ralph L. Cunningham, Jr.	1Jan-10Jan66
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LtCol Richard W. Sheppe	11Jan-20May66
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LtCol Elwin M. Jones	21May-12Sep66
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LtCol Harry Hunter, Jr.	13Sep-31Dec66
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**MASS-3\***

*\*The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Nov66.*

CO Maj John C. Dixon	1Nov-14Nov66
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LtCol Donald L. Fenton	15Nov-31Dec66
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**MABS-11**

CO Maj Douglas A. McCaughey, Jr.	1Jan-30Jun66
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Maj Clifton B. Andrews	1Jul-25Jul66
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Maj Guy R. Campo	26Jul-31Dec66
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**MABS-12**

CO Maj John W. Parchen	1Jan-28Feb66
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LtCol Paul G. McMahon	1Mar-21May66
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Maj George M. Lawrence, Jr.	22May-31Aug66
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LtCol William G. McCool	1Sep-16Oct66
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Maj William W. Campbell	17Oct-1Dec66
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LtCol Ralph D. Wallace	2Dec-31Dec66
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**MABS-13\***

*\*The squadron arrived in RVN on 9Sep66.*

CO LtCol Owen L. Owens	9Sep-31Dec66
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**MABS-16**

CO Maj Lewis I. Zeigler	1Jan-20Apr66
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LtCol William J. Webster	21Apr-18Jun66
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Maj Lewis I. Zeigler	19Jun-25Jun66
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LtCol Rodney D. McKittrick	26Jun-31Dec66
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**MABS-36**

CO Maj Jack A. Kennedy	1Jan-30Mar66
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LtCol McDonald D. Tweed	31Mar-9May66
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Maj Gordon H. Buckner II	10May-5Jul66
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LtCol Edward K. Kirby	6Jul-1Aug66
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LtCol William C. Carlson	2Aug-5Sep66
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LtCol Joseph A. Nelson	6Sep-31Dec66
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**VMFA-115\***

*\*The squadron departed RVN on 13Jan66 and returned to RVN on 11Apr66.*

CO LtCol Clyde R. Jarrett	1Jan-23Feb66
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LtCol Dean C. Macho	24Feb-7Aug66		<b>VMFA-314*</b>
Maj Larry R. Van Deusen	8Aug-31Dec66		<i>*The squadron arrived in RVN on 15Jan66 and departed RVN on 14Apr66. It returned to RVN on 1Aug66.</i>
		<b>VMA-121*</b>	
		<i>*The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Dec66.</i>	
CO LtCol Donald R. Stiver	1Dec-31Dec66		CO Maj Charles A. Sewell 15Jan-4May66
		<b>VMA-211*</b>	LtCol Darrel E. Bjorklund 5May-18Nov66
		<i>*The squadron departed RVN on 14Jul66 and returned to RVN 1Oct66.</i>	Maj William H. Heintz 19Nov-31Dec66
CO LtCol John W. Kirkland	1Jan-29May66		<b>VMFA-323*</b>
Maj Thomas J. Ayers	30May-16Oct66		<i>*The squadron departed RVN on 1Mar66 and returned on 5Jul66.</i>
LtCol William G. McCool	17Oct-31Dec66		CO LtCol Andrew W. O'Donnell 1Jan-20Jul66
		<b>VMA-214*</b>	LtCol Aubrey W. Talbert, Jr. 21Jul-31Dec66
		<i>*The squadron departed RVN on 16Feb66 and returned to RVN on 30Apr66.</i>	<b>VMFA-542</b>
CO LtCol Keith O'Keefe	1Jan-31Mar66		<i>*The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Mar66 and departed RVN on 1Aug66. It returned to RVN on 10Oct66.</i>
LtCol Dellwyn L. Davis	1Apr-8Jun66		CO LtCol Eddie E. Pearcy 1Mar-22May66
Maj Ralph D. Wallace	9Jun-30Nov66		Maj Paul S. Frappollo 23May-6Jul66
Maj Richard E. Hemmingway	1Dec-31Dec66		LtCol Donald L. May 7Jul-31Dec66
		<b>VMA-223*</b>	<b>VMCJ-1</b>
		<i>*The squadron departed RVN on 1Dec66.</i>	CO LtCol Francis C. Opeka 1Jan-9Jun66
CO LtCol Alexander Wilson	1Jan-1Apr66		Maj Robert W. Tucker, Jr 10Jun-28Oct66
LtCol Robert B. Sinclair	2Apr-26Nov66		LtCol William B. Fleming 29Oct-31Dec66
LtCol Leonard C. Taft	27Nov-30Nov66		<b>VMO-2</b>
		<b>VMA-224*</b>	CO LtCol George F. Bauman 1Jan-8Apr66
		<i>*The squadron departed RVN on 30Apr66 and returned to RVN on 14Jul66. It departed RVN again on 1Nov66.</i>	LtCol Arnold W. Barden 9Apr-30Sep66
CO LtCol Thomas E. Mulvihill	1Jan-31Mar66		Maj Robert A. Plamondon 1Oct-30Nov66
LtCol John Browne	1Apr-1Nov66		LtCol William F. Harrell 1Dec-31Dec66
		<b>VMF-(AW)-232*</b>	<b>VMO-3*</b>
		<i>*The squadron arrived in RVN on 15Nov66.</i>	<i>*The squadron arrived in RVN on 29Dec66.</i>
CO LtCol Nicholas M. Trapnell, Jr.	15Nov-31Dec66		CO Maj Kyle W. Townsend 29Dec-31Dec66
		<b>VMF-(AW)-235*</b>	<b>VMO-6</b>
		<i>*The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Feb66 and departed RVN on 15Nov66.</i>	CO LtCol Robert J. Zitnik 1Jan-23Mar66
CO LtCol George A. Gibson	1Feb-1Jul66		Maj Robert E. Presson 24Mar-10Jun66
Maj Don A. Mickle	2Jul-31Oct66		Maj William J. Goodsell 11Jun-16Jun66
LtCol Edward R. Rogal	1Nov-15Nov66		Maj Rawley M. Gregory 17Jun-23Jul66
		<b>VMA-(AW)-242*</b>	Maj William R. Maloney 23Jul-31Dec66
		<i>*The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Nov66.</i>	<b>1st LAAM Bn</b>
CO LtCol Howard Wolf	1Nov-31Dec66		CO LtCol Clyde L. Eyer 1Jan-1Oct66
		<b>VMA-311*</b>	Maj Thomas G. Davis 2Oct-10Dec66
		<i>*The squadron arrived in RVN on 15Feb66.</i>	LtCol Merton R. Ives 11Dec-31Dec66
CO LtCol Jack W. Harris	15Feb-20May66		<b>2d LAAM Bn</b>
LtCol Paul G. McMahon	21May-5Dec66		CO Maj Edward F. Penico 1Jan-30Jul66
LtCol Roger A. Morris	6Dec-31Dec66		LtCol Thomas I. Gunning 31Jul-31Dec66
		<b>VMF-(AW)-312*</b>	<b>Force Logistic Command*</b>
		<i>*The squadron departed RVN on 2Feb66.</i>	<i>*Activated on 15Mar66 from the Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG).</i>
CO LtCol Richard B. Newport	1Jan-1Feb66		<b>Force Logistic Command Headquarters</b>
			CO Col George C. Axtell, Jr 15Mar-20Oct66
			BGen James E. Herbold, Jr 3Oct-31Dec66

C/S\* Col William H. Cowper 30Oct-31Dec66  
*\*Billet established on 3Oct66.*

G-1 Maj Harold J. Field, Jr. 15Mar-28Sep66  
 Maj Leonard E. Fuchs 29Sep-10Oct66  
 Maj Joe B. Noble 11Oct-31Dec66

G-2\* LtCol Willard C. Olsen 1Jun-30Jun66  
 Maj Herbert C. Sanford 1Jul-21Oct66  
 LtCol Richard M. Taylor 22Oct-31Dec66  
*\*Billet established on 1Jun66.*

G-3 LtCol William L. Nelson 15Mar-31May66  
 Col William H. Cowper 1Jun-22Jul66  
 LtCol Raymond E. Roeder, Jr. 23Jul-29Oct66  
 Col Lyle S. Stephenson 30Oct-31Dec66  
 G-4 LtCol Richard M. Cook 15Mar-14Jun66  
 Maj Robert P. Chaney 15Jun-23Jun66  
 Maj Gilbert C. Hazard 24Jun-31Dec66  
 G-5\* Maj Leonard E. Fuchs 11Oct-31Dec66  
*\*Billet established on 11Oct66.*

#### Force Logistic Support Group A\*

*\*The Force Logistic Support Group was redesignated FLSG A on 15Mar66.*

CO Col Mauro J. Padalino 1Jan-31May66  
 Col Robert R. Weir 1Jun-31Dec66

#### Force Logistic Group B\*

*\*FLSG B was activated on 15Mar66 from the Logistic Support Unit at Chu Lai.*

CO Col Mitchell O. Sadler 15Mar-24Aug66  
 Col Kermit H. Shelly 25Aug-31Dec66

#### Force Logistic Support Unit-2\*

*\*FLSU-2 was designated as a major subcommand of the Force Logistic Command on 1Dec66.*

CO LtCol Rollin F. VanCantfort 1Dec-31Dec66

#### 5th Communication Bn\*

*\*The battalion was attached to the Force Logistic Command on 15Nov66 from the administrative control of III MAF.*

CO LtCol Hercules R. Kelly, Jr. 1Jan-30May66  
 LtCol Joseph Nastasi 31May-30Sep66  
 LtCol Phillip K. Leeseberg 1Oct-31Dec66

#### Separate Units under III MAF

#### 1st MP Battalion\*

*\*The battalion arrived in RVN on 17Jun66.*

LtCol Paul G. Stavridis 17Jun-31Dec66

#### 7th Engineer Bn

CO LtCol Ermine L. Meeker 1Jan-31Oct66  
 LtCol Frank W. Harris III 1Nov-31Dec66

#### 9th Engineer Bn\*

*\*The battalion arrived in RVN on 6Jun66.*

CO LtCol Richard W. Crispen 6Jun-31Dec66

#### Marine Operating Forces, Western Pacific

#### 1st MAW (Rear)/TG 79.3\* 1Jan-14Apr66

*\*1st MAW (Rear) was the controlling headquarters for most of the wing's units outside Vietnam until 14Apr66.*

CO Col Harry W. Taylor 1Jan-14Apr66

#### MAG-13 (1Jan-14Feb66)

CO Col Odia E. Howe, Jr. 1Jan-10Apr66

CO Col Edwin A. Harper 11Apr-14Apr66

#### H&MS-13 (1Jan-14Apr66)

CO LtCol Lytton F. Blass 1Jan-23Mar66

LtCol Kenneth G. Fiegenger 24Mar-14Apr66

#### MABS-13 (1Jan-14Apr66)

CO Maj William E. Caslin 1Jan-14Apr66

#### VMA-311 (1Jan-14Feb66)

CO LtCol Jack W. Harris 1Jan-14Apr66

#### VMFA-314 (1Jan-14Jan66)

CO Maj Charles A. Sewell 1Jan-14Apr66

#### VMFA-542 (1Jan-28Feb66)

CO LtCol Eddie E. Percy 1Jan-28Feb66

#### VMFA-115 (15Jan-10Apr66)

CO LtCol Clyde R. Jarrett 15Jan-22Feb66

LtCol Dean C. Macho 23Feb-10Apr66

#### VMA-214 (16Feb-14Apr66)

CO LtCol Keith O'Keefe 16Feb-31Mar66

LtCol Dellwyn L. Davis 1Apr-14Apr66

#### VMFA-323 (2Mar-14Apr66)

CO LtCol Andrew W. O'Donnell 2Mar-14Apr66

#### HMM-161 (4Jan-31Mar66)

Co LtCol Rex C. Denny, Jr. 4Jan-31Mar66

#### HMM-361 (1Apr-14Apr66)

CO LtCol Lloyd F. Childers 1Apr-14Apr66

#### VMGR-152 (1Jan-14Apr66)

CO LtCol Dan C. Holland 1Jan-14Apr66

#### 9th MAB/TF 79\*

*\*The 9th MAB was established on 1Mar66 and assumed responsibility for TF 79 from the CG 1st MarDiv on that date. On 15Apr66 the MAB assumed responsibility for most Marine air and ground units in the Western Pacific outside of Vietnam.*

<b>9th MAB Headquarters</b>		<b>RLT 26 20Aug-31Dec66</b>	
CO Col Herman Hansen, Jr	1Mar-29Mar66	CO Col John J. Padley	20Aug-31Dec66
BGen William A. Stiles	30Mar-14Apr66	<b>BLT 3/3 6Sep-29Oct66</b>	
BGen Michael P. Ryan	15Apr-31Dec66	CO LtCol Earl R. DeLong	6Sep-29Oct66
C/S Col Herman Hansen, Jr	30Mar-23Sep66	<b>BLT 1/9 5Oct-1Dec66</b>	
Col Richard R. Amerine	24Sep-31Dec66	CO Maj James L. Day	5Oct-1Dec66
G-1 LtCol James M. Cummings	1Mar-21Sep66	<b>BLT 2/4 8Nov-31Dec66</b>	
LtCol Edward V. Easter	22Sep-31Dec66	CO LtCol Arnold E. Bench	8Nov-31Dec66
G-2 Maj George J. Kleess	1Mar-14Sep66	<b>BLT 1/4 21Dec-31Dec66</b>	
Maj John H. Broujos	15Sep-4Oct66	CO LtCol Jack Westerman	21Dec-31Dec66
Maj James C. Hitz	5Oct-31Dec66	<b>1st Battalion, 13th Marines 20Aug-31Dec66</b>	
G-3 Col Arnold L. Emils	1Mar-8Dec66	CO LtCol Joseph M. Laney, Jr	20Aug-28Oct66
LtCol James G. Dionisopoulos	9Dec-31Dec66	LtCol Robert L. Christian, Jr.	29Oct-31Dec66
G-4 Col Oscar B. Johnston	1Mar-3Oct66		
Col Elton Mueller	4Oct-31Dec66		
		<b>TG 79.2 2Oct-7Nov66</b>	
<b>SLF 7th Fleet/TF 79.5</b>		CO Col John J. Padley	2Oct-7Nov66
CO Col John R. Burnett	1Jan-6Apr66	<b>BLT 3/3 2Oct-28Oct66</b>	
Col Richard A. Brenneman	7Apr-31Aug66	CO LtCol Earl R. DeLong	2Oct-28Oct66
Col Harry D. Wortman	1Sep-31Dec66	<b>HMM-163 2Oct-28Oct66</b>	
		CO LtCol Rocco D. Bianchi	2Oct-28Oct66
<b>SLF Battalion Landing Teams</b>			
<b>BLT 2/3 1Jan-27Feb66</b>		<b>MAG-13/TG 79.3* 15Apr-14Aug66</b>	
CO LtCol William K. Horn	1Jan-27Feb66	<i>*MAG-13 came under the operational control of the 9th MAB on 15Apr66.</i>	
<b>BLT 1/5 28Feb-7May66</b>		CO Edwin A. Harper	15Apr-15Aug66
CO LtCol Harold L. Coffman	28Feb-7May66	Col Douglas D. Petty, Jr.	16Aug-24Sep66
<b>BLT 3/5 14May-1Aug66</b>		<b>H&amp;MS-13 15Apr-24Sep66</b>	
CO LtCol Edward J. Bronars	14May-1Aug66	CO LtCol Kenneth G. Fiegenger	15Apr-13Sep66
<b>BLT 1/26 2Aug-26Sep66</b>		LtCol Owen L. Owens	26Aug-8Sep66
CO LtCol Anthony A. Monti	2Aug-26Sep66	<b>MABS-13 15Apr-9Sep66</b>	
<b>BLT 3/26 4Oct-10Dec66</b>		CO LtCol William E. Caslin	15Apr-14Aug66
CO LtCol Garland T. Beyerle	4Oct-10Dec66	<b>VMA-214 15Apr-29Apr66</b>	
<b>BLT 1/9 3Dec-31Dec66</b>		CO LtCol Dellwyn L. Davis	15Apr-29Apr66
CO Maj James L. Day	3Dec-31Dec66	<b>VMFA 323 15Apr-4Jul66</b>	
<b>SLF Helicopter Squadrons</b>		CO LtCol Andrew W. O'Donnell	15Apr-4Jul66
<b>HMM-261 1Jan-5Jan66</b>		<b>VMFA-314 15Apr-1Aug66</b>	
CO LtCol Mervin B. Potter	1Jan-5Jan66	CO Maj Charles A. Sewell	15Apr-4May66
<b>HMM-362 6Jan-8Apr66</b>		LtCol Darrel E. Bjorklund	5May-1Aug66
CO LtCol James Aldworth	6Jan-8Apr66	<b>VMA-224 1May-6Jul66</b>	
<b>HMM-362 28Sep-31Dec66</b>		CO LtCol John Browne	1May-6Jul66
CO LtCol Marshall B. Armstrong	28Sep-31Dec66	<b>VMA-211 4Jul-30Sep66</b>	
		CO LtCol Thomas J. Ayers	14Jul-30Sep66
<b>RLT 5/79.2 30Mar-4Apr66</b>		<b>VMFA-542 1Aug-14Aug66</b>	
CO Col Charles F. Widdecke	30Mar-26May66	CO LtCol Donald L. May	1Aug-14Aug66
<b>BLT 2/5 30Mar-4Apr66</b>		<b>HMM-361 15Apr-26May66</b>	
CO LtCol Robert H. Uskurait	30Mar-4Apr66	CO LtCol Lloyd F. Childers	15Apr-9May66
<b>BLT 3/5 7May-13May66</b>		LtCol McDonald D. Tweed	10May-26May66
CO LtCol Edward J. Bronars	7May-13May66		

<b>HMM-263 24May-31Jul66</b>		<b>VMF(AW)-232 2Sep-15Nov66</b>	
CO LtCol Jerome L. Goebel	24May-31Jul66	CO LtCol Nicholas M. Trapnell, Jr.	2Sep-15Nov66
<b>HMM-163 1Aug-14Aug66</b>		<b>VMF(AW)-235 16Nov-31Dec66</b>	
CO LtCol Rocco D. Bianchi	1Aug-14Aug66	CO LtCol Edward R. Rogal	16Nov-31Dec66
<b>MACS-6 15Apr-14Aug66</b>		<b>VMA-223 1Dec-31Dec66</b>	
CO Maj Francis L. Delaney	15Apr-14Aug66	CO LtCol Leonard C. Taft	1Dec-31Dec66
<b>VMGR-152 15Apr-14Aug66</b>		<b>VMFA-542 15Aug-9Oct66</b>	
CO LtCol Dan C. Holland	15Apr-19May66	CO LtCol Donald L. May	15Aug-9Oct66
LtCol John Urell	20May-14Aug66	<b>HMM-163 15Aug-31Dec66</b>	
		CO LtCol Rocco D. Bianchi	15Aug-31Oct66
		<b>HMM-161 7Nov-17Dec66</b>	
		CO LtCol Charles E. Wydner, Jr.	7Nov-17Dec66
		<b>HMM-361 16Dec-31Dec66</b>	
<b>MAG-15/TG 79.3 15Aug-31Dec66</b>		CO LtCol McDonald D. Tweed	16Dec-31Dec66
CO Col Charles Kimak	15Aug-31Dec66	<b>MACS-6 15Aug-31Dec66</b>	
<b>H&amp;MS-15 15Aug-31Dec66</b>		CO Maj Francis L. Delaney	15Aug-17Oct66
CO LtCol James McDaniel	15Aug-31Dec66	Maj Richard L. Hawley	18Oct-1Nov66
<b>MABS-15 15Aug-31Dec66</b>		Maj William K. Hutchings	2Nov-31Dec66
CO LtCol George H. Albers	15Aug-31Dec66	<b>VMGR-152 15Aug-31Dec66</b>	
<b>VMA-121 15Aug-30Nov66</b>		CO LtCol John Urell	15Aug-31Dec66
CO LtCol Donald R. Stiver	15Aug-30Nov66		

# Appendix B

## Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

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- A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, attack aircraft.
- A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, light-attack jet bomber in service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with land-based Marine attack squadrons.
- A-6A—Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, low-level, attack bomber specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completely obscured by weather or darkness.
- AAR—After action report.
- AC-47—Douglas C-47 Skytrain, fixed-wing transport modified with 7.62mm miniguns and used as a gunship.
- ADC—Assistant division commander.
- AdminO—Administrative officer.
- Adv—Advanced.
- AGC—Amphibious command ship.
- AK-47—Russian-made Kalashnikov automatic rifle, gas operated, uses 7.62mm ammunition with an effective range of 400 meters. It was the standard rifle of the North Vietnamese Army.
- AKA—Attack cargo ship, a naval ship designed to transport combat-loaded cargo in an assault landing.
- ANGLICO—Air and naval gunfire liaison company, an organization composed of Marine and Navy personnel specially qualified for shore control of naval gunfire and close air support.
- AOA—Amphibious objective area, a defined geographical area within which is located the area or areas to be captured by the amphibious task force.
- APA—Attack transport ship a naval ship, designed for combat loading a battalion landing team.
- APC—Armored personnel carrier.
- Arc Light—The codename for B-52 bombing missions in South Vietnam.
- ARG—Amphibious ready group.
- Arty—Artillery.
- ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- ASRT—Air support radar team, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system which provides ground controlled precision flight path guidance and weapons release.
- B-3 Front—North Vietnamese military command established in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam to control military operations in Kontum, Dar Loc, and Pleiku Provinces.
- B-52—Boeing Stratofortress, U.S. Air Force eight-engine, swept-wing, heavy jet bomber.
- BGen—Brigadier general.
- BLT—Battalion landing team.
- Bn—Battalion.
- Brig—Brigade.
- C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine transport aircraft.
- C-130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine turboprop transport aircraft.
- CAAR—Combat after action report.
- Capt—Captain.
- CAS—Close air support.
- CG—Commanding general.
- CH-37—Sikorsky twin-engine, assault, heavy transport helicopter which carries three crew members and 36 passengers.
- CH-46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-turbine, tandem-rotor transport helicopter, designed to carry a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops.
- CH-53—Sikorsky Sea Stallion, a single-rotor, heavy assault transport helicopter powered by two shaft-turbine engines with an average payload of 12,800 pounds. Carries crew of three and 38 combat-loaded troops.
- CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group, South Vietnamese paramilitary force, composed largely of Montagnards, the nomadic tribesmen who populate the South Vietnamese highlands, and advised by U.S. Army Special Forces troops.
- CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific.
- CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
- Class (I-V)—Categories of military supplies, e.g., Class I, rations; Class III, POL; Class V, Ammunition.
- CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps.
- CMH—Center of Military History, Department of the Army.
- CNO—Chief of Naval Operations.
- CO—Commanding officer.
- Col—Colonel.
- Cdr—Commander.
- Combined action program—A Marine pilot pacification program established at Phu Bai in August 1965 which integrated a Marine infantry squad with a South Vietnamese Popular Forces platoon.
- ComdC—Command chronology.
- ComUSMACV—Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- COSVN—Central Office of South Vietnam, the Communist military and political headquarters in South Vietnam.
- County Fair—A sophisticated cordon and search operation in a particular hamlet or village by South Vietnamese troops, police, local officials, and U.S. Marines in an attempt to screen and register the local inhabitants.
- CP—Command post.
- CRC—Control and reporting center, an element of the U.S. Air Force tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical Air Control Center, from which radar and warning operations are conducted.
- CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone.

- DASC—Direct air support center—A subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for control and direction of close air support and other direct air support operations.
- D-Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation.
- DD—Destroyer.
- DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.
- DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).
- Dtd—Dated.
- Div—Division.
- DOD—Department of Defense.
- EA-6A—The electronic countermeasures version of the A-6A Intruder.
- ECM—Electronic countermeasures, a major subdivision of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce the effectiveness of enemy equipment and tactics employing or affected by electromagnetic radiations and to exploit the enemy's use of such radiations.
- EF-10B—An ECM modified version of the Navy F-3D Skynight, a two-engine jet night-fighter.
- ELINT—Electronic intelligence, the intelligence information product of activities engaged in the collection and processing, for subsequent intelligence purposes, of foreign, noncommunications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations and radioactive sources.
- Engr—Engineer.
- F-4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engined, two-seat, long-range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber.
- FAC (A)—Forward air controller (Airborne).
- FFV—Field Force, Vietnam I and II, U.S. Army commands in II and III Corps areas of South Vietnam.
- FLC—Force Logistic Command.
- FLSG—Force logistic support group.
- FLSU—Force logistic support unit.
- FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
- FO—Forward observer.
- FSCC—Fire support coordination center, a single location in which were centralized communication facilities and personnel incident to the coordination of all forms of fire support.
- FSR—Force service regiment.
- Fwd—Forward.
- G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e. g., G-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; G-2 intelligence; G-3 operations; G-4 logistics, etc.
- Gen—General.
- Golden Fleece—Marine rice harvest protection operation.
- Grenade Launcher, M79—U.S. built, single-shot, break-open, breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained rate of aimed fire of five-seven rounds per minute and an effective range of 375 meters.
- Gun, 175mm, M107—U.S. built, self-propelled gun which weighs 62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum range of 32,800 meters. Maximum rate of fire is one-half round per minute.
- Gun, 155mm, M53—U.S. built, medium, self-propelled gun, with a 23,300 meter range, and weighing 96,000 pounds. It has a sustained rate of fire of one-half rounds per minute.
- GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- H&I fires—Harassing and interdiction fires.
- H&S Co—Headquarters and service company.
- HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air, guided missile, designed to defend against enemy aircraft flying at low altitudes and short-range missiles.
- HE—High explosive.
- H-Hour—In connection with planned operations, it is the specific hour the operation begins.
- HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC—Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
- HLZ—Helicopter landing zone.
- HMM—Marine medium helicopter squadron.
- Howitzer, 8 inch (M55)—U.S. built, self-propelled heavy-artillery piece with a maximum range of 16,800 meters and a rate of fire of one-half rounds per minute.
- Howitzer, 105mm, M101A1—U.S. built, towed, general purpose light artillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters and maximum rate of fire of four rounds per minute.
- Howitzer, 155mm, M-114A towed and M-109 self-propelled—U.S. built medium artillery with a maximum range of 15,080 meters and a maximum rate of fire of 3 rounds per minute. Marines employed both models in Vietnam. The newer and heavier self-propelled M109 was largely road bound, while the lighter towed M114A could be moved either by truck or by helicopter.
- Howtar—A 4.2-inch (107mm) mortar tube mounted on the frame of a 75mm pack howitzer.
- "Huey"—Popular name for UH-1 series of helicopters.
- ICC—International Control Commission established by the Geneva Accords of 1954 to supervise the truce ending the First Indochina War between the French and the Viet Minh and resulting in the partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel. The members of the Commission were from Canada, India, and Poland.
- ICCC—I Corps Coordinating Council, consisting of U.S. and Vietnamese officials in I Corps and coordinated the civilian assistance program in I Corps.
- I Corps—The military and administrative subdivision which includes the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.
- J—The designations for members of a joint staff which includes members of several services comprising the command, e.g., J-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; J-2 intelligence; J-3 operations; J-4 logistic etc.
- JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.).
- JGS—Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese).
- JTD—Joint table of distribution.
- KANZUS—A proposed international brigade to man defenses along the DMZ; the acronym stands for Korean, Australian, New Zealand, and United States.
- KC-130—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of the C-130 Lockheed Hercules.
- KIA—Killed-in-action.

- Kit Carson Scout—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines to serve as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents.
- L-Hour—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour the helicopter land in the landing zone.
- LAAM Bn—Light antiaircraft missile battalion.
- LCM—Landing Craft mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks, and trailers directly onto the beach.
- LCVP—Landing craft vehicle personnel, the principal craft used to transport assault troops to the beach.
- LOI—Letter of Instruction.
- LPD—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters.
- LPH—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked helicopters.
- LSA—Logistic support area.
- LSD—Landing ship, dock, a landing ship designed to combat load, transport, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicles together with crews and embarked personnel, and to provide limited docking and repair services to small ships and crafts.
- LST—Landing ship, tank, landing ship designed to transport heavy vehicles and to land them on a beach.
- Lt—Lieutenant.
- LtCol—Lieutenant colonel.
- LtGen—Lieutenant general.
- Ltr—letter.
- LVTE—Amphibian vehicle, tracked engineer, a lightly armored amphibious vehicle designed for minefield and obstacle clearance.
- LVTH—Amphibian vehicle, tracked howitzer, a lightly armored, self-propelled, amphibious 105mm howitzer.
- LVTP—Landing vehicle, tracked personnel, an amphibian vehicle used to land and or transport personnel.
- LZ—Landing zone.
- MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade.
- Machine gun, .50 caliber—U.S. built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450 meters.
- Machine gun, M60—U.S. built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters.
- MACS—Marine air control squadron, provides and operates ground facilities for the detection and interception of hostile aircraft and for the navigational direction of friendly aircraft in the conduct of support operations.
- MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- MAF—Marine amphibious force.
- MAG—Marine aircraft group.
- Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions and regiments as opposed to local VC guerrilla groups.
- Maj—Major.
- MajGen—Major general.
- MarDiv—Marine division.
- Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e.g. 3d Marines.
- MASS—Marine air support squadron, provides and operates facilities for the control of support aircraft operating in direct support of ground forces.
- MAW—Marine aircraft wing.
- MCAF—Marine Corps air facility.
- MCAS—Marine Corps air station.
- MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center.
- MCOAG—Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group.
- MedCap—Medical civilian assistance program.
- MIA—Missing-in-action.
- MilHistBr—Military History Branch.
- Mortar, 4.2-inch, M30—U.S. built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard; weapon weighs 330 pounds and has a maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute.
- Mortar, 60mm, M19—U.S. built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon, which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled; it has a maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.
- Mortar, 81mm, M29—U.S. built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon, which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled; it has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an effective range of 2,300-3,650 meters, depending upon ammunition used.
- Mortar, 82mm, Soviet-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters.
- Mortar, 120mm—Soviet or Chinese Communist built, smooth bore, drop or trigger fired, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon, which weighs approximately 600 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.
- MR-5—Military Region 5, a Communist political and military sector in northern South Vietnam, including all of I Corps.
- MS—Manuscript.
- Msg—Message.
- NAG—Naval Advisory Group.
- NCC—Naval component commander.
- NCO—Non-commissioned officer.
- Ngu Hanh Son*—The pilot pacification program begun south of Da Nang in 1965 and incorporated into the I Corps National Priority Area in 1966.
- NLF—National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communist-led insurgency against the South Vietnamese Government.
- NMCB—Naval mobile construction battalion (Seabees).
- NMCC—National Military Command Center.
- NPA—National priority area, designated targeted area for pacification in South Vietnam.
- Nui—Vietnamese word for hill or mountain.
- Nung—A Vietnamese tribesman, of a separate ethnic group and probably of Chinese origin, trained for special operations and used as separate bodyguards.
- NVA—North Vietnamese Army.

- O-1B—Cessna, single-engine observation aircraft.
- OAB, NHD—Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division.
- Ontos—U.S. built, lightly-armored tracked antitank vehicle armed with six coaxially mounted 106mm recoilless rifles.
- OpCon—Operational control, the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location.
- OpO—Operation order, a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.
- OPlan—Operation plan, a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession; it is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.
- OpSum—Operational summary.
- OSJS (MACV)—Office of the Secretariat, Joint Staff (Military Assistance Command Vietnam).
- PAVN—Peoples Army of Vietnam (North Vietnam).
- PF—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usually employed in the defense of their own communities.
- POL—Petroleum, oil, and lubricants.
- Practice Nine—The codename for the planning of the antiinfiltration barrier across the DMZ.
- Project Delta—A special South Vietnamese reconnaissance group consisting of South Vietnamese Special Forces troops and U.S. Army Special Forces advisors.
- Recoilless rifle, 106mm, M401A1—U.S. built, single-shot, recoilless, breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assembled and mounted for firing; it has a sustained rate of fire of six rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,365 meters.
- RF—Regional Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a specific area.
- RF-4B—Photo-reconnaissance model of the F4B Phantom II.
- RF-8A—Reconnaissance version of the F-8 Chance Vought Crusader.
- Regt—Regiment.
- Revolutionary Development—The South Vietnamese pacification program in 1966.
- Revolutionary Development Teams—Especially trained Vietnamese political cadre who were assigned to individual hamlets and villages and conducted various pacification and civilian assistance tasks on a local level.
- Rifle, M14—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, semi-automatic, 7.62mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 12 pounds with a full 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.
- RLT—Regimental landing team.
- ROK—Republic of Korea (South Korea)
- Rolling Thunder—Codename for U.S. air operations over North Vietnam.
- RRU—Radio Research Unit.
- Rural Reconstruction—The predecessor pacification campaign to Revolutionary Development.
- RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
- RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
- S- —Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels.  
S-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel;  
S-2 intelligence; S-3, operations; S-4 logistics; etc.
- SAR—Search and rescue.
- SATS—Short airfield for tactical support, a minimal expeditionary airfield used by Marine Corps aviation elements providing tactical air support for the landing force; characterized by a portable runway surface, aircraft launching and recovery devices, and other essential expeditionary airfield components.
- SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
- 2d AD—2d Air Division, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam prior to the establishment of the Seventh Air Force.
- SecDef—Secretary of Defense.
- SecState—Secretary of State.
- Seventh AF—Seventh Air Force, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam.
- Seventh Flt—Seventh Fleet, the U.S. fleet assigned to the Pacific.
- SitRep—Situation Report.
- SLF—Special landing force.
- Song—River in Vietnamese.
- SOP—Standing operating procedure, set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure.
- Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft.
- Steel Tiger—The codename for the air campaign over Laos.
- Stingray—Special Marine reconnaissance missions in which small Marine reconnaissance teams call artillery and air attacks on targets of opportunity.
- Strike Company—an elite company in a South Vietnamese infantry division, directly under the control of the division commander.
- Struggle Forces—the coalition in I Corps which directed the protests against the central government after the removal of the I Corps commander Nguyen Chanh Thi in the spring of 1966. Also known as "Military and Civilian Struggle Committee for I Corps" and "Popular Forces to Struggle for the Revolution."
- TAC (A)—Tactical air coordinator (Airborne), an officer, who coordinates from an airplane, the action of aircraft in close support operations.
- TACC—Tactical air control center, the principal air operations installation from which all aircraft and air-warning functions of tactical air operations are controlled.
- TADC—Tactical air direction center, an air operations installation under the overall control of the tactical air control center, from which is directed aircraft and aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center.
- TAOC—Tactical air operations center, a subordinate operational component of the Marine air command and control system designed for direction and control of all en route air traffic and air defense operations.
- TAFDS—Tactical airfield fuel dispensing system, the expeditionary storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tactical airfields. It uses 10,000 gallon fabric tanks to store the fuel.

Tally Ho—Bombing campaign under ComUSMACV begun in July 1966 of Route Package I in North Vietnam.

Tank, M48—U.S. built 50.7-ton tank with a crew of four; primary armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30 caliber and one .50 caliber machine gun. Maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.

TAOR—Tactical area of responsibility, a defined area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support.

TE—Task element.

TG—Task Group.

Tiger Hound—Airstrikes in Laos directed by U.S. Air Force small fixed-wing observation aircraft, flying up to 12 miles in southeastern Laos.

TU—Task unit.

UH-1E-Bell "Huey"—A single-engine, light attack/transport helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower; carries a crew of three with seven combat troops; in its armored configuration it is armed with air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns.

UH-34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transport helicopter with a crew of three, carries 16-18 combat soldiers.

USA—United States Army.

USAF—United States Air Force.

USAID—United States Agency for International Development.

USMC—United States Marine Corps.

U.S. Mission Council—Council, chaired by the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and included ComUSMACV, which

developed and coordinated U.S. policy within South Vietnam.

USN—United States Navy.

USOM—United States Operations Mission, the United States civilian organization in RVN including the U.S. Embassy, AID, etc.

VC—Viet Cong, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrilla in South Vietnam; a derogatory construction of the Vietnamese phrase meaning "Vietnamese Communists."

Viet Minh—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist groups, which actively opposed the Japanese in World War II and the French in the first Indochina War.

VMA—Marine attack squadron.

VMF (AW)—Marine fighter squadron (all-weather).

VMFA—Marine fighter attack squadron.

VMCJ—Marine composite reconnaissance squadron.

VMGR—Marine refueller transport squadron.

VMO—Marine observation aircraft squadron.

VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force.

VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade.

VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps.

VNN—Vietnamese Navy.

VT—Variable timed electronic fuze for an artillery shell which causes airburst over the target area.

WestPac—Western Pacific.

WIA—Wounded-in-action.

WFRC—Washington Federal Records Center.

# Appendix C

## Chronology of Significant Events

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- 4 Jan—The Special Forces camp at Khe Sanh reported 20 rounds of incoming 120mm mortar fire. This was the first confirmed enemy use of 120mm mortars in RVN.
- 18 Jan—The 1st Marines Headquarters arrived at Chu Lai.
- 28 Jan-19 Feb—Operation Double Eagle I was conducted by Task Force Delta in southern Quang Ngai Province.
- 6-8 Feb—President Johnson together with senior military and civilian advisors met with South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Head of State Nguyen Van Thieu in Honolulu. The resulting "Declaration of Honolulu" outlined U.S. and South Vietnamese political and military policy.
- 19 Feb-1 Mar—Operation Double Eagle II was conducted 30 miles south of Da Nang.
- 23 Feb—A detachment of the 3d FSR; HQ, 11th Marines; a detachment of HQ Bn, 1st Marine Division; and 4/11 arrived RVN.
- 1 Mar—The 26th Marines was activated at Camp Pendleton, California, initiating the formation of the 5th Marine Division. The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade was activated on Okinawa.
- 4-7 Mar—Task Force Delta conducted Operation Utah south of Chu Lai.
- 7 Mar—Secretary of Defense McNamara requested authorization for 278,184 Marines on active duty by 30 June 1967. This increase made the Marine Corps the only service to have a strength larger than its peak during the Korean War.
- 9-12 Mar—The *NVA 95th Regiment* overran the A Shau Special Forces Camp in western Thua Thien Province. HMM-163 assisted in the evacuation of the camp.
- 10 Mar—Prime Minister Ky removed LtGen Nguyen Chanh Thi from his position as ARVN commander, I Corps. As a result of this, protest demonstrations and strikes began in the Hue-Da Nang area and slowly spread to Saigon.
- 15 Mar—The Force Logistic Command (FLC) was established at Da Nang. The unit is made up of the 1st and 3d Service Battalions and the in-country elements of the 3d Force Service Regiment (FSR).
- 18 Mar—MajGen Wood B. Kyle assumed command of the 3d Marine Division from General Walt. General Walt continued as CG III MAF.
- 18 Mar—3d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived RVN.
- 20-25 Mar—Operation Texas was conducted south of Chu Lai by Task Force Delta.
- 26 Mar-6 Apr—The SLF Battalion, BLT 1/5, began Operation Jack Stay in the Rung Sat Special Zone about 27 miles SE of Saigon. This was the first operation by American troops in the Saigon River Delta.
- 29 Mar—MajGen Lewis J. Fields established the 1st Marine Division Headquarters at Chu Lai.
- 1 Apr—U. S. Naval Forces, MACV was established in Saigon and assumed control of the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang from III MAF. The 2d Air Division was redesignated the Seventh Air Force.
- 12 Apr—The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines arrived in RVN.
- 7 May—CG FMFPac assumed operational control of RLT-26.
- 8 May—1st Battalion, 5th Marines arrived RVN (formerly SLF).
- 15-31 May—The political unrest in I Corps flared up as Prime Minister Ky sent ARVN units, loyal to the Saigon government, into Da Nang to reestablish his authority. After several days, the "Struggle Forces" in Da Nang backed down but in Hue the situation was out of control until the end of the month.
- 16 May—MajGen Lewis B. Robertshaw relieved MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon as CG 1st MAW.
- 27 May—The 5th Marines Headquarters arrived at Chu Lai from Okinawa.
- 28 May—The 1st Military Police Battalion arrived at Da Nang from ConUS.
- 1-21 Jun—In Hue, militant Buddhist Thich Tri Quang began a hunger strike in protest against the government. The Buddhist leader was subsequently arrested and moved to Saigon where he was imprisoned.
- Forces loyal to the South Vietnamese government seized the Buddhist-controlled cities of Hue and Quang Tri and the Buddhist Secular Affairs Institute Headquarters in Saigon.
- Ten civilians, representing different religions and political factions, were added to South Vietnam's ruling junta on 6 June. In Saigon, the Unified Buddhist Church issued a manifesto disavowing Communism and recognizing the necessity of the temporary presence of American forces.
- 7 June-30 Jun—The 3d Marine Division conducted Operation Liberty, an extensive pacification sweep and clear operation in the Da Nang TAOR.
- 18-27 Jun—Deckhouse I was the first of a series of SLF amphibious attacks on Viet Cong coastal strongholds. This operation was in Phu Yen Province, 12 miles NW of Tuy Hoa in II CTZ. There were four operations in this series during 1966.
- 7 Jul-2 Aug—Operation Hastings, a search and destroy mission, 55 miles NW of Hue, was conducted under the command of Task Force Delta to counter the movement of the *NVA 324B Division* across the DMZ. In addition BLT 3/5 made an am-

- phibious landing and conducted Deckhouse II in conjunction with Hastings.
- 1 Aug—The advance echelon of the 2d Korean Marine Brigade arrived in I Corps approximately three miles south of Chu Lai.
- 3 Aug—The Marines began Operation Prairie in the former Hastings Area of Operations. Prairie, which started as a one-battalion operation, soon expanded into a multi-battalion campaign and continued through the end of the year. The Marines encountered elements of two NVA divisions, the 324B and the 341st.
- 26 Aug—The campaign for election to South Vietnam's Constituent Assembly officially opened with 540 candidates running.
- 28 Aug—BLT 2/26 arrived at Da Nang.
- 11 Sep—Of the 718,024 eligible voters in the I Corps area, 87.4 percent voted in South Vietnam's Constituent Assembly election. Over 80 percent of those registered voted throughout South Vietnam.
- 15-18 Sep—Deckhouse IV amphibious search and destroy operation was conducted in conjunction with Prairie I, eight miles NE of Dong Ha in I CTZ.
- 19 Sep—The 2d Battalion of the 2d Brig, ROKMC arrived at Chu Lai from Cam Ranh Bay.
- 25 Sep—MAG-13 arrived at Chu Lai from Iwakuni.
- 27 Sep—Elements of BLT 3/26 arrived at Okinawa.
- 1 Oct—MajGen Herman Nickerson Jr., relieved MajGen Lewis J. Fields as CG 1st Marine Division.
- 2 Oct—Battery C, 6th Bn (175mm guns), 27th Arty, USA, came under the operational control of Task Force Delta.
- 8 Oct—The 4th Battalion, 503rd Abn Inf, 173rd Abn Brig, USA, arrived at Da Nang.
- 10 Oct—The 3d Marine Division was ordered to displace to Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces to conduct offensive operations as directed and continue current offensive operations in the Phu Bai TAOR. Task Force Delta was ordered deactivated and Task Force X-Ray was activated at Chu Lai under the 1st Marine Division. The 1st Division assumed responsibility for all three southern provinces.
- 17-18 Oct—The 1st Bn, 40th Field Arty Regt (105mm How [SP]), USA, arrived at Da Nang and the next day the 2d Bn, 94th Arty Regt (175mm gun), USA, arrived.
- 24-25 Oct—At a conference in Manila, President Johnson met with leaders of six other nations: South Vietnam, New Zealand, Australia, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. The conferees issued a four-point "Declaration of Peace," calling for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam War.
- 23 Nov—The Office of Civil Operations was established in South Vietnam as a U.S. Embassy activity to direct U.S. civilian support of revolutionary development.
- 29 Nov—Headquarters Btry, 1st Field Arty Grp (FAG), arrived at Chu Lai.
- 3 Dec—The 4th Bn, 503d Inf, USA, departed I CTZ for III CTZ. The battalion was relieved by 3/9.
- 6 Dec—The administration disclosed that 9 to 10 billion dollars more is needed to pay for the war in Vietnam in the current fiscal year.
- 31 Dec—III MAF strength at the end of the year was 65,789.

# Appendix D

## Medal of Honor Citations, 1966

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The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

STAFF SERGEANT PETER S. CONNOR  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

### CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action against enemy Viet Cong forces at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Platoon Sergeant of the Third Platoon, Company F, Second Battalion, Third Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam on 25 February 1966. Leading his platoon on a search and destroy operation in an area made particularly hazardous by extensive cave and tunnel complexes, Sergeant Connor maneuvered his unit aggressively forward under intermittent enemy small arms fire. Exhibiting particular alertness and keen observation, he spotted an enemy spider hole emplacement approximately fifteen meters to his front. He pulled the pin from a fragmentation grenade intending to charge the hole boldly and drop the missile into its depths. Upon pulling the pin he realized that the firing mechanism was faulty, and that even as he held the safety device firmly in place, the fuze charge was already activated. With only precious seconds to decide, he further realized that he could not cover the distance to the small opening of the spider hole in sufficient time, and that to hurl the deadly bomb in any direction would result in death or injury to some of his comrades tactically deployed near him. Manifesting extraordinary gallantry and with utter disregard for his personal safety, he chose to hold the grenade against his own body in order to absorb the terrific explosion and spare his comrades. His act of extreme valor and selflessness in the face of virtually certain death, although leaving him mortally wounded, spared many of his fellow Marines from death or injury. His gallant action in giving his life in the cause of freedom reflects the highest credit upon the Marine Corps and the Armed Forces of the United States.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

GUNNERY SERGEANT JIMMIE E. HOWARD  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Platoon Leader, Company C, First Reconnaissance Battalion, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam. Gunnery Sergeant (then Staff Sergeant) Howard and his eighteen-man platoon were occupying an observation post deep within enemy-controlled territory. Shortly after midnight on 16 June 1966, a Viet Cong force of estimated battalion size approached the Marines' position and launched a vicious attack with small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire. Reacting swiftly and fearlessly in the face of the overwhelming odds, Gunnery Sergeant Howard skillfully organized his small but determined force into a tight perimeter defense and calmly moved from position to position to direct his men's fire. Throughout the night, during assault after assault, his courageous example and firm leadership inspired and motivated his men to withstand the unrelenting fury of the hostile fire in the seemingly hopeless situation. He constantly shouted encouragement to his men and exhibited imagination and resourcefulness in directing their return fire. When fragments of an exploding enemy grenade wounded him severely and prevented him from moving his legs, he distributed his ammunition to the remaining members of his platoon and proceeded to maintain radio communications and direct air strikes on the enemy with uncanny accuracy. At dawn, despite the fact that five men were killed and all but one wounded, his beleaguered platoon was still in command of its position. When evacuation helicopters approached his position, Gunnery Sergeant Howard warned them away and called for additional air strikes and directed devastating small arms fire and air strikes against enemy automatic weapons positions in order to make the landing zone as secure as possible. Through his extraordinary courage and resolute fighting spirit, Gunnery Sergeant Howard was largely responsible for preventing the loss of his entire platoon. His valiant leadership and courageous fighting spirit served to inspire the men of his platoon to heroic endeavor in the face of overwhelming odds, and reflect the highest credit upon Gunnery Sergeant Howard, the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

SECOND LIEUTENANT JOHN J. MCGINTY III  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Acting Platoon Leader, First Platoon, Company K, Third Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on 18 July 1966, Second Lieutenant (then Staff Sergeant) McGinty's platoon, which was providing rear security to protect the withdrawal of the Battalion from a position which had been under attack for three days, came under heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire from an estimated enemy regiment. With each successive human wave which assaulted his thirty-two-man platoon during the four-hour battle, Second Lieutenant McGinty rallied his men to beat off the enemy. In one bitter assault, two of the squads became separated from the remainder of the platoon. With complete disregard for his safety, Second Lieutenant McGinty charged through intense automatic weapons and mortar fire to their position. Finding twenty men wounded and the Medical Corpsman killed, he quickly reloaded ammunition magazines and weapons for the wounded men and directed their fire upon the enemy. Although he was painfully wounded as he moved to care for the disabled men, he continued to shout encouragement to his troops and to direct their fire so effectively that the attacking hordes were beaten off. When the enemy tried to out-flank his position, he killed five of them at point-blank range with his pistol. When they again seemed on the verge of overrunning the small force, he skillfully adjusted artillery and air strikes within fifty yards of his position. This destructive fire power routed the enemy, who left an estimated 500 bodies on the battlefield. Second Lieutenant McGinty's personal heroism, indomitable leadership, selfless devotion to duty, and bold fighting spirit inspired his men to resist the repeated attacks by a fanatical enemy, reflected great credit upon himself, and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

MAJOR ROBERT J. MODRZEJEWSKI  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Commanding Officer, Company K, Third Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam from 15 to 18 July 1966. On 15 July, during Operation Hastings, Company K was landed in an enemy infested jungle area to establish a blocking position at a major enemy trail network. Shortly after landing, the Company encountered a reinforced enemy platoon in a well organized, defensive position. Major (then Captain) Modrzejewski led his men in the successful seizure of the enemy redoubt, which contained large quantities of ammunition and supplies. That evening a numerically superior enemy force counterattacked in an effort to retake the vital supply area, thus setting the pattern of activity for the next two and one-half days. In the first series of attacks, the enemy assaulted repeatedly in overwhelming numbers but each time was repulsed by the gallant Marines. The second night the enemy struck in battalion strength, and Major Modrzejewski was wounded in this intensive action which was fought at close quarters. Although exposed to enemy fire, and despite his painful wounds, he crawled 200 meters to provide critically needed ammunition to an exposed element of his command and was constantly present wherever the fighting was heaviest. Despite numerous casualties, a dwindling supply of ammunition and the knowledge that they were surrounded, he skillfully directed artillery fire to within a few meters of his position and courageously inspired the efforts of his Company in repelling the aggressive enemy attack. On 18 July, Company K was attacked by a regimental size enemy force. Although his unit was vastly outnumbered and weakened by the previous fighting, Major Modrzejewski reorganized his men and calmly moved among them to encourage and direct their efforts to heroic limits as they fought to overcome the vicious enemy onslaught. Again he called in air and artillery strikes at close range with devastating effect on the enemy, which together with the bold and determined fighting of the men of Company K, repulsed the fanatical attack of the larger North Vietnamese force. His unparalleled personal heroism and indomitable leadership inspired his men to a significant victory over the enemy force and reflected great credit upon himself, the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

MAJOR HOWARD V. LEE  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer, Company E, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division near Cam Lo, Republic of Vietnam, on 8 and 9 August 1966. A platoon of Major (then Captain) Lee's company, while on an operation deep in enemy territory, was attacked and surrounded by a large Vietnamese force. Realizing that the unit had suffered numerous casualties, depriving it of effective leadership, and fully aware that the platoon was even then under heavy attack by the enemy, Major Lee took seven men and proceeded by helicopter to reinforce the beleaguered platoon. Major Lee disembarked from the helicopter with two of his men and, braving withering enemy fire, led them into the perimeter, where he fearlessly moved from position to position, directing and encouraging the overtaxed troops. The enemy then launched a massive attack with the full might of their forces. Although painfully wounded by fragments from an enemy grenade in several areas of his body, including his eye, Major Lee continued undauntedly throughout the night to direct the defense, coordinate supporting fires, and apprise higher headquarters of the plight of the platoon. The next morning he collapsed from his wounds and was forced to relinquish command. However, the small band of Marines had held their position and repeatedly fought off many vicious enemy attacks for a grueling six hours until their evacuation was effected the following morning. Major Lee's actions saved his men from capture, minimized the loss of lives, and dealt the enemy a severe defeat. His indomitable fighting spirit, superb leadership, and great personal valor in the face of tremendous odds, reflect great credit upon himself and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

SERGEANT RICHARD A. PITTMAN  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a member of First Platoon, Company I, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines during combat operations near the Demilitarized Zone, Republic of Vietnam. On 24 July 1966, while Company I was conducting an operation along the axis of a narrow jungle trail, the leading company elements suffered numerous casualties when they suddenly came under heavy fire from a well concealed and numerically superior enemy force. Hearing the engaged Marines' calls for more firepower, Sergeant (then Lance Corporal) Pittman quickly exchanged his rifle for a machine gun and several belts of ammunition, left the relative safety of his platoon, and unhesitatingly rushed forward to aid his comrades. Taken under intense enemy small-arms fire at point blank range during his advance, he returned the fire, silencing the enemy positions. As Sergeant Pittman continued to forge forward to aid members of the leading platoon, he again came under heavy fire from two automatic weapons which he promptly destroyed. Learning that there were additional wounded Marines fifty yards further along the trail, he braved a withering hail of enemy mortar and small-arms fire to continue onward. As he reached the position where the leading Marines had fallen, he was suddenly confronted with a bold frontal attack by 30 to 40 enemy. Totally disregarding his own safety, he calmly established a position in the middle of the trail and raked the advancing enemy with devastating machine gun fire. His weapon rendered ineffective, he picked up a submachine gun and, together with a pistol seized from a fallen comrade, continued his lethal fire until the enemy force had withdrawn. Having exhausted his ammunition except for a grenade which he hurled at the enemy, he then rejoined his own platoon. Sergeant Pittman's daring initiative, bold fighting spirit and selfless devotion to duty inflicted many enemy casualties, disrupted the enemy attack and saved the lives of many of his wounded comrades. His personal valor at grave risk to himself reflects the highest credit upon himself, the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

# Appendix E

## List of Reviewers

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### Marines

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr. (Ret)  
Gen Lewis W. Walt (Ret)

LtGen Leslie E. Brown (Ret)  
LtGen Leo J. Dulacki (Ret)  
LtGen Hugh M. Elwood (Ret)  
LtGen Lewis J. Fields (Ret)  
LtGen Victor H. Krulak (Ret)  
LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr. (Ret)  
LtGen Louis B. Robertshaw (Ret)  
LtGen Lawrence F. Snowden (Ret)

MajGen Marion E. Carl (Ret)  
MajGen Lowell E. English (Ret)  
MajGen Harold A. Hatch  
MajGen Wood B. Kyle (Ret)  
MajGen Oscar F. Peatross (Ret)

BGen Edward J. Doyle (Ret)  
BGen Roy E. Moss  
BGen Edwin H. Simmons (Ret)  
BGen William A. Stiles (Ret)

Col Sidney J. Altman (Ret)  
Col Nels E. Anderson (Ret)  
Col Emmett O. Anglin, Jr. (Ret)  
Col Edward L. Bale, Jr. (Ret)  
Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr. (Ret)  
Col Noble L. Beck (Ret)  
Col Van D. Bell, Jr. (Ret)  
Col Arnold E. Bench (Ret)  
Col Rocco D. Bianchi (Ret)  
Col James M. Callender (Ret)

Col George W. Carrington, Jr. (Ret)  
Col Bevan G. Cass (Ret)  
Col Alexander D. Cereghino (Ret)  
Col Steve J. Cibik (Ret)  
Col James M. Cummings (Ret)  
Col Clyde D. Dean  
Col Earl R. Delong (Ret)

Col Nicholas J. Dennis (Ret)  
Col Birchard B. DeWitt (Ret)  
Col Haig Donabedian (Ret)  
Col Joshua W. Dorsey, III (Ret)  
Col Donald L. Evans, Jr. (Ret)  
Col Fred J. Frazer (Ret)  
Col William F. Fry (Ret)  
Col Roy C. Gray, Jr. (Ret)  
Col Edward E. Hammerbeck (Ret)  
Col Harold A. Hayes, Jr. (Ret)  
Col Vincil W. Hazelbaker  
Col Peter L. Hilgartner (Ret)  
Col William K. Horn (Ret)

Col Thomas M. Horne (Ret)  
Col Robert M. Jenkins (Ret)  
Col David G. Jones (Ret)  
Col Charles J. Keever  
Col Karl T. Keller (Ret)  
Col James P. Kelly (Ret)  
Col John P. Lanigan (Ret)  
Col Edward R. McCarthy (Ret)  
Col James F. McClanahan (Ret)  
Col John L. Mahon (Ret)

Col Glen E. Martin (Ret)  
Col William J. Masterpool  
Col Herbert E. Mendenhall (Ret)  
Col John F. Mentzer (Ret)  
Col Anthony A. Monti  
Col Samuel M. Morrow  
Col Ross L. Mulford (Ret)  
Col Michael J. Needham  
Col Glenn E. Norris (Ret)  
Col Thomas J. O'Connor (Ret)

Col Mauro J. Padalino (Ret)  
Col Leslie L. Page (Ret)  
Col Francis F. Parry (Ret)  
Col Robert M. Port (Ret)  
Col Walter S. Pullar, Jr.  
Col Robert R. Read (Ret)  
Col Edwin M. Rudzis (Ret)

Col Mitchell O. Sadler (Ret)  
 Col Richard A. Savage (Ret)  
 Col Donald W. Sherman (Ret)  
 Col Harry W. Taylor (Ret)  
 Col Frank C. Thomas (Ret)  
 Col Paul C. Trammell (Ret)  
 Col Leon N. Utter (Ret)  
 Col Sumner A. Vale (Ret)  
 Col Roy R. Van Cleve (Ret)  
 Col Paul B. Watson, Jr. (Ret)  
 Col E. Robert Watson (Ret)  
 Col Gordon H. West (Ret)  
 Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (Ret)  
 Col Paul E. Wilson (Ret)  
 Col Robert J. Zitnik (Ret)

LtCol James Aldworth (Ret)  
 LtCol Billy H. Barber (Ret)  
 LtCol Garland T. Beyerle (Ret)  
 LtCol John E. Clements  
 LtCol Dwain A. Colby (Ret)  
 LtCol Ernest L. De Fazio (Ret)  
 LtCol William F. Donahue, Jr. (Ret)  
 LtCol Robert J. Driver, Jr.  
 LtCol Jim T. Elkins (Ret)  
 LtCol Fredric A. Green (Ret)  
 LtCol George R. Griggs  
 LtCol John J. Hess (Ret)  
 LtCol John J. W. Hilgers  
 LtCol Charles A. House (Ret)  
 LtCol Richard E. Jones (Ret)  
 LtCol Warren P. Kitterman (Ret)  
 LtCol Timothy B. Lecky  
 LtCol Alex Lee  
 LtCol Howard V. Lee (Ret)  
 LtCol Jerry D. Lindauer (Ret)  
 LtCol Fred D. MacLean, Jr. (Ret)  
 LtCol Robert J. Modrzejewski

LtCol McLendon G. Morris  
 LtCol Martin E. O'Connor  
 LtCol Raymond J. O'Leary (Ret)  
 LtCol John J. Roothoff (Ret)  
 LtCol Conway J. Smith (Ret)  
 LtCol Daniel A. Somerville (Ret)  
 LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan (Ret)  
 LtCol Emerson A. Walker (Ret)

Maj James O. Black (Ret)  
 Maj Marshall B. Darling  
 Maj Charles L. George  
 Maj Robert G. Handrahan  
 Maj Richard E. Maresco  
 Maj Theard J. Terrebone, Jr.

Capt Edwin W. Besch (Ret)  
 Capt James J. Kirschke (Ret)

MGySgt J. J. McDowell

#### Others

Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 Center of Military History, Department of the Army  
 Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force  
 Naval History Division, Department of the Navy  
 Adm John J. Hyland, USN (Ret)  
 Adm Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, USN (Ret)  
 Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret)  
 VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret)  
 Capt John H. Craven, USN (Ret)  
 Mr. V. Keith Fleming, Jr.  
 Mr. Francis J. West, Jr.

# Appendix F

## Distribution of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific\*

UNIT	DA NANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
<i>MAG-11</i>								
H&MS-11	3/UH-34D 4/TF-9J 1/C-117D							
VMCJ-1	9/EF-10B 1/RF-4B 4/EA-6A							
VMFA-115	11/F-4B							
VMF (AW)-232	15/F-8E							
VMA (AW)-242	12/A-6A							
<i>MAG-12</i>								
H&MS-12		1/C-117						
VMA-121		22/A-4E						
VMA-211		22/A-4E						
VMA-214		19/A-4C						
VMA-311		17/A-4E						
<i>MAG-13</i>								
H&MS-13		4/TF-9J 1/C-117						
VMFA-314		15/F-4B						
VMFA-323		13/F-4B						
VMFA-542		14/F-4B						
<i>MAG-15</i>								
H&MS-15					2/C-54 2/TF-9J 1/C-117D			
VMGR-152			12/KC-130F					
VMA-223					19/A-4E			
VMF (AW)-235					10/F-8E			
HMM-361			23/UH-34D					
HMM-362								24/UH-34D**
<i>MAG-16</i>								
H&MS-16	1/C-117D 9/O-1C 4/UH-34D 6/CH-37C							
VMO-2	27/UH-1E							
HMM-163			24/UH-34D					
HMM-164	20/CH-46A							2CH-46A**
HMM-263	22/UH-34D							
HMM-265	22/CH-46A							

UNIT	DA NANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
<i>MW</i> SG-17 H&MS-17	1/UC-45J 4/UH-34D 2/C-117D 2/US-2B							
<i>MAG</i> -36 H&MS-36		3/UH-34D 1/C-117D						
VMO-6 HMM-165 HMM-262 HMM-363		21/UH-1E 23/CH-46A 24/CH-46A 23/UH-34D						
<i>MAG</i> -33 H&MS-33							3/T-1A 1/C-47H	
VMCJ-3							12/RF-4B 8/EF-10B	
VMF-334 VMFA-122							15/F-8C 14/F-4B	
<i>MW</i> SG-37 MAMS-37							4/T-1A 3/C-117D 1/C-54Q 1/C-47J	
VMGR-352 HMM-364 HMH-463 VMO-3			4/KC-130F				10/KC-130F 6/UH-34D 10/CH-53A	4/CH-53A*** 12/UH-1E***
<i>MHTG</i> -30 HMMT-301 HMMT-302 VMO-5							24/UH-34D 16/UH-1E 16/UH-1E	
<i>1ST MAR</i> <i>BRIG</i> H&MS							4UH-34D 1/VH-34D 1/T-1A	
VMF (AW)-212							14/F-8D	
<i>TOTAL PAC</i> <i>AIRCRAFT</i> Fixed Wing (338)	72	129		16	34	15	72	
Helicopters (364)	108	94	24	23		5	68	42

\*From Status of Forces, dated 29 December 1966, with correction of obvious errors in addition

\*\*Aircraft indicated in "Other" column with SLF, Seventh Fleet

\*\*\*VMO-3(-) and Det, HMH-463, enroute to RVN, 4/UH-1E of number indicated with SLF, Seventh Fleet

# Appendix G

## Distribution of Personnel Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 22 December 1966

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		DONG HA PHU BAI		OTHER RVN		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		SLF OTHER		
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC
<b>HEADQUARTERS</b>																							
HQ, FMF, PAC																							
H&SBN, FMF, PAC		972	28	3NOV66														972	28				
HQ, FMF, PAC (FMF)																							
SU#2, H&SBN, FMFPAC		47	1	17NOV66									47	1									
HQ, III MAF																							
H&S CO, III MAF		714	18	30NOV66	714	18																	
HQ, V MEF	1																						
1ST CIV AFF GP (FMF)	1																						
HQ, 1ST MAR DIV																							
HQ BN, 1ST MAR DIV		1753	31	1DEC66	1183	24	570	7															
HQ, 3D MAR DIV																							
HQ BN, 3D MAR DIV		1570	114	1DEC66					1570	114													
HQ, 5TH MAR DIV	1																						
HQ BN, 5TH MAR DIV	1																						
HQ, FORTPS, FMF PAC																							
HQ CO, FORTPS		394	31	1DEC66																	394	31	
HQ, 9TH MAB																							
HQ CO, 9TH MAB		327		30NOV66									327										
HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG																							
HQ CO, 1ST MAR BRIG		314	35	1DEC66																	314	35	
<b>INFANTRY</b>																							
<b>1ST MARINES</b>																							
HQ CO, 1ST MAR		257	4	1DEC66	257	4																	
1ST BN, 1ST MAR		1048	5	1DEC66	1048	5																	
2D BN, 1ST MAR		1071	61	1DEC66	1071	61																	
3D BN, 1ST MAR		1040	50	1DEC66	1040	50																	
<b>3D MARINES</b>																							
HQ CO, 3D MAR	4	231	8	2DEC66						231	8												
1ST BN, 3D MAR	4	1059	53	1DEC66						1059	53												
2D BN, 3D MAR		1140	62	1DEC66						1140	62												
3D BN, 3D MAR		1068	63	1DEC66						1068	63												
<b>4TH MARINES</b>																							
HQ CO, 4TH MAR	4	253	6	1DEC66						253	6												
1ST BN, 4TH MAR		1032	56	1DEC66									1032	56									
2D BN, 4TH MAR		1132	45	8DEC66									1132	45									
3D BN, 4TH MAR	4	1128	71	8DEC66						1128	71												
<b>5TH MARINES</b>																							
HQ CO, 5TH MAR		229	5	1DEC66						229	5												
1ST BN, 5TH MAR		1025	50	1DEC66						1025	50												
2D BN, 5TH MAR	4	1170	53	1DEC66	1170	53																	
3D BN, 5TH MAR		1044	56	8DEC66						1044	56												
<b>7TH MARINES</b>																							
HQ CO, 7TH MAR		258	5	1DEC66						258	5												
1ST BN, 7TH MAR		1077	61	1DEC66						1077	61												
2D BN, 7TH MAR		1096	61	1DEC66						1096	61												
3D BN, 7TH MAR	4	1141	56	1DEC66	1141	56																	
<b>9TH MARINES</b>																							
HQ CO, 9TH MAR		195	4	1DEC66	195	4																	
1ST BN, 9TH MAR	1	1674	95	2DEC66																		1674	95
2D BN, 9TH MAR		1029	54	11NOV66								1029	54										
3D BN, 9TH MAR		1086	60	8DEC66	1086	60																	
<b>26TH MARINES</b>																							
HQ CO, 26TH MAR		400	14	30NOV66																			
1ST BN, 26TH MAR		1035	69	8DEC66	1035	69																	
2D BN, 26TH MAR		1037	60	2DEC66																			
3D BN, 26TH MAR	4	1694	97	24NOV66																			
<b>27TH MARINES</b>																							
HQ CO, 27TH MAR		70	2	15SEP66																		70	2
1ST BN, 27TH MAR		1156	39	1DEC66																		1156	39
2D BN, 27TH MAR																							
3D BN, 27TH MAR																							





UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		DONG HA PHU BAI		OTHER RVN		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		SLF OTHER			
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
<b>MAG-15</b>																								
H&MS-15		363		8DEC66											363									
M&BS-15		477	20	8DEC66										477	20									
NBC WPNS SEC-1		17		18NOV66									17											
MACS-6		232	3	8DEC66									232	3										
MATCU-60		67		8DEC66									67											
MATCU-66		54		30NOV66									54											
VHQR-152		560	9	1DEC66									467	9	93									
BHM-361		180		30NOV66									180											
VMA-223		183	5	8DEC66											183	5								
VMP(AW)-235		216	1	8DEC66											216	1								
H&MS, PUTAMA		232	56	1DEC66											232	56								
H&MS, IWAKUNI		485	298	1DEC66											485	298								
HMM-362	3	220	4	3NOV66																	220	4		
<b>MAG-16</b>																								
H&MS-16		460		1DEC66	460																			
M&BS-16		585	14	1DEC66	585	14																		
MATCU-68		72		30NOV66	72																			
VMO-2		182	4	1DEC66	182	4																		
BHM-163		218	4	1DEC66				218	4															
BHM-164		219	5	1DEC66	219	5																		
BHM-263		213	4	1DEC66	213	4																		
BHM-265		218	3	1DEC66	218	3																		
<b>MMSG-17</b>																								
H&MS-17		735	26	17NOV66	735	26																		
W&RS-17																								
<b>MAG-36</b>																								
H&MS-36		333		1DEC66											333									
M&BS-36		443	40	17NOV66											443	40								
VMO-6		232	3	8DEC66											232	3								
BHM-165		239	1	1DEC66											239	1								
BHM-363		197	1	30NOV66											197	1								
BHM-262		147	2	24NOV66											147	2								
<b>3D MAM</b>																								
<b>MMSG-3</b>																								
H&MS-3		1040	7	8DEC66																	1040	7		
NBC WPNS SEC-3		15		15SEP66																	15			
5TH LAAM BN		442	12	1DEC66																	442	12		
MACS-1		211		8DEC66																	211			
MACS-4		250		8DEC66																	250			
MATCU-65		46		8DEC66																	46			
M&BS-5		173		8DEC66																	173			
		1																						
<b>MMSG-30</b>																								
H&MS-30		482	3	8DEC66																	482	3		
HMPT-301		242	1	8DEC66																	242	1		
HMPT-302	2																							
VMO-5																								
<b>MAG-33</b>																								
H&MS-33		499	1	8DEC66																	499	1		
M&BS-33		487	2	8DEC66																	487	2		
VHFA-122		313	1	19SEP66																	313	1		
VHJ-334		174	1	8DEC66																	174	1		
VHJY-3		223	1	8DEC66																	223	1		
<b>MMSG-37</b>																								
H&MS-37		439		8DEC66																	439			
M&BS-37		702	133	8DEC66																	702	133		
M&BS-37		401	1	8DEC66																	401	1		
BHM-463		182	1	1DEC66																	182	1		
BHM-364																								
BHM-462		8		8DEC66																	8			
VHQR-352		362	4	8DEC66																	362	4		
VMO-3	6	216	3	1DEC66																		216	3	
<b>1ST MAR BRIG AIR</b>																								
H&MS, 1ST MAR BRIG		107		1DEC66																	107			
MACS-2		184		8DEC66																	184			
MATCU-70		30		18NOV66																	30			
VMP(AW)-212		157		8DEC66																	157			
USMC		23,943			6,230		6,462		218				1,017		2,049		549		6,982		436			
USN		893			159		163		4				12		380		0		168		7			
<b>AVIATION TOTAL</b>		<b>24,836</b>			<b>6,389</b>		<b>6,625</b>		<b>222</b>				<b>1,029</b>		<b>2,429</b>		<b>549</b>		<b>7,150</b>		<b>443</b>			

## RECAPITULATION OF PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION

		ASSIGNED STRENGTH	DANANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	OTHER RVN	OKINAMA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
<b>GROUND TOTAL</b>	USMC	66,409	25,631	11,299	13,411	130	8,715	0	2,852	1,954	2,417
	USN	3,361	1,209	842	681	6	252	0	120	156	95
<b>AVIATION TOTAL</b>	USMC	23,943	6,230	6,625	218		1,017	2,049	549	6,982	436
	USN	893	159	163	4		12	380	0	168	7
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	USMC	90,352	31,861	17,761	13,629	130	9,732	2,049	3,401	8,936	2,853
	USN	4,254	1,368	1,005	685	6	264	380	120	324	102

**NOTES:**

1. NOT ACTIVATED
2. PARTIALLY ACTIVATED
3. FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLF. TOTAL INCLUDES ALL ATTACHED UNITS
4. UNITS LOCATED AT LONG HA
5. FIGURE IN "OTHER RVN" AT VARIOUS RVN LOCATIONS
6. FIGURES IN "OTHER" ENROUTE TO RVN

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATIONS ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLECT DAY-TO-DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN REPORTING PERIODS.

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*The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points this device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.*

